Drone Strikes and Grand Strategy: Toward a Political Understanding of the Uses of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Attacks in US Security Policy

This article analyzes the political utility of US drone strikes theoretically and deductively. Placing strikes within the context of the theorized political functions of force and considering how they fit into two grand strategies, restraint and selective engagement, I argue that these strikes buy the United States relatively little in the way of political effects assuring its own security because the terrorism threat they are intended to combat is a limited one within the skein of US global interests. Furthermore, their contribution to counter-terrorism efforts is likely to diminish with the adoption of armed drones by non-state actors. Drone strikes can, however, provide leverage over recalcitrant US client states while reassuring liberal partners and giving them some leverage over US choices. In addition, within the counter-terrorism sphere, drone strikes are less likely to inflame popular opinion than are alternative uses of force. This analysis contributes to an increasingly rigorous examination of the strikes’ role in US foreign and security policy.     

At war with social theory: Instrumental and communicative action in US military doctrine during the War on Terror

As US counterinsurgency campaigns draw to a close, doctrine for asymmetric warfare written during the War on Terror has come under heavy criticism. While many have argued that this shift to ‘winning hearts and minds’ is evidence that the United States is taking humanitarianism and nation-building seriously, others argue that a wide gap exists between US counterinsurgency doctrine and the protection of civilians afflicted by conflict. In this article, I show that the latter is true by comparing theories of instrumental and communicative action to US doctrine for operational design, stability operations, and counterinsurgency. I argue that these texts treat the people as an object to be manipulated for the achievement of pre-determined self-interested strategic goals rather than members of a community that jointly designs operations to fulfill shared objectives. However, US doctrine does contain communicative elements that, if prioritized, would better support humanitarian and state-building objectives otherwise subordinated in the War on Terror.     

Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: US Performance and the Institutional Dimension of Strategy in Afghanistan

It is not too soon to draw cautionary lessons from the inconclusive results of US performance during more than 11 years of Operation ‘Enduring Freedom’ in Afghanistan. As in Vietnam, fundamental difficulties persist in adapting enduring institutions to the requirements of strategy. At the heart of the matter is tension between the assumptions that underlie counterinsurgency as practiced in Afghanistan and organization of the US Armed Forces, State Department, and Agency for International Development. Knowledge of basic principles and necessary changes is available to answer the question, could the US have done better?     

AFRICOM: hard or soft power initiative?

The United States (US) Africa Command (AFRICOM) was launched in 2007, ostensibly to foster African security. Rather than focusing on traditional military operations, AFRICOM also embraces non-military activities such as humanitarian aid and African development. This begs the question as to what type of power (hard or soft) the US intends to wield through AFRICOM. Several US official statements have emphasised the soft power attributes of this military project. To this end, this article seeks to respond to two fundamental questions. First, is AFRICOM a soft power project? Second, how, if at all, has AFRICOM enhanced perceptions of the US in Africa? The article concludes that sceptical and negative perceptions of AFRICOM inhibit its soft-power objective of winning the hearts and minds of the African people.     

Less than Meets the Eye

Observers of United States (US) interventions have almost universally characterized the 1994 Haiti intervention as multilateral, a model for how international cooperation can achieve common security goals. A closer analysis of the intervention reveals that the planning and execution of the intervention were almost entirely unilateral and therefore cost the US few if any of the theoretical costs of coalition warfare, including interoperability and policy compromise. Mapped onto the unilateral strategy and operation of the intervention, however, was a multilateral diplomatic effort that secured United Nations Security Council authorization and provided a cover for an intervention that the US had already planned and intended to execute with or without that authorization. That the US sought a multilateral cover for an intervention that it could easily accomplish unilaterally shows the importance of two factors: A domestic audience that opposed unilateral peacekeeping but would accept using US resources as part of a broader multilateral operation, and a local population that would be more responsive to a multilateral coalition than a use of force that was perceived to be unilateral. The Haiti intervention shows that the determinants of success in operations other than war are as much political as military. When the US already has overwhelming military superiority vis-à-vis its adversary, building military coalitions becomes as much about enlisting political support as aggregating material capability.     

