The danger of “hybrid warfare” from a sophisticated adversary: the Russian “hybridity” in the Ukrainian conflict

The term “hybrid warfare” is a new one that the West began to use to explain its failure to cope with asymmetric threats. Focusing on the war on global terrorism, the West temporarily withdrew its attention from traditional adversaries, such as Russia, which has used this gap and has audaciously returned to the stage as a global actor. Until the Russian annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014 and inflaming the Ukrainian crisis, most Western authors attributed “hybrid threats” mostly to non-state actors. But the Ukrainian scenario showed the true face of “hybridity” in the modern battlefield when practised by a powerful state actor. Russian “hybrid warfare” in Ukraine has already been seen as a combination of conventional and unconventional methods, that have been complemented with other instruments of national power – diplomatic, economic and information. The purpose of this article is, through an analysis of the Ukrainian scenario, to demonstrate that although the term “hybrid” is new, the concept itself is old and is a continuation of already seen doctrine from the Cold War era. Although “hybrid threats” can come both from state and non-state actors, the Russian interference in Ukraine is proof that they are especially dangerous for the West if, or when, they are initiated from a traditional, sophisticated adversary that has the capacity to use all forms of warfare.     

War,vagueness and hybrid war

It has frequently been observed in the literature on hybrid wars that there is a grey zone between peace and war, and that hybrid wars are conflicts which are not clear cases of war. In this paper, I attempt to illuminate this grey zone and the concept and nature of war from the philosophical discussions of vagueness and institutional facts. Vague terms are characterized by the fact that there is no non-arbitrary boundary between entities which lie in their extension, and entities which do not lie in their extension. I apply a theory of vagueness to notions such as “war” and “peace” and go on to suggest that the exact boundary for what counts as a war or not is arbitrary. However, the context in which the conflict occurs determines a range of possible locations for this boundary. The most important contextual parameter is in this respect how the parties to the conflict themselves conceptualize the conflict. I suggest that this can in various ways help us understand grey-zone conflicts.     

Egypt: new government,old challenges

The new government in Egypt will have to deal with the following challenges in its foreign policy: the Palestinians, Sinai, the arms race between Israel and Egypt, the nuclear issue, the Suez Canal, and the Tiran Straits. Egypt has to decide what its approach would be toward these issues and as to how to maneuver between its own interests and those of other states such as Israel and the USA. All the sides have to consider their steps carefully in order to avoid an unnecessary crisis.     

Jacques Maritain: Christian Theorist of Non-Violence and Just War

Jacques Maritain (1882–1973) is widely recognized as one of the foremost Catholic philosophers of modern times. He wrote groundbreaking works in all branches of philosophy. For a period of about 10 years, beginning in 1933, he discussed matters relating to war and ethics. Writing initially about Gandhi, whose strategy of non-violence he sought to incorporate within a Christian conception of political action, Maritain proceeded to comment more specifically on the religious aspects of armed force in “On Holy War,” an essay about the civil war then ongoing in Spain (1936–1939). After the outbreak of World War II in September 1939, Maritain penned a series of essays that sought to explain why the Anglo–French declarations of war were warranted on Christian just war principles. While the secondary literature on Maritain’s thought is extensive, thus far there has been little systematic exploration of his writings on war. In what follows I seek to remedy this lacuna, by examining how he conceptualized just war in the three phases outlined above.     

The Normative Implications of “Knowing the Future” for Preventive War

What if claims about the future informed us about the intentions and the capabilities of our opponents to wage war against ourselves? Would and should the existing norms that restrict the preventive use of force change in the wake of such transformation? This article highlights the potential normative consequences of this change and discriminates between several possible normative evolutions. Would and should the “knowability of the future” alter radically the traditional rule of self-defense? This rule could indeed be jeopardized but, as I argue in this paper, it should not (and might not necessarily). However, the distinction between preemption and prevention could become obsolete. Future claims about security will also induce new security doctrines as knowledge about the future would be used to signal one’s intentions and deter one’s opponent. This change would also have a significant impact on accountability, as citizens would have a more active role in discussions over foreign policy. Moreover, new modes of predictions and forecasting will challenge the traditional role of experts whose biases have hampered their analyses and anticipations. Thus, trustworthy future claims could bring significant progress in both ethical and political terms as they would trigger a debate on the role of knowledge in democratic societies.     

Nuclear deterrence and cyber warfare: coexistence or competition?

