United States special operations forces and the war on terrorism

Those leading the war on terrorism have emphasized from the beginning that this war would be unlike other wars. Special Operations Forces (SOF) are military forces unlike other military forces. The implication is that SOF and the war on terrorism are thus made for each other. This contribution examines this assumption, the war on terrorism and SOF in greater detail.     

Planning for the next Takur Ghar

The USA is currently facing an increasingly diverse range of threats, including non-state actors, particularly violent extremist organizations attempting to do harm. The national leadership has made it clear that for the near future it will employ Special Operations Forces (SOF) as the tool of choice in short-duration, high-intensity operations that have more in common with the battle of Takur Ghar, than those with a larger footprint. It is critical then that the lessons of the past are learnt now and are applied before employing SOF in the future. This becomes especially important given the short lead-time in concert with the short-duration/high-intensity tempo of their operations. In the Battle of Takur Ghar, during Operation Anaconda, rigid adherence to the joint functions, especially clearer and more robust Command and Control (C2) and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) in the planning and execution of Operation Anaconda would have yielded a better operational outcome and saved lives. With the benefit of hindsight, many things could have been done differently, but several key issues stand out. The C2 structure must include all components from the outset to synchronize effects and rapidly re-task ISR. There must be multiple communications redundancies and adequate bandwidth. Finally, all SOF, conventional and interagency capabilities must be synchronized under one task force commander with a sufficiently robust C2 infrastructure to direct the entire effort. As our nation calls on SOF at an ever-increasing rate, we must take those lessons learned and apply them to future operations.     

The missing dimension: IDF special operations forces and strategy in the Second Lebanon War

In the course of the 2006 Lebanon War the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) employed special operations forces (SOF) for raids against Hizb'allah's command and control structure. This article argues that a faulty conceptualization of the value of special operations and misguided expectations determined by the new IDF concept of operations impacted adversely on the employment of SOF for this kind of operations. Both these elements contributed in turn to substantially degrade SOF performance in the context of the war.     

The Rise of Special Operations Forces: Generalized Specialization,Boundary Spanning and Military Autonomy

The special operations forces (SOF) of the industrial democracies have suddenly and rapidly grown in numbers and resources during the past decades. Most explanations for this growth focus on factors external to the armed forces. We argue that the enlargement of SOF is also the result of internal organizational dynamics. First, we compare SOF to other units and military appendages that have grown over the past 30 years in order to delineate what is unique to their development and the special adaptive potential they bring to the armed forces: generalized specialization, boundary spanning roles, and enlargement of military autonomy. Second, we analyze the actions of internal military entrepreneurs and their organizational mentors to show how they use this adaptive potential to “sell” the use of SOF to key policy-makers and decision-makers.     

Security Cooperation Issues in the Western Hemisphere

Building regional security cooperation in the Western Hemisphere is not a strictly short-term, unilateral or bilateral defense effort. Regional security will only result from a long-term, cooperative, multilateral civil-military effort. A viable framework for success includes the need to advance hemispheric understanding of the security concerns of each country and those that the region as a whole faces (for example, the internal and external threat(s) to security). Finally, these issues and associated recommendations demand a carefully staffed and phased regional security plan of action, with measurable short- and long-term objectives to validate its planning and implementation. The basic directions for a regional security plan, as identified at the Miami conference, are as follow.     

Regional Support for Afghan Insurgents: Challenges for Counterinsurgency Theory and Doctrine

After the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001, several thousand Afghan Taliban forces fled across the border to Pakistan, and the area became a safe haven for Afghan insurgents. In 2014, the transnational dimension of the insurgency is still highly prominent. Although regional support for insurgents is not uncommon, how to counter this aspect is mostly ignored in counterinsurgency (COIN) theory and doctrines. In this article, a regional counterinsurgency framework is developed, using the regional counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan as an example. The framework will facilitate the systematic inclusion of regional COIN measures in theory and doctrine.     

The Dilemmas of US Maritime Supremacy in the Early Cold War

After World War II, the US Navy confronted the challenge of adapting to dramatically altered geopolitical circumstances. Moscow did not have an ocean-going fleet, and early Cold War strategy was dominated by the salient position of nuclear strategic bombing – a mission thought to be outside the purview of the navy. Traditional roles, such as protecting sea lines of communication and supporting ground forces ashore, quickly proved indispensable. However, the navy eventually also succeeded in fielding dramatic technological and institutional innovations, for example, the strategic missile submarine, which enabled the US to successfully leverage maritime power against the continental power of the USSR.     

MOZAMBIQUE

Mozambique is widely regarded as a success story. The parliamentary and presidential lections in 1994 marked the peak of the peace process in Mozambique. Despite minor irregularities, the elections were declared free and fair by international observers. Mozambique has succeeded where other countries such as Angola has failed—a stable peace process, multiparty elections and the transformation of the armed opposition into a civil political party. Its transition to liberalism and capitalism brought macro-economic growth rates that are probably envied by many countries in the region. This article argues, however, that Mozambique provides an example of a third wave democracy where the transition from in electoral democracy to a consolidated democracy has not yet been completed, with little progress towards democratic maturity. In particular, the repercussions of the elections in 1999, Mozambique's ‘black’ November in 2000 and the process of recent consultation between the and Frelimo leadership in order to resolve the paralysed state of Mozambican politics underline a tendency towards a permanent entrenchment of democratic minimalism.     

