Multilateral Counter-Insurgency Networks

Postmodern terrorism presents a significant challenge to global security and law enforcement institutions. Non-state actors operating across international borders, engaged in an apparent global insurgency of extremism that transects the traditional boundaries of crime and war, pose significant challenges to both intelligence and law enforcement agencies. These networked global insurgents blend political and religious fanaticism with criminal enterprises to challenge the rule of law and pose an epochal shift in the structures and relations among states. Negotiating this epochal shift requires traditional organs of national security (the diplomatic, military and intelligence services) to forge new partnerships with police and public safety organizations at the state and local (sub-national), as well as transnational levels. Significant operational, policy and cultural challenges must be overcome to forge an effective multi-lateral global network to counter global terrorism and insurgency.     

Boko Haram insurgency in Northern Nigeria and the vicious cycle of internal insecurity

The phenomenon of the Boko Haram insurgency in Northern Nigeria has generated many security concerns. This article explores the implications of the Boko Haram insurgency in Northern Nigeria for internal security. The article, which relies on a study of secondary sources of data, reveals that the insurgency has spawned varied implications such as an international image crisis, huge economic losses, a health and humanitarian crisis, a huge burden on the security apparatuses, arms proliferation, and endangered national unity. It holds that the insurgency is essentially interlinked with a breakdown of the social contract manifested in opportunistic behavior, economic stagnation, and lack of functioning institutional mechanisms for policy conduct and conflict resolution. Owing to the security menace posed by the insurgency, the article recommends that the root causes of the insurgency should be tackled rather than relying on reactive measures that cannot guarantee enduring peace and internal security.     

The Fallujah awakening: a case study in counter-insurgency

The successful pacification of Fallujah in 2007 during the Anbar Awakening movement was due to the coordinated efforts of US and Iraqi forces to physically and psychologically separate the people from the insurgency. Efforts along security, political, and development lines along with a robust tribal effort eliminated the armed insurgency and set the basis for victory in the area. But a synchronized delivery of these resources was insufficient to defeat the insurgency by itself absent the population's decision to turn against the insurgents. This process began to occur in 2006 and was successfully capitalized upon by Coalition Forces in Fallujah in 2007.     

Population-centric counterinsurgency and the movement of peoples

The theory of population-centric counterinsurgency rests upon the untenable premise that the population within a theater of operations is fixed in place. By showing that people tend to move away from contested rural areas towards the relative safety and prosperity of counterinsurgent-controlled areas, this article demonstrates that this crucial premise is empirically false. Furthermore, a theory of counterinsurgent resource deployment, population movement, and incumbent strategic ineffectiveness is presented. Ultimately, the application of counterinsurgency resources actually dislocates the population from their place of residence and causes them to move into cities. When the urban areas' ability to absorb newcomers is overwhelmed, localized negative externalities emerge and can give rise to crime and insecurity. Such increased insecurity then creates an incentive for the counterinsurgency to retrench its resource use into the cities. As more physical territory is conceded to the insurgency, the relative strategic effectiveness of the counterinsurgency declines.     

The origin of internal security in Colombia: Part I — A CIA special team surveys La Violencia, 1959–60

In October 1959 the Eisenhower administration dispatched a CIA Special Team to survey the violence problem in Colombia. This article, part one of a two‐part series, examines this first significant attempt by a US administration to influence that nation's internal security situation. It investigates the Special Team's actions and analyses its recommendations for transforming Colombia's conventionally‐orientated security forces. The Team's survey, which focuses on counter‐insurgency tactics, civil action, intelligence operations, psychological warfare, and covert action, is the foundation from which Colombia's modern internal security structures are derived.     

The Maoist insurgency in India: between crime and revolution

Since 2004, the Indian government has described the country's Maoist insurgency as a grave threat to domestic security. A study of the sustaining dynamics behind Maoist violence suggests that the rebels are growing operationally stronger due to profits derived from organized crime. Having built up a parasitic economy that operates within the boundaries of nominal state control, they are proceeding to undermine that same control. In effect, the Maoists have assumed characteristics of a Mafia group. With India's economic growth having surged in recent years, their ability to finance aggressive operations and consolidate their subversive infrastructure has increased correspondingly.     

Military intelligence and the war in Dhofar: An appraisal

This article examines the role military intelligence played in the Dhofar campaign between 1970 and 1976. Drawing on an array of sources, it examines not only the crucial role played by military intelligence in prosecuting a successful operational campaign against a Marxist inspired insurgency, but equally, the importance that intelligence played in consolidating the Al Bu Said dynasty when across Oman and Dhofar itself, the material benefits to be had from the discovery and production of oil had yet to be realised.     

