Do migrant remittances react to bouts of terrorism?

This paper examines the short-run behaviour of migrant remittances in the face of terrorism. Using monthly data for post 9/11 terrorist attacks in Pakistan, the study finds evidence of increase in the volume of remittances sent from abroad. This increase is evident in the aggregate, as well as for the three main source regions of North America, the Persian Gulf and Europe. The positive association holds for all the top five migrant-hosting countries of Pakistan. The findings point in favour of an altruistic behaviour of migrant remittances at the macroeconomic level.     

9/11: WHAT DID WE KNOW AND WHEN DID WE KNOW IT?

In February 1998, Osama Bin Laden published a signed statement calling for a fatwa against the United States for its having ‘declared war against God’. As we now know, the fatwa resulted in the unprecedented attack of 9/11. The issue of whether or not 9/11 was in any way predictable culminated in the public debate between Richard Clarke, former CIA Director George Tenet and the White House. This paper examines whether there was any evidence of a structural change in the terrorism data at or after February 1998 but prior to June 2001, controlling for the possibility of other breaks in earlier periods. In doing so, we use the standard Bai–Perron procedure and our sequential importance sampling (SIS) Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method for identifying an unknown number of breaks at unknown dates. We conclude that sophisticated statistical time‐series analysis would not have predicted 9/11.     

From the Editors

For the first four years of the Algerian War British ministers and officials claimed that while supporting the French position in North Africa they did not support their policies. Successive Conservative governments sought to sustain France in North Africa because of the impact that long term insurgency in Algeria would have on Western defence by draining French human and material resources. They also feared that Western influence in North Africa could decline, opening the way for the spread of Communism, and that further humiliation for France, coming on the heels of Indochina, could lead to a ‘neutralist’ government in Paris, which would politically weeaken the Western alliance. Yet Britain's own foreign interests led it to wish to limit the spread of Arab nationalism and to avoid being tarred with the colonialist brush. The ambiguity of Britain's position led to shifting policies, which made the job of HM Ambassador in Paris, Gladwyn Jebb, particularly difficult.