Political Scientists and Historians in Search of the Bomb

Britain's failure to cut military commitments in spite of escalating defence costs was not the result of blocking policies by disgruntled services. Rather, there was no determination among Whitehall's political departments to cut commitments even before the service departments could obstruct a decision on force levels. The Conservative governments under Macmillan and Douglas‐Home showed a propensity for substantial force reductions in Europe rather than in out‐of NATO areas. This remained London's long‐term aim even after it had been accepted to build up British troops in Europe to agreed force levels. During Alec Douglas‐Home's premiership Britain's global military role, especially east of Suez, gained a greater significance. An Anglo‐American military axis operating in the Far East and the Indian Ocean became a prominent feature. Ultimately, Anglo‐American military interdependence outside NATO was to ensure that Britain would be able to pursue a policy with more room for independent action.     

COUNTRY SURVEY XX: DEFENCE SPENDING AND PEACEKEEPING IN URUGUAY

Uruguay is a country with a very unusual profile, since it has just 3.4 million inhabitants but is among the top ten troop contributors to the UN PKO (Peace Keeping Operations) and is the first contributor per capita. In 2002 and 2003 it was the seventh troop contributor to the UN, and by the end of 2005 it was eighth in the UN ranking. Uruguay has never had any imminent external threat to its security after its independence in 1828, and it has had no internal threat since the end of the urban guerrillas’ actions in the 1970s. The country has no defence industry, and has always had an all‐volunteer military service, which presently involves almost 1% of the total population, and about 2% of the labour force. The empirical evidence presented in this paper shows that, in the past decades, Uruguayan defence spending has been influenced mainly by internal factors, most of them of an economic nature. The high participation in PKO has not increased military expenditure and it has produced a positive impact on the country’s economy.     

美国西点军校橄榄球运动传统文化透析

著名的美国西点军校百余年来有着橄榄球运动的传统。从表面上来看，人们可能会以为这是西点为培养军事人才的素质而采取的常规训练手段，而实际上更为重要的是它深受美国社会的政治和文化影响。这是因为：一方面体现了西点军校平民化治军的政治文化，另一方面橄榄球运动表征着美国主流文化和美国精神，这二者的结合是这一传统经久不衰的深层原因。     

MILITARY EXPENDITURE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN MIDDLE EASTERN COUNTRIES: A DYNAMIC PANEL DATA ANALYSIS

Defence expenditures have both costs and benefits to the economy. The costs of defence expenditures are mainly emphasized as opportunity costs. On the other hand, defence spending may have growth‐promoting potential benefits: a rise in defence spending may result in a higher aggregate demand, production and employment. This paper examines empirically the effects of military expenditures on economic growth for Middle Eastern countries and Turkey, for the time‐period 1989–1999. The relationship between military expenditure and economic growth is investigated by using cross‐section and dynamic panel estimation techniques. Empirical analysis indicates that military expenditure enhances economic growth in the Middle Eastern countries and Turkey as a whole.     

France and its allies: A comparative study of defence spending trends since 1985*

Within the EU France devotes to defence the largest financial and human resources although it is not the richest country, nor has it the largest population or labour force. The cost of nuclear weapons accounts for only a small fraction of this abnormally high French defence effort. If France had restructured its military capabilities at the same rate as its principal Allies during the 1985–1994 period, then French defence outlays would be about 20% less than at present. The fundamental reasons for France's excess defence outlay comprise virtual total dependence on French sources for equipment, produced in very small numbers; a military presence outside of Europe; and too many personnel. These deficiencies, and the consequent absence hitherto of a “peace dividend”, indicate a failure to identify the country's real strategic requirements, and a lack of will to reorganise efficiently French defence. The recently announced reform towards an all‐professional force is unlikely to achieve the potential and desirable improvement in cost‐effectiveness.     

THE PEACE DIVIDEND EFFECT OF TURKISH CONVERGENCE TO THE EU: A MULTI‐REGION DYNAMIC CGE MODEL ANALYSIS FOR GREECE AND TURKEY

This paper examines the peace dividend effect of Turkish convergence to EU membership. By employing a multi‐region dynamic CGE model, we examine the prospect for conflict resolution if Turkey becomes an EU member. The model allows us to analyse several scenarios that imply varying amounts of reduction of the military expenditure/GDP ratios. On the one hand, this change will cause a decrease in sectoral demand for military expenditures, while on the other hand, reallocation of the reduced expenditure on (i) education, (ii) tax decrease, and (iii) infrastructure, should have a huge growth impact. Our dynamic CGE simulation experiments emphasize the economic gain for all parties involved.     

