Lesotho’s 2015 elections in the context of an ongoing security vacuum

After inconclusive elections in 2012, Lesotho had a coalition government for the first time, made up of three political parties that had a narrow majority in parliament. The new government, however, faced several challenges, some of which were of its own making. The agreement among the three parties was to literally divide the government into three parts, leading to a continuous stalemate in its operation; the most serious consequence was the prorogation of parliament and the resultant attempted coup. The flight of the prime minister to South Africa and his return under a Southern African Development Community (SADC) security detail provided a short-term solution to Lesotho's security crisis. Under Cyril Ramaphosa's mediation, the prorogued parliament was conditionally opened and the election date set for 28 February 2015. However, the security dilemma – whereby the prime minister, who is also minister of defence, has no control over the military – remains. When elections are held, there does not seem to be a guarantee that they will be held in peace; moreover, there are now fears that the losers will not accept the results of the elections because of the security vacuum in Lesotho. This article argues that peace can only be salvaged by enhanced SADC security before, during and after the elections. It argues that the SADC mission should remain beyond the elections to oversee the constitutional changes that are necessary for ensuring long-term stability. On their own, Lesotho politicians are unlikely to be able to work together in order to move the country forward.     

When will the long nightmare come to an end?

This article seeks to show that the emotive reconciliation project in Zimbabwe, which is currently spearheaded by the Organ on National Healing, Reconciliation and Integration, is not new in the Zimbabwe polity. Its incarnation under the Government of National Unity clearly indicates the inadequacies and ineffectiveness of the initial reconciliation project, which was enunciated immediately after independence in 1980. In this article we argue that while the notion of resuscitating reconciliation is an important step towards durable peace, this institutionalised, state-centric and state-propelled project is haunted by the very same challenges that undermined and shattered its predecessor. We further assert that the reconciliation and healing project, which is politically engineered and institutionally driven without being inclusive and community driven, is a mere token that comes at the expense of durable peace and the actual victims of violence and impunity.     

Using public health information to inform,build support and implement policies for gun violence prevention: A case study from the gun ban referendum

Gun violence is one of the most serious health problems in Brazil. Information on gun deaths and injuries is collected by the Ministry of Health. This data has been used very successfully to inform and design public policies for preventing gun violence. This article analyses the use of public health information by researchers and activists, as well as government officials and the media, to reveal the severity of firearm injuries and deaths and to gain consensus on the need for reforms to national gun laws. It also assesses the resounding ‘no’ vote in a recent disarmament referendum to decide whether to prohibit the sale of guns and ammunition. The results of the Brazilian referendum are a lesson to other countries struggling to deal with high levels of gun violence, showing that it may not always be enough to have data to back up efforts to change policies—as people's decisions around gun ownership and use, as well as their choices regarding security policies, are motivated by a complex interaction of factors.     

Political dynamics in Kenya’s post-electoral violence: Justice without peace or political compromise?

The political upheavals that erupted in Kenya after the release of the 2007–8 election results resulted in the death of approximately 1 200 people, as well as the loss of livestock and other valuable property. While the Kenyan government tried to seek solutions to the crisis, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued warrants for the arrest of top government officials. For its part, the African Union (AU) accused the ICC of racism by targeting only African leaders, and maintained that such practices undermine the rule of equality before the law set forth in Article 27 of the Rome Statute. The AU is therefore advising African countries, including Kenya, to consider withdrawing from the ICC. Will the ICC's intervention into the situation in Kenya bring justice and peace to the country, or will it add to the existing injuries affecting not just the country but the region as well? Through a critical analysis of contemporary scholarly discourse, this article unravels the dilemma of the ICC's intervention and the likely consequences of this action for the people of Kenya and Africa.     

Was the Nigerian 2015 presidential election a victory for Boko Haram or for democracy?

The ousting of Dr Goodluck Jonathan marked the first time in Nigerian history that a member of the opposition unseated an incumbent in fair and peaceful elections. The smooth transition of power, uncharacteristic of Nigeria, was hailed by the international community as a victory. However, did Muhammadu Buhari win because Jonathan lost or did Jonathan lose because Buhari won? This article argues that Jonathan's growing unpopularity gave Buhari the win, and that Boko Haram played a major role in the president's sinking support. The 2015 presidential election was thus a win for both democracy and Boko Haram.     

A drive to regime change through nonviolent economic warfare: The post-Mugabe era, 2017–2019

ABSTRACT

This article examines efforts made by the Movement for Democratic Change Alliance to bring about regime change through nonviolent economic warfare including its subsequent failure. The 30 July 2018 harmonised elections in Zimbabwe led to a victory by Emmerson Mnangagwa but it was disputed by Nelson Chamisa. Since August 2018, the political opposition led by Chamisa sought to make the country ungovernable by waging a nonviolent economic war nicknamed Kuzvidira jecha (pouring sand) against the Mnangagwa administration. This was punctuated by price hikes, fluctuation of the local currency, artificial food stuff price hikes and fuel shortages which caused serious challenges for most Zimbabweans. This was primarily intended to bring about regime change via public unrest against the Mnangagwa regime. On the contrary, the anticipated public uproar failed to foster regime change in Zimbabwe despite widespread adverse socio-economic effects. This led to the nonviolent participants resorting to violent tactics instead of adhering to nonviolence. Consequently, it was the failure to adhere to nonviolent principles by opposition advocates which forced the Mnangagwa regime to deploy its own instruments of violence in an effort to protect lives and property.     

