India's counter-insurgency experience: the ‘trust and nurture’ strategy

The Indian Army, a force trained primarily for conventional warfare, has been engaged in internal counter-insurgency operations since the 1950s. Despite such a long innings on a counter-insurgency mode, little attention has been accorded within military circles to doctrinal innovation for waging sub-conventional warfare in India's democratic political context. At best, the Army continues to view counter-insurgency duty as secondary to its primary duty of defending India from external conventional threats. By conceptualizing a counter-insurgency strategy of ‘trust and nurture’, this article aims to fill this critical doctrinal gap in India's military policy. The author argues that a counter-insurgency strategy of ‘trust and nurture’ based on democratic political culture, measured military methods, special counter-insurgency forces, local social and cultural awareness and an integrative nation-building approach will result in positive handling of India's internal security problems. The author utilizes India's counter-insurgency experiences in Assam, Mizoram, Nagaland, Punjab, and Operation ‘Sadhbhavana’ in Jammu and Kashmir as illustrative empirical indicants in order to validate the ‘trust and nurture’ strategy.     

Revisiting the Naga conflict: what can India do to resolve this conflict?

Soon after India attained its independence from British colonial administration in 1947 the Nagas started waging an armed conflict against India to establish a sovereign independent state in Nagaland in the country's Northeast region. The conflict is today one of the world's longer running and little known armed conflicts. India's central government has tried unsuccessfully to tackle the problem through political reconciliation, use of force, and several development measures. Over the years, it has also undergone several changes in which the situation of conflict deepened whenever India's central government intervened. And yet, the road ahead also faces severe challenges because the demand for bringing the Nagas of India together into a single political entity will not go unchallenged from other ethnic groups. Moreover, a bitter leadership battle divides the Naga rebels and hence any future agreement is likely to be difficult due to factional politics as have happened in the past. Thus one way to satisfy the aspirations of different ethnic groups while protecting the boundaries of the existing states in India is to explore the option of cultural autonomy. This idea is not entirely new, but has lost significance over the years.     

New terrorist threat to India's internal security: the danger from Pakistan's “Karachi Project”

The spectacular commando-style terrorist strike on Mumbai in November 2008 exposed India's lax internal security structure. As nearly all the security apparatus broke down during the long spell of attacks, massive public outrage flared up across the country calling for a firmer government response. Shockingly, India has done little to prevent a recurrence and a new security threat faces the country every single day not merely before but even after the Mumbai attacks. In contrast, Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence and the Lashkar-e-Taiba have successfully evaded pressures from both India and the international community and continue their terror campaign against India under the “Karachi Project” with the explicit intention to unsettle South Asia. Classified documents indicated that India is at the forefront of a cataclysmic “nuclear terrorism” threat from a “combination of Pakistan-based terrorists and homegrown radicals.” This article analyses the danger posed by the Indo-Pak radical groups targeting India and India's lack of preparedness to the new security threat from the “Karachi Project.”     

The Kargil Conflict: Waging War in the Himalayas

In 1999 India and Pakistan engaged in a limited war in the Himalayan peaks of Kashmir. Pakistani irregulars occupied territory in the Indian-held district of Kargil. A campaign that lasted 74 days and cost each side more than 1,000 casualties concluded with India in control of the commanding heights around Kargil. The conflict exposed flaws in the Indian armed forces as well as enduring truths of combat in the high mountains. Political constraints combined with the unforgiving environment and a determined enemy to diminish India's military advantage. Transition from counterinsurgency to high-intensity combat in the Himalayas proved to be a daunting task. Early failure was only overcome through innovation and adaptation to the environment. Specialised forces, unconventional techniques and the focused application of overwhelming firepower ultimately secured victory.     

ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT WITHIN A CONTESTED LAND: THE CASE OF KASHMIR

This paper considers the case of Kashmir to examine the relation between the people of the contested land (Indian-occupied Kashmir) and one of the nation states claiming it (India, in this case) in a game-theoretic framework. The motivation for this paper was whether it was possible to rationalize the lack of democratic space in Kashmir, relative to other states in India (especially since the founding fathers of the country had announced such democratic practices to be the guiding principles of the new nation) and at the same time, a highly rigid stance of the Indian Government on the Kashmir issue. An otherwise standard political economic model is used to capture how the way in which citizens determine their allegiance to one or the other nation state (India or Pakistan) can, in turn, affect the nation state's (India's) policies towards the contested land. I conclude that if the Indian Government perceives allegiance of the citizens to be determined primarily by partisan preferences of the citizens, not so much by their preferences for policies, then the government rationally concentrates on minimizing its disutility due to deviations from its ‘most-favorite' policy. This understanding rationalizes the policies of the Indian Government towards Kashmir. More importantly, it points towards areas that need consideration for any peace-making process to take-off.     

