生物武器及其未来发展

本文综述了生物武器发展的历史、现状,并根据《禁止生物武器公约》影响的有限性,探讨了生物武器发展的未来。     

渡海登岛作战中生物武器的威胁不容忽视

我作战对象对我使用生物武器的潜在威胁,加大了我渡海岛作战防化保障的难度,针对生物武器的特点,立足现有装备,技术,采取相应的多种防护对策,将有效地抵卸生物武器的伤害。     

罪恶的生物武器

生物武器是以生物战剂杀伤有生力量和破坏植物生长的各种武器、器材的总称。生物武器包括装有生物战剂的炮弹、航空炸弹、火箭弹、导弹和航空洒布器、喷雾器等。生物武器可使人畜发病或死亡,也可大规模毁伤农作物,从而削弱敌方战斗力及战争潜力。生物武器的发展分三个阶段:从本世纪至第一次世界大     

国防要闻

7月30日据有关报道,美国政府目前正在离华盛顿不远的军事基地修建一座生物武器研究所,尽管研究目的在于模拟、分析生物恐怖袭击,寻找反恐薄弱环节和对抗袭击办法,但这一机构的高度机密等级仍然引起许多人的质疑,而且在法律上对作为《禁止生物武器公约》缔约国的美国也是一个不小挑战。这个在今年6月开始新建的研究所隶属美国国家生物武器防护分析和对抗中心(简称生物武器防护中心),中心成立于2001年,隶属国土安全部。研究所将分为两个部分,一个是犯罪勘测中心,一旦发生使用生物武器的恐怖袭击,他们将利用现代刑侦技术搜捕恐怖分子,另一部分…     

生物武器，杀人不见硝烟

近日，英国《星期日泰晤士报》刊文称：伊朗从非洲购买数百只猴子，怀疑其用于生物武器试验。早在2003年美英政府发动伊拉克战争前，美英媒体就曾大肆指责伊拉克拥有生物武器等大规模杀伤性武器。近来，美国媒体正连篇累牍地报道以色列可能在年底空袭伊朗。此际。英国媒体抛出这样的话题，立即引起了各界的诸多联想和猜测。而“生物武器”这一敏感话题也再次成为人们关注的焦点被推到了台前。     

天花:无声的生物武器

直到冷战束后的今天,生物武器一直是非常神秘的东西.前苏联是如何在冷战期闻完美地将天花武器化9这种生物武器是否仍会威胁成千上万人的生命?     

生物武器:不容忽视的威胁

当前,国际战略格局充满变数、战略环境日趋复杂,战争的非对称性和作战手段的多样性更加明显。尽管国际社会签署了《禁止生物武器公约》,但仍无法有效遏止生物武器的发展势头。国际生物威胁形势日趋恶化,我国面临的生物威胁形势也不容乐观。     

21世纪十大军用生物技术

在引发21世纪武器装备革命性变化的高新技术中,以生命科学为基础的综合性技术——生物技术将成为军事高技术的制高点。有识之士认为,现代化生物武器是一支重要的或慑力量,在未来战场上,生物武器比原子弹更可怕。据有关专家预测,21世纪将有十大生物技术应用于军事领域。     

伊拉克战争对未来防化装备发展的启示

简要分析了伊拉克原有化学、生物武器能力，介绍了美军参战部队化学兵编配情况与美军装备的侦防消救等防化装备性能．伊拉克战争是一场化学、生物武器威胁条件下、不对称的高技术局部战争，强大的防化装备对大规模杀伤性武器具有反威慑的战略意义，结合伊拉克战争的特点探讨了未来防化装备发展的5点启示．     

即将被开启的“潘多拉魔盒”——基因武器

前不久发生的炭疽病毒袭击事件搅得美国人坐立不安，同时也震惊了全世界，现在人们才真正明白，其实在我们的身边一直就有一个恐怖幽灵在游荡，那就是生物武器。应用生物武器作战可谓是源远流长。比如在二战期间，臭名昭著的日本法西斯731部队就已经在中国战场大量投入使用了这种杀人不见血的武器，给中国人民带来了巨大的灾难。     

VISIONS OF FISSION

For many years, non-nuclear weapons states have sought binding commitments from nuclear armed states that they would not be the victim of either the threat or use of nuclear weapons—so-called negative security assurances (NSAs). The nuclear weapon states have traditionally resisted granting such unconditional NSAs. Recent U.S. efforts to use nuclear deterrence against the acquisition and use by other states of chemical, biological and radiological weapons, however, have further exacerbated this divide. This article analyzes the historical development of NSAs and contrasts U.S. commitments not to use nuclear weapons with the empirical realities of current U.S. nuclear weapons employment doctrines. The authors conclude that NSAs are most likely to be issued as unilateral declarations and that such pledges are the worst possible manner in which to handle the issue of security assurance.     

