Beyond the state: reconceptualising African security in the 21st century

Confronted with myriad security challenges, African states and the much-vaunted peace and security architecture of the African Union (AU) has proven not to be up to the challenge. Indeed, this is implicitly acknowledged by the AU itself if one considers the creation of such security structures as the African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which exists outside its peace and security architecture. This paper argues for a radical rethink of security structures on the African continent – one in which state structures of security coexist with newer forms of security actors, including private military companies (PMCs), community movements and the business sector. Whilst this shift in security actors is already happening on the ground, policymakers need to embrace this new reality.     

South Africa's arsenal of terrorism legislation

After only ten years in existence, the African Union (AU) has already made its mark on the landscape of peace and security in Africa. This paper seeks to explore the relationship between the AU's leading collaborative interstate security policy, the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), and sustainable peace in the Horn of Africa. It examines four countries – Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Kenya – and how engaging with the APSA through early warning systems can contribute to developing the elements necessary for sustainable peace, namely regional stability, conflict management, and good governance.     

Towards the revision of the 1977 Organisation of African Unity/African Union Convention on the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa

The revision of the 1977 Organisation of African Unity's Convention on the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa (Mercenary Convention) is now long overdue. The existence of the Mercenary Convention has over the years failed to eliminate mercenarism in Africa, among others as a result of the manner in which it defines a ‘mercenary’. The problem is exacerbated by the rapid growth of the private security sector in the form of the private military/security company (PMSC), which to a large extent arguably represents a new form of ‘mercenary’ outfit that is technically not covered by the Mercenary Convention. Because the Mercenary Convention was adopted during a different epoch in African history there is now a need to take stock of its successes and failures and determine how it can best be revised to address the new security challenges in Africa. In this contribution the need for the revision of the Mercenary Convention is discussed. Given the difficulties and challenges presented by the Mercenary Convention, the contribution advocates the drafting of two conventions, one focusing on the regulation of PMSCs and the other focusing on the elimination of mercenarism in Africa.     

GUNS AND BUTTER

Having developed an arms industry of extraordinary depth and breath of capacity, the advent of the De Klerk presidency in 1989 dramatically affected the South African military establishment and its defence industry as budgets were slashed, procurement came to a standstill and the industry was reorganized. Subsequent majority rule did not auger well for the defence industry, yet, a decade later, by 2004, the armaments industry was not only thriving, but had managed to embed itself in the long-term security vision of the state. Key moments in this process was the inclusive and consultative development of the South African White Paper on Defence in 1996, the Defence Review in 1998, and a White Paper on South African Defence Related Industries the following year. Today the relationship between the industry and the government is again close and South Africa's arms producers constitute an interesting combination of intertwined public and private sector entities, ranging from Armscor, Denel and Defencetek in the public sector to private arms producers embedded in large industrial groupings and a heterogeneous host of smaller autonomous enterprises.     

REFLECTIONS ON THE INTEGRATION OF THE MILITARY IN SOUTH AFRICA

This paper explores the contribution of the African Union (AU) to human security promotion in Africa. It contends that human security concerns informed the formation of the AU. Through the efforts of the AU Commission, the African ruling elite and policy-makers have become aware of human security doctrines. Human security ideas have been integrated into AU binding agreements, declarations, decisions and policies. The commission is now in the difficult, yet most important, phase of trying to persuade significant numbers of the African ruling elite and civil society to accept human security as a guiding principle and the desirable norm. Through the African Citizens' Directorate (CIDO), the commission is using indigenous African civil society groups to institutionalise human security doctrines in Africa. The commission faces serious challenges in its efforts to make human security the only security norm. While member states of the AU that have never been comfortable with the introduction of human security doctrines into the continental integration project are tacitly undermining the CIDO's ability to work with civil society groups to institutionalise the doctrines in Africa, the leaders who enthusiastically supported the integration of human security doctrines into the documents and work of the AU have seemed in recent times to be less resolute in their support of AU Commission's human security work.     

EASTERN SUDAN INDIGENOUS CONFLICT PREVENTION,MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION MECHANISMS

In the wake of heightened media and political pressure about the Darfur humanitarian catastrophe, the African Union (AU) hurriedly deployed its monitors in Darfur, to be augmented later by a protection force to safeguard the monitors, albeit without adequate pre-deployment and logistic assessment. Without doubt, the Darfur crisis has become the AU's major preoccupation for the past year. The deployment of the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) since June 2004 has presented many challenges to the AU and its partners. A restrictive mandate, inadequate troops to cover Darfur, serious operational, logistical and capacity shortfalls have combined in an inextricable way to present the AU's mission to some observers as spineless and ineffective. The UN and partners have acknowledged the lead role of the AU in Darfur, and have been very supportive with assistance in these critical deficient areas. How the AU will take advantage of this favourable environment and optimise the benefits from its partners will be crucial to its success in Darfur. The article emphasises the need for the AU to strengthen its capacity and expertise at all levels of command through technical cooperation and appropriate assistance from the UN and partners. The entire world is waiting to see how Africa delivers on this critical assignment.     

