Strategic “defensivism” and post-reset blues: US–Russian nuclear arms reductions,missile defenses and minimum deterrence

US nuclear deterrence and arms control policy may be moving, by design and by inadvertence, toward a posture of strategic “defensivism”. Strategic “defensivism” emphasizes the overlapping and reinforcing impact of: (1) reductions in US, Russian and possibly other strategic nuclear forces, possibly down to the level of “minimum deterrence,” (2) deployment of improved strategic and/or theater antimissile defenses for the US, NATO allies and other partners; and (3) additional reliance on conventional military forces for some missions hitherto preferentially assigned to nuclear weapons. This article deals with the first two of these aspects only: the interaction between missile defenses and offensive force reductions in US–Russian strategy and policy. The findings are that stable deterrence as between the USA and Russia is possible at lower than New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty levels, but reductions below 1000 deployed long-range weapons for each state, toward a true minimum deterrent posture, will require multilateral as opposed to bilateral coordination of arms limitations. Missile defenses might provide some denial capability against light attacks by states with small arsenals, but they still fall short of meaningful damage limitation as between powers capable of massive nuclear strikes.     

Reconciling strategic studies … with itself: a common framework for choosing among strategies

Three distinct, and seemingly irreconcilable, schools of thought are identified within the strategic studies literature. One which searches for “universal principles of war,” a second, “context-dependent,” approach that seeks to embed each instance of warfare within its concurrent social, political, technological milieu and, finally a “paradoxical logic” school, which equates strategy with the generation of uncertainty. The author offers some intuitive concepts from non-cooperative game theory to develop a “dominate-mix” approach to strategy choice. In doing so, he helps to reconcile these disparate approaches and provides a simple framework to assist researchers in framing military decisions as well as to assist planners in choosing among strategies.     

Requirements of an “optimizer” for computer simulations

Computer simulation has many advantages. However, one major disadvantage is that, in all too many cases, the attempt to use computer simulation to find an optimum solution to a problem rapidly degenerates into a trial-and-error process. Techniques for overcoming this disadvantage, i. e., for making optimization and computer simulation more compatible, are applicable at two points in the development of the overall computer simulation. Techniques which are used within actual construction of the mathematical models comprising the simulation will be labeled as internal methods, while those which are used after the simulation has been completely developed will be termed external methods Because external methods appear to offer the largest potential payoff, discussion is restricted to these methods, which are essentially search techniques. In addition, the development of an “Optimizer” computer program based on these techniques is suggested Although drawbacks to the use of search techniques in the computer simulation framework exist, these techniques do offer potential for “optimization.” The modification of these techniques to satisfy the requirements of an “Optimizer” is discussed.     

A continuous submarine versus submarine game

This paper analyzes, from a game-theoretic standpoint, the simultaneous choice of speeds by a transitor and by an SSK which patrols back and forth perpendicular to the transitor's course. Using idealized acoustic assumptions and a cookie-cutter detection model which ignores counterdetection, we are able to present the problem as a continuous game, and to determine an analytic solution. The results indicate that with these assumptions, there are conditions under which neither a “go fast” nor a “go slow” strategy is optimal. The game provides a good example of a continuous game with a nontrivial solution which can be solved effectively.     

Uniformly minimum variance unbiased estimates of operational readiness and reliability in a two-state system

This paper obtains the uniformly minimum variance unbiased estimates of two indices of performance of a system which alternates between two states “up” or “down” in accordance with a Markov process. The two indices are (1) operational readiness, which measures the probability that the system will be up when needed; and (2) operational reliability, which measures the probability that the system will be up during the entire time of need. For the purpose of obtaining these estimates, two types of observations are considered: (a) those which reveal only the state of system at isolated time-points, and (b) those which continuously record the duration of the “up” and “down” times of the system.     

Insurgency in Afghanistan: implications for Pakistan's internal and external security

In the aftermath of 9/11, the USA embarked on a massive global hunt for terrorists and launched its “Operation Enduring Freedom” in Afghanistan. Its failure to control insurgency in Afghanistan spilled over into Pakistan, with disastrous consequences. The resurgence of the Taliban with more formidable tactics and maneuvering skills has become more troublesome for both Afghanistan and Pakistan and for the USA and its allied forces. The fierce comeback of the insurgents has challenged the political and territorial integrity of Pakistan, one that it cannot tolerate. This article analyzes the current situation and its implications for Pakistan's security. Moreover, it looks into the internal and external security complexities that Pakistan faces and the possible implications of the US exit strategy for Pakistan's security. It concludes that the security situation in Pakistan is continuously deteriorating and no part of her territory is immune from terrorists' attacks. To be successful, Pakistan must pursue a broad-based strategy that encompasses military, political, social, economic and informational domains aimed at accomplishing four major objectives: (1) elimination of foreign terrorists and their facilitators; (2) strengthening of the political and administrative institutions in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA); (3) establishing a safe and secure environment conducive for sustained development and the realization of real socio-economic progress and (4) integrating the FATA into the national mainstream. In the long term, a strategy based on the concept of “Enlightened Moderation” is the right solution, not only to the internal problems of Pakistan but also for the Muslim world and the international community.     