SPEED BUMP ON THE ROAD TO GLOBAL ZERO

The prospect of the United States continuing to reduce the size of its nuclear arsenal to “very low numbers” has raised questions in Japan and South Korea, where US extended deterrence guarantees are premised on the “nuclear umbrella.” In both countries, however, concerns focus less on numerical arsenal size than on the sufficiency of specific nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities to meet evolving threats and on the degree of broader US commitment to these alliances. This article assesses developments in US-Japan and US-South Korea relationships in response to the Obama administration's nuclear disarmament policies, focusing on how the evolutionary course of those relationships may in turn condition prospects for sustaining this US nuclear policy direction. The analysis finds that the challenges of deterrence credibility and allied reassurance are difficult and long-term, but also that US nuclear arsenal size is secondary to broader political, strategic, and military factors in meeting these challenges. The evaluation concludes that strong alliance relationships and strategic stability in East Asia can be maintained while the size of the US nuclear arsenal continues to decline, but also that deterioration of these relationships could imperil core US nuclear policy and nonproliferation objectives.     

美国创新体系军民深度融合发展特点及启示

美国具有全球最为先进的军事科技实力、军事科技创新能力和国防保障能力,美国的科技创新体系具有军民融合深度发展的特点,在军民融合创新发展上没有明显的时间滞后,是世界上军民融合科技创新体系发展最好的典型样板国家。论文梳理分析美国国防创新系统及其特点,分析美国国防科技经费预算、研究方向和项目流程,研究分析美国促进军民融合创新与发展的制度保障体系,总结美国创新体系中军民深度融合发展的特点,解析美国军民融合发展中的典型案例、各自成功的模式和主要经验,并结合我国军民融合发展的实际情况提出建议。     

In the right place at the right time: US signals intelligence relations with Scandinavia,1945–1960

This paper demonstrates that US–Scandinavian intelligence relations in general, and Signals Intelligence (Sigint) relations in particular, during the period 1945 through 1960 were more extensive and complicated than had previously been believed. Bilateral US intelligence liaison relations with nominally neutral Sweden were of particular importance in the early years of the Cold War given its geographic location adjacent to the northwestern portion of the USSR. Moreover, the importance of Sigint received from the three principal Scandinavian countries covered by this paper (Norway, Denmark, and Sweden) proved to be quite important to the US intelligence community during the early years of the Cold War, when the US Sigint infrastructure was relatively weak and stretched thin by commitments in Asia and elsewhere. This paper covers the quantity, quality, and types of intelligence information provided to the US by each of the Scandinavian nations, demonstrating that the nature of US intelligence relations with these countries changed substantially as time went by.     

REGIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON LOW NUCLEAR NUMBERS

President Barack Obama has outlined a course toward lower numbers of US nuclear weapons. Much attention has been paid to the US-Russian context, where deterrence is believed to be basically stable and conditions ripe for gradually reducing arsenals on both sides. But considerably less attention has been paid to the possible implications of lower nuclear numbers on other regions of the world and the reactions of both adversaries and US allies. If nuclear reductions are to be stabilizing and beneficial to security, reassurance and strengthened nonproliferation efforts in various regions need to accompany nuclear cuts. But the specific problems and remedies across regions vary. This article summarizes the results of a multi-author study. It concludes that regions with US allies and formal extended deterrence pledges may pose more vexing problems than those areas of the world without such close allies or commitments.     

