Local perceptions of the EU’s role in peacebuilding: The case of security sector reform in Palestine

ABSTRACT

Perception research can make a valuable contribution to the study of the local dimension in EU peacebuilding. The conceptual framework developed in this article distinguishes between perceptions of the “legitimacy,” “effectiveness,” and “credibility” of EU peacebuilding practices, which are crucial factors for successful peacebuilding. Relying on the case of the EU’s support for security sector reform (SSR) in Palestine, this article shows that local stakeholders—which participate in various EU-sponsored training and capacity-building programs—display considerable support for liberal peacebuilding norms. Yet, perceived discrepancies between the EU’s peacebuilding rhetoric and its SSR activities have severely undermined the potential of the EU’s liberal peacebuilding model in the eyes of Palestinian stakeholders. Critical local perceptions are frequently articulated with reference to the EU’s own liberal peacebuilding discourse, pointing to a lack of inclusiveness of the SSR process and deficits in terms of democratic governance and the rule of law.     

Identifying the spoilers in the security sector reform – disarmament demobilisation and reintegration process in the Congo

The Congolese security sector reform – disarmament demobilisation and reintegration (SSR-DDR) process has suffered from setbacks in its military sector during the last 10 years, such as insufficient funding, lack of coordination and domestic reluctance to major changes, with as a result, a very fragile and disjointed Army. These problems have deepened as officers have defected from the Army and caused new instability in the East of the Congo. This article aims to analyse the recent mutinies and the reaction by the Congolese government by applying a capabilities-based approach in combination with a typology of spoilers. The objective is to identify and classify the spoilers and answer the questions of why they emerge now and how they are dealt with on a national level. From the analysis, the author suggests that there are several spoilers involved in the current situation – the most powerful being the Congolese and the Rwandan governments, prompting the question of whether an international involvement is necessary to solve the problem.     

Reinterpreting western use of coercion in Bosnia‐Herzegovina: Assurances and carrots were crucial

This article demonstrates that assurances and carrots accompanied credible threats every time Western coercion succeeded in Bosnia. This finding is hardly surprising as it merely confirms earlier research on coercive diplomacy, but it is nevertheless important because the crucial role played by assurances and carrots has been completely ignored in most analyses to date. It also has important policy implications at a time when Western, and particularly American, policy‐makers tend to ignore this fact at their peril. US policy towards Iraq and Western policy towards Yugoslavia have been based almost exclusively on the stick in recent years, and its lack of success is therefore not surprising. If Western policy‐makers had learned the right lessons from Bosnia, they would have known that strategies coupling credible threats with credible assurances and carrots would have been more likely to succeed.     

EU armed forces and social media: convergence or divergence?

This article explores how armed forces in EU member states work with and view social media in national and international settings, and what the patterns of convergence/divergence are on these issues. To that end, a questionnaire targeted at EU armed forces was constructed. An index of qualitative variation was calculated to explore the relative convergence among respondents (n = 25) on issues of risks and opportunities with using social media nationally and internationally. Consistent with previous research on European armed forces, we found higher levels of divergence than convergence. Contrary to our expectations that similar challenges, joint international standards, and membership in international organizations would foster convergence with regard to social media use in areas of deployment, we found that convergence appeared foremost pertaining to the domestic level. Policy divergence was strongest in areas of deployment.     

Too much Western bias? The need for a more culturally adaptable approach to post-conflict security sector reform

The existing guidelines for security sector reform (SSR) tend to draw on theoretical work in the field of civil–military relations, which in turn has been derived from Western, liberal democratic models of governance. Although guidelines strongly advise that local culture and context need to be considered when drawing up objectives for post-conflict SSR programmes, this is not often reflected in practice. This article considers some of the reasons for this, citing both in-country challenges and donor-related issues, and suggests that one of the biggest problems is a lack of alternative, non-orthodox models of civil–military relations to draw upon. It is further suggested that elements of suitable alternative models may be found in states which possess political structures not entirely dissimilar to the Western, liberal democratic ideal, but which can offer different perspectives. Detailed research of these structures should produce a pool of sub-models which could then be employed to create bespoke, culturally appropriate objectives for use in post-conflict SSR programmes.     

African maritime security and the Lomé Charter: Reality or dream?

ABSTRACT

Traditionally the African concept of security concept has been dominated by land-based conflicts with little attention being paid to maritime threats and the protection of the maritime environment. With the rapid escalation of piracy on the East Coast, the African Union (AU) was compelled to develop a joint strategy to address its changing African Maritime Domain (AMD). This was achieved by the AU’s Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy (AIMS 2050) in 2014, culminating in the adoption of a binding maritime security and safety charter in Lomé in 2016. The Lomé Charter should ideally focus the general provisions of AIMS 2050 so that Africa, as a continent, can take responsibility for security and economic empowerment of the AMD. This article considers various maritime security documents against the backdrop of an African context for understanding maritime security, in order to evaluate whether the Lomé Charter, as a manifestation of AIMS 2050, will realise its aspirations. Focussing on security is not sufficient and too much emphasis is placed in the Lomé Charter on restriction rather than development. Strong political will and leadership is required to facilitate implementation, identifying common security concerns to ensure better cooperative and collective strategies in a diverse implementation environment.     