Escalation and de-escalation of violence in insurgencies: Insights from Northeast India

Insurgencies in the Northeast of India have been a recurring phenomenon since India's independence in 1947. One of the most significant aspects of the multiple insurgencies has been the use of violence for political goals. By drawing upon three cases of insurgencies in Northeast India, the article offers a conceptual framework on escalation and de-escalation of violence in insurgencies. The article argues that the most critical variables which have a direct bearing on the levels of insurgent violence are: popular support, loss of legitimacy and the state's counter-response.     

Airpower in India's 1999 Kargil War

For 74 days in mid-1999, India waged an intense war against intruding Pakistani forces on the Indian side of the Line of Control dividing Kashmir in the Himalayas. The Indian Air Force (IAF) was a key contributor to India's eventual victory in that war. Among other things, the IAF's combat performance showed how the skillful application of air-delivered firepower, especially if unmatched by the other side, can shorten and facilitate the outcome of an engagement that might otherwise have persisted indefinitely. It also showed that a favorable position in the conventional balance remains strategically useful even in conditions of mutual nuclear deterrence.     

India's Evolving Nuclear Posture

This article analyzes India's nuclear doctrine, finding it to be critically flawed and inimical to strategic stability in South Asia. In pursuing an ambitious triad of nuclear forces, India is straying from the sensible course it charted after going overtly nuclear in 1998. In doing so, it is exacerbating the triangular nuclear dilemma stemming from India's simultaneous rivalries with China and Pakistan. Strategic instability is compounded by India's pursuit of conventional “proactive strategy options,” which have the potential to lead to uncontrollable nuclear escalation on the subcontinent. New Delhi should reaffirm and redefine its doctrine of minimum credible nuclear deterrence, based on small nuclear forces with sufficient redundancy and diversity to deter a first strike by either China or Pakistan. It should also reinvigorate its nuclear diplomacy and assume a leadership role in the evolving global nuclear weapon regime.     

Military Spending,Conflict and External Debt in Sub-Saharan Africa

The damaging economic effects of the debt crises on Africa in the late 1980s encouraged considerable research on the determinants of external debt in developing economies. Although sub-Saharan Africa's (SSA) debt was cut by two-thirds by 2008, through two debt relief programmes, debt in the region has since been rising at an increasingly rapid pace. This study provides an empirical analysis of the determinants of external debt in SSA over the period 1960–2016, using dynamic panel methods. It also considers two potentially important factors that have received relatively little attention. One is military spending, rarely considered, despite a number of well-publicised scandals over the procurement of unnecessary and expensive high-tech weapons systems. A second, is the possibility that the countries studied have been involved in conflict. The empirical results point to a positive impact of military spending on external debt, but with some evidence of heterogeneity across the countries. Furthermore, findings indicate that the positive effect of military expenditure on debt becomes more marked in countries that have been affected by conflict. These results imply that policies to improve security and reduce military spending could be beneficial in reducing external debt and, potentially, improving economic performance in the region.     

The March of the Lord's Resistance Army: Greed or Grievance in Northern Uganda?

This article addresses the form and nature of an insurgency in Northern Uganda that has been active since the mid-1980s. The insurgency movement itself grew out of an internal breakdown in security lasting over several years, during which ethnicity played a critical part in defining access to power and resources within Uganda. The recent explosion of literature relating to conflict inside Sub-Saharan Africa outlines several different analytical approaches to violence. One of the most recent and influential has been that of examining greed rather than grievance as the main driver behind conflict. This articl looks at the evolution of warfare in Northern Uganda over 15 years and puts the argument that greed and grievance are not mutually exclusive in this situation and it is the interaction between the two that provides the impetus for continued violence.     