濒海战斗舰——美国海军新型装备

美国海军称濒海战斗舰（LCS）是一种适于近海复杂水情的快速、高度机动的水面作战平台。海湾战争之后,美军为了加强水面舰艇对地攻击、加强机动性和适应削减军费的形势,濒海战舰应运而生一跃成为当今世界武器的新宠。LCS具有单体和三体两种船体,根据三种作战任务实现模块化重构。尽管发展十多年来LCS在功能设计和火力配置上远远未达到军方的要求,被人指责为＂中看不中用＂,尽管LCS的费效比一直为美国国会所诟病,然而,LCS的建造代表着美国海军作战理念的战略转型。美海军在LCS的快速灵活、续航能力、武器装备方面不断寻求最优组合,以达到其控制亚太和世界海洋权的目的。文章较为系统地介绍美国LCS崛起的原因、发展历史、战术技术性能及近期发展动态。     

Empirical analysis of the defense interdependence between Japan and the United States

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the defense interdependence between Japan and the United States (US) in the short and long run and to investigate whether Japan is a follower or a free rider of the “US” over the 1975–2009 period. Given that mutual aid between Japan and the US has been maintained, the empirical results suggest that Japanese defense has a stable relationship with US defense. Furthermore, the results reveal that Japan is not a free rider but rather a follower in the period under consideration.     

Allies with Benefits: US Effect on European Demand for Military Expenditures

This paper examines the security relationship between the US and Europe, focusing on potential spillin effects of US military expenditures on European demand for military expenditures during the early twenty-first century. The goal is to test whether or not European states view US expenditures as a complement or as a substitute to their own military expenditures. Past work in this area has found mixed results concerning the effect of US military expenditures, but focus strictly on the spillins within a formal alliance, specifically NATO, and use a time series dominated by Cold War dynamics. This study differentiates itself by accounting for both US total military expenditures and its regional expenditures through incorporation of US military base and personnel deployments across Europe. Additionally, this paper uses government revenue in its estimation to mitigate potential endogeneity. Findings using Arellano–Bond dynamic panel analysis suggest that there is a strong probability of substitution among European states.     

Nuclear Weapons and the Vietnam War

This article analyzes why US leaders did not use nuclear weapons during the Vietnam War. To date, there has been no systematic study of US decision-making on nuclear weapons during this war. This article offers an initial analysis, focusing on the Johnson and Nixon administrations. Although US leaders did not come close to using nuclear weapons in the conflict, nuclear options received more attention than has previously been appreciated. Johnson's advisers raised the issue of nuclear weapons and threats on several occasions, and Henry Kissinger, Nixon's national security adviser, looked into nuclear options to bring the war to an end. Ultimately, however, both administrations privately rejected such options. The conventional explanation for the non-use of nuclear weapons during the Cold War – deterrence – is insufficient to explain the Vietnam case. This article analyzes the role of military, political and normative considerations in restraining US use of nuclear weapons in the Vietnam War. It argues that while military and political considerations, including escalation concerns, are part of the explanation, a taboo against the use of nuclear weapons played a critical role.     

Strategic “defensivism” and post-reset blues: US–Russian nuclear arms reductions,missile defenses and minimum deterrence

US nuclear deterrence and arms control policy may be moving, by design and by inadvertence, toward a posture of strategic “defensivism”. Strategic “defensivism” emphasizes the overlapping and reinforcing impact of: (1) reductions in US, Russian and possibly other strategic nuclear forces, possibly down to the level of “minimum deterrence,” (2) deployment of improved strategic and/or theater antimissile defenses for the US, NATO allies and other partners; and (3) additional reliance on conventional military forces for some missions hitherto preferentially assigned to nuclear weapons. This article deals with the first two of these aspects only: the interaction between missile defenses and offensive force reductions in US–Russian strategy and policy. The findings are that stable deterrence as between the USA and Russia is possible at lower than New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty levels, but reductions below 1000 deployed long-range weapons for each state, toward a true minimum deterrent posture, will require multilateral as opposed to bilateral coordination of arms limitations. Missile defenses might provide some denial capability against light attacks by states with small arsenals, but they still fall short of meaningful damage limitation as between powers capable of massive nuclear strikes.     