The security sector and the plunder of Zimbabwe’s Chiadzwa alluvial diamonds: the ‘goat mentality’ in practice

While the human rights impact of the deployment of state security agencies in the Chiadzwa diamond fields has been explored, it is important to continue to expose the increasing tendency within the sector to take public resources that should be protected by the state and used for the benefit of the people and channel them for personal gain. The security sector stranglehold of President Robert Mugabe and the ruling political party, the Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), has facilitated the siphoning of Chiadzwa diamond revenue into the pockets of individual security personnel. The unfolding sociopolitical crisis in Zimbabwe has also meant that these security personnel have been deployed beyond conflict zones and into traditionally civilian domains, with dire consequences for the public purse. With this in mind, it is asserted that these issues have driven state security agencies to enrich themselves through what is termed in this article as a ‘goat mentality’. The article thus explores the ways in which state security agencies have been deployed and gone on to promote personal enrichment in the Chiadzwa diamond fields.     

The lobbies’ network at the EU policy level: the case of security and defense

Lobbyists may not share the same interests, but they usually agree to form a link in a network which could eventually be used to spread information, to search for potential partners, to speak with one voice to decision makers. In other words, social links represent value for lobbyists because they may ultimately facilitate access. In this article, we explore the network of the Security and Defense lobbies in the EU and we describe its structure.     

Force deployment and the production of security: Why is the united states in NATO?

Standard economic concepts of production and cost minimization subject to a production constraint are used to derive the conditions of optimal deployment of home and forward military forces for the production of home security. United States' participation in the NATO alliance is then analyzed in the context of a two‐ally (U.S. and Western Europe) optimal force deployment model of NATO. Next, U.S. force‐basing policy is adduced as an enforcement mechanism for the “transatlantic contract.” Lastly, statistical evidence on burden sharing within Western Europe, and the effectiveness of the U.S. contract enforcement policy, is presented.     

All or nothing? The EU Global Strategy and defence policy after the Brexit

The public expects European governments and the European Union (EU) to deal with the security challenges in and around Europe. So does the US, whose strategic focus has pivoted to the Pacific. Washington, DC has made it clear that it will not, and cannot, solve all of Europe’s problems. The call for ‘strategic autonomy’ in the new EU Global Strategy of June 2016 does not come a moment too soon. But should the aim be EU strategic autonomy, without the UK, or can the aspiration still be European strategic autonomy, with the UK? Can nothing be achieved unless all are fully involved? Or are intermediate solutions possible? How EU Member States and the UK answer these questions will determine which degree of strategic autonomy the EU can achieve. With which degree of British involvement. And whether the UK itself will be left with any measure of strategic autonomy.     

Information sharing in multinational security and military operations. Why and why not? With whom and with whom not?

Military operations increasingly require cooperation between agencies within the same nation, but also collaboration with security and military organizations internationally. Throughout history multinational military cooperation has often been an appropriate way to conduct major operations; national manpower and material resources are generally insufficient to address the demands of missions worldwide. The desire to optimize the use of scarce research and development and investment capabilities, the need for international legitimacy and political support, and the fact that today’s risks transcend national borders, have rendered multinational cooperation in the security domain unavoidable. With joint operations comes the requirement for multi-partner- and multinational information sharing. However, information sharing has both advantages and costs, and is subject to both enabling factors as well as barriers. This paper reflects on theories, both classical and current, as well as empirical case studies, to examine the pros and cons of multinational information sharing, and the factors that conduce or interfere with the transmission and the receipt of intelligence. The importance of a holistic approach and of learning lessons learned are two key lessons gleaned from the analysis, along with an emphasis on developing both the organizational and the interpersonal enablers of information sharing.     

British counter‐insurgency in Kenya, 1952–56: Extension of internal security policy or prelude to decolonisation?

Despite considerable post‐war planning, the British counter‐insurgency campaign in Kenya did not constitute a Colonial Office strategy for decolonisation. COIN in Kenya had one purpose: to re‐impose law and order, or British control. If for no other reason, this is demonstrated by the initial reluctance of the Colonial Office to intervene. Frequent re‐assessments and postponement of the ending of the State of Emergency, and the subordination of socio‐economic and political reforms to military objectives, show clearly that decolonisation was not high on the British list of priorities in Kenya. This article questions the relationship between COIN and decolonisation, and the validity of models of British counter‐insurgency.     

Intelligence and military doctrine: paradox or oxymoron?

This article examines the evolution of the current British military joint intelligence doctrine. We argue that military intelligence doctrine is dogged by an intrinsic tension between the ethos and expectations of military doctrine and those of the professional practice of intelligence. We further argue not only that prior iterations of UK joint intelligence doctrine failed to effectively deal with this intelligence doctrine dilemma, but also that measures in the current doctrine to address this problem directly created their own problems. Moreover, as a result, otherwise sound innovations in the current UK intelligence doctrine have proven unsuitable to wider diffusion in more recent intelligence doctrine such as the new NATO intelligence doctrine which, otherwise, draws extensively on its British precursor.