Another manifestation of cyber conflict: attaining military objectives through cyber avenues of approach

Cyberspace is an avenue of approach through which a military force can attain objectives of value. Through these cyber avenues of approach, military forces can engage, vet, organize, and direct human agents to accomplish specific activities. Although the objectives of these activities could differ from traditional military objectives, they still have military relevance. This particular manifestation of cyber conflict is neither a new domain of war nor something outside of warfare. Rather, it can be viewed as an emerging avenue of approach in the larger context of military operations, auguring benefits in the integration of cyber activities with operations.     

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Over the last 18 years or so, much of the debate about modern warfare has been about whether it should be described as ‘old’ or ‘new’. However, there has not been a definitive answer as to which best reflects war in the modern world. Increasingly, the alternative arguments are polarised into opposing camps. Indeed, it would be fair to say that there is little in the way of debate at all. By revaluating the strengths and weaknesses of each argument, this paper aims to reinvigorate that discussion by examining whether changes in the way we understand war are really required. Finding that the ideas are not in fact mutually exclusive, it suggests that future research could benefit from a combined approach.     

African nations as proxies in covert cyber operations

The growth of the African Internet, and services related to the Internet, has been rapid over the last decade. Following this market expansion, a variety of service providers have started to provide access. A fast-growing market puts pressure on the providers to deliver services first and only then seek to secure the networks. Over time, industrialised nations have become more able to detect and trace cyber attacks against their networks. These tracking features are constantly developing and the precision in determining the origin of an attack is increasing. A state-sponsored cyber attacker, such as intelligence agencies and electronic warfare units, will seek to avoid detection, especially when the attacks are politically sensitive intelligence-gathering and intrusion forays into foreign states' networks. One way for the attacker to create a path that links the attacks and the originating country is by actions through a proxy. The less technologically mature developing nations offer an opportunity for cyber aggression due to their lower level of security under the quick expansion of the Internet-based market. Developing countries could be used as proxies, without their knowledge and consent, through the unauthorised usage of these countries' information systems in an attempt to attack a third country by a state-sponsored offensive cyber operation. If the purpose of the cyber attack is to destabilise a targeted society and the attack succeeds, the used proxies are likely to face consequences in their relations with foreign countries, even if the proxy was unaware of the covert activity.     

网络舆论战的理论探析

网络舆论战是一种新型作战样式。加强网络舆论战研究,既是信息化战争的时代要求,又是实现强军目标的客观需要,对于丰富具有我军特色的现代舆论战理论体系,推动我军政治工作的创新发展,具有十分重要意义。文章通过论述网络舆论战的地位作用和主要特点,对开展网络舆论战的基本战法进行了探讨。     

美军网络电磁行动定义及分析

近几年美军针对网络电磁空间不断出台新的政策和联合条令,但是相关规定在网络空间作战、电子战、频谱管理行动的定义上有交叠,为了进一步提高作战能力,防止冲突的发生,美军提出网络电磁行动的概念对三者进行整合,针对美军提出的网络电磁行动进行了介绍和分析并提出了对我国的一些启示。     

网络舆论战的心理学意义

从舆论战和网络舆论战的概念和特点出发,阐述了心理学在网络舆论战中的重要作用。综合心理学理论和舆论传播理论分析了网络舆论形成的心理机制,得出了网络舆论是通过个体心理和群体心理两个阶段而形成的结论。根据这个结论,提出了网络舆论引导的具体策略。即在个体层面上,通过操纵信息来影响人的认知;在群体层面上,通过塑造引导者主体的可信性和喜爱性,以及网络技术手段来增强舆论引导的效果。最后,指出了网络舆论战的发展前景在于充分考虑受众的心理,有针对性地进行舆论引导。     

潜艇信息系统信息安全与纵深防护策略研究

随着网络中心战的发展，信息安全问题在现代潜艇系统中的重要性日益凸显。首先分析潜艇信息安全问题的背景、总结其研究现状，然后研究了潜艇信息安全需求及属性定义，探讨了潜艇信息系统信息安全防护整体框架，在此基础上提出了一种综合静态安全防护和动态运行安全防护的潜艇信息系统信息安全纵深防护体系结构。以期为解决潜艇系统设计中的安全缺陷、建立潜艇信息安全防护体系，辅助系统维护、保障系统安全提供基础。     

Disrupt and restraint: The evolution of cyber conflict and the implications for collective security

In the last decade, cyber conflict has become a main feature of international politics and a growing concern for strategic stability and collective security. Unfortunately, cyber conflict suffers from a lack of conceptual clarity about its impact on collective security and a lack of consensus among international actors on how to interpret it. This article proposes to understand cyber conflict as an evolving process driven by two factors: the way in which digital space is configured and the way in which tactical, organizational, strategic, and doctrinal characteristics related to cyber have been included in the field of national and international security. Both tend to encourage offensive behavior but also demonstrate features pointing to restraint.     