ADVANCED US CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS AND NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

The Obama administration has made a great effort to increase the role of advanced conventional weaponry in US national security thinking and practice, in part to help reinvigorate the global nuclear disarmament agenda by reducing the role played by nuclear weapons in the US defense posture. However, such a strategy is fundamentally flawed because increases in US conventional superiority will exacerbate US relative strength vis-à-vis other powers, and therefore make the prospect of a nuclear weapon-free world seem less attractive to Washington's current and potential nuclear rivals. Consequently, it is highly likely that the impact of efforts to increase US advanced conventional superiority through ballistic missile defense and a conventional “prompt global strike” program will ensure that the Obama administration is adopting a pathway to nuclear abolition on which it is the sole traveler for the foreseeable future.     

US–Latin America’s security: moving through an inflection point?

Recent elections in Latin America, such as those of Mauricio Macri in Argentina, Horacio Cartes in Paraguay, and the impeachment process of Dilma Rousseff in Brazil, point to a new direction in Latin American politics and away from the “hard left;” they also point to a new momentum in the security relationship between the US and Latin American countries. Former US President Obama’s 2016 trip to Cuba and Argentina was a clear demonstration of this new security paradigm and also a clear indication that there is a new momentum brewing in the US towards a rethinking and reshaping of security strategies and mindsets. This article will explore the multidimensional security relationship between the US and Latin American countries in light of recent changes in the US’ posture toward the region.     

The elephant in the room: US ballistic missile defence under Barack Obama

Conventional wisdom seems to hold that under Barack Obama, the US ballistic missile defence programme has been pushed aside to allow for a refreshed domestic and international agenda. Proponents point to Obama's campaign thinking and rhetoric, the ballistic missile defence (BMD) budget cuts, the decision to end the Third Site in Europe, and the reset relations with Russia through the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) as evidence that the programme has undergone a significant period of change, retraction and rationalisation. This article argues instead that BMD has not fallen from prominence and that there is a change in focus rather than retraction of its strategic goal. Consequently, BMD continues to grow in importance as a component of US national security strategy.     

Russia,America and missile defense

Russia has sharply objected to US plans for ballistic missile defense. The Russian official explanation is that the real purpose of the US missile defense plan is to make it impossible for Russia to retaliate against a US nuclear (or massive conventional) attack, thus making Russia subject to military blackmail by the US. The Russian response has been the result of a sum total of various factors, mostly political and cultural, while the technical capabilities of the proposed system have played a secondary role.     

“Leading from behind”: neoclassical realism and operation Odyssey Dawn

In March 2011, President Barack Obama ordered US air and naval forces to commence Operation Odyssey Dawn in Libya to impose a no-fly zone. The decision by the Obama Administration to intervene in a limited and supporting role in Libya is an important development in US foreign policy. Operation Odyssey Dawn presents scholars with a valuable opportunity to analyze and explore how US foreign policy is made and what roles domestic politics and elite perceptions play in decisions to use force. The author argues that neoclassical realism is a useful and compelling theoretic framework with which to analyze Operation Odyssey Dawn. While the Administration intervened in response to perceived external-level threats to US national interests, salient intervening domestic-level variables and elite perceptions shaped and guided the tenor and scope of the operation.     

Regaining Strategy: Small Powers,Strategic Culture,and Escalation in Afghanistan

Abstract

In Western operations in Afghanistan, small European powers escalate in different ways. While Denmark and the Netherlands have contributed to Western escalation through integration with British and US forces, Norway and Sweden have done so by creating a division of labour allowing US and British combat forces to concentrate their efforts in the south. These variations in strategic behaviour suggest that the strategic choice of small powers is more diversified than usually assumed. We argue that strategic culture can explain the variation in strategic behaviour of the small allies in Afghanistan. In particular, Dutch and Danish internationalism have reconciled the use of force in the national and international domains, while in Sweden and Norway there is still a sharp distinction between national interest and humanitarianism.