Measures for Security in a Counterinsurgency

Quantitative measures to gauge progress in a counterinsurgency in use today include the number of enemy, friendly, and civilian casualties, and the level of violence. While common, each of these has drawbacks. With this and the sparseness of the literature on this topic in mind, we argue for a series of improved measures. These include the ratio of who is initiating incidents, an historical analysis of incidents and related variables, and an analysis of insurgent target sets. These measures are presented using data for Al Anbar province, Iraq, along with a discussion of their advantages over more common metrics.     

Moving Beyond Population-Centric vs. Enemy-Centric Counterinsurgency

Historically, insurgency is one of the most prevalent forms of armed conflict and it is likely to remain common in the foreseeable future. Recent experiences with counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan offer many lessons for future counterinsurgents, but the discourse on the subject continues to be mired in a traditional dichotomy pitting population-centric approaches to counterinsurgency against enemy-centric approaches. Historical analysis suggests that this traditional dichotomy is not a sufficiently nuanced way to understand or plan for such operations. Instead, discussions of counterinsurgency should focus on two dimensions: actions (use of physical force vs. political or moral actions) and targets (active insurgents vs. insurgent support). This perspective divides the space of possible counterinsurgency efforts into four quadrants, suggesting that effective counterinsurgency campaigns find a balance of effort across the four quadrants that is well matched to the specific context.     

Counterinsurgency and Operational Art

Addressing insurgency requires the same application of operational art as utilized in conventional warfare planning. Counterinsurgency strategy will be driven by the nature of the insurgent movement, with campaigns constructed to use tactics appropriately so that key facets of the insurgent campaign are neutralized. It is especially important to determine whether terror is used as a tactic (a method of action) by an insurgency or as a stand-alone strategy (a logic of action) by a challenger divorced from a mass base. Insurgencies, in turn, will normally emphasize strategically either winning allegiance of the target population or using violence as a substitute for other methods. Each of these approaches requires the weighting of the appropriate campaign elements of the counterinsurgency strategy. Sri Lanka, having faced both approaches, is an especially useful case study.     

Emulating US Counterinsurgency Doctrine: Barriers for Developing Country Forces,Evidence from Peru

ABSTRACT

Recent US advances in counterinsurgency doctrine have been adopted by developing country armed forces. Nevertheless, no systematic study has examined the barriers they face to implementing highly involved counterinsurgency strategy. Tracing the evolution of Peruvian doctrine demonstrates that Peru was able to quickly improve the unity of effort, intelligence capacity, and military basing to meet the demands of a population-centric hearts-and-minds approach to counterinsurgency. Nevertheless, the limited tactical initiative and flexibility of Peruvian forces remains a challenge. The Peruvian experience is instructive for other militaries undergoing similar transitions. However, given the diversity of insurgent conflicts, this doctrine is not universally appropriate.     

Counterinsurgency as armed reform: The political history of the Malayan Emergency

Despite the emphasis in doctrine and academia that counterinsurgency is in its essence political, these operations are all too commonly discussed and approached as primarily military endeavors. Informed by the need to refocus counterinsurgency studies, this article revisits a foundational case of the canon – the Malayan Emergency – to discuss its political (i.e., not military) unfolding. The analysis distinguishes itself by emphasizing the diplomatic processes, negotiations, and deals that gave strategic meaning to the military operations underway. In so doing, the article also generates insight on the use of leverage and elite bargains in creating new political settlements and bringing insurgent conflicts to an end.     

Counterinsurgency force ratio: strategic utility or nominal necessity

As a consequence of intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan, force ratio for counterinsurgency (COIN) has come under increased scrutiny. Reduced to its essence, the issue is simply, ‘How many troops does it take to get the job done?’ This answer has been sought by the US military, academia, and think tanks. There have been numerous responses, culminating in several ‘plug-and-play’ equations for minimum force ratios in COIN operations. Due to the impossibility of determining precisely how many insurgent forces there are, it has become common to base force ratios on the population of the country. In the realm of policy, the question above is posed as, ‘How many of our troops does it take to get the job done?’     