军民融合视角下的美国网络安全人才战略

由于网络技术的军民两用特性,军民融合是提升网络空间安全能力的必然选择。而网络空间的竞争,归根结底是人才竞争。网络安全人才战略必须有效应对人才资源整体不足的现实困难,通过合理配置资源和创建创新机制安排,推进军民融合式的网络安全人才体系建设。美国高度重视人才在网络安全战略体系中的关键作用,通过宏观政策引导、创新交流机制、拓宽吸纳渠道等多种方式,为构建军民融合式的网络安全人才战略提供了经验借鉴。     

网络舆论斗争的全域一体化联合作战

作战体系已成为制约网络舆论斗争作战效能的关键性问题。论文借鉴信息化战争的一体化联合作战思想,分析了网络舆论斗争的全域一体化联合作战特点,建立了全域一体化联合作战体系架构,为网络舆论斗争实践提供思想理论指导。论文的研究成果,对于丰富网络舆论斗争理论,占领网络舆论制高点,具有重要理论意义和参考价值。     

‘Cumulative Deterrence’ as a New Paradigm for Cyber Deterrence

This article suggests that there is a paradigm crisis in the sub-field of cyber deterrence. Cyber deterrence is evolving slowly and unpromisingly as a strategic tool in both theory and practice, mostly due to the ill-fitting theoretical framework and underlining assumptions it borrows from the absolute-nuclear-deterrence context. Therefore, this article suggests replacing the accepted yet inadequate paradigm of absolute deterrence with a better-fitting restrictive-cumulative-deterrence paradigm that draws on the Israeli approach to deterrence, introducing it into the cyber domain. The article further criticizes the current discourse in the field, including some ‘common knowledge’ (mis)understandings of cyberspace and the ways it affects the possibility of deterrence.     

作战系统Agent交互链的形成及其链结构变换

目前,采用基于Agent建模（Agent-Based Modeling,ABM）方法研究战术级分队层次作战系统建模,存在如何直观形象而准确地表达与实现多Agent组织模式的问题。着眼军事需求,从如何建立Agent交互链的新角度来开展作战系统建模问题研究,推动ABM方法的创新发展,深化Agent和多Agent系统（Multi-Agent System,MAS）技术研究。通过提出规范、实用的Agent交互链形成过程,确立了交互链中的链节点Agent的层次化变换机制,揭示了链节点Agent聚合／解聚和交互链结构约简／扩充同步变换的工作机理。研究结果表明：与一般的ABM方法相比,Agent交互链的形成及其链结构变换,是一种更好地实现战术级分队层次作战系统建模的新途径。     

Becoming the enemy: Convergence in the American and Al Qaeda ways of warfare

The United States and Al Qaeda represent two fundamentally different forms of warfare. The US, with its basis in the Western way of warfare, relies on an almost totally instrumental form of warfare and Al Qaeda, with its basis in the Islamic way of warfare, fights an expressive, existential form of warfare. This paper illustrates how both sides' ways of warfare are converging toward each other. It also argues that this is in fact a good thing because it will allow the US to understand its enemy and thereby allow the US to defeat him in terms he can understand.     

Hybrid warfare through the lens of strategic theory

Hybrid warfare is the latest of the terms/concepts that have been used within the defence community in the last three decades to label contemporary warfare. It has been officially adopted in the core strategic documents of NATO, EU and national governments and has already inspired many articles, policy papers and books; however, this paper is unique in the sense that it analysis the hybrid warfare concept through the lens of strategic theory. It is argued that hybrid warfare does not merit the adoption as a doctrinal concept. Strategic theory instead, which lies at the nexus of all dimensions of warfare, provides a better viewpoint to approach contemporary warfare. It concludes that efforts should be directed towards exploring warfare under the light of eternal principles instead of proving the emergence of new types of warfare.     

Holmes’ front: constructing a new face of battle for America’s Civil War

ABSTRACT

In his seminal study of the changing nature of warfare between Agincourt and the Somme, military historian John Keegan proposed that future historians might consider combatants’ emotions in their assessments of the impact and nature of conflict. Recent years have witnessed the emergence of the history of emotions as an analytical approach, but rarely, if ever, is this directed toward the study of military history, far less the history of insurgencies and counter-insurgencies. This paper examines America’s civil war (1861–1865) as a case study of the ways in which an emotional history approach might illuminate not the physical experiences of but rather the immediate and longer-term reactions to counter-insurgency conflict through a focus on one specific individual, the future Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. It proposes that Holmes, whilst not a man of the ranks, nevertheless can reveal the wider ramifications of civil war and its emotional impact, both individually and culturally. As a relatively limited internecine war, one not fought by professional armies but by volunteer forces, America’s civil war highlights the ways in which the soldier’s response points us toward the kind of emotional revolution that has, to date, mainly been located within the European nations.     

