Estimation of strategies in a markov game

In this paper a two-person Markov game, in discrete time, and with perfect state information, is considered from the point of view of a single player (player A) only. It is assumed that A's opponent (player B) uses the same strategy every time the game is played. It is shown that A can obtain a consistent estimate of B's strategy on the basis of his past experience of playing the game with B. Two methods of deriving such an estimate are given. Further, it is shown that using one of these estimates A can construct a strategy for himself which is asymptotically optimal. A simple example of a game in which the above method may be useful is given.     

Optimal strategies in a game of economic survival

The games of economic survival introduced by Shubik and Thompson seem tailor-made for the analysis of some problems in insurance and have found many applications in this industry. The optimal strategy in such games may be a so-called “band strategy.” This result seems counter-intuitive and has caused some puzzlement. This paper gives sufficient conditions so that the optimal strategy will be of a simpler form, and it is argued that these conditions are satisfied in most applications to insurance.     

The matrix game derived from the many-against-many battle

The many-against-many battle, which is a variant of the Friedman's one-against-many battle, is formulated as a two-person constant-sum game. It is shown that the matrix which expresses this game has a saddle point. Some cases are presented in which the payoff matrix of the game can be reduced. Finally, some parametrically special cases are analyzed.     

An infiltration game on k arcs

An infiltrator, starting at a safe base, tries to pass, undetected by a guard and within a time limit, along one of k nonintersecting arcs to a safe destination. Optimal strategies and the value are obtained for this discrete zero-sum search-evasion game.     

美国空间攻防对抗概念体系下的空间武器平台

首先指出空间武器平台在未来空间攻防对抗中占有极其重要的位置;然后对美国的研究现状及趋势进行了系统的总结,重点分析了3种子平台的性能参数和作战方式,这3种子平台包括:空间机动飞行器(SMV)、模块插入级(M IS)和通用航空飞行器(CAV);最后给出了美国空间攻防对抗概念体系下的空间武器平台的构成。     

A search game with a protector

A classic problem in Search Theory is one in which a searcher allocates resources to the points of the integer interval [1, n] in an attempt to find an object which has been hidden in them using a known probability function. In this paper we consider a modification of this problem in which there is a protector who can also allocate resources to the points; allocating these resources makes it more difficult for the searcher to find an object. We model the situation as a two‐person non‐zero‐sum game so that we can take into account the fact that using resources can be costly. It is shown that this game has a unique Nash equilibrium when the searcher's probability of finding an object located at point i is of the form (1 − exp (−λ_ix_i)) exp (−μ_iy_i) when the searcher and protector allocate resources x_i and y_i respectively to point i. An algorithm to find this Nash equilibrium is given. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 47:85–96, 2000     

The discrete evasion game with three-move lag

The discrete evasion game with three-move lag, formulated over 30 years ago, was one of the earliest games with time-lag complications. This game remains unsolved even though it is well known that the game has a value. In this article we obtain an upper bound for the value by constructing a strategy which consists of 400 conditional probabilities for the minimizing player. This is believed to be the best upper bound known.     

A one-dimensional helicopter-submarine game

The article considers a two-person zero-sum game in which a searcher with b bombs wishes to destroy a mobile hider. The players are restricted to move on a straight line with maximum speeds v and u satisfying v > u > 0; neither player can see the other but each knows the other's initial position. The bombs all have destructive radius R and there is a time lag T between the release of a bomb and the bomb exploding. The searcher gets 1 unit if the hider is destroyed and 0 if he survives. A solution is given for b = 1, and extended to b > 1 when the time lag is small. Various applications of the game are discussed.     

A one-dimensional infiltration game

Minimax strategies are obtained for an infiltration game in which one player must move through a one-dimensional interval defended by the other player.     

