An alliance between Cyprus and Greece: assessing its partners’ relative security contribution

The issue that this paper tackles is the assessment of the relative security benefits that Cyprus and Greece derive in the context of their cooperation on defence matters. This form of cooperation, known as the ‘Integrated Defence Space Doctrine’, aims at defending their interests in the Aegean Sea and the broader East Mediterranean theatre. The paper relies heavily on earlier research on this topic, which deals with the Greek–Cypriot alliance facing an arms race against Turkey, and uses a coefficient especially designed to assess the optimal levels of security and the associated defence expenditure of the two allies. A comparison of the relative security coefficient values for the two allies suggests that the security benefit that Greece derives thanks to its alliance with Cyprus exceeds the corresponding Cypriot benefit by far. Given the importance assigned to human resources by this index, in conjunction with the demographic problems of Greece, this conclusion justifies the recent Greek defence policy revision, emphasizing quality, capital equipment and flexibility of forces. This revision aims at satisfying the security requirements of the alliance and the increasing demands of an arms race against Turkey.     

Optimal versus required defence expenditure: The case of the Greek-Turkish arms race

The aim of this paper is to indicate the extent to which the arms race against Turkey, in which Greece and Cyprus have been entangled, imposes a defence expenditure burden that is tough for the two allies to bear. To do so we have resorted to evaluating the optimal military expenditure for the two countries, allied in the context of the Integrated Defence Doctrine, which is compatible with the constraints imposed by the resources of their economies. All experiments and scenarios examined lead to the conclusion that the current defence burden of the two allies seems to be driving their economies beyond capacity limits. The fact remains, however, that under the circumstances, a one-sided disarmament policy like the one currently followed by Greece, is a risky choice given that the long-term armament programmes pursued by Turkey, whose role in this arms race has been proven as leading, leave very small room to the Greek and Cypriot sides to reduce their own defence expenditure.     

FINANCIAL VERSUS HUMAN RESOURCES IN THE GREEK–TURKISH ARMS RACE 10 YEARS ON: A FORECASTING INVESTIGATION USING ARTIFICIAL NEURAL NETWORKS

This paper looks into the Greek–Turkish arms race a decade after an earlier contribution to the issue that relied heavily on artificial neural networks. The time period between the two papers contributes to the reliability of the results derived, not just by increasing the number of observations, but also mainly by incorporating the progress made in the realm of artificial intelligence. The focus on the case of both countries unlike the paper mentioned above that dealt with just the Greek side provides ample room for comparative purposes regarding the determinants of defense expenditure on both sides. The results derived in terms of input significance estimation support the findings of the earlier research as indicated above, pointing to the leading role of the demographic preponderance of Turkey over Greece. The paper also points to the fact that 10 years later, Turkey continues to set the arms race rules against its rival by determining the defense expenditure of Greece, whereas the role of the latter in affecting the military spending of Turkey is non‐existent.     

Financial versus human resources in the Greek‐Turkish arms race: A forecasting investigation using artificial neural networks

This paper aims at forecasting the burden on the Greek economy resulting from the arms race against Turkey and at concentrating on the leading determinants of this burden. The military debt and the defence share of GDP are employed alternatively in order to approximate the measurement of the arms race pressure on Greece, and the method used is that of artificial neural networks. The use of a wide variety of explanatory variables in combination with the promising results derived, suggest that the impact on the Greek economy resulting from this arms race is determined, to a large, extent, by demographic factors which strongly favour the Turkish side. Prediction on both miltary debt and defence expenditure exhibited highly satisfactory accuracy, while the estimation of input significance, indicates that variables describing the Turkish side are often dominant over the corresponding Greek ones.     

Greek response to the Cyprus invasion

The contemporary history of three countries was marked on July 1974 when the Greek colonels overthrew the legitimate government of Cyprus, Turkey invaded the island to preserve her interests and Greece returned to democracy, but withdrew from NATO. The apathy of her allies was a bitter experience for Greece, considering that the government in Athens was struggling to cope with the consequences of the invasion and Turkey's aggression, as well as with the diplomatic isolation caused by the seven-year dictatorial rule. This paper examines the response of the Greek government and makes particular reference to Karamanlis's archives and Greek parliamentary proceedings. The purpose of the present study is to explore whether Greece was genuinely committed to the settlement of the Cyprus issue and failed due to lack of support or simply ignored the appeals of the Cypriot people and pursued more vital foreign policy objectives, thus contributing to the partition of the island.     

