THE ACRS EXPERIENCE AND ITS RELEVANCE TO THE WMDFZ CONFERENCE

This article examines the arms control logic that was applied to the only regional arms control talks that have taken place in the Middle East to date: the Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) working group that was part of the multilateral track of the Madrid peace process in the early 1990s. It highlights both the successes and major constraints of the ACRS talks in an effort to assess what might be relevant to the weapons of mass destruction-free zone conference proposed for later this year. In addition to the basic arms control dilemmas that will continue to challenge this conference—as they did ACRS—the article suggests that current conditions in the Middle East are even less conducive to regional dialogue than they were in the earlier period, due to the internal upheavals in several key Arab states, and the specific challenge of Iran's move to develop a military nuclear capability.     

MIDDLE EAST NONPROLIFERATION

The Middle East is a crucial region for the global nonproliferation regime. In 2010, the state parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons proposed a conference on a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone. The nuclear weapon-free zone model, on which this idea builds, has achieved important results in other regions, but faces especially stark challenges in the Middle East. However, the attempt to apply the boldly imaginative zone approach to the Middle East holds promise for building a more inclusive dialogue on nonproliferation and regional security.     

Prospects for creating a regional security structure in the Middle East

‘The Middle East talks the talk, but it doesn't walk the walk’, argues Heller when relating to attempts by parties in the region to create some kind of a cooperative security relationship. Concepts of regional security have simply been grafted onto traditional political-military doctrine, with the result that multilateralism has become just another vehicle for pursuing long-standing policy. He shows this with regard to the Middle East peace process as well as the Barcelona Process and attempts to forge a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. What should be done in order to promote the process? Heller's conclusion is that moving along the track of cognitive convergence while bypassing the sequencing problem by simultaneously pursuing both peace and security building will help mitigate some of the major problems in regional security.     

FROM PROLIFERATION TO PEACE

Despite both regional and international efforts to establish a weapons of mass destruction–free zone (WMDFZ) in the Middle East, regional support beyond mere rhetoric seems unattainable. The lack of commitment to WMD disarmament results from the complexity of regional security dynamics, which are characterized by a high level of weaponization and crosscutting conflicts. This article examines a strategy for WMD disarmament in the Middle East. First, such a strategy must reflect the motives underlying a state's WMD aspirations. Security and prestige may be identified as two motives that affect the acquisition, and thus also the abandonment, of WMD. Second, Egypt, Iran, Israel, and Syria are important actors because their reasons for desiring WMD cannot be considered apart from each other, and progress will consequently depend on the inclusion of all these actors. In this regard, we recommend the establishment of a parallel process between efforts to establish a WMDFZ and peaceful relations in the Middle East. Solving central problems, like the lack of political determination and security cooperation, is vital to create consensus on the final framework of a zone. This study suggests a way forward by analyzing the central causes of conflict in the region and recommending ways to resolve them in order to establish a WMDFZ.     

Regional security and the levels of analysis problem

This study explores the issues involved in creating a regional security regime in the Middle East using insights from the levels of analysis framework of international relations theory. In doing so, Spiegel focuses on the means which can be implemented in the region in order to improve the prospects for establishing such a regime.     

NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS AND MIDDLE EAST STABILITY

The United States faces a series of strategic and policy conundrums as it attempts to promote strategic stability in the Persian Gulf and the wider Middle East. This article examines the relationship between a reduced US nuclear arsenal and strategic stability in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East. It argues that a series of interrelated political and military factors play a much more significant role in regional security and stability than the US strategic arsenal, which has never, with a few extraordinary exceptions, played a direct role in maintaining regional security. The United States has constructed a system of regional stability based on conventional deterrence and defense that has seen it forward base forces at various installations in the region in combination with efforts to arm, train, and equip host-nation militaries. Nuclear weapons have never played a prominent role in this regional system. Evidence presented in this article suggests that there is no compelling reason for the United States to abandon and/or modify the defensive system of conventional deterrence and defense by adding nuclear-backed guarantees to the mix.     

NUCLEAR POWER IN THE MIDDLE EAST:

With the exception of Iran, no Middle Eastern state has an operating nuclear power reactor. Several states, including the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Israel, Syria, Jordan, Turkey, and Egypt are considering constructing such reactors; some have even taken steps towards commencing nuclear power projects. There exist, however, considerable economic, technical, safety, and security challenges to achieving these goals, many of which are acute in the Middle East region. Regional and international cooperation on nuclear technology could not only help regional states meet their energy objectives, but it could also help to build trust among states as a basic step towards a future Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone.     