Country survey military expenditure in Cyprus

Cyprus, a small island state, gained independence from British colonial rule in 1960. For more that half its history as an independent state Cyprus has been under occupation following the 1974 Turkish invasion. Despite the fact that it has faced war, invasion and occupation, Cyprus has allocated a comparatively small proportion of its national income to defence. The average defence burden—military expenditure as a share of GDP—during 1964–98 was around 2.5%. However, as a result of a substantial shift in defence policy during the past decade or so, the defence burden during the 1990s has increased, averaging about 4% of GDP as Cyprus decided to implement an extensive military modernization program aiming to present a more credible military deterrence vis‐a‐vis Turkey. Empirical estimations of a demand function for Cypriot military expenditure suggest that it is positively affected by alliance spillins and external military threat.     

Leadership at NATO: Secretary General Manfred Woerner and the Crisis in Bosnia

NATO's post-Cold War transformation, as well as the military alliance's decision to use force in Bosnia in 1994 and 1995, has been examined from multiple perspectives. Among an array of diplomatic, historical and political approaches, however, analysts have given little attention to the role played by NATO's top civilian leader in Brussels, the Secretary General. On the crisis in Bosnia, no research has been devoted to the leadership of Secretary General Manfred Woerner, who oversaw NATO as it moved toward aggressive military action in the Balkans. Using an approach that examines the Secretary General's leadership from three perspectives, this article provides the first assessment of Woerner's role in shaping alliance policy on Bosnia. The findings suggest that Woerner was a critical leader in influencing NATO decisions, which provides new explanations for NATO's conduct in the Balkans, and speaks to the broader literature on NATO's evolution after the Cold War.     

军校学报保密工作初探

军校学报是展示前沿军事科研成果和学术成果的窗口,是军事科研工作者进行军事学术交流的桥梁,也是国内外敌对势力窃取我国家秘密的重要目标。只有制定健全的保密规章制度,使保密工作贯穿于编辑出版全过程,才能确保军校学报的信息安全。     

Research communication security in the 90s: A view from the UK

This paper develops a methodology for measuring the capital value of military assets in monetary terms. We distinguish between two military capital measures. One measure, called the value of military capital (services) summarizes the value of military defense assets during a particular year. A comparison of the capital‐services value of U.S. and Soviet tactical combat aircraft is provided for the period 1970–1984.

One feature of the capital‐services measure that makes it particularly interesting is that its size can be compared with such military expenditures as operating and support. While these latter expenditures reflect the readiness of a defense establishment, the relevant capital‐services measure reflects force structure and modernization.

A second measure, called the value of military capital (wealth), summarizes the military benefits obtained from defense assets over the remainder of their service lives. This measure depreciates the capital as it ages, and is useful for comparing military wealth with other types of wealth in the economy. We provide this measure for the U.S. military capital stock for 1925–1984.     

SECURITY SECTOR PLANNING IN AFRICA

The security sector in Africa has often been a threat to citizens instead of being a benefit. Military leaders, feared by politicians for their ability to seize power by force, are often reluctant to be open about problems within the military. The lack of dialogue between politicians, citizens and soldiers has made it difficult for the real problems to be identified or addressed. States need to take stock of their security sector assets, decide how they are to be used and then agree on a clear vision for the future of the military forces within the context of the broader national interest. A defence review, the restructuring of personnel, and a transparent budgeting process can all help to achieve a more motivated and better-equipped force. A properly planned transition from the old system to the new will ensure that only manageable steps are attempted and long-term goals are not sacrificed because of short-term crises.     

The Agency of Force in Asymmetrical Warfare and Counterinsurgency: The Case of Chechnya

The use of force in asymmetrical warfare, and in counterinsurgency operations in particular, has been written off as strategically dangerous and politically irrational. The goal of the article is to examine the role of force in a modern military context and determine if victory through its application is theoretically feasible. This hypothesis will be tested against the backdrop of the conflict in Chechnya. The work will examine the Russian military and public policy as a subordinate subject to the overall inquiry of the article in an attempt to show that force was one of the major factors behind Russian military success in 2001.     

