Conflict and fiscal capacity

We examine the role of war in retarding state fiscal capacity in developing countries, measured by tax revenue ratios to GDP. We build a simple theoretical model of a factionalized state, where patronage substitutes for common interest public goods, along with violent contestation over a rent or prize. Our dynamic panel empirical analysis applied to 79 developing countries, during 1980–2010, indicates that war, especially civil war, retards fiscal capacity, along with imperfect democracy, political repression, poor governance, and dependence on oil and macroeconomic mismanagement. High intensity conflict is particularly destructive of state capacity. In countries experiencing low intensity wars, other institutional factors may matter more than war. The diminution of fiscal capacity due to war appears less pronounced after the end of the cold war.     

伊拉克战争美军后勤(装备)保障特点及启示

伊拉克战争中,美军采取多种手段和措施,成功地实施了后勤(装备)保障,在保障准备、保障方法、保障信息化建设等方面呈现出许多新特点,为我军做好新形势下的装备保障工作提供了有益的启示。     

Innovation Inhibitors in War: Overcoming Obstacles in the Pursuit of Military Effectiveness

What explains the pace at which militaries adopt new technology? We argue that the hierarchical structure and unique expertise requirements of military organizations combine to empower select individuals as ‘gatekeepers’ of innovation. These individuals acquire beliefs throughout their military careers regarding the nature and means of warfare that act to shape their attitudes towards new military innovations. By filtering, sidelining, and ignoring competing sources of advice and information, these officers actively inhibit the adoption of new, often advantageous, innovations. We develop this argument through the analysis of two cases: the delayed acquisition of breech-loading and repeating rifles by the Union Army during the American Civil War, and the failure of the US Army to adopt an adequate heavy-type tank in World War II.     

Explaining US and British performance in complex expeditionary operations: The civil-military dimension

A nation's structure and culture of civil-military relations are important and largely overlooked factors in explaining the performance of armed forces involved in complex expeditionary operations. The US model of ‘Huntingtonian’, divided civil-military structures and poor interagency cooperation, makes the US military less suited for complex expeditionary operations. British civil-military relations involve a Defence Ministry that conscientiously integrates military and civilian personnel, as well as extensive interagency cooperation and coordination. This ‘Janowitzean’, integrated form of civil-military relations makes the British military more likely to provide for the planning and implementation of comprehensive campaigns that employ and coordinate all instruments of power available to the state, as well as troops in the field displaying the flexibility and cultural and political understanding that are necessary in complex expeditionary operations.     

The Escalation and De-escalation of Irregular War: Setting Out the Problem

Abstract

The introduction sets out the theme of the special issue. It introduces the topic of escalation by discussing the current state of the art in the literature and it outlines the set up of the remainder of the issue.     

Shifting power,preventive logic,and the response of the target: Germany,Russia, and the First World War

If a declining state has incentives for preventive war, the rising state should have incentives to delay a confrontation until it is stronger. We develop the theoretical paradox and examine the July 1914 crisis. Why did Russia, rising relative to Germany, not adopt a buying-time strategy? We argue that although most Russian leaders hoped to avoid a confrontation, they feared that the failure to support Serbia would lead to a loss of Russian credibility and a significant setback to Russia’s position in the Balkans, one that could not easily be reversed, even with Russia’s expected increase in relative military power.     

The Hidden Factors that Turned the Tide: Strategic Decision-Making and Operational Intelligence in the 1973 War

This article analyzes the quality of the Egyptian and Israeli intelligence advice and decision-making process in the October 1973 War as key factors that determined its course. Following a background to the subject, we focus on the 9–13 October standstill stage, in which Sadat decided, despite his generals’ advice, to renew the Egyptian offensive. Effective Israeli intelligence collection about the coming attack, which was well used by the decision-makers, saved Israel from accepting an undesired ceasefire. The result was the 14 October failed Egyptian offensive that turned the tide of the war and led to Israeli military achievements at the war’s final stage     

毛泽东军事思想对古代兵学文化的传承与发展

毛泽东军事思想植根于中国古代兵学文化的土壤,它的战争观、军事伦理价值观、战争谋略法等思想,与中国古代社会"仁战"、"义战"、"以民为本"、"以奇制胜"、"以礼治军"等战略方法、战略思想一脉相承,同时也是对古代兵学文化的创造性发展,是中国革命战争实践、马列主义军事思想和古代兵学文化相结合的产物。     

Holding the Bridge in Troubled Times: The Cold War and the Navies of Europe

European navies made a fundamental contribution to the Cold War at sea, ensuring the effectiveness of deterrence even as Soviet naval forces grew to ominous proportions. European fleets were tasked with containing a Soviet attack until US forces could arrive on the scene. Many European navies pursued essential niche capabilities tailored for their own unique maritime environments. Others made important contributions to broader NATO efforts in the high-stakes arenas of sea control, power projection and even nuclear deterrence. Contentious issues did arise, for example concerning burden-sharing, but true to its name, the alliance succeeded collectively in wielding formidable sea power. This paper is based on the premise that the maritime players in the Cold War at sea were by no means restricted to the US and Soviet navies. The navies of Western Europe and Canada had major roles to play as well within the NATO area. They contributed a great deal to the political cohesion crucial to an essentially maritime alliance, and in many cases had a real operational contribution to make as well. What follows, then, is the Cold War at sea from a European point of view.     