NATO and the broader Middle East, 1949–2007: The history and lessons of controversial encounters

The engagement of the Atlantic Alliance in the Middle East dates back to the founding of the Alliance. With one eye on this history and one eye on current controversies, this article investigates the preconditions for and nature of the allies' engagement in the region in order to assess whether the Middle East today is causing a rupture within the Alliance. The article finds that the Alliance was never likely to engage as one in the region. The Alliance instead guarded its cohesion by either letting the Alliance leader, the United States, take a lead role or by acting as a coalition enabling framework. This latter option has prevailed since the early 1980s. Today, NATO can preserve its cohesion and simultaneously engage in the region if it continues this legacy of coalition-making from within the allied framework. Conversely, an effort to engage collectively in the region will likely set of internal tensions to the extent that the Alliance itself will be at risk.     

The Nuclear Peace Fallacy: How Deterrence Can Fail

Some scholars counter-intuitively argue that the proliferation of nuclear weapons increases international security by substantially reducing the chances for inter-state armed conflict. This school of thought draws heavily on the history of the American-Soviet Cold War rivalry to inform its analysis. The security dilemmas in the contemporary Middle East and South Asia where numerous states have or want nuclear weapons, however, are profoundly different than the competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. States in the Middle East and South Asia today may see nuclear weapons as usable instruments of warfare in contrast to conventional wisdom in the West that views them as weapons of deterrence and last resort. As common sense would have it, American and Allied policy designed to stem the proliferation of nuclear weapons is prudent. American diplomatic intervention, moreover, in regional crises as a third party may be needed in the future in the Middle East and South Asia to lessen the risks of nuclear warfare. Nevertheless, American policy-makers are likely in the future to find themselves facing a nuclear-armed nation-state-or soon to be nuclear weapons-capable state-in a crisis and will have to grapple with the risks of pre-emptive or preventive military action.     

Israel’s relations with the Gulf states: Toward the emergence of a tacit security regime?

By drawing on the literature about security regimes, this article posits the idea that a particular type of regime, which can be termed a “tacit security regime” (TSR), has begun to emerge between Israel, on the one hand, and several Gulf Arab states, on the other. It is a regime which, unlike liberal institutional variants that attempt to privilege the promotion of collective norms, remains configured around perceptions of threats to be countered and strategic interests to be realized. By examining the development, scope, and scale of this nascent TSR, this article explores the extent to which Israel, mindful of Washington, DC’s regional retrenchment, sees the emergence of such a regime as redefining the political and strategic contours of Israel’s relations with much of the Middle East.     

TURKEY AND MULTILATERAL NUCLEAR APPROACHES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

As many states in the Middle East are considering whether to embark on nuclear power programs, there is an urgent need to develop confidence-building measures to reassure states in the region that the programs are peaceful. One possible path would be to consider multilateral approaches to the fuel cycle in order to foster nuclear cooperation between states in the region, instead of each state going it alone, which would likely increase suspicions and the risk of a cascade of nuclear proliferation. With its policy of “zero problems with neighbors,” strategic connection to the West, and long-standing experience in the nuclear field, Turkey would be well-placed to take the lead on such a nuclear confidence-building agenda. Over time and under the right political conditions, Turkey could initiate or participate in measures including cooperation on nuclear education, safety and security, research and development, and joint fuel cycle facilities such as a regional fuel fabrication center.     

Underselling Islamist extremism in Sub-Saharan Africa

Islamist extremism as an ideology has seemingly spread in influence in the past few years. The violent Islamist threat may have a singular religious dogma, but that does not mean that it will interact in the same fashion within the various cultures it infests. The Sub-Saharan region is one general context where Islamist extremism is both vividly active and misunderstood. Africa's reaction to: Arabization; the adjustment to post-colonial rule; the perception of secular government institutions; the extent of cultural and religious pluralism; and the local character of Muslim leadership and institutions are all very different from that of the Middle East. Scores of terrorism analysts and even Arab populations only too familiar with the Middle East context superimpose Middle East threats over the Sub-Saharan African cultural landscape. Instead of generalizing the Islamist threats, it might be better to ask why it is that violent Islamist groups have traditionally been challenged to expand their influence in Muslim Sub-Saharan Africa. The underestimated Islamist is using ignorance to its advantage, recruiting through channels unnoticed by its Arab counterparts while creatively catering its message by region.     

Assessing regional security dialogue through the agent/structure lens: reflections on ACRS

Using insights from agent/structure dynamics, the authors highlight the interplay between social/ideational elements drawn from the international experience with arms control, and those that prevailed at the state/agent level, among participants in ACRS. At the agent level, they focus on Egypt and Israel, the major protagonists in the talks. Their analysis reveals implicit clashes that occurred among these different ideational dimensions, and their constraining impact on the ability of states to achieve agreement on cooperative security arrangements. They suggest that attention must be directed to these constraints in any attempt to reconvene the ACRS talks.     