Is there a Greek‐Turkish arms race?: Evidence from cointegration and causality tests†

Greece and Turkey are both members of NATO and are two of the principal players in the Balkan region. Their respective defence burdens (i.e. the share of military expenditure to GDP) are the highest in NATO. Their bilateral relations are marred by serious friction and conflict of interest and have on a number of occasions come close to an armed confrontation. Their strategic interaction and mutual weapons build‐up has recently attracted the attention of researchers in the field testing the hypothesis of a Greek‐Turkish arms race with conflicting results. This paper, using cointegration and causality tests, finds evidence of a systematic armaments competition between the two countries provided that a defence policy regime shift estimated to occur in 1985 is explicitly taken into consideration. This policy regime change is associated with the stagnation of defence spending in Greece owing to the gradual deterioration of Greek public finances over the last decade.     

The structure of defense production in the United States, 1929‐∗

This article contains a critical review of the literature on the economics of military affairs in Greece and Turkey as of December 1999. In particular, I review (a) arms race models; (b) models of the demand for military expenditure; (c) models measuring the economic impact of military expenditure; and (d) literature and issues related to indigenous arms production. I conclude with a number of summary lessons and observations of how future research might improve upon the existing body of work.     

Country survey military expenditure in Cyprus

Cyprus, a small island state, gained independence from British colonial rule in 1960. For more that half its history as an independent state Cyprus has been under occupation following the 1974 Turkish invasion. Despite the fact that it has faced war, invasion and occupation, Cyprus has allocated a comparatively small proportion of its national income to defence. The average defence burden—military expenditure as a share of GDP—during 1964–98 was around 2.5%. However, as a result of a substantial shift in defence policy during the past decade or so, the defence burden during the 1990s has increased, averaging about 4% of GDP as Cyprus decided to implement an extensive military modernization program aiming to present a more credible military deterrence vis‐a‐vis Turkey. Empirical estimations of a demand function for Cypriot military expenditure suggest that it is positively affected by alliance spillins and external military threat.     

Asymmetric effects of military expenditure between Turkey and Greece

One of the major topics of the defense economics literature regarding Turkey and Greece has been the empirical modeling of various aspects of arms racing. However, despite a considerable amount of research, little evidence has been found in favor of an arms race between the two countries. In the literature, this failure of applied studies has been attributed, among other reasons, to the sensitivity of the results to the underlying model specification, to small sample size, and to measurement issues. This study uses novel, nonlinear, models to investigate the possible relationship between the military expenditures of the two countries. It is assumed that if there are two regimes characterizing the low (or negative) and high-growth military expenditure periods, the growth rates of one country's military expenditure may have distinct effects on the military expenditure regimes of the other country or may contribute to the change from one regime to another. The nonlinear models examined are Smooth Transition Regression models (STRs). Strong evidence of nonlinearity for Greece is found, with asymmetry relating to two distinct regimes through lagged Turkish military expenditure changes.     

Friend or foe? The Cyprus Police Force and the EOKA insurgency

This article examines the ambiguous role played by the Cyprus Police Force during the Greek Cypriot insurgency against Britain between 1955 and 1959. A multiethnic force policing a multiethnic society, the CPF struggled to fulfill its duties. Greek Cypriot officers became ineffective as sympathy for, or fear of insurgents undermined their ability to function. Some collaborated, others resigned. Those who stayed became targets of their own people. Turkish Cypriot officers, recruited in greater numbers to compensate for a reduction in Greek Cypriot officers, worked to enforce the law, but exacerbated intercommunal relations in doing so. In spite of the peculiar conditions present in Cyprus, the case has valuable implications for contemporary policymakers on the vulnerabilities inherent in the use of local police forces to restore law and order in ethnically divided societies.     