The Effectiveness of Coercive and Persuasive Counterinsurgency Practices since 1945

Which counterinsurgency approaches are most effective in defeating insurgencies? Counterinsurgency advocates and critics have debated the effectiveness of winning hearts and minds as well as using brute force against ordinary civilians. But little scholarship has sought to systemically compare these counterinsurgency approaches among a broad range of cases. This paper seeks to remedy this gap in the literature with an empirical analysis of 47 counterinsurgency wars from 1945–2000 to evaluate the effectiveness of coercive and persuasive approaches to counterinsurgency. To do so, I use crisp-set qualitative comparative analysis (QCA), or Boolean analysis, to identify the presence or absence of six coercive and persuasive counterinsurgency practices across all cases. This method enables me to highlight how counterinsurgency victory can be produced by combinations of practices rather than a single set of practices that might be expected to be useful across cases. The results demonstrate that many combinations of coercive, persuasive, and mixed counterinsurgency practices can lead to victory. However, more persuasive combinations of practices consistently lead to counterinsurgent victory compared to others, although limited coercion against civilians is constant in all cases of counterinsurgency. These findings cast doubt on the ability of counterinsurgents to refrain from harming civilians and suggest that victory requires a mix of both positive and negative incentives for cooperation.     

The Role of Perceptions and Political Reform in Counterinsurgency: The Case of Western Iraq, 2004–05

The political side of counterinsurgency has long been recognized as more important than the military side. The major works on counterinsurgency call for political reform that redresses legitimate insurgent grievances. Thereby, insurgents are encouraged to pursue their aims via political instead of military means. In western Iraq, insurgent perceptions of US weakness inhibited effective political reform. Moderate Sunnis did not engage the Coalition or Iraqi government until these perceptions had been revised. The connection between insurgent perceptions and effective political reform deserves greater attention. With the exception of some arguments from the political science field, the literature on counterinsurgency insufficiently addresses the importance of insurgent perceptions.     

All Counterinsurgency is Local: Counterinsurgency and Rebel Legitimacy

Abstract

Although the concept of legitimacy is central to Western counterinsurgency theory, most discourse in this area black-boxes the concept. It hence remains under-specified in many discussions of counterinsurgency. Fortunately, recent research on rebel governance and legitimacy contributes to our understanding of the problems faced by counterinsurgents who want to boost state legitimacy while undermining that of the rebels. Taken together, this research illustrates that a rational choice approach to legitimacy is simplistic; that micro-level factors ultimately drive legitimacy dynamics; and that both cooption of existing legitimate local elites and their replacement from the top–down is unlikely to succeed. Western counterinsurgency doctrine has failed to grasp the difficulties this poses for it.     

India: Fleeting Attachment to the Counterinsurgency Grand Strategy

India’s success in dealing with insurgency movements was based on adherence to four key rules of engagement: identifying a lead counter-insurgent force, launching population-centric counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, non-use of excessive force and confining the role of the COIN operations to preparing a ground for a political solution. While the country does not yet have a COIN doctrine, these four rules of engagement do constitute what can be referred to a COIN grand strategy. Analysis of the several continuing insurgencies, however, reveals the country’s inability to adhere to the grand strategy. Political considerations, incapacity to manoeuvre through the demands of various stake holders, and even the wish to expedite the decimation of insurgent outfits through a force-centric approach has produced a long history of failures in dousing the fires of discontent.     

Critics gone wild: Counterinsurgency as the root of all evil

The Western interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan have produced a heated polemic concerning the merits and demerits of counterinsurgency – the operational approach underpinning both campaigns. The two books reviewed here provide a good summation of the arguments against counterinsurgency: it is not a strategy and will fail when mistaken as such; its theory does not make intervention and war significantly easier; and even the most successful counterinsurgency campaigns have been bloody, violent, and protracted. Yet as this review highlights, beyond these central points, criticism of counterinsurgency is too often off the mark in its approach and totalizing in its pretentions. There is much to criticize and an urgent need to learn from past campaigns, yet bold claims and broad generalizations can mislead rather than enlighten. The analysis is particularly unhelpful when the definition of the central issue at hand – counterinsurgency – is being unwittingly or deliberately distorted. In the end, these two books form a poor basis for the debate that must now take place, because they are too ideological in tone, too undisciplined in approach, and therefore too unqualified in what they finally say.     

Keep the change: Counterinsurgency,Iraq, and historical understanding

This article explores the historical reasoning behind counterinsurgency thinking, particularly as applied to Iraq, using Douglas Porch's book, Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War as a reference point. It argues that the classic historical analogies of counterinsurgency theory were inapt in dealing with the conflict in Iraq, and that the historical reasoning behind counterinsurgency more generally deserves greater scrutiny. Not only are the analogies of questionable applicability, but the evidence of causation in prior conflicts is ultimately unproveable. In the end, Counterinsurgency theory and the US Army's Field Manual 3-24 on Counterinsurgency were politically useful during the ‘Surge’, beginning in 2007, but remain intellectually and historically problematic.     