装甲机械化部队面临高技术局部战争的挑战

本文通过对典型高技术条件下局部战争的分析,指出了装甲机械化部队所面临的挑战及应战的对策.     

抗日战争时期爱国主义的特点及启示

抗日战争时期爱国主义的主要特点是:爱国力量的空前广泛性;爱国理念的鲜明时代性;爱国内容的明显进步性;爱国斗争的极大彻底性。上述特点给予我们的启示是:爱国主义是振兴中华民族的根本动力,中华儿女要永远高举爱国主义伟大旗帜;爱国主义具有鲜明的时代内容,弘扬爱国主义必须与时俱进;爱国主义具有深刻的内涵,实践爱国主义必须以科学理论为指导。     

A Matter of Choice: Strategy and Discretion in the Shadow of World War II

American policy-makers are predisposed towards the idea of a necessary war of survival, fought with little room for choice. This reflects a dominant memory of World War II that teaches Americans that they live in a dangerously small world that imposes conflict. Critics argue that the ‘choice versus necessity’ schema is ahistorical and mischievous. This article offers supporting fire to those critiques. America's war against the Axis (1941–45) is a crucial case through which to test the ‘small world’ view. Arguments for war in 1941 pose overblown scenarios of the rise of a Eurasian super-threat. In 1941 conflict was discretionary and not strictly necessary in the interests of national security. The argument for intervention is a closer call that often assumed. This has implications for America's choices today.     

浅谈《孙子兵法》在部队安全防事故中的应用

《孙子兵法》中所蕴含的军队管理理念对部队的安全防事故工作有着高度的借鉴意义。从各级指挥员是部队安全防事故工作的主导,有效预防各类事故案件指挥员应具备综合的管理素质,明确部队安全防事故工作是全体官兵的共同责任三个方面,对《孙子兵法》在部队安全防事故中应用的合理性进行了分析。     

Coordinating Covert Action: The Case of the Yemen Civil War and the South Arabian Insurgency

Focusing on British involvement in the 1960s Yemen Civil War, this article examines the centralised mechanisms developed in Whitehall to coordinate covert action interdepartmentally. It therefore sheds new light on London's security and intelligence machine and its input into clandestine operations. Drawing on recently declassified documents and interviews, it uncovers various important but secretive actors, which have been overlooked or misunderstood in the existing literature, and outlines their functions in the most detail yet available. In doing so, it considers how these bodies evolved in relation to competing threat assessments of the local situation and the impact they had on Britain's covert intervention in the theatre. This article assesses the utility of the system and argues that it provided an effective means to ensure that any covert action sanctioned was properly scrutinised so as to reduce risks and best meet national interests.     

浅谈《孙子兵法》中的战场造势理论

《孙子兵法》问世两千多年以来,其学术价值受到历代军事家、史学家、哲学家们的广泛重视和一致赞誉。对于战场造势的研究,尤以孙子兵法为最先和最具代表性。其中,先胜后战、因情造势和择人任势等内容,是《孙子兵法》中战场造势理论的核心和精华。     

MAD,not Marx: Khrushchev and the nuclear revolution

The revival of nuclear strategy in US policy and scholarship has been strengthened by arguments that the ‘nuclear revolution’ – the assumption that thermonuclear bombs and missiles had made major war too dangerous to wage – does not affect international behaviour as much as nuclear revolution advocates claim. This article shows that the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev indeed regarded nuclear war as too dangerous to wage, a decision which manifested itself not so much in foreign policy or military doctrine but in his determination to avoid war when the possibility arose. We argue that Khrushchev’s experience provides us with a more useful way to characterise the nuclear revolution and suggest some implications of this argument for contemporary debates about nuclear weaponry.     

Becoming the enemy: Convergence in the American and Al Qaeda ways of warfare

The United States and Al Qaeda represent two fundamentally different forms of warfare. The US, with its basis in the Western way of warfare, relies on an almost totally instrumental form of warfare and Al Qaeda, with its basis in the Islamic way of warfare, fights an expressive, existential form of warfare. This paper illustrates how both sides' ways of warfare are converging toward each other. It also argues that this is in fact a good thing because it will allow the US to understand its enemy and thereby allow the US to defeat him in terms he can understand.