Holding the Bridge in Troubled Times: The Cold War and the Navies of Europe

European navies made a fundamental contribution to the Cold War at sea, ensuring the effectiveness of deterrence even as Soviet naval forces grew to ominous proportions. European fleets were tasked with containing a Soviet attack until US forces could arrive on the scene. Many European navies pursued essential niche capabilities tailored for their own unique maritime environments. Others made important contributions to broader NATO efforts in the high-stakes arenas of sea control, power projection and even nuclear deterrence. Contentious issues did arise, for example concerning burden-sharing, but true to its name, the alliance succeeded collectively in wielding formidable sea power. This paper is based on the premise that the maritime players in the Cold War at sea were by no means restricted to the US and Soviet navies. The navies of Western Europe and Canada had major roles to play as well within the NATO area. They contributed a great deal to the political cohesion crucial to an essentially maritime alliance, and in many cases had a real operational contribution to make as well. What follows, then, is the Cold War at sea from a European point of view.     

单兵数字化系统外部通信研究——“数字化战场与单兵数字化系统”系列论文之六

讨论了单兵数字化系统外部通信的功能结构和实现途径，以及战场信息网的无线电网和地域网实现。重点研究了联合战术信息分布系统ＪＴＩＤＳ，包括其ＴＤＭＡ工作方式和多网工作原理。最后研究了单兵数字化系统通信的一个安全问题。     

MONGOLIA

Formed according to broad principles laid out by the United Nations, nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) play an important role in promoting nuclear nonproliferation, paralleling and complementing the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. But the traditional regional treaty-based path to establishing NWFZs is not open to all states. Owing to various factors, some countries cannot realistically follow the path of states that have established traditional NWFZs. Mongolia, having declared itself a single-state NWFZ in 1992 and gained UN General Assembly recognition of this status in 1998, may provide an example for other countries to follow. This viewpoint presents Mongolia's case as a state seeking to acquire a nontraditional nuclear-weapon-free status despite unfavorable geopolitical circumstances. The case of Mongolia clearly demonstrates that the creation of a credible, single-state NWFZ status is possible, but demands the support and flexibility of both neighboring states and the nuclear weapon states.     

卫星导航系统功率增强子星座优化设计与性能分析

卫星功率增强技术是提高区域导航信号抗干扰性能的一种有效措施,在卫星导航全星座中优选出卫星数量少、服务性能优的功率增强子星座,是新一代卫星导航系统建设迫切需要解决的问题。因此提出基于卫星数最少准则的功率增强子星座优化设计方法,详细介绍设计流程、数学模型及最优解搜索策略;定义了可用性水平、精度水平和覆盖范围等指标评估功率增强子星座性能;以GPS为例,分别针对覆盖点目标和区域目标两种应用背景进行功率增强子星座优化设计及性能评估。分析结果表明:全球范围内任意目标点进行功率增强需要12～17颗卫星;实现对我国沿海地区的连续覆盖需要18颗功率增强卫星;覆盖整个亚太地区则需要全星座24颗卫星都具备功率增强能力,这样才能满足其连续性和精度要求,此时最优功率增强子星座的服务范围可扩充至全球区域。     

Information Is Not a Weapons System

ABSTRACT

While many militaries have tried to capitalize on the potential of information operations in internal war, few have succeeded. I argue that military information campaigns fall short of expectations for two reasons. First, the theory of influence militaries generally embrace – communications as a non-lethal weapons system – is largely invalid. While treating information as a weapons system makes it easier to integrate it into the existing military planning system, this overstates the independent effects of communications on behavior and understates the importance of interactive effects of what commercial marketing theory refers to as the “marketing mix” – product, price, promotion, and placement. It would be more appropriate to treat military information operations as a form of marketing: a composite effort to induce a specific behavior in a target audience by applying a combination of material and ideational instruments. The marketing model suggests that the efficacy of information operations will depend not simply on the message and its delivery (promotion) but on the behavior the sender seeks to induce (the product), the costs of that behavior (the price), and the opportunities available for such behavior (the placement).     

