THE CASE FOR DEFENCE

What is the case for defence and is it a worthwhile investment? This question is addressed for two contrasting nations, namely, the UK and New Zealand. Economists have a set of standard analytical tools for addressing the question but they are difficult to operationalise. This paper provides policy‐relevant answers.     

THE BOTSWANA DEFENCE FORCE

When Botswana arrived at independence in 1966, it had no army, depending instead on a police force with deep roots in the colonial era. The country waited another eleven years before creating a military and within a quarter of a century had seen it develop into a capable, well-educated and self-disciplined force that was attracting some of the nation's most talented young people. It had also become the government's institution of choice for addressing the country's most pressing security dilemmas, whether environmental catastrophe or serious crime, and had performed sterling service in regional peace operations. To its members and external observers, it emphasised its professionalism and service, enjoying a high level of respect in the nation as a whole. Given the generally poor reputation of armies in Africa, this qualifies as a notable achievement.     

DETERMINING THE DEFENCE INDUSTRIAL BASE

This paper models the determination of the defence industrial base – the number of different military systems a country decides to maintain. High R&D costs means that few countries can afford to produce major weapons systems and the producers also import systems. Non‐producers rely on imports and we assume their demand is driven by regional arms races. Military capability is determined by the number of systems and the quantity and quality of each. We examine how the defence industrial base is influenced by military expenditures, R&D costs, export controls, the nature of regional arms races and a variety of other factors.     

THE FUTURE OF UK DEFENCE RESEARCH

Developments within the UK in the Ministry of Defence’s policy on defence equipment acquisition demand changes in the scale and allocation of the Ministry’s budget for defence research. To facilitate the national debate on those changes, this paper reviews the key questions about UK defence research which the Ministry must resolve in order to implement its new Defence Technology Strategy.     

EUROPEAN DEFENCE FIRMS: THE INFORMATION BARRIER ON PRIVATE FINANCE*

After the fall of the Berlin Wall, European governments adopted a hands‐off policy towards the defence industrial base, in an attempt to increase the sector’s efficiency and reactivity. In this context, one topical issue is how to motivate defence firms to apply for private rather than public finance. Since banks have no prior experience with European defence firms, a problem of asymmetric information may block this transition. The problem is analysed within the framework of a game between defence firms and banks. It is shown that the Bayesian Equilibrium might correspond to a situation where low‐risk firms prefer the state‐financed scheme; yet, in a perfect information set‐up, the same firms would apply for bank credit. In order to facilitate the transition to private finance, the government might decide to subsidize investors who agree on financing defence firms; the state aid should be made available during a transitory learning period.     

DEFENCE SECTOR TRANSFORMATION

Sub-Saharan Africa is a region facing many problems and challenges. Many of the countries in the region are experiencing internal conflicts and others are involved in processes of peace negotiations and post-conflict peace building. All these countries face the challenge of defence sector transformation in order to align their post-conflict defence departments and military forces with the demands of democratic societies. This is more than a demand for a reduction in defence spending and requires a fundamental change in defence policies, management and practises. There are, however, lessons to be learnt from other similar experiences in the region. This article examines some of those lessons and presents a generic model for defence sector transformation in sub-Saharan Africa.     

EFFECTS OF MILITARY SPENDING ON THE PROFITABILITY OF SPANISH DEFENCE CONTRACTORS

The traditional view of the defence industry obtaining large profits from contracts with the Ministry of Defence relies on several assumptions. Among these are the use of such arrangements as an instrument of industrial policy, the strong market power enjoyed by prime contractors, and the inefficiency encouraged by the sector. The findings show that defence contracts have a positive effect on profits, as well as the prizes for innovation and the market power enjoyed by some defence subsectors.     

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EXTERNAL DEBT,DEFENCE EXPENDITURES AND GNP REVISITED: THE CASE OF TURKEY

This paper contributes to the continuing debate on the economic effects of military expenditure by undertaking a case study of Greece. Within Europe Greece provides a particularly interesting object of study. It has the highest military burden in Europe and NATO, is the only European Union country situated in the unstable environment of the Balkans, faces a military threat from Turkey, and has a very weak economy. After some background analysis of the economy and military expenditure, the paper investigates the determinants of Greek military expenditure as well as whether the high military burden has played an important role in Greece's poor economic performance over the period 1960–1996. It estimates a Keynesian simultaneous equation model with a supply side, which allows the indirect effects of military expenditure to be captured explicitly. It concludes that the major determinants of Greek defence spending are not economic but strategic (the threat of war) and that the direct effect of defence spending on economic growth as well as the indirect effects through savings and trade balance are all significantly negative. On the basis of such strong results, the paper concludes that defence spending is harmful for the Greek economy.     

PARLIAMENT AND DEFENCE OVERSIGHT

Abstract

A tremendous amount of important work has been done recently on operationalising the protection of civilians as a military task. The bulk of the discussion has focused on how militaries should respond to direct attacks on civilians. This is an important issue, but thinking about civilian protection should also include a serious examination of the ways in which the approach of military organisations to the problem of ‘spoiler’ groups can affect the level and dynamics of attacks on civilians – importantly, where armed groups are interested in violent control of civilian populations, attempts to ‘dislodge’ them from areas of control may substantially increase the level of violence against civilians (beyond the dangers to be expected from being near areas where active fighting is taking place). In 2009, the United Nations mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) supported the Congolese military in operations to dismantle the Hutu-dominated FDLR (Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda, Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda) militia group, at massive human cost. Critics have primarily focused on MONUC's failure to protect civilians from direct attack, consonant with the general discourse on tactics for civilian protection. These criticisms are valid, but in this paper I argue that two crucial additional considerations should be kept in mind: the way that military operations can affect violence against civilians, and the way that moralising the approach to armed groups, even those which have committed serious abuses, can limit military and political options – potentially in ways that increase civilian risk in the name of protecting them.     

防御阵地火力编成一种静态评估方法和优化模型

提出了防御阵地火力编成的建模思想、要素体系,并得到了相应的权重值,分析了地形对火力发扬的影响,建立了各种火器的等效关系式,找到了各参量的计算方法,对多种参量用模糊评判的方法进行分级、综合和评判。不仅能评价各级火力阵地的优劣,而且能对火力阵地进行优化,组合和配系。