The United States and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) in East Asia: Connecting Coercive and Non-Coercive Uses of Military Power

Abstract

Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) is increasingly important for East Asian militaries, but there is little scholarship on how HADR relates to broader national strategies. This article considers US involvement in HADR in East Asia in relation to changing conceptions of national power. HADR is frequently described as use of ‘hard’ military assets to further soft power goals. Looking at recent US experiences, this article shows that HADR also serves instrumental ends linked to traditional military objectives. Rather than considering power as ‘soft’ or ‘hard’, it argues that HADR illustrates connections between non-coercive and coercive uses of military power.     

I Will Follow: Smart Power and the Management of Wartime Alliances

Abstract

This paper employs the concept of smart power to construct an analytical framework for assessing wartime alliance management. It makes two arguments. First, wartime sources of soft power differ from those obtaining during peacetime. Second, the coerciveness with which an alliance leader wields hard power towards actual or prospective allies should vary inversely with the amount of soft power it possesses. The smart power framework illuminates three types of alliance management failure. The paper’s key contentions are illustrated with examples furnished from the record of US alliance leadership since World War II.     

Economic Development and Military Effectiveness

Abstract

What makes some states more militarily powerful than others? A growing body of research suggests that certain ‘non-material’ factors significantly affect a country's ability to translate resources into fighting power. In particular, recent studies claim that democracy, Western culture, high levels of human capital, and amicable civil-military relations enhance military effectiveness. If these studies are correct, then military power is not solely or even primarily determined by material resources, and a large chunk of international relations scholarship has been based on a flawed metric. The major finding of this article, however, suggests that this is not the case. In hundreds of battles between 1898 and 1987, the more economically developed side consistently outfought the poorer side on a soldier-for-soldier basis. This is not surprising. What is surprising is that many of the non-material factors posited to affect military capability seem to be irrelevant: when economic development is taken into account, culture and human capital become insignificant and democracy actually seems to degrade warfighting capability. In short, the conventional military dominance of Western democracies stems from superior economic development, not societal pathologies or political institutions. Therefore, a conception of military power that takes into account both the quantity of a state's resources and its level of economic development provides a sound basis for defense planning and international relations scholarship.     

Mailed Fists and Velvet Gloves: The Relevance of Smart Power to Singapore’s Evolving Defence and Foreign Policy

Abstract

This paper critically assesses the conceptual utility of smart power to Singapore’s evolving defence and foreign policy and behaviour. First, as a political concept adopted by the United States for its post-Afghanistan strategy, smart power does not travel easily. With qualifications, however, the notion is relevant to Singapore’s policy pragmatism and its emphasis on deterrence and diplomacy. Second, Singapore’s willingness to employ its military assets in disaster relief and peacekeeping arguably hews most closely to smart power’s mix of hard and soft approaches. Third, Singapore’s contributions to global governance, albeit limited, imply a rethinking among its leaders on the place of values in its policy.     

Understanding the Legitimacy of Armed Groups: A Relational Perspective

Abstract

This paper analyses the multiple pathways through which legitimacy of armed groups is constructed in conflict-affected states. It adopts a political sociological approach to the study of armed group legitimacy. Such a strategy assists in identifying whether armed groups enjoy legitimacy in a given empirical context and avoids applying pre-determined normative criteria. The focus is on three types of relationships: civilian communities, the state or regime in power and external actors including regional and international sponsors, to discern which types of legitimacy matter for armed groups in different relationships.     

The People’s Liberation Army and China’s Smart Power Quandary in Southeast Asia

Abstract

China has a strong interest in pursuing a smart power strategy towards Southeast Asia and has worked laboriously to engage with regional countries economically, socially, and politically. But China has been only partially successful in achieving its goals in the region. This paper argues that China’s security policy towards Southeast Asia significantly contradicts many other objectives that Beijing wishes to accomplish. Given the deep-seated, narrowly-defined national interests of the Chinese military in the South China Sea disputes, it is likely that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) will continue to pose the main obstacle to the effective implementation of a Chinese smart strategy in Southeast Asia.     