ECOSOCC

Provision for an Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) among the new organs of the African Union (AU) offers to bridge the distance between African governments and their peoples. Designed and implemented correctly, the Council could be an influential forum for the diverse voices of civil society. Greater popular involvement in government is a prerequisite for stability on the continent—particularly since governance is often weak, corruption endemic and democracy in a number of countries little more than a façade.

The essay considers comparative institutions at national, regional and international levels as examples of how ECOSOCC could work. We argue that its structure will have to take account of the varying strengths and weaknesses of social and economic actors in different parts of Africa, and between those from AU countries and other regions of the world. Ultimately, success depends on whether African civil society is ready and able to take the lead in this initiative. The paper concludes with a number of recommendations.     

Does civil war hamper financial development?

We examine how armed conflict effects financial development in a cross-country setting using dynamic panel data analysis in a panel of 66 developing countries for the period 1985–2010. Financial development is measured by M2 as a share of GDP, and credit allocated to private sector by banks as a share of GDP. Our findings suggest that armed conflict has a significant adverse effect on financial development. Simultaneously, the quality of governance is always highly significant and conducive to the financial development. The quality of governance is more salient in determining financial development compared to low- and medium-intensity armed conflict; however, the quality of governance cannot entirely offset the adverse impact of high-intensity armed conflict on financial development.     

‘Fighting for peace’

In Africa, most of the present conflicts are civil, intra-state wars where belligerent groups use guerrilla tactics to achieve various political, economic or ideological objectives. The atrocities and the effect of these on-going wars on innocent civilians, human suffering, poverty and development are beyond comprehension. Not surprisingly, the majority of current peace operations are in Africa, with more than 70 countries contributing forces to these conflict zones. On the continent, South Africa has come to assume a leading role in peace operations and is now a major troop-contributing country to UN and AU missions. In the past 11 years, the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) has taken part in no fewer than 14 peace missions. This article provides a brief background of the conflicts in Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Sudan, the different United Nations (UN) and African Union (AU) mandates under which peacekeepers had to operate as well as their objectives, and the extent of South Africa's involvement in the various missions. In the last section, the major challenges, that these operations have posed are highlighted.     

Conflict circuit breakers in the Great Lakes Region of Africa

Conflict resolution in the African Great Lakes Region has been linked to the protocols and projects agreed upon at the Second International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR). The ICGLR created a continental-wide framework of conflict circuit breakers focused on resolving the structural and surface situational causes of the 1996 to 2003 armed conflicts that drew in at least six nations and destabilised the entire region. The implementation of these protocols and projects will serve as a test for the African Great Lakes Region to move away from conflict and into a cooperation and development phase; however, the effort to bring peace, stability and development will face obstacles not only in the security sector, but also in developing infrastructure, civil society, and good governance. In summary, this article contends that peace in the Great Lakes Region will depend equally on two factors: internal governance and building civil society institutions, and focused regional interlocking circuit-breaking institutions.     

THE AFRICAN STANDBY FORCE

The African Union is preparing for its enhanced role in the maintenance of peace and security by establishing a Peace and Security Council that is tasked with identifying threats and breaches of the peace. To this end, the AU has recommended the development of a common security policy and, by 2010, the establishment of an African Standby Force capable of rapid deployment to keep, or enforce, the peace. The ASF would comprise of standby brigades in each of the five regions, and incorporate a police and civilian expert capacity. G8 leaders have pledged support for the AU proposal through funding, training, and enhanced co-ordination of activities. For its part, the AU will need to undertake a realistic assessment of member capabilities, to clearly articulate its needs, and to set realistic and achievable goals. The latest plan for establishing a rapidly deployable African peacekeeping force will require something that similar proposals have lacked: the political will to fund and implement a long list of recommendations. Success will ultimately be judged by the AU's future responses to situations of armed conflict. Even if such responses are largely symbolic in the short term, a sufficient display of political will among African leaders could inspire the confidence needed to galvanise international support.     

