经济建设贯彻国防需求中的企业激励问题

经济建设贯彻国防需求是指民用经济建设过程搭载国防功能,为动员能力扩张做准备,形成潜在的国防供给能力。在经济建设中贯彻国防需求就要对企业形成有效激励,促使其有效落实国防需求,确保政府国防动员目标的实现。有效的激励方式应包括利益激励、强化激励及竞争激励等。     

装备研制中的国防知识产权激励强度优选

为定量研究促进国防知识产权向装备研制转化的有效激励政策,运用效用函数理论构造了政府和武器装备研制单位的效用函数,建立了国防知识产权激励强度优化选择模型,并进行了数值模拟。结果表明:政府需要在促进转化运用和激励技术创新之间进行权衡,制定的以国防知识产权使用费为核心的激励政策既要保证研制单位的应用积极性,又要激励企事业单位的开发积极性。     

激励相容视角下民企参军知识产权激励研究

当前,民企参军成绩斐然但问题不少,其中知识产权激励成为制约民企参军一个突出瓶颈,一定程度上影响了优势民企参与国防科研活动的热情和积极性。从激励相容理论视角,阐述了其对知识产权激励问题的理论意义和现实价值,探讨了民企参军进程中知识产权激励缺失主要问题,提出了加强国防知识产权管理,在权属分配、定价评估、保密解密、产权纠纷等方面建立和完善激励相容的民企参军知识产权激励的对策措施。     

军工企业国防知识产权管理问题研究

军工企业是国防科研和生产的重要基地,是产生国防知识产权的摇篮。阐述了军工企业国防知识产权管理现状,针对当前管理工作中存在的为管理而管理、工作主动性不足以及国防知识产权转化障碍等问题进行了分析,并从加强管理人员激励工作、推动管理规范化系统建设和搭建转化平台等方面提出了国防知识产权管理意见建议。     

对我国国防知识产权利益分配现状的基本认识

国防知识产权利益的合理分配能够有效的激励创新主体寻求技术突破,从根本上提高我国国防科技水平和武器装备自主创新能力,最终为国防建设的科学发展提供有力条件。文章针对当前我国国防知识产权利益分配中存在的三个现实问题：缺少明确的法律规范、没有清晰的分类标准和未找到适用的理论和方法,提出相应的对策,以达到激励国防知识产权生成,保护国防技术安全,促进国防科技进步的目的。     

国防采购应急管理策略研究

文章基于突发事件下国防采购需求突发和时间紧迫的特征,将时间敏感性需求引入到"供应商-国防采购方"二级供应链应急决策中,建立了提供及时交付奖励的Stackelberg博弈模型,并对国防采购应急管理协议供货策略进行研究,得出激励方案对提高及时交货率具有明显作用,还讨论了在突发事件引起需求的时间敏感系数变动时,采购方应如何调整激励策略来保证供应商及时交货。     

国防知识产权激励与管理政策研究

文章利用资本共生理论和优势权能力理论,分析了国防知识产权形成机理及其运动关系,明确提出应制定复合产权权属政策、分层分类管理政策和优化合同管理政策,建立和完善紧急状态下国家征用和占有国防知识产权政策,完善国防知识产权保密解密等相关制度,提高国防知识产权激励与管理效益。     

国防专利技术转移自组织形成及培育研究

将国防专利技术转移过程视为一个开放的自组织系统,在分析国防专利技术转移的内涵及要素构成基础上,剖析了国防专利技术转移自组织形成的基本条件及演化动力,并从打破平衡、激励竞争和促进合作3个方面提出了具体的培育路径。     

借鉴X效率理论加强国防人力资源管理

军队作为国防人力资源管理的垄断性组织同样存在X低效率。通常,X低效率水平等于军队最大的战斗力生成水平与实际战斗力生成水平之差。导致X低效率的原因有:传统的人事管理制度、国防人力资源的选择理性、劳动合同的不完全性和激励约束机制不健全。降低X低效率必须树立以人为本的管理思想,创新国防人力资源管理体制,完善激励约束机制,营造和谐的军营环境。     