On the inspection game

The Inspection Game is a multistage game between a customs inspector and a smuggler, first studied by Melvin Dresher and Michael Maschler in the 1960s. An extension allowing the smuggler to act more than once, treated by Sakaguchi in a special case, is solved. Also, a more natural version of Sakaguchi's problem is solved in the special case where the smuggler may act at each stage. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 45: 327–334, 1998     

A search game on the union of graphs with immobile hider

We consider a search game for an immobile hider on one arc of the union of n graphs joined at one or two points. We evaluate a lower bound on the value of a strategy for the hider on this union. When we have identical graphs, we give the conditions under which the value of the strategy for the hider on this union is greater than or equal to n times the value of this strategy on one graph. We also solve search games on graphs, consisting of an odd number of arcs, each of length one, joining two points. © 1995 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

未来战争模式及对策浅议

未来战争呈现大纵深、立体化作战空间,快速到达、全天候的作战行动,高度发达的信息获取、控制、使用技术使战场趋于透明化,自动化、网络化、智能化的指挥系统,屈人而不夺人的军事胜利的基本特征;针对新一代战争提出了对策建议。     

A continuous game of ambush

The article considers a two-person competitive problem in which a traveller wishes to choose a path across a rectangle from left to right in such a way as to avoid being ambushed by his adversary who has placed obstacles within the rectangle. Our results supplement those that have already been obtained by Ruckle and they indicate that, under certain conditions, the players need to adopt rather sophisticated strategies if they are to act optimally. This suggests that a complete solution to the problem could be difficult.     

Discretization of the continuous ambush game

This article further considers the two‐person continuous ambush game introduced by Ruckle. This article extends the work of Ruckle, Baston and Bostock, and Lee by considering the game for a general number of barriers. By supplanting optimal strategies from a discretized version of the game, we show that there always exists a value for the game, which, furthermore, can be found using linear programming techniques. Further to this, we show that the discrete ambush game considered by Garnaev has the same value as a continuous game, allowing many new results to be obtained in both games. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 50: 515–529, 2003     

具有模糊偏好认知矩阵的超对策稳定性分析

针对一类具有模糊偏好认知矩阵的超对策问题,给出了具体的稳定性分析方法。基于相对模糊距离的概念和模糊有序加权平均(FOWA)算子提出了三角模糊互补判断矩阵的一种排序方法。由此方法得到局中人的结局偏好认知向量,进而给出了一阶超对策的稳定性分析过程。最后,以实际冲突为例说明这一方法。     

A fast infiltration game on n arcs

Starting from a safe base, an Infiltrator tries to reach a sensitive zone within a given time limit without being detected by a Guard. The Infiltrator can move with speed at most u, while the Guard can only perform a restricted number of searches. A discrete variant of this zero-sum game played on a graph consisting of two vertices joined by n nonintersecting arcs is investigated. Optimal strategies and an explicit expression for its value are obtained. © 1996 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

A game theory approach to logistics allocation

A simple model containing elements common to all logistics pipeline allocations is presented. This model is based on a two-sided game.     

A remark on a helicopter and submarine game

The article considers a two-person zero-sum game in which the movement of the players is constrained to integer points …, −1, 0, 1, … of a line L. Initially the searcher (hider) is at point x = 0 (x = d, d > 0). The searcher and the hider perform simple motion on L with maximum speeds w and u, respectively, where w > u > 0. Each of the players knows the other's initial position but not the other's subsequent positions. The searcher has a bomb which he can drop at any time during his search. Between the dropping of the bomb and the bomb exploding there is a T time lag. If the bomb explodes at point i and the hider is at point i − 1, or i, or i + 1, then the destruction probability is equal to P, or 1, or P, respectively, where 0 < P < 1. d, w, u, and T are integer constants. The searcher can drop the bomb at integer moments of time t = 0, 1, … . The aim of the searcher is to maximize the probability of the destruction of the hider. © 1993 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

A remark on the customs and smuggler game

Baston and Bostock formulated a zero-sum game of exhaustion modeling the problem of Customs trying to stop a Smuggler attempting to ship a cargo of perishable contraband across a strait, when Customs has n speedboats for patrolling. Thomas and Nisgav solved this problem for one speedboat. Baston and Bostock investigated it for two speedboats. This article addresses the solution of the three-boat variant of the Customs and Smuggler game. © 1994 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.