土壤源-湖水源热泵系统及工程应用实例

由于土壤源、湖水源热泵的应用受到地理条件、初投资等因素的制约,某些地区更适宜采用土壤源-湖水源的混合式热泵系统。以某工程应用为例,分别从性能系数、初投资及运行费用3个方面分析证明了采用混合式热泵系统的可行性。结果表明,混合式热泵系统的初投资虽然较大,但通过节约运行费用,在较短年限内可收回增加的成本,并且可以减少废水废气的排放。因此,在合适的地区可以推广使用土壤源-湖水源的混合式热泵系统。     

Close Encounters of the Tribal Kind: the Implementation of Co-option as a Tool for De-escalation of Conflict – The Case of the Netherlands in Afghanistan's Uruzgan Province

Abstract

In contemporary counter-insurgency campaigns de-escalation is typically achieved by obtaining the local population's collaboration. The rationale underlying this approach is that such collaboration spawns control over the population and therefore weakens the insurgent's position. This article seeks to understand how this approach is practised in the reality of contemporary counter-insurgency warfare. In Iraq as well as Afghanistan counter-insurgents were confronted with fragmented indigenous societies in which the various local segments were dominated by local power-holders. Consequently, obtaining the local population's collaboration required co-option of these agents. As such a strategy of co-option is a highly localized approach, this article focuses on Afghanistan's Uruzgan province and analyzes the implementation of co-option by the Netherlands' Task Force Uruzgan (TFU), which operated there from 2006 to 2010. The analysis discusses how the counter-insurgents obtained a profound understanding of Uruzgan's societal landscape and how co-option of local power-holders became part of the counter-insurgency routine. In the end, co-option was successfully implemented as TFU even succeeded in obtaining the collaboration of previously marginalized elements of the population. However, as the methods employed for co-option were mainly of a persuasive nature, the TFU co-option strategy was less effective in containing the influence of notorious spoilers. Thus this case study provides an insight into the dynamics and limitations of co-option as a tool for de-escalation in contemporary counter-insurgency warfare.     

C~3I系统综合效能模型（上）

根据一般地区防空Ｃ￣３Ｉ系统的特点,从系统总体角度讨论了建立一种Ｃ￣３Ｉ系统综合效能模型的方法,并给出一个模型系统的模块组成及其信息流程。通过模拟计算,可以对Ｃ￣３Ｉ系统进行定量分析和综合评价。与同类系统进行分析比较,具有一定的通用性,对实现Ｃ￣Ｉ系统的程序化设计也很有参考价值。最后,以地区防空Ｃ￣３Ｉ系统为例,对模型的应用作了较详尽的说明。     

The misguided and mismanaged intervention in Libya: Consequences for peace

In this paper, I critically analyse the doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP), as it relates to the responsibility of intervening forces towards the people they claim to protect and the challenges that the situation in Libya now poses in the region and for the African Union (AU). I focus most of my attention on the coercive elements of the RtoP framework (Pillar III). This is the most contested element in the framework. Three questions guide this article: were there legitimate grounds to justify an external intervention in Libya? In the words of Hugh Roberts in Who Said Gaddafi Had to Go, ‘[w]hat if anything has Libya got in exchange for all the death and destruction that have been visited on it’ since 2011? What are the practical implications and consequences of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intervention, led by the United States (US), for regional peace? I discuss the problems surrounding the US–NATO intervention, followed by an analysis of the various positions and narratives leading up to the intervention, the framing and justifications provided for the intervention, and an analysis of the AU's proposal for the resolution of the Libyan crisis. I analyse the various debates that took place in the US (Pentagon/White House), at the United Nations, among scholars in the West and in Africa, and among various actors who tried to broker a ceasefire in Libya before and during the intervention. I conclude with a discussion of the implications for regional peace.     

Chemical weapons and the Iran‐Iraq war: A case study in noncompliance

Policy makers and scholars have drawn improper lessons from the Ukrainian case of disarmament. Employing a content analysis of Ukrainian and Russian news sources, as well as a series of interviews with Ukrainian officials conducted by the author, this paper argues that Ukraine did not surrender its nuclear arsenal because it received compensation or faced financial and technical hurdles in securing effective command and control over the weapons. Instead, Ukraine surrendered its nuclear weapons due to a lack of demand for them. The historical interactions between Ukrainians and Russians led the majority of Ukrainian leaders to reject a conception of the Ukrainian national identity that cognitively perceived Russia as a security threat. Only with a proper understanding of this case study can the international community understand how the nonproliferation norm succeeded.     

省部共建高校的服务定位：打造区域经济社会发展的核心动力源

省部共建高校是我国高等教育的重要组成部分,其服务应立足区域经济建设和社会发展的需要,一方面推进区域自主创新,另一方面实现学校自身又好又快的发展。该文从人才培养、科技创新、社会服务、文化辐射四方面分析了省部共建高校的服务定位,提出力争将其建设成为推动区域经济社会发展的核心动力源,成为地方高校发展的示范集群。     

The political and military effectiveness of Commonwealth forces in Confrontation 1963–661

Low-intensity conflicts such as counterinsurgencies tend to be characterized by a large number of contacts. The sheer number and often inconclusive nature of these incidents makes it difficult to determine whether military operations are effective. This article uses Confrontation as a case study, first building a database of incidents (including contacts) and then analysing the database statistically to identify patterns. This process shows that the British Commonwealth security forces succeeded in controlling the number of incidents and the space to force ratio. They also dominated the contact battle. The article helps to account for the British Commonwealth success at the operational and tactical level.