构建PPBES预算制度提高国防费效益

国防费投入及结构是国防经济发展和提高效益的前提,但是我国国防费增长的剧烈波动直接影响国防经济和国民经济的健康发展。通过科学配套的PPBES国防预算制度创新,建立健全决策、监控、激励约束、国防费标准体系和支付增长机制,并完善国防预算法律法规体系,有利于促进国防投入配置的有效性、透明性和国防经济运行的健康发展。     

Strategic dynamic sourcing from competing suppliers with transferable capacity investment

We study the supplier relationship choice for a buyer that invests in transferable capacity operated by a supplier. With a long‐term relationship, the buyer commits to source from a supplier over a long period of time. With a short‐term relationship, the buyer leaves open the option of switching to a new supplier in the future. The buyer has incomplete information about a supplies efficiency, and thus uses auctions to select suppliers and determine the contracts. In addition, the buyer faces uncertain demand for the product. A long‐term relationship may be beneficial for the buyer because it motivates more aggressive bidding at the beginning, resulting a lower initial price. A short‐term relationship may be advantageous because it allows switching, with capacity transfer at some cost, to a more efficient supplier in the future. We find that there exists a critical level of the switching cost above which a long‐term relationship is better for the buyer than a short‐term relationship. In addition, this critical switching cost decreases with demand uncertainty, implying a long‐term relationship is more favorable for a buyer facing volatile demand. Finally, we find that in a long‐term relationship, capacity can be either higher or lower than in a short‐term relationship. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 2009     

What Goes Up Must Come Down: Military Expenditure and Civil Wars

Abstract

This paper examines the impact of civil war on military expenditure. We employ two measures of military expenditure: the share of military expenditure in general government expenditure and the logarithm of military expenditures. We would reasonably expect a priori that military expenditure as a share of general government expenditure increases during a civil war and that such increases would taper off over the duration of a civil war. We also explore whether the termination of a civil war induces a decline in the share of military expenditure as a share of the general government expenditure in the short-run. We find evidence the of share of military expenditure increases during a civil war and falls in the year succeeding the end of a civil war, and, in particular, if a war ends in a peace treaty. The level of military expenditures, however, rises during civil wars and does not appear to decline in the short-term after the end of a civil war.     

平面B—样条曲线的拐点定理

利用插入节点的算法,本文研究了Ｂ—样条曲线的形状,得到了Ｂ—样条曲线拐点的一个定理。该定理描述了当控制多边形只有一个拐向点时Ｂ—样条曲线的拐点、尖点和二重点的关系。此项研究对于工程应用中的ＣＡＤ有较实际的指导作用。     

学术论文摘要与关键词规范化浅析

摘要是从论文中提炼出来的语义完整的概括文章主旨的紧缩性短语的短文;关键词是从报告、论文中选取出来的,用以表示全文主题内容信息的词或词组。摘要、关键词是文献检索的重要标识,具有窥一斑而见全豹的作用。读者只要浏览摘要及关键词,便可了解文章大意,决定是否阅读全文。二者都是为文献检索提供信息或直接为某些文章所转摘。所以,应按照规范要求,把握摘要四要素,认真撰写摘要,准确选取关键词。将文献信息全面、准确、清晰地提供给读者,提高文献转摘率和被引用率。     

A Castle in the Air? The Building,Arms, Action and Incident on the Eleventh-Century ‘Castle’ Capital from Westminster Hall

The restoration of Westminster Hall in the 1830s revealed a number of eleventh-century carved capitals, one depicting, as then described, ‘an armed man assailing a castle’. Aided by archaeological evidence from Abinger (Surrey), the ‘castle’ can be convincingly interpreted as a motte-top tower, carried by earth-fast posts, open-sided below and faced above with boards painted to resemble masonry. It is the only known depiction in elevation of a type of tower that is likely, given its simplicity, to have been widely used in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. The assailant, armed with an axe, carrying a round shield and wearing a helmet with nasal, is shown climbing the tower’s external stair at the moment of being despatched or wounded by the defender’s spear. The incident, an individual action rather than a ‘siege’ as such, has many oddities, and may represent a topical event or scene from history or mythology. The story of the Trojan War is suggested as a possible source.     

