我国海域管制立法问题初探

为有效维护我国海洋安全,完善我国海域管制立法势在必行.目前,我国在相关立法中对海域管制制度进行了设定,但还存在着适用法律和执法主体不够明确、法律法规调整范围不统一、法规之间处罚差异过大、对特殊海域的管控缺乏法律支持等问题.这些问题主要源于立法传统的实用主义、部门立法特点、对沿海边防的职能定位过窄等,严重影响着中央事权的统一和海上管制活动的有效开展.我国应当借鉴外国的相关制度,制定“海防管理法”,设定特殊海域管制制度,将《沿海船舶边防治安管理规定》上升为行政法规,并细化该管制制度。     

国际领海法律制度探析

领海是沿海国领土组成部分,各个沿海国都针对本国领海颁布了有关资源开发、船舶航行、海上安全、海洋环境保护等方面的法律法规。由于受国际无害通过制度的影响,领海主权的行使还要受国际法律制度的约束。武警边防部队担负在海上特别是领海中的巡逻、船舶监护检查、打击犯罪等重要勤务,不仅要了解和掌握我国国内法中有关领海法律制度的内容,还要熟悉国际法关于领海的规章制度。本文试图对国际法律制度中关于领海的地位、宽度、无害通过、司法管辖等内容作一探讨。     

新时期海防面临的挑战与思考

新的历史时期,世界海洋斗争日趋激烈,我国海上面临着严峻挑战。根据1994年11月生效的联合国《海洋公约》,我国政府确定200海里为专属经济区,这对中华民族的生存和发展具有重大战略意义。随着我国海疆面积的扩大,海防区域也要相应扩大,海洋防卫线应加长,海上防御纵深应显著增大、努力加强海上防卫力量的建设,以有效地维护国家领海主权和海洋权益。加强新时期的海防建设,必须以联合国《海洋公约》确立海防的新观念:必须以海洋威胁方向确立国防的主导方向;必须以维护海洋权益为海防的战略目标。     

处置海上涉外事件研究

近年来,随着改革开放的不断深入,我国海上贸易、海洋产业和海洋经济迅速发展,海上突发涉外事件日益增多.在新形势下,处置海上突发涉外事件,涉及国与国之间的关系,不仅要严格遵守国际法和国家有关法律规定,而且要严格遵循我国的外交方针、政策,有利于维护我国与周边国家的睦邻友好关系.     

海洋——国防之重

我国是一个海洋大国,有着绵延1.8万公里的大陆海岸线.近些年,我国在海洋开发方面取得了不小的成绩,海上力量日渐强大.但与发达国家相比,我们的海洋意识还不够强,维护海洋权益的力度还不够大,海上力量的建设步伐还不够快,要想在新世纪成为世界海上强国,还有很长的路要走.     

沿海船舶边防治安管理浅探

面临海上治安管理的新形势,要加大对驻泊地船舶的边防检查登记力度,摸清辖区内船舶的有关情况,结合海上的巡逻检查,及时查明、掌握辖区海上治安情况,有效打击海上各类违法犯罪活动,维护海上治安秩序.     

海上渔民国防教育亟待加强

我国是一个濒海大国,海洋既是我国对外友好往来的重要通道,也是外国入侵中国的重要通道。因此,结合海洋和海上渔业发展出现的一些新特点,进一步加强海上渔民的国防教育,增强他们的国防意识,对于提高其维护国家利益的自觉性和行为能力具有十分重要的意义。     

我国东部沿海海上突出治安问题原因与对策

随着改革开放和经济建设的深入发展，我国东部沿海海上旅游、海上捕捞、养殖生产、贸易等经济活动日益扩大。这一方面带来了区域经济的大发展，另一方面也给海上治安和海洋管理带来了诸多新问题。为此，各相关部门应积极转变执法观念；建立高效、规范的海上防控体系；加强渔政建设，促进渔政管理体制的改革。从根本上预防和制止海上治安违法行为，维护上述海域的安全与稳定，促进该海域经济的可持续发展。     

海上武装冲突的调节器——海战法

《联合国海洋法公约》生效后,引起了传统海洋法律制度的重大变化,扩大了濒海国家的海上管辖范围,也加剧了各海洋国家的利益磨擦。海战法是对海上武装冲突双方军事行为的规范,也是其他国家对冲突双方行为进行评判的一个依据。我国是一个海洋大国,有300万平方公里的海洋领土新中国成立后,我国相继承认、缔结了相关的海战法法规。按照国际法原则规定,我们应当     

着力提升海上民兵维权斗争后勤保障能力

本文根据当前我国海洋维权斗争的具体实践,对海上民兵维权斗争后勤保障中存在的现实问题进行了深刻剖析,从后勤指挥体系、海上综合保障、军民融合保障和标准制度建设四个方面展开深入的研究和探讨,旨在提升海上民兵维权斗争后勤保障能力。     

沿海船舶边防治安管理立法问题研究

沿海船舶边防治安管理是维护海上治安秩序稳定的重要手段。为加强海上治安管理,需要通过立法活动赋予公安边防机关特殊的执法权,并以此规范公安边防行政执法活动。分析沿海船舶边防治安管理立法概况及其存在的问题,提出完善沿海船舶边防治安管理立法的建议。     