India's Pursuit Of Ballistic Missile Defense

This article analyzes India's efforts to deploy a Ballistic Missile Program (BMD). The article has three objectives. First, it argues that scientific-bureaucratic factors and India's incapacity to deter Pakistan's use of terrorist proxies have driven its quest for BMD. Second, the article also evaluates the current state of India's two-tiered missile defense shield. In spite of various claims on the part of India's defense science establishment, the paper estimates that India still lacks a deployable BMD system and is still far from developing an effective strategy of deterrence-through-denial. Third, the article analyzes the implications of the development of India's BMD system for nuclear stability in South Asia. The article shows how India's BMD capacities, however limited, have indirectly exacerbated the security concerns of India's regional rival, Pakistan.     

When the Going Gets Tough… Monitoring Missions and a Changing Conflict Environment in Sri Lanka, 2002–2008

This article analyzes how the conflict environment in which a civilian monitoring mission is deployed influences the monitors' assessment of the operation. It draws on unique empirical material from the experience of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), deployed to oversee a ceasefire agreement in Sri Lanka 2002–2008. With material from a survey and in-depth interviews, experiences of the monitors are analyzed and changes over time are traced in relation to the monitors' assessment of the mandate and organizational set-up of the mission. The study points to the difficulty of monitoring missions to address escalation during an ongoing peace process. Its function is dependent on the goodwill of the parties. In essence, monitoring missions have the potential to strengthen peace when there is momentum in favor of progress, but when relations between the parties turn sour and the conflict escalates a civilian monitoring mission basically loses its potential. During the final stages of the war, which saw a very large number of civilian casualties, the war-torn areas were closed to international observers. Moreover, international pressure for a short-term ceasefire to alleviate the humanitarian situation was dismissed by the Sri Lankan government, which also saw the backing of several important actors, not the least China.     

Insurgency in Afghanistan: implications for Pakistan's internal and external security

In the aftermath of 9/11, the USA embarked on a massive global hunt for terrorists and launched its “Operation Enduring Freedom” in Afghanistan. Its failure to control insurgency in Afghanistan spilled over into Pakistan, with disastrous consequences. The resurgence of the Taliban with more formidable tactics and maneuvering skills has become more troublesome for both Afghanistan and Pakistan and for the USA and its allied forces. The fierce comeback of the insurgents has challenged the political and territorial integrity of Pakistan, one that it cannot tolerate. This article analyzes the current situation and its implications for Pakistan's security. Moreover, it looks into the internal and external security complexities that Pakistan faces and the possible implications of the US exit strategy for Pakistan's security. It concludes that the security situation in Pakistan is continuously deteriorating and no part of her territory is immune from terrorists' attacks. To be successful, Pakistan must pursue a broad-based strategy that encompasses military, political, social, economic and informational domains aimed at accomplishing four major objectives: (1) elimination of foreign terrorists and their facilitators; (2) strengthening of the political and administrative institutions in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA); (3) establishing a safe and secure environment conducive for sustained development and the realization of real socio-economic progress and (4) integrating the FATA into the national mainstream. In the long term, a strategy based on the concept of “Enlightened Moderation” is the right solution, not only to the internal problems of Pakistan but also for the Muslim world and the international community.     

Is the Indian Nuclear Tiger Changing Its Stripes?

Sixteen years after stepping out of the nuclear closet, India's nuclear posture, some of its operational practices, and hardware developments are beginning to mimic those of the original five nuclear weapon states. Several proliferation scholars in the United States contend that India's national security managers are poised to repeat the worst mistakes of the superpowers’ Cold War nuclear competition, with negative consequences for deterrence, crisis, and stability in South Asia and the Asia-Pacific region. This article takes a contrarian view. It dissects the best available data to show why the alarmist view is overstated. It argues that not only are the alarmists’ claims unsupported by evidence, their interpretation of the skeletal and often contradictory data threatens to construct the very threat they prophesize.     

South Asia's Missile Expansion

ABSTRACT

Over the past decade, contrary to declarations that they are pursuing “minimum” deterrence, India and Pakistan have considerably expanded their missile forces. India has developed eleven types of missiles while Pakistan has fielded nine. These missile forces have a mixed impact on deterrence stability. Both states' medium-range missiles strengthen their countervalue deterrent capabilities against the other, though India's China-specific missiles still have limitations. India's and Pakistan's short-range missiles and first-generation naval systems raise concerns about nuclear ambiguity, command and control, and escalation across the nuclear threshold, ultimately undermining deterrence stability on the subcontinent.     