舰载近区防卫武器综合运用

水面舰艇近区防卫武器的作战运用研究是舰载武器作战运用研究的新课题。在分析近区防卫目标特征、武器特点、作战方法的基础上,提出近区防卫武器综合运用一般原则,基于作战时域的连续性及效果的叠加性,构建近区防卫武器使用逻辑结构,建立武器运用的对策模型,可为近区防卫武器的科学使用提供理论参考。     

Nuclear Weapons and the Vietnam War

This article analyzes why US leaders did not use nuclear weapons during the Vietnam War. To date, there has been no systematic study of US decision-making on nuclear weapons during this war. This article offers an initial analysis, focusing on the Johnson and Nixon administrations. Although US leaders did not come close to using nuclear weapons in the conflict, nuclear options received more attention than has previously been appreciated. Johnson's advisers raised the issue of nuclear weapons and threats on several occasions, and Henry Kissinger, Nixon's national security adviser, looked into nuclear options to bring the war to an end. Ultimately, however, both administrations privately rejected such options. The conventional explanation for the non-use of nuclear weapons during the Cold War – deterrence – is insufficient to explain the Vietnam case. This article analyzes the role of military, political and normative considerations in restraining US use of nuclear weapons in the Vietnam War. It argues that while military and political considerations, including escalation concerns, are part of the explanation, a taboo against the use of nuclear weapons played a critical role.     

灰色预测模型在非致命武器经济寿命预测中的应用

针对目前非致命武器经济寿命方面的研究相当缺乏的现状，结合非致命武器的自身特点，在全面分析装备全寿命周期费用的基础上，引入灰色理论，运用GM（1，1）模型对非致命武器的经济寿命周期费用进行估算和预测。通过分析，灰色预测模型具有较高的建模精度，预测方法和结果对非致命武器的经济寿命预测具有很强的实用性。     

Missile Strategy in a Post-Nuclear Age

While the arrival of nuclear weapons coincided roughly with the development of short, medium, intermediate, and eventually intercontinental missiles, the contribution of missile technology to the deterrence equation is often lost. If nuclear weapons were eliminated, even new generation missiles with conventional payloads could struggle to render effective deterrence. But some of the physical and psychological effects commonly ascribed to nuclear weapons could still be in play. And in a world without nuclear weapons, thinking about the use and control of force from the nuclear age would also deserve renewed attention.     

Nuclear opportunism: A theory of how states use nuclear weapons in international politics

How do states use nuclear weapons to achieve their goals in international politics? Nuclear weapons can influence state decisions about a range of strategic choices relating to military aggression, the scope of foreign policy objectives, and relations with allies. The article offers a theory to explain why emerging nuclear powers use nuclear weapons to facilitate different foreign policies: becoming more or less aggressive; providing additional support to allies or proxies, seeking independence from allies; or expanding the state’s goals in international politics. I argue that a state’s choices depend on the presence of severe territorial threats or an ongoing war, the presence of allies that provide for the state’s security, and whether the state is increasing in relative power. The conclusion discusses implications of the argument for our understanding of nuclear weapons and the history of proliferation, and nonproliferation policy today.     

Russia and Strategic Conventional Weapons:

ABSTRACT

Russian political leaders and military strategists are growing increasingly concerned about “strategic conventional weapons”—a broad category that appears to include all non-nuclear, high-precision, standoff weapons—and about long-range, hypersonic weapons, in particular. These concerns are complex and multifaceted (and, in some cases, contradictory), but chief among them are the beliefs that strategic conventional weapons could prove decisive in a major conflict and that Russia is lagging behind in their development. US programs to develop and acquire such weapons—namely, the Conventional Prompt Global Strike program—are of great concern to Russian strategists, who argue both that the United States seeks such weapons for potential use against Russia—its nuclear forces, in particular—and because strategic conventional weapons are more “usable” than nuclear weapons. Asymmetric responses by Russia include increased reliance on tactical nuclear weapons, efforts to enhance the survivability of its nuclear forces, and investments in air and missile defenses. There is also strong—but not completely conclusive evidence—that Russia is responding symmetrically by attempting to develop a long-range, conventionally armed boost-glide weapon.     

Bedeviled by a Paradox: Nitze,Bundy, and an Incipient Nuclear Norm

ABSTRACT

This article explores how two influential American policy makers—Paul Nitze and McGeorge Bundy—wrestled with the idea of a norm against the use of nuclear weapons. Existing scholarship has overlooked how both Bundy and Nitze came to understand the idea of nuclear non-use, especially related to the credibility of threats to use nuclear weapons. Using documentary evidence from their personal papers, this article illuminates the thinking of Bundy and Nitze, finding that both engaged with the idea of a norm of non-use of nuclear weapons in their strategic writing and thought.     

Establishment,simulation and verification of firepower safety control model

On a narrow warship platform, the coordinated use of shipborne weapon systems may cause firepower conflicts, which seriously endangers the ship safety. Meanwhile, with directed-energy weapons mounted on ships, firepower conflicts between weapons become a “high probability event”. Aiming at the problem of firepower safety control, based on the research about the collision probability model of air crafts and space targets and according to the cone of fire model of conventional weapons and directed-energy weapons, this paper solved the firepower conflict probabilities between conventional weapons as well as between conventional weapons and directed-energy weapons respectively using the methods of probability theory, and established the firepower safety control model. Then the calculation of firepower conflict probability was carried out using the dimensionality reduction method based on the equivalent conversion of polar coordinates and the power series method based on Laplace transform. The simulation results revealed that the proposed model and calculation methods are effective and reliable, which can provide theoretical basis and technical support for resolution of firepower conflicts between weapons.     

基于G-AHP的非致命性武器驱散效能评估

定义了非致命性武器驱散效能的概念;根据非致命性武器的研发目的和应用实际,对影响其驱散效能的各相关因素进行逐层递阶划分,建立了较为全面的指标评估体系;提出非致命性武器效能G-AHP评估方法,借鉴专家经验,实现了非致命性武器装备驱散效能的量化评估;案例计算结果符合实际,验证了灰色层次分析法的可行性,为下一步有针对性地使用非致命性武器,提供了有力的科学依据。