Bringing Balancing Back In: Britain's Targeted Balancing, 1936–1939

This article challenges the conventional wisdom that Neville Chamberlain rejected the British tradition of balance of power in the 1930s. In contrast to balance of power and balance of threat theories, states do not balance against aggregate or net shifts in power. Instead, leaders define threats based on particular elements of a foreign state's power. The import is that different components of power of a foreign state are more or less threatening and aggregate shifts in power alone may not provoke counterbalancing behavior. In the 1930s, Britain balanced against the most threatening components of power: the German Luftwaffe and the threat of a knock-out air assault against the homeland, Japan's Imperial Navy and its threat to Britain's commercial trade routes and the Dominions in East Asia, and the Italian Navy and the threat to Britain's line of communication through the Mediterranean Sea to India and Asia. Given Britain's difficult financial circumstances, all other components of power, such as the army and the land components of power of Germany, Japan, and Italy were ranked as secondary in terms of its rearmament priorities. Thus, London was able to narrow the gap with Berlin in specific components of power of strategic importance such as aircraft production or to exceed Germany in other areas such as the Royal Navy and its battlefleet.     

Smart Power and Japan’s Self-Defense Forces

Abstract

From Iraq to the Gulf of Aden and the South Pacific, this paper evaluates how far theoretical ideas about smart power manifest in operational missions of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF). To function within a ‘smart’ power context, this paper suggests that JSDF operates in ‘assisting’ mode, rather than the ‘threatening’ behavior of ‘hard’ power. JSDF also deployed alongside other Japanese ‘soft’ power tools – diplomatic, cultural, developmental, and NGOs, using tailored programs for different cultural and geographical contexts. Given constitutional constraints and public sensitivity towards coercive force, JSDF missions could be integrated more into a ‘whole-of-government’ approach advancing foreign policy goals through ‘smart power’.     

Cyberpower in Strategic Affairs: Neither Unthinkable nor Blessed

Abstract

This article explores the effect of connectivity on strategic affairs. It argues that the effect on war's character is potentially, although not yet shown in practice, considerably large. Its effect upon the distribution of power among states in the international system is small, contrary to the claims of ‘cyberwar’ alarmists. All told, however, its effect upon strategic affairs is complex. On the one hand, it represents a significant advance in the ‘complexification’ of state strategies, understood in the sense of the production of intended effects. On the other hand, strategists today – still predominantly concerned with the conflicts and confrontations of states and organised military power – are generally missing the power which non-traditional strategic actors, better adapted to the network flows of the information age, are beginning to deploy. These new forms of organization and coercion will challenge the status quo.     

Feeding the Lion: China and defence development in African states

ABSTRACT

In analysing trends in Chinese defence engagement and their impact on defence development in African states, it is important to consider both China's changing policy priorities and its capabilities for the provision of defence support. China's international ambitions and its economic development contribute to its emergence as a key supporter of defence capability development in Africa, occupying a crucial niche as a provider of support, particularly arms transfers, appropriate to evolving local requirements. The economic and politico-military imperatives driving China's engagement of Africa, which stem from its economic reforms and re-emergence as a great power, are facilitating defence modernisation by accelerating the introduction of modern arms in substantial quantities. The commercial importance of arms exports and the growing importance of strategic ties strongly situate China to help sustain processes of defence capability development in African states over the long term.     

Was World War Two a Completely Just War?

ABSTRACT

According to Brian Orend’s binary political model, minimally just states possess a robust set of moral rights, while other states essentially exist in a moral vacuum in which they possess no moral rights. I argue that a more plausible comparative model would allow for a state to acquire (or lose) discrete moral rights as it improves (or damages) its moral record. This would generate a more accurate portrayal of both domestic policy within states and military conflict between states; including, in particular, the role of the Allied forces during World War Two.     

Beyond Iran: Containing Nuclear Development in the Middle East

ABSTRACT

Several states in the Middle East have noted their interest in nuclear energy programs, but current cost and timeline estimates understate the difficulties that these states will face. A state-level analysis of nuclear development capacities in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates suggests that building nuclear infrastructure in the region will, in fact, be a lengthy and expensive endeavor, due to concerns such as export constraints, public opposition, a lack of human resources, and high overhead costs. This has implications for nuclear weapon nonproliferation: first, fears that these developing nuclear energy capabilities may facilitate possible weapon proliferation are premature, and second, there is time to ensure that any burgeoning nuclear infrastructure in the region remains safe and civilian in nature.     

Battlefields and marketplaces

Divided societies in the developing world experience wasteful struggles for power. We study the relationship between political stability and resources wasted in the struggle within a model of competitive power contests. The model of power contests is similar in structure to models describing oligopolistic market competition. This analogy helps us in deriving results that are new to the conflict literature. We show, for example, that the Herfindahl-Hirschman index can be interpreted as a measure of power concentration and that a peace treaty between fighting groups has a parallel in tacit collusion between firms in a market.     