Holding the Bridge in Troubled Times: The Cold War and the Navies of Europe

European navies made a fundamental contribution to the Cold War at sea, ensuring the effectiveness of deterrence even as Soviet naval forces grew to ominous proportions. European fleets were tasked with containing a Soviet attack until US forces could arrive on the scene. Many European navies pursued essential niche capabilities tailored for their own unique maritime environments. Others made important contributions to broader NATO efforts in the high-stakes arenas of sea control, power projection and even nuclear deterrence. Contentious issues did arise, for example concerning burden-sharing, but true to its name, the alliance succeeded collectively in wielding formidable sea power. This paper is based on the premise that the maritime players in the Cold War at sea were by no means restricted to the US and Soviet navies. The navies of Western Europe and Canada had major roles to play as well within the NATO area. They contributed a great deal to the political cohesion crucial to an essentially maritime alliance, and in many cases had a real operational contribution to make as well. What follows, then, is the Cold War at sea from a European point of view.     

建立装备成体系建设模式，为加快海洋强国建设提供强大力量支撑

建设海洋强国战略目标、建设强大海上军事力量需要探索中国特色的装备体系建设新模式。针对未来信息化战争体系对抗的特点,在研究中外武器装备体系建设经验基础上,提出了海上军事力量装备成体系建设的新模式,并讨论了海上军事力量装备成体系建设的有关问题。     

海上犯罪案件的特点及侦查方略研究

随着海洋经济的迅速发展，海上人、财、物的流动急剧增加，海上治安形势日趋复杂。海上抢劫、盗窃、偷渡及贩枪贩毒等犯罪活动呈多发态势，这严重破坏了海上的生产作业秩序，危害了海上治安秩序的稳定。研究海上犯罪案件的特，点，有助于公安边防部门采取有针对性的侦查方略，有力地打击海上犯罪，以创造安全、有序的海上治安环境。     

Communications intelligence and the battle for convoy OG 71, 15–23 August 1941

In 1941, the British instituted a comprehensive system of convoys in the Atlantic. One of the first convoys, OG 71, while sailing between Britain and Gibraltar, was shadowed by German aircraft and attacked by U‐boats. In the ensuing August battle, while no U‐boats were sunk, the British lost, out of a convoy consisting of 22 vessels, two escorts and eight merchant ships. The German victory was not complete owing to the inability of the German aircraft and U‐boats to cooperate successfully as well as the failure of the U‐boats to fight the battle effectively and aggressively. The British also made many mistakes during the defence of Convoy OG 71. The surface escorts made many errors of tactics; as for the British aircraft, owing to an inability to cooperate with the surface forces, they became almost totally ineffective. One bright spot for the British during the battle, however, was communications intelligence. The battle saw the first use of high frequency direction finders and on several occasions skillful use was made of information obtained from enemy radio transmissions. In fact important lessons were learned by the British from such use of communications intelligence which would pave the way for a more effective implementation of such information in future convoy battles.     

基于国家海上安全战略的海警智库建设研究

海警智库建设对加快海警力量建设发展,提高海警力量的应对能力和加强海上安全问题研究具有重要意义。立足于国家海上安全战略,对我国海警智库建设的动因、功能和策略进行了探讨。     

From show of force to naval presence,and back again: the U.S. Navy in the Baltic, 1982–2017

This article discusses roles and missions of the United States Navy with a particular focus on the Baltic Sea. That particular sea has gained renewed political and military attention following Russia's resurgent and increasingly hybrid-offensive foreign policy. Baltic nations, uncertain of what the future holds, ought to look at sea power and maritime missions in the Baltic, as well as US naval presence in Europe, to draw lessons for future posture.     

Maritime interdiction in Sri Lanka's counterinsurgency

A comprehensive maritime interdiction strategy to attack the insurgent's logistic system was a key element in the defeat of the Tamil Tigers. The campaign of maritime interdiction required the Sri Lankan Navy (SLN) to attack LTTE arms smuggling, sea piracy, and maritime terrorism. The SLN degraded the insurgency's robust maritime logistical network while also devising tactics to engage the maritime insurgents who reacted with swarm and suicide boat tactics. The efforts of the SLN forced the Tamil Tigers to confront the government's final land offensives with diminished resources, thus collapsing a three decades’ old insurgency in a matter of months.     

Shielding the ‘Hot Gates’: Submarine Warfare and Japanese Naval Strategy in the Cold War and Beyond (1976–2006)

The build-up of Japan's military apparatus in the 1990s and 2000s has been often regarded by security analysts as indicative of a departure from the country's Cold War strategic posture. Japan appears to be engaged in a process of militarisation that is eroding the foundations of its ‘exclusively defence-oriented’ policy. In the case of the archipelago's naval strategy, such assessments overlook the longstanding significance of a core feature of its defence policy, namely the surveillance of maritime crossroads delivering the wealth of the country. The paper reassesses the evolution of the Japanese strategy since the Cold War by examining the development of the Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Force's submarine force, one of the key components of the defensive shield for these crossroads. The paper argues that with the changes in the security environment of the 1990s, Japan already fielded a mature force with state-of-the-art submarines, and that the rise of a new naval competitor aiming at controlling key strategic points along Japan's sea lanes reconfirmed the critical importance of submarine operations to Japanese national security.