ECONOMIC GROWTH AND VIOLENT INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT: 1875–1999

This paper extends the joint product model of military alliances to apply to the new strategic doctrine adopted by NATO in the 1990s. In particular, a choice must be made between protecting one's own territory and pooling forces for an alliancewide rapid reaction force. This new model accounts for a host of externalities and their implications for burden sharing, full financing, and allocative efficiency. The Pigouvian taxes that adjust for force thinning and attack deflection are shown to finance optimal border‐protecting forces under a variety of circumstances. Second‐best considerations arise owing to the pure publicness of rapid reaction forces. The ideal toll arrangement does not currently characterize NATO financing, nor is it likely to do so.     

Counterinsurgency force ratio: strategic utility or nominal necessity

As a consequence of intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan, force ratio for counterinsurgency (COIN) has come under increased scrutiny. Reduced to its essence, the issue is simply, ‘How many troops does it take to get the job done?’ This answer has been sought by the US military, academia, and think tanks. There have been numerous responses, culminating in several ‘plug-and-play’ equations for minimum force ratios in COIN operations. Due to the impossibility of determining precisely how many insurgent forces there are, it has become common to base force ratios on the population of the country. In the realm of policy, the question above is posed as, ‘How many of our troops does it take to get the job done?’     

Collecting Oriental and Asiatic Arms and Armour: The Activities of British and East India Company Officers,c.1800-1850

During the first half of the 19th century substantial quantities of Oriental and Asiatic arms and armour first began to appear in Britain. On the one hand they certainly reflected the expansion of empire but their wider significance has yet to be discussed. This article seeks to address that omission by exploring the growth of interest in these objects within military circles, what they represented to the individuals who acquired them, and how they fitted into the wider collecting strategies of military officers as a group.     

Iraq's role in the 1973 Arab‐Israeli War

The events of the 1973 Arab‐Israeli War serve as an early indicator of Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein's willingness to use military power to address foreign policy concerns. In that war, Iraq intervened on the Syrian front with an armored division, other supporting units, and over 100 aircraft. This intervention, which occurred despite severe political and military difficulties, was larger than any previous Iraqi contribution to the anti‐Israeli struggle. Baghdad later asserted that Iraqi forces had saved Damascus from possible Israeli occupation, and these claims have been widely repeated by a variety of authors of different nationalities with various degrees of agreement or skepticism. Nevertheless, Iraqi claims to have saved Damascus from Israeli capture are false since the Israelis did not view the seizure of the city as important to their strategy for victory. Rather, the Iraqi presence on the Golan Heights was useful to the Arab war effort as one of many factors helping to delay the Israeli advance and prevent some important Syrian targets from being placed within artillery range of the Israeli force. Iraqi military shortcomings were well highlighted in this conflict, and many were repeated in the early stages of the war with Iran.     

Principles of Minimum Force and the Parachute Regiment in Northern Ireland, 1969–1972

Developing literature on Operation Banner, the codename for the British military operation in Northern Ireland, has indicated that the conduct of soldiers deployed was not always in line with principles of minimum force. Adherence to these principles would seem to have been essential to the success of the operation given the initial deployment of the soldiers was in the role of military aid to the civil power. This article will examine the role of one of the British Army’s most aggressive units, the Parachute Regiment, and will show how the responses of the regiment to the demands of the operation in Northern Ireland were frequently in contravention of minimum force principles.     

What is Doctrine?

‘Doctrine’ has been part of military vernacular for at least a century. Nonetheless, it is a concept which is rather under-explored. The aim of this article is thus to break doctrine down into its component parts in order to grasp what a military doctrine actually is. Thereafter, the article points out different ways to utilise doctrine as a military devise. A doctrine cannot be, or rather should not be, all things to all men. On the contrary, doctrine can be a tool of command, tool of education or a tool of change. The main upshot of the article is that the future of doctrine is far brighter than its critics want us to believe.     

Operation ‘Serval’: A Strategic Analysis of the French Intervention in Mali, 2013–2014

In 2013, France launched Operation ‘Serval’ to halt the southwards advance of Islamist insurgents in Mali. Using a Clausewitzian analytical framework, this article provides an assessment of France’s political and military aims in Mali and the degree to which they have been attained. Clear political goals, coordinated international diplomacy, an effective use of military force and blunders by the rebel forces turned ‘Serval’ into a short-term success. Strategically, however, the mission has proven unable to address the conflict’s underlying causes. Serval’s long-term effect is probably better measured by what it prevented than what it contributed.