Counterinsurgency and Operational Art

Addressing insurgency requires the same application of operational art as utilized in conventional warfare planning. Counterinsurgency strategy will be driven by the nature of the insurgent movement, with campaigns constructed to use tactics appropriately so that key facets of the insurgent campaign are neutralized. It is especially important to determine whether terror is used as a tactic (a method of action) by an insurgency or as a stand-alone strategy (a logic of action) by a challenger divorced from a mass base. Insurgencies, in turn, will normally emphasize strategically either winning allegiance of the target population or using violence as a substitute for other methods. Each of these approaches requires the weighting of the appropriate campaign elements of the counterinsurgency strategy. Sri Lanka, having faced both approaches, is an especially useful case study.     

US Counterinsurgency vs Iranian-Sponsored Terrorism

Terrorist networks involve not only non-state actors but also an international environment in which state sponsors and 'gray areas' play significant roles. Non-state actors need the sanctuaries of state sponsors and of areas outside of effective state control to recruit, organize, and train their ranks, and to finance their activities. Through statistical analysis of statements of Iranian state intentions, and measures of direct US military interventions, this study examines how US military interventions into Iran's perceived sphere of interests deterred Iranian support for terrorist actions by its proxy groups against United States targets from 1980 to 1990.     

Measures for Security in a Counterinsurgency

Quantitative measures to gauge progress in a counterinsurgency in use today include the number of enemy, friendly, and civilian casualties, and the level of violence. While common, each of these has drawbacks. With this and the sparseness of the literature on this topic in mind, we argue for a series of improved measures. These include the ratio of who is initiating incidents, an historical analysis of incidents and related variables, and an analysis of insurgent target sets. These measures are presented using data for Al Anbar province, Iraq, along with a discussion of their advantages over more common metrics.     

Military Maladaptation: Counterinsurgency and the Politics of Failure

Tactical learning is critical to battlefield success, especially in a counterinsurgency. This article tests the existing model of military adaption against a ‘most-likely’ case: the British Army’s counterinsurgency in the Southern Cameroons (1960–61). Despite meeting all preconditions thought to enable adaptation – decentralization, leadership turnover, supportive leadership, poor organizational memory, feedback loops, and a clear threat – the British still failed to adapt. Archival evidence suggests politicians subverted bottom-up adaptation, because winning came at too high a price in terms of Britain’s broader strategic imperatives. Our finding identifies an important gap in the extant adaptation literature: it ignores politics.     

The Nineteenth Century Origins of Counterinsurgency Doctrine

Abstract

In counterinsurgency, the population is the center of gravity. This insight has become a key doctrinal tenet of modern armed conflict. But where does it come from? The razzia, a tactic introduced by the French in North Africa around 1840, first thrust tribal populations into the focus of modern operational thinking. Soon the pioneering bureaux arabes added an administrative, civil, and political element. Eventually, in the 1890s, French operations in Madagascar gave rise to a mature counterinsurgency doctrine. David Galula, a French writer who heavily influenced the American Counterinsurgency manual, is merely the joint that connects the nineteenth century to the twenty-first.     

Regional Support for Afghan Insurgents: Challenges for Counterinsurgency Theory and Doctrine

After the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001, several thousand Afghan Taliban forces fled across the border to Pakistan, and the area became a safe haven for Afghan insurgents. In 2014, the transnational dimension of the insurgency is still highly prominent. Although regional support for insurgents is not uncommon, how to counter this aspect is mostly ignored in counterinsurgency (COIN) theory and doctrines. In this article, a regional counterinsurgency framework is developed, using the regional counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan as an example. The framework will facilitate the systematic inclusion of regional COIN measures in theory and doctrine.     

The Iraq Survey Group: From Weapons of Mass Destruction to Counterinsurgency

The discovery and elimination of Iraq's alleged weapons of mass destruction (WMD) was a focal point of the Coalition's strategy and operations in the aftermath of Operation ‘Iraqi Freedom’. Despite the failure of the WMD mission to meet expectations after almost two years of intensive operations, the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) was able to integrate multinational and multi-agency forces to provide detailed intelligence regarding the history of Iraq's WMD programs and to assist in the battle against insurgents. The ISG's experience raises the question of whether a standing intelligence force could become a key component in future counterproliferation and counterterrorism efforts around the world.1 ¹The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Dept. of Defense, or the US Government. View all notes     

The Agency of Force in Asymmetrical Warfare and Counterinsurgency: The Case of Chechnya

The use of force in asymmetrical warfare, and in counterinsurgency operations in particular, has been written off as strategically dangerous and politically irrational. The goal of the article is to examine the role of force in a modern military context and determine if victory through its application is theoretically feasible. This hypothesis will be tested against the backdrop of the conflict in Chechnya. The work will examine the Russian military and public policy as a subordinate subject to the overall inquiry of the article in an attempt to show that force was one of the major factors behind Russian military success in 2001.     