Defence spending and economic growth: A causal analysis for Greece and Turkey*

There are a number of studies which consider the relation between military spending and economic growth using Granger causality techniques rather than a well‐defined economic model. Some have used samples of groups of countries, finding no consistent results. Others have focused on case studies of individual countries, which has the advantage of the researchers bringing to bear much more data than the cross country samples and a greater knowledge of the structure of the economy and the budget. This paper adds to the literature by providing an analysis of two countries, Greece and Turkey, which are particularly interesting case studies given their high military burdens, the poor relations between the two and the resulting arms race in the area. In addition to analysing the data using standard “pre‐cointegration” Granger causality techniques, this paper employs modern vector autoregressive (VAR) methodology that utilises cointegration via Granger's representation theorem. The standard Granger causality tests suggest a positive effect of changing military burden on growth for Greece, but this is not sustained when the cointegration between output and military burden is taken into account. The only evidence of significant Granger causality is a negative impact of military burden on growth in Turkey.     

Domestic political and external security determinants of the demand for greek military expenditure

By European Union and NATO standards, Greece consistently allocates substantial human and material resources to defence. The Greek defence burden (i.e. military expenditure as a share of GDP) has invariably been appreciably higher than the EU and NATO averages. The paper applies an autoregressive distributed lag model (ARDL) to present cointegrated estimates of the demand function for Greek military expenditure, in which domestic political factors and external security determinants are incorporated. Our empirical findings suggest that Greek defence spending over the period 1960-1998 has been influenced by both external security concerns, namely Turkey, as well as changes in the domestic political scene.     

Arms Racing and the Costs of Arms Imports: A Stochastic Model

The paper draws on the demand for arms imports model of Levine and Smith (1995, 1997) using stochastic processes of the birth-death type in steady state. It assumes two antagonistic regional players engaged in an armaments race satisfying their demand for military hardware through imports from the international market. The paper examines the effects that arms imports have on the military balance between the two recipient countries. It constructs a state space of possible outcomes in terms of the military balance/imbalance between the two countries involved. A new variable is introduced which tries to encapsulate the absolute difference in their respective security functions at any moment in time. This variable affects the transition from one state of affairs to the other.     

Turkey-Africa alliance: Evolving patterns in security relations

ABSTRACT

Turkey has maintained its strategic relations with Africa at the highest level under recent AK Party governments in the field not only of low politics but also of high politics. For example, it opened its largest overseas military base in Somalia in 2017 and signed military, defense and security pacts with more than 25 African countries. This article traces the deep historical and cultural relations with Africa behind its newly evolving foreign policy identity, arguing that its booming economic power has been a significant driving force in shaping a new security strategy. It examines what the growing security involvement means for both Turkey and Africa in order to contribute to the relevant literature through a holistic approach from both theoretical and conceptual perspectives.     

Israeli foreign policy and the arms race in the Middle East 1950–1960

Previous accounts of the arms race in the Middle East during the 1950s have focused on the imbalance that resulted from the ‘Czech deal’ of September 1955. While that transfer of weaponry by the Soviet Union to Egypt constituted both a historical turning point and sharp acceleration of the arms race, it was only one of several changes in the regional strategic balance of that decade. This article makes extensive use of archival material in order to identify five phases of the arms race of the 1950s and analyze the manner in which Israeli policy‐makers dealt with the exigencies of procurement during each phase. Except for a brief period following the arms deals with France in 1956 that marked the beginning of the fifth phase examined below, the Israelis never abandoned the attempt to obtain arms from the United States. Israel's success in maintaining a high degree of independence in foreign policy throughout this period was the result of arms purchases from Britain and France that marked each phase of the arms race examined here. Yet, the Israelis considered arms from both of these Western powers to be temporary substitutes for the arms relationship with the USA that came about during the 1960s.     

Country survey VII: Military spending in Greece

Greece is one of the poorest members of the European Union, yet its defence burden is the highest in Europe and NATO. At around 5.6% of GDP in 1994 it is twice the average NATO and European Union burden. In terms of the human and material resources devoted to defence yearly Greece is in comparative terms the most militarised country in Europe. The purpose of this paper is to examine military spending in Greece. It begins with a brief survey of the Greek economy and its development as it relates to defence. The determinants of Greek military spending are then modelled and analysed. The causes of military spending appear to be primarily regional rivalries and conflicts. In particular the ongoing dispute with Turkey is the main external security determinant of defence spending in Greece. The supply of defence inputs is then examined with reference to equipment procurement and indigenous arms production.     