Applying Order-of-Battle to Al Qaeda Operations

Since the global war on terror began, the pursuit of Al Qaeda is widely considered as warfare and not the pursuit of criminals. In light of counter-terrorism being redefined as war, the criteria applied for tracking militaries of conventional enemies may also be applicable to Al Qaeda. Intelligence analysts have long used the nine order-of-battle (OB) criteria as part of the estimative process for conventional, or nation-state, enemies. Applying OB criteria to Al Qaeda may assist intelligence analysts in knowing the enemy and identifying changes that will allow for predictive analysis. Many elements of Al Qaeda's OB prior to the events of 11 September were viewed as clutter and not significant changes that might have otherwise alerted intelligence analysts to the impending attack. This essay suggests how one might go about applying the nine OB criteria to analysis of Al Qaeda. Although more difficult and requiring modification, using an analytical procedure that has been tested successfully over many years is a logical step in the war on Al Qaeda. If all OB changes are tracked and analyzed using a systematic approach as outlined in this essay, Al Qaeda attacks may be predicted and/or curtailed in the future.     

Westmoreland was right: learning the wrong lessons from the Vietnam War

Fourth Generation Warfare is a theory of contemporary warfare that posits a number of different ideas that are able to shed light on current conflicts. Whilst much of the debate has been concentrated on the linear development of warfare and also on analysis of the current situation of US forces in Iraq, it has resonance for a number of different conflicts taking place in Africa, if only because the US has become involved in contemporary conflicts in Somalia and the Mahgreb. There are clearly significant issues with the US-centric, flawed linear approach to history, but the actual analysis of modes of warfare has much to offer policymakers in a continent that is under-represented in the literature, and is also in danger of being forgotten in the shadow of analysis of Iraq. This paper moves on from criticising the stepped approach to history and looks at patterns of warfare in contemporary Africa, arguing that there is much in the theory that could be used to explain seemingly illogical tactics or patterns, and thus has much to tell policymakers engaged in conflict analysis.

Rebellions can be made 2 per cent active in a striking force, and 98 per cent passively sympathetic.1 ?1. T.E. Lawrence, ‘Science of Guerrilla Warfare’, 1929, published in Malcolm Brown (ed) T.E. Lawrence in War and Peace: An Anthology of the Military Writings of Lawrence of Arabia (London: Greenhill Books, 2005) p.284.      

Japan’s Emerging Trajectory as a ‘Cyber Power’: From Securitization to Militarization of Cyberspace

Japan has been overlooked as a ‘cyber power’ but it now becoming a serious player in this new strategic domain. Japanese policy-makers have forged a consensus to move cybersecurity to the very core of national security policy, to create more centralized frameworks for cybersecurity, and for Japan’s military institutions to build dynamic cyberdefense capabilities. Japan’s stance has moved rapidly toward the securitization and now militarization of responses to cyber challenges. Japan’s cybersecurity stance has bolstered US–Japan alliance responses to securing all dimensions of the ‘global commons’ and extended its defense perimeter to further deter but potentially raise tensions with China.     

Precision cyber weapon systems: An important component of a responsible national security strategy?

Given the advances made in conventional weapon capabilities, precision should by now be the accepted and expected norm in cyberspace as well. In this article I argue that developing precision cyber weapon systems, to be used during a lawful conflict, can be an important part of a responsible national security strategy to reduce the amount of violence and physical destruction in conflicts. I first describe a precision cyber weapon system in a military context. I then present three compelling rationales for the development of precision cyber weapon systems based on ethical, operational, and financial considerations. To support the position, I address several arguments that have been levied against their development. Thereafter I present several recommendations for a way ahead.     

Keeping Nothing Secret: United Kingdom Chemical Warfare Policy in the 1960s

After renouncing an offensive chemical warfare programme in 1956, the UK Cabinet Defence Committee decided in 1963 to re-acquire a chemical warfare retaliatory capability. This article describes how the re-acquisition decision was engendered by a combination of novel research findings, changes in strategic thinking, new intelligence and pressures from NATO. Despite the 1963 decision, no new chemical weapons capability was acquired by the UK and information that Britain lacked a stockpile of chemical weapons was eventually leaked to the public, initiating a fierce debate between ministries over the significance of this leak. This paper argues that non-existent technology is equally problematic for government secrecy, and equally consequential for government action, as what exists. Furthermore, actors' different interpretations of what constituted a secret, point towards a more subtle understanding of secrecy than simply construing it as the hiding or uncovering of items of information.