When the Going Gets Tough… Monitoring Missions and a Changing Conflict Environment in Sri Lanka, 2002–2008

This article analyzes how the conflict environment in which a civilian monitoring mission is deployed influences the monitors' assessment of the operation. It draws on unique empirical material from the experience of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), deployed to oversee a ceasefire agreement in Sri Lanka 2002–2008. With material from a survey and in-depth interviews, experiences of the monitors are analyzed and changes over time are traced in relation to the monitors' assessment of the mandate and organizational set-up of the mission. The study points to the difficulty of monitoring missions to address escalation during an ongoing peace process. Its function is dependent on the goodwill of the parties. In essence, monitoring missions have the potential to strengthen peace when there is momentum in favor of progress, but when relations between the parties turn sour and the conflict escalates a civilian monitoring mission basically loses its potential. During the final stages of the war, which saw a very large number of civilian casualties, the war-torn areas were closed to international observers. Moreover, international pressure for a short-term ceasefire to alleviate the humanitarian situation was dismissed by the Sri Lankan government, which also saw the backing of several important actors, not the least China.     

维和警察射击训练应注意的几个问题

维和警察射击训练中应重视枪的携带方法和快速出枪动作,在握枪时应掌握好握枪的用力和力量练习。要想提高射击的命中率还应练习“记忆”,射击是技能训练,技能训练更应该提高肌肉记忆和各部器官的感觉记忆。     

Comment: Why “an identified systemic model of the democracy‐peace nexus” does not persuade*

In their article in this journal, James, Solberg and Wolfson (1999) challenge our findings that two states are more likely to have peaceful relations if they are both democratic. They claim to develop a simultaneous system of two equations showing that peace and democracy foster each other, and that the effect of peace in encouraging democracy is stronger than that of democracy on peace. Their analysis, however, is flawed. Their research design employs measures of dispute and joint democracy that are inferior to those now common in the literature, and their equation for predicting peace is not properly specified. These problems distort their results. Even so, their results provide evidence of the pacific benefits of democracy. Analyses we conduct with a more completely specified model reveal stronger support for the democratic “ peace. Furthermore, a test of the effect of interstate conflict on democracy should be done at the national (or monadic) level of analysis; but James et al. perform a dyadic analysis. In a monadic test using vector autoregression, we find that disputes make no contribution to explaining the character of regimes. Even with their dyadic method, their finding that peace promotes democracy is not robust Including a crucial control variable, the ratio of militarily relevant national capabilities, that James et al. omitted, dramatically alters their findings.     

Political influence on civil war mortality rates: The electoral college as a battlefield

This paper employs public choice analysis to explain certain kinds of military decision‐making during the Civil War. Specifically, the political costs and benefits which may have influenced policy with respect to casualty rates in the Union army are considered. A primary empirical finding is that electoral votes per capita are a strong explainer of casualties across Union states, all else equal.     

首都周边维稳预警机制研究

在构建首都大周边维稳预警机制中,情报工作具有监测、预测和辅助决策功能。社情监测离不开情报的收集,维稳社情预测依赖于情报的分析、研判、传递与通报,危害社会安全稳定案件预控离不开情报支撑。做好首都周边地区维稳预警工作,需要健全和完善情报收集制度、情报分析和研判制度、情报送报制度、相关情报工作制度以及社会舆情信息汇集与分析制度。     

浅析达尔富尔和平进程及其面临的挑战

达尔富尔危机始于2003年2月。这场危机主要是由北方的游牧民与南方的定居农民之间对生存资源的争夺而引发的国内冲突。在国际社会的斡旋下,苏丹政府已与几个反政府武装签署了和平协议,并同意部署联合国-非盟混合维和行动,达尔富尔地区的和平进程已步入正轨。由于苏丹国内的复杂形势和困难,达尔富尔地区的和平进程仍面临诸多挑战,和平与和解之路仍然漫长。     

Walking a tightrope: the International Criminal Court and conflict prevention in Africa

Many African countries gained political independence in the 1960s. This era of independence came with promises and great expectations of economic, political and social development. Fifty years later, it is certain that the promises and expectations of independence have not been easily realised. Perennial violent conflicts have continued to ravage many countries in Africa, causing the catastrophic breakdown of law and order. Therefore, one of the major issues in conflict resolution discourse in Africa is how to develop functional mechanisms for the prevention of violent conflicts. This article examines the capacity of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to act as a mechanism for conflict prevention in Africa. Notwithstanding the doubts and uncertainties associated with the impact of law on conflict transformation, this article argues in the main that the ICC contributes to conflict prevention in Africa by expressing global norms of international law, challenging the culture of impunity in some countries, contributing to general deterrence, speedily intervening in some violent conflicts, and contributing to building some records of atrocities by identifying who did what.     

No war,no peace

The armed conflict over crude petroleum oil in the Niger Delta has raged for several decades. A host of peace initiatives have been adopted by the Nigerian state to address it, but with minimal impact. The amnesty offer to repentant militias in 2009 by President Umaru Yar'Adua's administration is one of the most recent and broadest peace initiatives by the Nigerian government intended to end the general tendency to warfare and the absence of peace in the Niger Delta. This article, based on secondary sources of data, examines the components of the amnesty, its critical problems and their implications for peacebuilding in the Niger Delta. It finds that though the programme has engendered relative peace, the issues and grievances that occasioned the general tendency to warfare and absence of peace in the region – such as inequitable distribution of oil revenue, environmental degradation, and underdevelopment – are not properly articulated in the disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration components of the programme. Thus, it holds that the prevailing situation in the region largely approximates a swinging pendulum of no war, no peace.