Schlock and Blah: Counter-insurgency Realities in a Rapid Dominance Era

This article examines the concept of ‘shock and awe’ in US military thought. It argues that the term derives from two main sources in defense thinking: rapidity in operations and overwhelming military superiority and is reflected in the concept of ‘full spectrum dominance’. However, the concept is not well attuned to fighting net-based counter insurgency war in a terrain such as Iraq which depends upon both intelligence gathering and adaptive military organizations. The article concludes that US military thinking should be more attuned to the effects of military force especially on political processes and the capacity of insurgents to mobilize popular support.     

Counter-Insurgency in Pakistan: The Role of Legitimacy

The Pakistani security forces have won their fight against the insurgency of the Pakistani Taliban, though terrorism will remain a serious problem for the foreseeable future. Victory was won not chiefly on the basis of new tactics, but of the recovery of legitimacy for the campaign among the population and the armed forces. This occurred when the war came to be seen as one waged not in the interests of the USA, but for the defence of Pakistan. In Balochistan, the nationalist insurgency has been different from and weaker than that of the Taliban—but may prove longer lasting. Military tactics in Balochistan have closely resembled those of the British Raj, and have been based with some success on fomenting tribal divisions and co-opting tribal elites.     

Thailand and the Insurgency in the South

The insurgency in southern Thailand has proven to be intractable over the last few years. The insurgents, who comprise several different groups, have largely retained the initiative in a series of relatively unsophisticated operations. Although involving ethnic Malay Muslims – and marked by an increasingly strong Islamist ideology – the insurgency has been predominantly ethnic rather than religious. External jihadist involvement has been minimal at best. The recent coup in Thailand may improve the odds of reaching some form of accommodation with the southern insurgents; but it is likely that the south will remain a continuing security problem for Bangkok.     

Capitalism & the “new wars”: free markets and societal insecurity before and after the cold war, 1970–2013

Critics of globalisation suggest that growing free-market conditions generate anomie, leading ultimately to what some term ‘new wars’ and new insecurities. Others argue that liberal economies dissuade violence since people gain from peace. This study argues for a micro perspective that views predatory economic policies driving higher investment in rebellion-specific capital, such as shadow economic activity that easily translates into insurgency in weak-state settings. Investment in the shadows determines survivability against superior state forces, and survivability determines rebellion, by definition. Using civil war onset data from 1970 to 2013, as well as the Global Peace Index (GPI) and several of its individual components, which capture societal insecurity above and beyond the absence of armed violence, this study finds that countries that are more capitalistic have a lower risk of civil war and societal insecurity. The results are robust to alternative models, testing methods, and uphold when examining several relevant subcomponents of the index, such as internal conflict, violent crime, homicides, ease of access to small arms, and political instability. Surprisingly, democracy tends not to be associated with peace but associates with increased criminality whereas strong autocracy reduces it, suggesting that capitalism, more than democracy, associates with conditions favourable to societal security, independently of a country’s level of development.     

British counterinsurgency in Brunei and Sarawak, 1962–1963: developing best practices in the shadow of Malaya

This paper uses recently-released material from the ‘migrated archives’ to provide an original counterinsurgency analysis of the TNKU revolt in Brunei and Sarawak from December 1962 to May 1963. It argues that, despite a failure to act upon intelligence predicting the outbreak of insurgency, Britain developed a highly effective counterinsurgency organisation. These records also indicate that decision-makers drew inspiration from the Malayan Emergency to inform success in Brunei. Although Malaya has been challenged as a counterinsurgency paradigm, the Brunei operations show the utility of striking a balance between inappropriately copying from past campaigns and developing best practices applicable to the unique environment of Borneo. In turn, the evolution of effective operational practices in Brunei informed their successful application to the subsequent Indonesian Confrontation.     

The March of the Lord's Resistance Army: Greed or Grievance in Northern Uganda?

This article addresses the form and nature of an insurgency in Northern Uganda that has been active since the mid-1980s. The insurgency movement itself grew out of an internal breakdown in security lasting over several years, during which ethnicity played a critical part in defining access to power and resources within Uganda. The recent explosion of literature relating to conflict inside Sub-Saharan Africa outlines several different analytical approaches to violence. One of the most recent and influential has been that of examining greed rather than grievance as the main driver behind conflict. This articl looks at the evolution of warfare in Northern Uganda over 15 years and puts the argument that greed and grievance are not mutually exclusive in this situation and it is the interaction between the two that provides the impetus for continued violence.     

