THE PRISONERS OF HOPE: CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE OPPOSITION IN ZIMBABWE

There are many debates as to what constitutes the essence of our African humanity and, indeed, Zimbabwean-ness. The country has had a difficult but illustrious history characterised by turmoil and tenacity, chaos and courage, corruption and compassion. Zambia's Kenneth Kaunda once described forgiveness as “a constant willingness to live in a new day”. In this article I intend to demonstrate why there has not been any revolt in Zimbabwe, despite unparalleled repression. Perhaps it is the ingrained capacity of Zimbabweans to constantly hope for a new day that has made us prisoners of hope. I wish to focus my comments on the effect the ZANU-PF's authoritarian regime has had on political opposition in Zimbabwe, on the architecture of civil society, and in particular on the role of civil society organisations. A particular area of concern is the threat to their functioning posed by the new NGO Bill.     

THE EXERCISE OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY

Skeptics of the Bush administration have castigated its strong aversion to formal international agreements in responding to the threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), citing unilateral actions as the default alternative. Yet this critique misses the growing emergence of a conscious framework guiding the administration's actions: an emphasis on the exercise of national sovereignty and the corollary principle of sovereign responsibility. Rejecting the paradigm of arms control as the answer to WMD proliferation, the current administration instead advocates a toolkit of alternative mechanisms based on the full exercise by individual nation, states of their domestic authorities and rights under international law, acting in their capacities as responsible citizens of the global community. This paper will examine that philosophical approach and its concrete application through the following policies: (1) the Proliferation Security Initiative; (2) enforcement of national laws and regulations as exemplified by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 and the U.S. proposals for consideration by Biological Weapons Convention signatories; and (3) preemptive warfare to disarm the WMD programs of a threatening state.     

DETERMINING THE DEFENCE INDUSTRIAL BASE

This paper models the determination of the defence industrial base – the number of different military systems a country decides to maintain. High R&D costs means that few countries can afford to produce major weapons systems and the producers also import systems. Non‐producers rely on imports and we assume their demand is driven by regional arms races. Military capability is determined by the number of systems and the quantity and quality of each. We examine how the defence industrial base is influenced by military expenditures, R&D costs, export controls, the nature of regional arms races and a variety of other factors.     

储油罐区灭火确定冷却兵力部署的模拟模型

本文提出了冷却燃烧罐和邻近罐时水枪应放置的位置的一系列数学描述原则,从而建立了油罐灭火冷却力量部署的模拟模型,该模型可方便地用于计算机模拟系统。     

某型导弹弹翼静力分析的一种数学模型

应用有限元方法,建立了变厚度薄板三角形单元刚度矩阵,给出了变厚度薄板三角形单元形心上的应力和位移计算的数学模型。通过对某型反坦克导弹弹翼进行静力分析和实验比较,表明采用这种模型进行分析合乎结构设计精度要求。     

THE ACRS EXPERIENCE AND ITS RELEVANCE TO THE WMDFZ CONFERENCE

This article examines the arms control logic that was applied to the only regional arms control talks that have taken place in the Middle East to date: the Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) working group that was part of the multilateral track of the Madrid peace process in the early 1990s. It highlights both the successes and major constraints of the ACRS talks in an effort to assess what might be relevant to the weapons of mass destruction-free zone conference proposed for later this year. In addition to the basic arms control dilemmas that will continue to challenge this conference—as they did ACRS—the article suggests that current conditions in the Middle East are even less conducive to regional dialogue than they were in the earlier period, due to the internal upheavals in several key Arab states, and the specific challenge of Iran's move to develop a military nuclear capability.     

INTRODUCTION: THE DYNAMICS OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

Decisionmaking processes leading to the acquisition of nuclear weapons by democratic states have served as the basis for theories about nuclear proliferation. In contrast, less is known about how a totalitarian regime responds to immense external pressure to abolish unconventional weapons it considers crucial for its security and survival. This article will analyze how we can explain Iraq's behavior after the passing of Resolution 1441 and during the United Nations inspections in 2002–2003.