From first to third stream activities in higher education: the case of the Spanish Defence University centre

The paper adds to the debate on the relationship between military spending and economic growth by analysing the contribution of a military university centre to regional economic development. It goes beyond traditional economic impact studies by including research related effects and integrating “third stream” activities. Conceptualization and categorization are carried out to thoroughly analyse the different dimensions of knowledge and “third stream” actions. The analysis is performed from its settlement and during its first 5 years of existence which allows showing how the strategy of community engagement is developed. The conclusion suggests that, as traditional military roles extend, and military education institutions become higher education institutions, a comprehensive evaluation should be taken into account to enrich the public debate on government spending.     

“Flectas non frangas”: revisiting early twenty-first century UK–US defense relations (2000–2005) after five years

Adopting the analytical framework of the established interpretive “schools” of Anglo-American relations, this article offers several reflections on UK–US defense relations as they occurred over the significant years of 2000–2005. During those years, trajectories were established on which UK–US defense relations continue to travel today and outcomes emerged which are still being navigated. This article concludes that the Latin phrase, “Flectas Non Frangas” (essentially translated as: “Bend not Break”), is the most appropriate to adopt to characterize the developments undergone in recent UK–US defense relations. Many historical and strategic lessons with contemporary relevance are drawn.     

Defending Australia in the digital age: toward full spectrum defence

Australian defence strategy is disjointed and incomplete. Some would say that it is non-existent. Either way, this paper argues that Australia’s underwhelming approach to defence is the product of a crippling geographically focused strategic dichotomy, with the armed forces historically having been structured to venture afar as a small part of a large coalition force or, alternatively, to combat small regional threats across land, sea, and air. However, it is argued that Australia can no longer afford to drift between these two settings and must take measures to define a holistic “full spectrum defence” strategy and develop capability to fight effectively and independently across all domains of the twenty-first century-battlespace: land, sea, air, space, and the cyber realm.     

Expansion of Chinese maritime power in the Indian Ocean: implications for India

This paper examines the ongoing expansion of China’s maritime power in the Indian Ocean region and analyses its potential impact on the extant balance of Sino-Indian maritime power in the region. It posits that the expanding Chinese maritime power in the Indian Ocean could seriously challenge India’s geostrategic advantage in the near future and that India can no longer take for granted its strategic location at the centre of the Indian Ocean nor the strength of its historical ties with the various regional states. It further argues that the current Indian maritime strategy for the Indian Ocean region, to be the “net security provider” for the entire region, is unsustainable and thus needs to be reviewed and rebuilt leveraging the geographic advantage enjoyed by India over China in the Indian Ocean.     

How viable is international arms control for military artificial intelligence? Three lessons from nuclear weapons

Many observers anticipate “arms races” between states seeking to deploy artificial intelligence (AI) in diverse military applications, some of which raise concerns on ethical and legal grounds, or from the perspective of strategic stability or accident risk. How viable are arms control regimes for military AI? This article draws a parallel with the experience in controlling nuclear weapons, to examine the opportunities and pitfalls of efforts to prevent, channel, or contain the militarization of AI. It applies three analytical lenses to argue that (1) norm institutionalization can counter or slow proliferation; (2) organized “epistemic communities” of experts can effectively catalyze arms control; (3) many military AI applications will remain susceptible to “normal accidents,” such that assurances of “meaningful human control” are largely inadequate. I conclude that while there are key differences, understanding these lessons remains essential to those seeking to pursue or study the next chapter in global arms control.     

Assessing military reform in Indonesia

This article seeks to assess the magnitude of military reform in Indonesia and its impact in establishing greater levels of professionalism within the armed forces. To this end, the authors will offer some reflections on the studies of civil-military relations and military transformation for inculcating a higher degree of military professionalism; analyse to what extent the process of military reform in Indonesia has reshaped the institutional role of the armed forces; and discern three major strategic gaps in Indonesia's military reform, namely the “legal loopholes and regulation vacuum,” the “shortcomings of democratic civilian control,” and the “defence-economic gap.” This article asserts that military professionalism will grow more substantially depending on the ability of civilian elites to exercise effective control over the military and the capacity of the government to transform the military establishment keeping pace with strategic challenges and operational requirements.     

The case of Donald Rumsfeld: leadership traps in national security

Taking its point of departure in Donald Rumsfeld’s second term as US Secretary of Defense (2001–2006), this article analyses the crisis of strategic leadership in Western national security. Three “traps” are identified that explain why Donald Rumsfeld ultimately was a failure as defence secretary and demonstrate the perils of national security governance. These traps are termed the inquisitor trap, the strong leader trap and the delegation trap. It is argued that our understanding of strategic leadership in national security, particularly in defence, can benefit from insights gained from the study of strategic leadership in business. As such, this article engages the recent trend of merging insights from business and military strategy.     