Nuclear deterrence and cyber war seem almost antithetical in their respective intellectual pedigrees. Nuclear weapons are unique in their ability to create mass destruction in a short time. Information or “cyber” weapons, at least for the most part, aim at sowing confusion or mass disruption instead of widespread physical destruction. Nevertheless, there are some intersections between cyber and nuclear matters, and these have the potential to become troublesome for the future of nuclear deterrence. For example, cyber attacks might complicate the management of a nuclear crisis. As well, information attacks on command-control and communications systems might lead to a mistaken nuclear launch based on false warnings, to erroneous interpretations of data or to panic on account of feared information blackout. It is not inconceivable that future nuclear strike planning will include a preliminary wave of cyber strikes or at least a more protracted “preparation of the battlefield” by roaming through enemy networks to plant malware or map vulnerabilities.     

Chief of staff in quest of a war: Moshe Dayan leads Israel into war

That Dayan was a central figure in Israel's formative years during the 1950s is beyond dispute. His star blazed particularly bright in the Sinai War of October‐November 1956. However, the roots of Dayan's extraordinary influence are to found in the period leading up to the Sinai War rather than in the war itself.

It is impossible to understand the Sinai War, particularly its Israeli aspect, without understanding the central role played by the army and its chief in the preparations and in lobbying for its execution. For the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), the idea of an Israeli‐initiated war was neither a theoretical or a practical surprise. The IDF was prepared to launch an offensive against Egypt, and that fact was of major importance far beyond the Israeli government's decision to launch a war against Egypt.

It was Dayan who ensured full coordination between progress in the military preparations and progress in the diplomatic process (the negotiations with France and Britain), as he himself was at the center of events in both spheres of activity.     

A Typology of War Ethics

Interdisciplinary communication on war is impeded by doctrinal gaps concerning its morality, immorality, and amorality. Much is written on ad bellum ethical standards for military force by states, mainly in the fields of international politics and religious studies. However, a necessary first step in comparing these different approaches to war ethics with each other is to develop a system for classifying them. The classification system offered in this paper places war ethics on a grid with two scales. One axis of the grid ranges from permissiveness to restrictiveness. The other axis ranges from regard for self to regard for others. Twelve forms of war ethics are assigned points within the grid, including pacifism, just war, holy war, UN Charter obligations, several variants of realism, cost–benefit analysis, isolationism, and various ideological war ethics such as communist and fascist approaches. In doing so, this paper lays the groundwork for “quantifying” war ethics, to enable measurements of their effects against other state-level characteristics and outcomes of interaction.     

伊犁哈萨克族“民考民”和“民考汉”中学生语言文字使用情况调研--以特克斯县初级中学为个案

新疆推行民汉合校后，少数民族学生的语言使用情况一直是双语教育领域关注的问题。本文通过问卷调查和访谈的方式，以特克斯县初级中学为个案，考察了伊犁地区哈萨克族“民考民”及“民考汉”中学生语言使用情况。结果表明，哈萨克族“民考汉”和“民考民”学生在语言文字使用、语言态度以及语言文化认同上有较大差异，但也有一致性：希望在熟练地掌握汉语的同时，也能掌握好自己的本民族语言。最后基于提高新疆少数民族基础教育水平和培养民汉兼通人才的目的提出对策。     

Is Britain a force for good? Investigating British citizens’ narrative understanding of war

It is commonly assumed in the foreign policy literature that narratives are uniquely persuasive and thus integral to obtaining public support for war. Yet, empirical research on “strategic narrative” is often vague on both the concept of narrative and how it persuades. Moreover, the stories publics use to interpret war are rarely examined. This paper offers a novel approach to studying “from the ground up” the war stories of individual British citizens. It examines public interpretations of war through emplotment: the way people select and link events to create a coherent story. Examining the wars people include and those they silence, it illustrates how a diverse range of citizens morally evaluates Britain’s military role, be it as a Force for Good, a Force for Ill or a country Learning from its Mistakes. In doing so, the paper offers an alternative methodological approach to studying how individual citizens understand war.     

Aligning national “logics” in a European military helicopter program

This article analyzes the public side of the NH90 network consisting of four participating countries (Germany, France, Italy, and the Netherlands) and their industrial partners. Comparable to observations in earlier international projects in the defense sector, the development and production of the NH90 defense helicopter did not match original plans and costs estimates. On the basis of four mechanisms that were intended to facilitate the cooperation between the partnering countries (the General Memorandum of Understanding; coalition formation; the role of the central agency; and the process of vertical escalation) the question is posed whether or not there was a true alignment of national interests and “logics.” The lack of standardization, as well as program delays and issues concerning the division of the work-share, lead to the emerging alignment being characterized as “quasi-alignment” at best.     