‘God willing,I will be back’: Gauging the Truth and Reconciliation Commission's capacity to deter economic crimes in Liberia

Recently, in July 2012, the high-profile and bitterly fought nine-month race for the post of Chair of the African Union (AU) Commission, between Dr Jean Ping of Gabon, and his main challenger, Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, culminated in the latter's victory. Her victory came after the deadlock at the Eighteenth AU Summit in January 2012. Borne out of the considered need for a quick fix through reliance on a vote of expediency, the election of Dr Dlamini-Zuma represented a political resolution to the crisis that arose due to the earlier ongoing electoral deadlock. Far from being a competitive election by design, the 2012 AU Commission election by default became transformed into an intensely fought campaign that put the AU in the limelight. This article briefly introduces the electoral process, explains in detail the voting behaviour of AU member states, and offers five specific reasons for the victory of Dr Dlamini-Zuma. On the surface the election looks very competitive, but the article explains why this is not the case. To create greater competition for these posts, the AU needs to overhaul the nomination process and the voting procedure. In this regard, the article proffers detailed analysis and proposes a radical revision of the existing criteria for the nomination. The article also proposes specific recommendations for the amendment of the rules of procedure of the AU Assembly to allow for a qualified majority as a deadlock breaker in the fifth round. It also assesses whether the integrity of the AU Commission election was damaged during the campaigning and voting process. In this regard, it recommends the development of a code of conduct for future elections at the AU.     

Brazil's new defense paradigm

In 2015, Brazil has taken steps toward re-consolidating its domestic defense industry. In the 1980s, Brazil built a dynamic and diversified defense industry. The state-driven effort resulted in a tripod strategy, where the state, state-run companies, and their private sector became the pillars of Brazil's defense industry. Brazil developed an export-driven defense industry; where close to 80–90% of its output was exported to Latin American, African, Arab, and Asian nations. In the 1980s, Brazil became the world's fifth largest exporter of defense products and services, exporting to over 40 countries. In the 1990s and 2000s, Brazil's defense industry suffered a dramatic reduction in size, diversification, and momentum. Successions of domestic political and economic policies have relegated Brazil's once emerging defense industry to a marginal position in the global defense industry. This article analyzes future prospects, challenges, and growth strategies for Brazil's defense industry.     

Bangladesh: The Changing Dynamics of Violent Extremism and the Response of the State

Bangladesh is currently facing an incremental growth of radicalization. This radicalization can be traced back to the country’s early post-Independence years. Over time, political violence, ideological clashes between secular and right-wing ideologies, and weak governance have created conditions for the growth of radical Islam. The public rhetoric on corruption, weakening of democratic institutions, inadequate law enforcement agencies, fragile justice delivery system, fledgling educational and social institutions and growing unemployment provides further space for alternative narratives by extremist ideologues. Home-grown extremist outfits have received ideological and tactical supports from transnational terrorist network such as Islamic State (IS) and Al-Qaeda in Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), but only in a limited manner. The supply and demand side of radicalization in Bangladesh has not yet been addressed by actors such as the government, private sector, civil society and media. The failures in multiple sectors in the state governance have led to a situation where IS and AQIS now see Bangladesh as a potential ground for exerting their supremacy as flag bearers of radical forms of Islam.     

From stopping to preventing atrocities

The Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU) provides for the right of the continental body to intervene in the face of war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. According to its formulation, Article 4(h) intervention entails military force, which is triggered when a target state fails to discharge its duty to protect its population from mass atrocities. Although Article 4(h) is an ambitious statutory commitment to intervene in a member state by the AU, the Libyan crisis in 2011 showed the ambivalence of the continental institution to act in a decisive and timely manner. The AU's failure to invoke Article 4(h) exposed the need for building the capacity and political will to intervene and to interpret Article 4(h). Therefore, the primary focus of this article is on how Article 4(h) should be interpreted. Flowing from the Pretoria Principles, which seek to provide clarity on the implementation of the AU's right of intervention, Article 4(h) should be viewed as a duty rather than a right to prevent or stop mass atrocities. The duty dimension of Article 4(h) derives from the international instruments that AU member states have ratified to prevent mass atrocities. Rather than being a paper tiger, Article 4(h) should be used in a proactive and timely manner as a military option available to the AU to persuade member states to prevent or halt atrocities. As a last resort, military force pursuant to Article 4(h) should aim at protecting the population at risk and pursuing the perpetrators in order to avoid contravening Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations (UN). Although military intervention can save lives in the short term, it cannot necessarily address the underlying, structural causes of atrocities, such as ethnic rivalries, economic inequalities and scramble for natural resources, among others. Therefore, the prevention of mass atrocities should not be equated with, or be seen through the prism of, Article 4(h) intervention alone. The focus should instead be on the entire spectrum of preventive strategies at the disposal of the AU in the face of mass atrocities, including the African human rights system and the African Peer Review Mechanism.     

AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY

Intervention which violates state sovereignty is often justified by its humanitarian goals. In Africa, the debate goes beyond humanitarian objectives and considers intervention when collapsed state authority threatens regional security. Poorly planned interventions can do more harm than good while also weakening the norm of non-intervention in international relations. The brutal and often degrading history of colonization and neo-colonialism still influences African thinking on intervention. Africa's relative geopolitical weakness has compelled it to rely strongly on the international rules. African state's view on intervention should be rethought in the light of failed states, the spill-over of conflicts, threats to the democratic process and an abject failure to act in the face of hummanitarian catastrophe. Military intervention should be an exceptional action of last resort but it will remain an option while states are unwilling or unable to protect their own populations. The objective should be prevention through good governance and the democratic process.     

Political dynamics in Kenya’s post-electoral violence: Justice without peace or political compromise?

The political upheavals that erupted in Kenya after the release of the 2007–8 election results resulted in the death of approximately 1 200 people, as well as the loss of livestock and other valuable property. While the Kenyan government tried to seek solutions to the crisis, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued warrants for the arrest of top government officials. For its part, the African Union (AU) accused the ICC of racism by targeting only African leaders, and maintained that such practices undermine the rule of equality before the law set forth in Article 27 of the Rome Statute. The AU is therefore advising African countries, including Kenya, to consider withdrawing from the ICC. Will the ICC's intervention into the situation in Kenya bring justice and peace to the country, or will it add to the existing injuries affecting not just the country but the region as well? Through a critical analysis of contemporary scholarly discourse, this article unravels the dilemma of the ICC's intervention and the likely consequences of this action for the people of Kenya and Africa.     

Peace enforcement in Africa: Doctrinal distinctions between the African Union and United Nations

When the United Nations (UN) Security Council needs to authorize a peace enforcement operation in Africa, its partner of choice is the African Union (AU). Africa has developed significant peace operations capacity over the past decade. In addition to deploying eight AU operations, Africa now contributes 50% of all UN peacekeepers. African stability operations, like its mission in Somalia, are often described as peace enforcement operations. In this article, I question whether it is accurate to categorize African stability operations as peace enforcement? I answer the question by considering what the criteria are that are used to differentiate between peace enforcement and peacekeeping operations in the UN context. I then use the peace enforcement criteria to assess whether AU stabilization operations would qualify as peace enforcement operations. In conclusion, I consider the implications of the findings for the strategic partnership between the AU and the UN.     

The African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis: conceptual breakthrough or anti-imperialist phantom?

The creation of an African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis (ACIRC) is a sign of Africa's willingness to take its destiny into its own hands. Presented as a reaction to the slowness of the development of the African Standby Force (ASF), it is also a response to some of the ASF's conceptual weaknesses. This decision reflects a wish to establish an instrument better equipped to deal with the challenges Africa is facing. Departing from the (sub)regional logic of the ASF results from a desire to take into account the transnational nature of threats, while its enlarged mandate is meant to offer Africa the capacity to intervene in all kinds of conflicts, including by undertaking peace enforcement activities. But the obstacles on the road towards the actual creation and mobilisation of this capacity should not be underestimated. These include material difficulties, but also political tensions, between ‘small’ and ‘big’ states as well as between the African Union and subregional organisations. The risk then is high that the ACIRC, whose announcement came as a reaction to France's intervention in Mali, ends up joining the ranks of the many ‘anti-imperialist’ phantoms haunting the history of the Organization of African Unity/African Union (OAU/AU). Confronted by events considered ‘neocolonial’ initiatives, African actors have indeed traditionally reacted by launching grand projects that never got off the ground. However, by actually establishing this new instrument, they may also demonstrate that times have definitively changed.     

African maritime security and the Lomé Charter: Reality or dream?

ABSTRACT

Traditionally the African concept of security concept has been dominated by land-based conflicts with little attention being paid to maritime threats and the protection of the maritime environment. With the rapid escalation of piracy on the East Coast, the African Union (AU) was compelled to develop a joint strategy to address its changing African Maritime Domain (AMD). This was achieved by the AU’s Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy (AIMS 2050) in 2014, culminating in the adoption of a binding maritime security and safety charter in Lomé in 2016. The Lomé Charter should ideally focus the general provisions of AIMS 2050 so that Africa, as a continent, can take responsibility for security and economic empowerment of the AMD. This article considers various maritime security documents against the backdrop of an African context for understanding maritime security, in order to evaluate whether the Lomé Charter, as a manifestation of AIMS 2050, will realise its aspirations. Focussing on security is not sufficient and too much emphasis is placed in the Lomé Charter on restriction rather than development. Strong political will and leadership is required to facilitate implementation, identifying common security concerns to ensure better cooperative and collective strategies in a diverse implementation environment.