Kazakhstan's Nuclear Decision Making, 1991–92

This article examines Kazakhstani nuclear decision making from December 1991 to May 1992. The study is based on unique archival data and reveals how Kazakhstan's policy makers solved a nuclear dilemma that the nation faced in its first years of independence. The article reconstructs the internal policy-making process behind the decision made by President Nursultan Nazarbayev and his circle of advisors to accept non-nuclear status. The author argues that Almaty elaborated a deliberately ambivalent strategy toward the republic's nuclear status with the aim of maximizing the state's strategic interests. The article reviews external pressures affecting Nazarbayev's course of action and discusses policy options articulated during this period.     

THE EFFECTS ON SOUTH ASIA OF DEEP US NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS

Significant nuclear reductions by the United States can affect other states in one of five ways: by directly altering their strategic calculations and postures; by indirectly altering their strategic calculations and postures by affecting the behavior of third-party states; by undermining formal US deterrence commitments; by eroding the United States's perceived ability to provide “informal” deterrence through the maintenance of an active global presence; and by creating normative pressure for states to emulate US nuclear reductions. Only the erosion of “informal” deterrence is likely to affect South Asia; to the extent that significant US nuclear reductions affect South Asia, then, their impact is likely to be destabilizing.     

Russian Reactions to Reagan's ‘Maritime Strategy’

The US Navy's audacious Maritime Strategy of the 1980s is often credited with acting as a key catalyst to the demise of the USSR. In assessing the role of strategic missile submarine “bastions” in the country's overall military strategy, the authors are skeptical of the above thesis, explaining that Moscow actually viewed deployments of Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles on to US submarines (versus direct threats against the Soviet Navy itself) as the most alarming threat. The authors concede that the arms race played a role in the collapse of the USSR, but deny a direct connection with Soviet naval development citing the relatively minor naval proportion of overall defense spending. For the difficulties facing the fleet at the end of the Cold War, they instead blame deep systemic problems internal to the Soviet Navy.     

Rose-tinted lenses: how American functionalist strategy inhibits our appreciation of complex conflicts

Strategists and military professionals have previously questioned many of the methodological (theoretical underpinnings, the principles, and rules applied by the discipline) decisions associated with American military strategy, but the direction this essay takes is above and beyond the common methodological rivalries in how we pursue strategic desired future states. To get beyond methodological disputes entirely, we must consider thinking about our thinking as an organization on American strategy. Thus, this article hovers between philosophies, organizational theory, as well as our usually unquestioned belief in something called “strategy”. Questioning things about our basic understanding of the world tends to trigger strong organizational defense mechanisms, for good reason. Critical reflection at deep levels puts our worldview, and our role within it at stake. Nonetheless, as strategic disappointment emerges over multiple complex conflict developments, even the most cherished and guarded choices on how the world ought to work are ripe for critical inquiry. This essay examines the limited single strategic paradigm of the US defense industry and how the latest American National Security Strategy and Army Future Operating Concept (Win in a Complex World through 2030) presents a flawed strategic position. This essay presents valid alternative strategies that operate within different paradigmatic constructs.     

Economic Competition and Nuclear Cooperation

The number of bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements surged during the “nuclear renaissance” of the past decade. This proliferation is only partially explained by the prevailing approaches that focus on strategic imperatives. To supplement these explanations, this study draws on neoliberal models of economic competition to posit that bilateral agreement negotiations also exhibit conditions of “uncoordinated interdependence” and maneuvering to gain market share. Case evidence suggests the contours of supplier state bids for civilian assistance are determined at least as much by considerations about economic competition as they are by positive strategic goals. In addition, this study identifies several cases of cooperation where there appears to be little or no strategic motive for export agreements. The study concludes that patterns of economic competition and the influence of peers in defined competitive spaces alter material payoffs and impact policies. It also identifies a surprising role for principled restraint in dampening strategic and economic competition in some dyads.     

Violence in context: Mapping the strategies and operational art of irregular warfare

The malaise that the United States, and the West, have experienced in recent campaigns stems in large part from unclear thinking about war, its political essence, and the strategies needed to join the two. Instead, analysis and response are predicated on entrenched theoretical concepts with limited practical utility. The inadequacy of understanding has spawned new, and not so new, terms to capture unanticipated trends, starting with the re-discovery of “insurgency” and “counterinsurgency” and leading to discussion of “hybrid threats” and “gray-zone” operations. New terminology can help, but the change must go deeper. Challenging analytical orthodoxy, this article sets out a unifying approach for the study of political violence, or more accurately: violent politics. It provides a conceptual foundation that helps to make sense of recent shifts in warfare. In effect, it offers sorely needed theoretical insights into the nature of strategy and guides the process of responding to nontraditional threats.     

The war after next is here – what does the elephant look like?

A comprehensive paradigm of future wars can be defined, and is called in this article “Extended conflicts.” These can be characterized by strategic attrition, to which all national resources and all possible international legitimacy are mobilized, in order to achieve a resolution by transformation of the opponent. The use of military force in this kind of conflict is limited. The understanding that we are facing an era of extended conflicts will improve the way it is utilized.