Counterinsurgency Challenge in Post-2001 Afghanistan

Although the Taliban insurgency was internally divided and unable to coordinate its activities in 2014–2015, the Afghan security forces were not able to contain it and steadily lost ground throughout 2015. Until 2015, there had been little effort to develop an indigenous Afghan counterinsurgency strategy, but a sense of urgency emerged after a string of Taliban victories. At the beginning of 2016, it was still not clear if and when the National Unity Government would be able to produce a counterinsurgency strategy and, in any case, the need for a coherent counterinsurgency approach became questionable as the Taliban appeared to be transitioning towards conventional warfare.     

The Nineteenth Century Origins of Counterinsurgency Doctrine

Abstract

In counterinsurgency, the population is the center of gravity. This insight has become a key doctrinal tenet of modern armed conflict. But where does it come from? The razzia, a tactic introduced by the French in North Africa around 1840, first thrust tribal populations into the focus of modern operational thinking. Soon the pioneering bureaux arabes added an administrative, civil, and political element. Eventually, in the 1890s, French operations in Madagascar gave rise to a mature counterinsurgency doctrine. David Galula, a French writer who heavily influenced the American Counterinsurgency manual, is merely the joint that connects the nineteenth century to the twenty-first.     

Countering Insurgent-terrorism: Why Nato Chose The Wrong Historical Foundation For Cimic

History teaches that counterinsurgency and counterterrorism campaigns have never been won through purely military action. Defeating an opponent who avoids open battle, but who uses force to reach his goals, including terrorist action, requires a combination of police, administrative, economic and military measures. As a counterinsurgency campaign should pursue a comprehensive political objective, it requires high levels of civil–military cooperation. However, current NATO doctrine for Civil–Military Cooperation (CIMIC) as it emerged from the 1990s is founded in conventional war-fighting and outdated peacekeeping doctrine. CIMIC's focus is on supporting military objectives rather than enabling the military to make a coherent contribution to political objectives. This makes CIMIC unfit for the Alliance's main operational challenges that have expanded from peace operations on the Balkans to countering insurgent terrorism in Afghanistan. When developing CIMIC, the Alliance obviously neglected the historical lessons from counterinsurgency campaigns.     

Military Maladaptation: Counterinsurgency and the Politics of Failure

Tactical learning is critical to battlefield success, especially in a counterinsurgency. This article tests the existing model of military adaption against a ‘most-likely’ case: the British Army’s counterinsurgency in the Southern Cameroons (1960–61). Despite meeting all preconditions thought to enable adaptation – decentralization, leadership turnover, supportive leadership, poor organizational memory, feedback loops, and a clear threat – the British still failed to adapt. Archival evidence suggests politicians subverted bottom-up adaptation, because winning came at too high a price in terms of Britain’s broader strategic imperatives. Our finding identifies an important gap in the extant adaptation literature: it ignores politics.     

Counterinsurgency and the limits of state-building: An analysis of Colombia's policy of territorial consolidation, 2006–2012

Since 2002 the Colombian government has been implementing a series of policy initiatives that have sought to coordinate state resources in a neo-classical counterinsurgency approach to fight the country's main insurgent group, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), and recover and consolidate the territory. Despite impressive operational successes against the insurgency and other illegal groups, the government has been unable to reassert its control and build legitimacy via the state-building effort known as ‘Consolidación’, in some of the most recalcitrant areas of the country. This article examines two areas where government efforts at consolidation appear to be failing to discuss the limits of COIN theory and practice.     

‘The People are Revolting’: An Anatomy of Authoritarian Counterinsurgency

Rather than win hearts and minds, authoritarian counterinsurgency is said to rely heavily on coercion. It has a reputation for effectiveness, if also for its amorality. Still, the research into authoritarian counterinsurgency is surprisingly lacking. By distilling common features from key cases, this article concludes that this approach goes beyond the indiscriminate violence that typically captures the imagination. Like their democratic counterparts but differently, authoritarian regimes also engage in mobilisation, create narratives, and turn military advantage into political gain. The analysis explains how these tasks are undertaken and, by contradistinction, sheds light on more liberal approaches as well.     

Counterinsurgency American style: Considering David Petraeus and twenty-first century irregular war

This article examines the complex legacy of David Petraeus who was a key figure in the emergence of the US military shift towards counterinsurgency doctrine in the years after 2006. Although Petraeus has been perceived by critics as a publicity seeker, he can be credited with laying the foundations for a more serious commitment to COIN involving in particular in integrating conventional and Special Forces in arenas like village stability operations. The article looks a Petraeus's role in both Iraq and Afghanistan: it concludes that, in the case of Afghanistan, it is too early to assess whether counterinsurgency has had a decisive impact of the outcome of the war against the Taliban.