隧道火灾机械通风临界风速研究

由于隧道的半封闭性,空间有限,当长度很长时空气流通不畅,一旦发生火灾,烟气就会迅速填充隧道,而且CO等危险气体也会随烟气向隧道扩散,这对隧道内车辆和人员造成极大的危险。因此,需要保证隧道内空气流通状态的良好以及发生火灾时对烟气的良好控制。模拟了隧道口附近发生一定功率火灾的情况下,控制烟气层流动所需要的临界风速。     

Deterrence of Nuclear Terror

Nuclear proliferation, lax security standards in the storage of fissile materials, and international apathy in the prosecution of terrorists make nuclear terror a serious threat to the United States and its allies, yet no doctrine of retaliation has been established. To decrease the probability of terrorist use of nuclear weapons, a doctrine of retaliation—a negligence doctrine—should be considered. If the United States can distinguish whose fissile material was used for a nuclear terror event, a negligence doctrine would prescribe retaliation against that state. Where the proximate cause—terrorists—is unavailable for deterrent retaliation, deterring an accessible mediate cause—a state that has failed to adequately secure its fissile material—is one of a few effective alternatives. In the absence of such a negligence doctrine, the United States and its allies are increasingly vulnerable to a nuclear terror attack and the ensuing negative consequences.     

India: Fleeting Attachment to the Counterinsurgency Grand Strategy

India’s success in dealing with insurgency movements was based on adherence to four key rules of engagement: identifying a lead counter-insurgent force, launching population-centric counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, non-use of excessive force and confining the role of the COIN operations to preparing a ground for a political solution. While the country does not yet have a COIN doctrine, these four rules of engagement do constitute what can be referred to a COIN grand strategy. Analysis of the several continuing insurgencies, however, reveals the country’s inability to adhere to the grand strategy. Political considerations, incapacity to manoeuvre through the demands of various stake holders, and even the wish to expedite the decimation of insurgent outfits through a force-centric approach has produced a long history of failures in dousing the fires of discontent.     

Using stochastic programming to solve an outpatient appointment scheduling problem with random service and arrival times

We study a stochastic outpatient appointment scheduling problem (SOASP) in which we need to design a schedule and an adaptive rescheduling (i.e., resequencing or declining) policy for a set of patients. Each patient has a known type and associated probability distributions of random service duration and random arrival time. Finding a provably optimal solution to this problem requires solving a multistage stochastic mixed‐integer program (MSMIP) with a schedule optimization problem solved at each stage, determining the optimal rescheduling policy over the various random service durations and arrival times. In recognition that this MSMIP is intractable, we first consider a two‐stage model (TSM) that relaxes the nonanticipativity constraints of MSMIP and so yields a lower bound. Second, we derive a set of valid inequalities to strengthen and improve the solvability of the TSM formulation. Third, we obtain an upper bound for the MSMIP by solving the TSM under the feasible (and easily implementable) appointment order (AO) policy, which requires that patients are served in the order of their scheduled appointments, independent of their actual arrival times. Fourth, we propose a Monte Carlo approach to evaluate the relative gap between the MSMIP upper and lower bounds. Finally, in a series of numerical experiments, we show that these two bounds are very close in a wide range of SOASP instances, demonstrating the near‐optimality of the AO policy. We also identify parameter settings that result in a large gap in between these two bounds. Accordingly, we propose an alternative policy based on neighbor‐swapping. We demonstrate that this alternative policy leads to a much tighter upper bound and significantly shrinks the gap.     

The 1983 Nuclear Crisis – Lessons for Deterrence Theory and Practice

This article distills insights for the scholarship of deterrence by examining the 1983 nuclear crisis – the moment of maximum danger of the late Cold War. Important contributions notwithstanding, our understanding of this episode still has caveats, and a significant pool of theoretical lessons for strategic studies remain to be learned. Utilizing newly available sources, this article suggests an alternative interpretation of Soviet and US conduct. It argues that the then US deterrence strategy almost produced Soviet nuclear overreaction by nearly turning a NATO exercise into a prelude to a preventive Soviet attack. Building on historical findings, this article offers insights about a mechanism for deterrence effectiveness evaluation, recommends establishing a structure responsible for this endeavor, and introduces a new theoretical term to the strategic studies lexicon – a ‘culminating point of deterrence’.