Whose Hearts and Whose Minds? The Curious Case of Global Counter-Insurgency

Traditionally regarded as a secondary activity in military thinking and practice, the notion of counter-insurgency (COIN) has undergone a remarkable renaissance. This analysis traces the origins of this renaissance to two distinctive schools: a neo-classical school and a global insurgency school. The global insurgency school critiques neo-classical thought and presents itself as a more sophisticated appreciation of current security problems. An examination of the evolution of these two schools of counter-insurgency reveals how the interplay between them ultimately leaves us with a confused and contradictory understanding of the phenomenon of insurgency and the policies and strategies necessary to combat it.     

The unnecessary uprising: Jeju Island rebellion and South Korean counterinsurgency experience 1947–48

This paper systematically analyzes the causes of the escalation of violence during the initial stages of the Jeju Island Rebellion and the failure of South Korean counterinsurgency operations. It is argued that four interrelated factors provided the conditions for armed insurgency in the small island of Jeju: inter-agency tension between the Korean National Police (KNP) and the Korean Constabulary; the mainlanders' misinterpretation of the insurgency; the effect of systematic police brutality; and the role of youth groups. Consequently, two counterinsurgency lessons will be drawn from this study: that inter-agency cooperation and coordination at the tactical level between security branches and the incorporation of local population at the micro-level is essential in conducting efficient and effective counterinsurgency operations.     

Urban Insurgency

Urban insurgency has generally been presented by analysts and security force personnel as a distinct variant. In contrast, insurgents themselves have often recognized the particular requirements of two dissimilar but related approaches of operation, the urban and rural. Hence they have sought to field approaches and doctrine that exploited the specifics of each. In some cases, simply debating such has led to internal fractures that could not be overcome. More often there has been a deadly rural-urban synthesis that has increasingly challenged security forces.     

The vanguard's dilemma: understanding and exploiting insurgent strategies

The purpose of this paper is to provide a better conceptualization of insurgent strategies. Specifically, I shall examine Che Guevara's ‘Foco’ theory of insurgency, as it is one of the most theoretically popular and most pervasive strategies of insurgency currently practiced throughout the world. After briefly examining the origins, objectives, and theoretical strengths of the Foco theory (also known as the Vanguard Theory), I will argue that Guevara's theory suffers from an internal tension that I term the ‘Vanguard's Dilemma’. The significance of this dilemma creates a tension within the Vanguard Theory that can be fatal for insurgents if properly exploited by counterinsurgent operations. This paper will examine in detail this dilemma and show how it can be exploited. Given that several insurgent groups within Iraq and Afghanistan currently adhere to the Vanguard Theory of insurgency, a proper understanding of this insurgent strategy is an essential first step in the long road towards confronting and winning asymmetrical conflicts.     

Brinkmanship,not COIN,in Pakistan’s post-9/11 Internal War

Politics is critical to making sense of Pakistani successes and failures in dealing with non-state armed groups. This includes domestic political currents; regional political currents; and the global impetus of the post-9/11 era. How these currents overlap renders to any reading of insurgency in Pakistan real complexity. This article engages with this complexity rather than shirking from it. Its hypothesis is that while the insurgency bordering Afghanistan has been an epicentre of Pakistani military efforts to fight the Taliban, this theatre is in of itself insufficiently inclusive to grasp the nature of Pakistan’s security challenges and its consequent responses.     

Boko Haram’s increasingly sophisticated military threat

ABSTRACT

This paper evaluates Boko Haram’s military capabilities and details the process of how its standing army, driven by these capabilities, came to pose a phased threat between 2013 and 2015 in particular. This was a period when military fighting dominated the insurgency in north-east Nigeria. Whereas there is an abundance of literature on Boko Haram’s histories and the impact of its insurgency on north-east Nigeria, analysis of Boko Haram’s military campaigning is still deficient. Attempting to fill this gap, this paper uses field findings and battlefield case studies from north-east Nigeria to highlight how Boko Haram’s overt front – its standing army – came to supplant its guerrilla operations as the main security threat to the frontier area.

This pivot towards military fighting, for a group initially composed of a few ragtag combatants, on the surface might seem surprising. Yet, whereas Boko Haram may lack the popular support required for ‘people’s war’, classic insurgency theories nevertheless hold some explanatory power for this deliberate shift: away from guerrilla warfare as the expedient of the weaker side, and towards the use of a large standing army of locals to swarm, and sometimes successfully overrun, state forces.     

Transforming Mexico’s energy field: the intended consequences of a drug war

ABSTRACT

By utilizing the theory of Strategic Action Fields (SAFs), the present article explains how a new meso-level social order seems to have emerged in Mexico as a result of the paramilitarization of organized crime, militarization of security, and the opening of Mexico’s energy sector to private investment. This work describes the transformation of Mexico’s energy field after a process of major constitutional and economic changes that were the consequence of a security crisis and an agenda of energy reform for which the so-called ‘drug war’ was a key underlying foundation.