Changing civilian support for the Maoist conflict in India

Prolonged domestic political conflicts change over time. The Maoist conflict in India which began in the late 1960s is one such conflict. Over time, the ‘old’ Maoist conflict has become a ‘new’ Maoist conflict. Important changes have occurred both in the macro and micro processes of the conflict. Some of these changes include the strategic relocation of the Maoist bases, a shift in the class character of the conflict, the nature of civilian support, and the rebels' methods of operation. While in the 1960s, the conflict was involved in land redistribution with the aim of annihilating class enemies, the recent conflict focuses on caste identities. In addition, it is intrinsically linked with territorial control and local political competition. This has automatically led the Maoists to become involved with local criminal networks and also local business networks based. This involvement has led to financial resources for the conflict. Furthermore, it has forced the local population to become linked with the conflict. Studying these changes is important, especially for counterinsurgency policies.     

THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

The armed conflict in the DRC has been characterised by appalling, widespread and systematic human rights violations. It varies from civil war to a war between national armies. Much of the conflict falls between these two categories due to the involvement of foreign troops in civil strife, as well as foreign rebel groups fighting their home government's troops but on Congolese soil. The most pressing need is to cease hostilities and address the humanitarian situation in the country. Questions of justice and accountability, and issues relating to the rule of law will have to be addressed soon in order to achieve a durable peace in the country and in the region. Since there are links between different conflicts in the region, a broader solution should preferably be found. However, this would further complicate an already difficult proposition. Efforts limited to the DRC would be more feasible and could lead to similar measures in other conflict ridden countries in the region. This essay therefore discusses the available processes for justice.     

Contextualising the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Nigeria's Niger Delta: Local and global intersections

This essay explores the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) in Nigeria's oil-rich Delta. Its thesis is that the intersections which the global and local environment provide have fuelled the proliferation of SALW in the region. Since the conflict in the region is resource-driven, the global and local context for its resolution must be taken into account. Presently the situation in the region has assumed new dimensions, with the need for its resolution that the forefront of regional and national discourse.     

The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad factor in the Mali crisis

Mali has been a battleground for more than a year now. While the armed conflict came in the aftermath of the Libyan crisis that left the regional security environment depleted, it also served as a catalyst for the collapse of state authority in Mali. This created conditions conducive for the proliferation of, and attacks by, radical religious armed groups in the northern regions of the country, including the Tuareg armed movement: the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA). But, far from being a new phenomenon, the Tuareg-led armed insurrection in the northern regions is as old as the post-colonial Malian state, and continues to pose tremendous challenges in West Africa and the Sahel region for both regional and extra-regional actors. The recent crisis in the Sahel region is seen as one of the most serious since the end of the Cold War, with anticipated dire long-term impacts on the security of the region and beyond. While attention is predominantly focused on defeating the jihadist groups that have threatened the survival of the Malian state, one must not lose sight of the fact that the ‘Tuareg Factor’, as represented by the rebellion launched by MNLA, remains critical both in terms of appreciating the deterioration of the situation and attempting to frame long-lasting solutions. The paper argues that the Tuareg's persistent recourse to rebellion against Bamako needs to be understood within a historical trajectory that takes into consideration three key parameters: firstly, the post-colonial state in Mali and its African leadership's relations with the descendants of the Tuareg communities; secondly, the amalgamation created by the so-called war on terror; and, finally, the contradictions of the democratisation process of the 1990s.¹1 This article is based on field research carried out between 2008 and 2013 on the ‘Resurgence of Tuareg-led Rebellions’.     

Hard Line: The Republican Party and US Foreign Policy since World War II Shaping Strategy: The Civil-Military Politics of Strategic Assessment

This article examines the Dhofar campaign in Oman (1965–75), and the role Britain played in assisting the Omani royal government against left-wing insurgents. Using existing secondary sources and declassified British government papers, it reassesses the contribution of British military advisers and special forces to the counter-insurgency (COIN) campaign, the balance between military action and civil affairs, the external dimension of the conflict, and intelligence and covert operations. It concludes by assessing whether the Dhofar War offers any guidance to Western armed forces involved in contemporary COIN campaigns such as those in Afghanistan and Iraq.