Modeling the effects of military tension on foreign trade: Some preliminary empirical findings from the Greek-Turkish rivalry

In this paper we examine the effects of irreversibility on foreign trade in the case where there are two sources of uncertainty. The two sources considered in this paper are uncertainty arising from business risk and uncertainty arising from military tension. The resulting insights are then used to model the import markets of Greece and Turkey. These models are then empirically estimated, in order to ascertain, on the one hand whether there is evidence that irreversibility is indeed a factor on the supply side of these markets, and on the other hand, the direction of the incidence of military tension on foreign trade. An index of military tension is used for the two countries, based on the number of airspace violations by Turkish military aircraft of Greek airspace.     

Re-thinking the Unthinkable: Arms Control in the Twenty-First Century

ABSTRACT

Since the end of the Cold War, arms control proponents tried to make the case for deep nuclear reductions and other forms of security cooperation as necessary for strategic stability. While different versions of strategic stability analysis did sometimes produce innovative proposals, constructive negotiations, and successful ratification campaigns in the past, this analytical framework has become more of a hindrance than a help. Treating arms control as a predominantly technical way to make deterrence more stable by changing force structure characteristics, military operations, relative numbers of weapons on either side, or total number of nuclear weapons gives short shrift to political factors, including the fundamental assumptions about world politics that inform different arms control logics, the quality of political relations among leading states, and the political processes that affect negotiation, ratification, and implementation. This article compares two logics for arms control as a means to enhance strategic stability, one developed by the Cambridge community in the 1960s and one used by the Reagan administration and its successors, with current perspectives on strategic stability in which flexibility and freedom of action are preferable to predictability and arms control. It also contrasts what the Barack Obama administration has tried to achieve through strategic stability dialogues with Russia and China with how they envision security cooperation. It then presents an approach developed during the Cold War by Hedley Bull for thinking about both the technical and the political dimensions of arms control, and suggests that the logic of Cooperative Security (which shares important features with Bull's approach) is a more appropriate and productive way to think about arms control in the twenty-first century than strategic stability analysis is.     

The Effects of Defence Spending Reductions: A CGE Estimation of the Foregone Peace Dividend in the Case of Greece

With the collapse of bipolarity and the end of the East-West armaments race, defence budgets have shrunk and military expenditures across many countries have fallen, opening-up the prospect of potential beneficial economic spin-offs. In the case of Greece, a country with a higher than average defence burden, military spending has not exhibited similar downward trends as it has done in other members of NATO and the European Union. The paper, using a Computable General Equilibrium model, estimates through simulations the effects on the Greek economy had reductions in current defence spending been equal to the NATO average. The results from the CGE estimations suggest that a shift of expenditure from defence into non-defence public spending would have an appreciable beneficial impact.     

Limiting cyberwarfare: applying arms-control models to an emerging technology

ABSTRACT

An arms race in cyberspace is underway. US and Western government efforts to control this process have largely been limited to deterrence and norm development. This article examines an alternative policy option: arms control. To gauge whether arms-control models offer useful lessons for addressing cyber capabilities, this article compiles a new dataset of predominantly twentieth-century arms-control agreements. It also evaluates two case studies of negotiated agreements that regulate dual-use technologies, the 1928 Geneva Protocol prohibiting chemical- and biological-weapon use and the 1944 Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation. The analysis underscores the limits of norm development for emerging technologies with both civilian and military applications. It finds lessons for developing verifiable, international cooperation mechanisms for cyberwarfare in the regulatory model of international aviation. Conventionally, arms-control agreements take advantage of transparent tests or estimates of arms. To restrict cyberwarfare activities, experts and policy makers must adapt arms-control models to a difficult-to-measure technology at an advanced stage of development and use. Further investigation of international regulatory schemes for dual-use technology of similar diffusion and development to the internet, such as international civil aviation, is needed.