UNITED STATES—SOUTH AFRICA RELATION

Abstract

The article evaluates the security challenges that are likely to occur along international borders in East Africa with the advent of the East African Community Common Market in July 2010. In an attempt to illustrate the porosity of borders and the likelihood that criminals could take advantage of the situation, the author describes the ease with which transnational crime could thrive (in the absence of efficient border security measures) under the guise of informal cross-border trade that derives its basis largely from the customs and historical linkages in the region. Border towns in the region are considered zones of risk but also opportunities for quick money-making ventures and deals that tend to attract a variety of criminals. While the danger is not alarmingly high, there is a likelihood that with the opening up of the East African Community to the free movement of goods and people, criminals will exploit this freedom to commit crimes such as human trafficking, drug smuggling and moving terrorists and contraband goods unless mechanisms are put in place to curtail these activities. Should this not happen, the mission of the East African Community could be jeopardised.     

Detecting Clandestine Reprocessing Activities in the Middle East

Remote monitoring of krypton-85 from undeclared reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel could be part of a fissile material cut-off treaty, could serve as an additional measure for the IAEA safeguards system to monitor compliance with the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty, and could be an important verification tool of a reprocessing moratorium or Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East or East Asia. Atmospheric transport modelling is applied to determine the area over which krypton-85 emissions from undeclared reprocessing activities at various levels in the Middle East would still be detectable against the high krypton-85 background from reprocessing in historical weapon programs in the United States and USSR as well as more recent and ongoing commercial reprocessing in France and the U.K. Analysis of annual wind flow over Israel's Dimona facility, the only operating reprocessing site in the region, suggests that a known reprocessing plant could be monitored with one or a few fixed monitoring stations. Random air sampling for krypton-85 analysis, perhaps using drones, may be feasible for reliable and timely detection of clandestine reprocessing plants against the krypton-85 background but would require on the order of 50–100 air samples per day. Ending reprocessing at La Hague in France and at Sellafield in the UK and the resulting decline of the krypton-85 background over time would reduce to about 10 the number of daily samples required to monitor the Middle East.     

FOUNDATIONS FOR REGIONAL SECURITY: PREPARING TO KEEP THE PEACE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

Since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the continent of Africa, particularly Greater East Africa, has played an increasingly signifi cant role in United States (US) national security strategy. Transnational security threats and political authoritarianism continue to plague the region, creating calls for greater US and international involvement. Before reacting to the situation, however, it is prudent to pause, reflect, and understand that the United States developed strategic relations with nation-states in the region well before contemporary concerns for international terrorism and ungoverned spaces entered the strategic lexicon. Toward a more comprehensive understanding of Greater East Africa's strategic history, this paper examines the core strategic relationship in the region, US-Kenya relations, its origins and implications, and offers policy recommendations that will affect future international security.     

伊拉克战争对国际政治格局的影响

美国凭借其强大的势力肆意出兵攻打伊拉克。这一结果虽不能使国际政治格局发生重大变化 ,世界多极化的趋势不能改变 ,但它进一步强化了美国的单边主义思想 ,使世界多极化的进程受到严峻挑战 ,同时也将改变中东地区的力量对比 ,重塑中东地区的政治格局 ,也使联合国的权威和地位受到了严重的挑战。     

THE MIDDLE EAST WMD-FREE ZONE CONFERENCE

This article reviews the origins and evolution of the Middle East weapons of mass destruction-free zone (WMDFZ) concept and the proposal for a 2012 conference on the subject, and explores new challenges and opportunities for regional arms control in the current regional environment. It suggests that new models may be necessary to revitalize regional arms control efforts. The establishment of a broad regional security forum could include, but should not be limited to, curtailing weapons of mass destruction through the zone approach. Even if the 2012 conference fails to materialize, or is limited to a one-time event, the proposal for such a conference has provided an important opportunity to rethink future options for a regional arms control and security process.     

EXTENDED DETERRENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The article presents and analyzes the US extended deterrence commitments in the Middle East as well as those provided by regional states, and assesses the effectiveness and credibility of these commitments. The article then proceeds to analyze a situation wherein Iran successfully develops nuclear weapons. It considers first the security requirements and alternatives of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, and then proceeds to assess the stability—or instability—of an Israeli-Iranian nuclear balance. The enhancement of US extended deterrence in the region is required in order to deter Iran, reassure allies, and contribute to the stability of an Israeli-Iranian nuclear balance. The article also discusses several contextual issues, such as: the future form of US extended deterrence; distinguishing between the latter and other US extended deterrence commitments; and the different approaches of specific GCC states and Israel.     

On the Road to the 2015 NPT Review Conference

The second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference (RevCon) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) highlighted two issues in particular—progress toward a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction–Free Zone and the Joint Statement on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons—that may not only greatly affect the health and vitality of the NPT and the 2015 RevCon, but possibly also have implications for the international nonproliferation regime as a whole. Dr. William Potter, director of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, interviewed Ambassador Cornel Feruta, chairman of the 2013 PrepCom, to discuss these and other issues related to the meeting and the future of the treaty and its review process.