How not to pay for the war

As a result of allied subsidy and the influence of sunk costs, the marginal cost of the Gulf War to the US was reduced to negligible size. This result is at variance with the Olson‐Zeckhauser thesis that in an alliance “the small exploit the large.” A game theoretic alternative explanation suggests that the relation between allies resembles the game of Chicken, successfully played by the US. The ability to shift the marginal costs of war in the short term raises questions about the possible underestimation of long term effects.     

“What is dear to you?” Survey of beliefs regarding protection of critical infrastructure against terrorism

Up to the present, there is only very little research on how the population perceives terrorism and its threats, even though support from the population is crucial for effective counterterrorism. By eliciting beliefs and subjecting them to content analyses, six factors were found that determine the protection worthiness of a target in the people's view: the potential damage to “people,” “symbolism,” “economy,” “politics,” “nature,” and “image/publicity.” These empirically found factors are in line with factors specified by terrorist target selection models. They differ in the strength of their cognitive representation among participants and, thus, their subjective importance to the people. The first three factors are shared among all participants, whereas the latter ones could only be found in a part of the participant sample. People's judgments of the targets' protection worthiness differ substantially from their judgments of the targets' attractiveness to terrorists, even though the same factors seem to be involved. This study offers an insight into the people's mental model about protection worthiness of targets. Together with classical risk analysis and knowledge about terrorists, these results can form a basis for setting up a holistic scheme for critical infrastructure protection.     

俄罗斯应对导航战举措

卫星导航系统作为重要的战场传感器,已经成为现代战争不可或缺的重要组成部分,围绕卫星导航系统的攻防博弈由此兴起。针对美国首先提出的导航战概念,俄罗斯为进一步提升导航战作战实力,有针对性地采取了应对举措。文章介绍了导航战概念及相关作战案例,具体分析了俄罗斯应对导航战威胁的主要举措,并结合美俄围绕导航战开展的攻防博弈,得出掌握现代战争制导航权的改进方向。     

Reconciling strategic studies … with itself: a common framework for choosing among strategies

Three distinct, and seemingly irreconcilable, schools of thought are identified within the strategic studies literature. One which searches for “universal principles of war,” a second, “context-dependent,” approach that seeks to embed each instance of warfare within its concurrent social, political, technological milieu and, finally a “paradoxical logic” school, which equates strategy with the generation of uncertainty. The author offers some intuitive concepts from non-cooperative game theory to develop a “dominate-mix” approach to strategy choice. In doing so, he helps to reconcile these disparate approaches and provides a simple framework to assist researchers in framing military decisions as well as to assist planners in choosing among strategies.     

What Goes Up Must Come Down: Military Expenditure and Civil Wars

Abstract

This paper examines the impact of civil war on military expenditure. We employ two measures of military expenditure: the share of military expenditure in general government expenditure and the logarithm of military expenditures. We would reasonably expect a priori that military expenditure as a share of general government expenditure increases during a civil war and that such increases would taper off over the duration of a civil war. We also explore whether the termination of a civil war induces a decline in the share of military expenditure as a share of the general government expenditure in the short-run. We find evidence the of share of military expenditure increases during a civil war and falls in the year succeeding the end of a civil war, and, in particular, if a war ends in a peace treaty. The level of military expenditures, however, rises during civil wars and does not appear to decline in the short-term after the end of a civil war.     

How Is a Man to Decide? Unjust Combatants,Duress and McMahan’s Killing in War

Jeff McMahan’s much-discussed work Killing in War is an important part of the revisionist school of just war studies. This paper avoids discussion of McMahan’s use of human rights and examines the practical consequences of his argument about duress on soldiers to fight an unjust war. These arguments are found to be wanting and to be impractical ones that do not fit battlefield realities. The importance of the Law of Armed Conflict and the legal equality of combatants that is part of it is emphasised and accepted as the most practical way of regulating battlefield behaviour and saving lives. It is concluded that attempts to tell soldiers what to do when they may be fighting an unjust war add to their burdens and are misplaced.     

THE CONCEPT OF NUCLEAR LEARNING

This article seeks to elucidate the concept of nuclear learning. It explores both the “nuclear” and the “learning” aspects of the concept. On the nuclear side, it distinguishes between learning basic facts about nuclear arms and drawing inferences about the larger implications of those facts. On the learning side, it discusses three issues: whether to use the term in a normative or value-neutral manner; the difference between learning that leads to a change in means versus learning that leads to a re-evaluation of ends; and whether learning only takes place at the level of individuals or whether there can also be learning by collective entities. The article argues there is no universal best answer to these questions and that the particular concept of learning that should be employed depends on the goals of the analyst. If the goal is to reduce the chances of nuclear war, however, one type of learning that will be important to consider is whether there is shared, cross-national learning.