A Doctrine without Dogma

ABSTRACT

In No Use: Nuclear Weapons and U.S. National Security Policy, Thomas M. Nichols calls for a constructive rethinking about the history of nuclear weapons and the attitudes that have grown up around them. Despite dramatic reductions since the end of the Cold War, the United States still maintains a robust nuclear triad that far exceeds the needs of realistic deterrence in the twenty-first century. Nichols advocates a new strategy of minimum deterrence that includes deep unilateral reductions to the US nuclear arsenal, a no-first-use pledge, withdrawing US tactical nuclear weapons from Europe, and ending extended nuclear deterrence for allies. The weakest part of his argument eschews nuclear retaliation against small nuclear states that attack the United States, opting instead to use only conventional weapons to guarantee regime change. He admits this will entail enormous cost and sacrifice, but cites the “immorality” of retaliating against a smaller power with few targets worthy of nuclear weaponry, which totally ignores the massive underground facilities constructed to shield military facilities in many of these states. Despite this, Nichols's thoughtful approach to post-Cold War deterrence deserves thoughtful consideration.     

Choosing the Right Sidekick: Economic Complements to US Military Grand Strategies

ABSTRACT

Scholars and practitioners of grand strategy agree that the use of military force should be supplemented by appropriate economic policies. However, strangely few accounts of economic complements to military grand strategies have been presented in recent discourse on US grand strategy. This paper takes a first step to fill this information gap. I first assess the role that could be played by economic measures under two types of grand strategies – one focusing on the balance of power and the other emphasising influence and order. Second, I introduce what I call ‘the influence-capability dilemma’ and discuss tradeoffs in adopting certain economic policies in order to help the US sustain pre-eminence in the international system. Third, I discuss how the US should address this dilemma of economic means in dealing with the rising China.     

To free or not to free (ride): a comparative analysis of the NATO burden-sharing in the Czech Republic and Lithuania

ABSTRACT

The recent rise in the defence budgets among the NATO members reawakens the free-riding dilemma. This article provides an analysis of the defence spending of two new member states, the Czech Republic and Lithuania. Based on the free-riding theory, we explain why some of the new NATO members decide to increase their defence budgets (Lithuania), and others do not (Czech Republic). In contrast to the majority of works which focus either on the US as the biggest spender or on the “old” members of the Alliance, we explain under what circumstances some of the small European states who became new NATO members started to increase their defence budgets even though they do not have to, and the literature suggests that free-riding is easier. In the process, we identify three crucial factors that in?uence the decision-making process in this regard: the level of threat perception, economic situation, and the US pressure.     

Subcontracting State-Building

Abstract

Contemporary development assistance often takes the form of subcontracted state-building. Foreign donors hire for-profit firms to provide services and to improve or create institutions in developing countries, particularly those experiencing internal conflict. This arrangement creates two counterproductive dynamics: first, it introduces agency problems between donors, recipient states, subcontractors, and citizens; and second, it undermines the long-run development of domestic bureaucratic capacity by creating disincentives for the host government to invest. These dynamics hinder, rather than foster, the legitimacy of state institutions. This paper summarizes trends in external support to state-building since the 1970s and illustrates subcontracted state-building with examples from Colombia.     

EU security sector reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Reform or resist?

ABSTRACT

Attempts to explain the failure to reform the security sectors in post-conflict countries have often resorted to two sets of explanatory factors: international and local factors. This article seeks to move from that unhelpful dichotomy to an explanation linking both factors. Drawing on a Foucauldian approach and the concept of “counter-conduct,” it examines the rationality and practices of European Union (EU) governmentality and how governing technologies are resisted and reversed by local elites involved in security sector reform (SSR). Instead of understanding power and resistance as binary opposites, this article argues that counter-conduct can be conceived as implicated in the very relations of power that it seeks to resist. To tease out these relations, the article analyzes the EU's efforts in SSR in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where it identifies four forms of counter-conduct: upholding European standards, using the local ownership trap, simulating reforms, and lowering the bar.     

Political influence on civil war mortality rates: The electoral college as a battlefield

This paper employs public choice analysis to explain certain kinds of military decision‐making during the Civil War. Specifically, the political costs and benefits which may have influenced policy with respect to casualty rates in the Union army are considered. A primary empirical finding is that electoral votes per capita are a strong explainer of casualties across Union states, all else equal.