Asymmetry of Values,Indigenous Forces,and Incumbent Success in Counterinsurgency: Evidence from Chechnya

This article fills the gap in existing scholarship on asymmetric conflict, indigenous forces, and how socio-cultural codes shape the dynamics and outcomes of conflict transformation. Specifically, it identifies three key socio-cultural values commonplace in honorific societies: retaliation, hospitality, and silence. As sources of effective pro-insurgent violent mobilisation and support from among the local population, these values provide insurgents with an asymmetric advantage over much stronger incumbents. Using the case studies of the two Russian counterinsurgencies in Chechnya, the article shows the mechanisms on the ground through which Moscow’s deployment of indigenous forces against insurgents helped to stem the tide of conflict, reversing the insurgents’ initial advantage in terms of asymmetry of values.     

Articles: GCMA/GMI: A French Experience in Counterinsurgency during the French Indochina War

In 1951, the French created a special unit in Indochina, the Groupement de Commandos Mixtes Aéroportés (GCMA), to deal with the unconventional side of Vietminh strategy. Its initial purpose was to destroy Vietminh subversion of the rural population and not to harass Vietminh units. The GCMA developed an efficient process of swiftly taking control of large zones in the Vietminh rear areas through the use of native contact Special Mission teams. These infiltrated the population, gathered intelligence, and established guerrilla bands. This process enabled the GCMA to increase its strength dramatically through this specialised native recruitment to 14,000 men during the latter half of 1953. An important lesson from this experience is that the isolated teams were militarily weak and thus vulnerable to any concerted Vietminh offence. Counterinsurgency thus cannot be successful without an effective coordination between conventional and unconventional forces to counter this vulnerability.     

GPRS技术及其应用

通过介绍GPRS技术原理及特点 ,分析GPRS技术的优势 ,深入探讨其未来在个人和行业中的应用前景。     

生物附着及防治

由生物附着引起的船舶航速下降、过量耗费燃料（温室气体排放）及过高的船舶维修保养费用及船舶腐蚀等一系列问题,使得相关部门不得不耗费巨资来解决这一问题,同时也引起了生物学、流体力学、材料学及工程学等多个学科的专家们的共同关注。文章主要根据现阶段研究进展介绍了生物污损的过程及附着生物的分类．最后概述了防除船舶附着生物方法,并探讨了采用宏基因组学方法来尝试解决生物附着问题的可能性。     

极限概念及其发展的哲学解析

极限是微积分学的核心概念。极限概念及其发展过程中充满辨证思维,蕴含着深刻的哲学思想,体现了辨证法的联系论、对立统一律、否定之否定律。     

“联合全资产可视化”及其关键技术

论述了美军"联合全资产可视化"(JTAV)的背景、目标、策略及主要因素,重点阐述了JTAV的关键技术手段--射频识别技术,包括光储卡、射频识别、灵巧卡和射频数据通信等.提出了我军装备维修保障信息化过程中急需研究和开发的相关技术及基础架构.     

声纹鉴别及其应用

声纹是人说话声音的频谱图 ,由于人的个性 ,决定了不同人声纹的差异性 ,因此 ,声纹识别或声纹鉴定能够确定说话人的身份。声纹鉴别在很多领域有着广泛的应用价值和前景 ,这里 ,简单介绍声纹和声纹鉴定与识别的概念及其应用的历史与现状 ,探讨声纹鉴别的方法原理和步骤 ,讨论声纹鉴别在个人身份证明、刑事侦察、军事、通信、防伪等领域的应用 ,展望声纹鉴别的应用前景。     

电脑病毒及防治方法

本文介绍了电脑病毒的定义、来源、特征、形成、传播途径,同时介绍了在实际工作中如何判断电脑是否感染病毒,如何预防,以及常见电脑病毒的检测和解除方法。     

海德格尔与基本本体论

海德格尔的整个哲学体系是在区别“存在”和“存在者”的不同含义的基础上建立起来的。在海德格尔看来,此在的本真性生存也就是存在的意义,作为基础存在论的生存论是此在对自己存在的领悟并在领悟基础上的解释。海德格尔以人的生存为基础,使哲学获得了更加广阔的视野,但未能完全摆脱传统本体论思路的消极影响。     

一种可调控的申请分配模型及应用

针对分配总量一定情况下的申请分配问题,给出了一种带有决策者意愿的分配模型;讨论了模型中各参数的取值范围,得出了使得模型有意义的参数取值范围;给出了具体的应用案例,通过选取不同的参数得出了不同结果,说明了模型的有效性。     

反舰导弹齐射及其应用

为了提高反舰导弹对目标的射击效果,阐述了反舰导弹齐射的意义导弹齐射可缩短导弹武器系统的作战反应时间、提高导弹的突防概率,以及对大目标的选择概率和对目标的毁伤概率等.分析了反舰导弹齐射组织的相关因素,并提出了反舰导弹齐射时应注意的几个问题.