先期毁伤原则下武器单元的射击时机分配

以先期毁伤为原则,首次对武器单元的射击时机分配问题进行数学建模。提出一种使毁伤概率密度在时间上靠前分布的武器单元射击时机分配模型,在保证指定瞬时之前以期望概率毁伤目标的前提下,合理分配各武器单元的射击时机,实现对目标的尽早毁伤。根据射击时机分配模型中约束函数的单调性特点,提出一种改进的连续域蚁群算法,使算法自变量满足约束条件的"优良区域"开始搜索,采用搜索窗口平移的方法逐步寻找最好解,提高了算法的搜索速度。实例分析验证了模型和算法的有效性。     

发射与制导分离的编队协同防空目标分配决策

为解决舰艇编队协同防空中发射和制导分离时的动态目标分配问题,以编队生存概率最大、目标突防综合威胁值最小和制导单元分配效益最优为最优函数,建立了动态多目标优化分配决策模型及状态的动态更新方式.采用多项改进措施设计了动态多目标粒子群优化求解算法及流程.仿真结果表明,所建立的目标分配模型能较好地解决舰舰协同防空中火力通道固定和分离时的不同分配问题,并得到了一些有益结论.     

一种应用于数据通道综合的定向搜索流水调度算法

流水调度是专用数字信号处理器高层综合中一个困难而急待解决的问题。给出了一种定向搜索流水调度算法 ,目标是使全面考虑了运算单元、寄存器和互连的硬件代价最小化。它作为一种利用启发信息的迭代算法 ,一方面克服了确定性算法爬峰能力差、易于陷于局部极值的缺点 ,另一方面启发信息的利用加快了搜索过程。典型设计实例显示算法性能达到或超过了目前流水调度文献报道的最好性能     

基于模型诊断的集合逻辑运算法计算最小碰集

在基于模型的故障诊断仿真系统的诊断流程中,由最小冲突集计算最小碰集是整个流程中的关键步骤。针对现有计算最小碰集方法中存在的缺陷,提出了运用集合逻辑运算法计算最小碰集,将冲突集表示为集合的逻辑"与"、逻辑"或"运算,通过其运算法则进行运算简化,可得到全部的最小碰集。该方法具有简单有效、数据结构简单、计算简便快捷和易于程序实现等优点。最后通过实例计算,验证了该算法的正确性、简单性和高效性。     

基于自适应变异粒子群算法的火力分配方法研究

针对最优火力分配的特点,分析了火力分配优化问题的数学模型,设计了一种求解该类问题的自适应变异粒子群算法（Adaptive Mutation Particle Swarm Optimization, AMPSO）。该算法采用十进制编码方法和基于数值运算的个体更新方法;为平衡算法的局部搜索能力和全局收敛性能,设计了一种关键参数自适应调整方法;为增强种群在进化后期的多样性,提出了一种变异策略。仿真结果表明,所提AMPSO算法具有良好的寻优性能,是优化火力分配的一种有效算法。     

基于GA-PSO的目标分配问题研究

防空作战中的目标分配问题属于NP完全问题,在综合考虑火力单元作战效能和防御效能的基础上,引入火力单元综合有利度,建立了一种用于大规模多火力单元对抗多轮次目标的静态目标分配模型,给出了基于GA因子的改进PSO算法,并将算法应用于目标分配模型的求解,通过VC 6.0编程和计算机仿真验证了模型的可行性和算法的有效性.     

动态WTA问题的混沌人工鱼群算法

针对不同作战平台上多个武器单元对一批目标进行射击时的武器目标分配问题,建立了该问题的数学模型。采用混沌人工鱼群算法对动态条件下的武器目标分配问题进行求解,并设计一个实例进行仿真实验。仿真结果表明,在时间约束条件下该算法较遗传算法更具优越性,验证了混沌人工鱼群算法用于动态武器目标分配的有效性。     

计算机中的大整数运算技术

对计算机中大整数的“模”“乘”算术运算问题提出了一种快速而有效的算法,即利用汇编语言编程途径实现“模”“乘”的算术运算,并将其嵌入到C语言中用数组实现数据的空间分配.     

一种基于最小生成树的无线多跳网络信道分配算法

为提高无线多跳网络的吞吐量和传输可靠性,提出一种信道分配算法。该算法优先考虑最小生成树上的可用信道,为每个节点分配信道资源;然后考虑利用生成树外其他可用链路,为节点提供信道资源,以提高吞吐量。算法通过考虑每个用户的通信需求,可以充分利用空闲信道资源。仿真结果显示,相比于不考虑最小生成树外链路时,有效地提高了网络整体吞吐量。     

基于递推最小二乘的单站无源定位仿真分析

为达到无线射频注入的定位精度和实时性要求,提出采用递推最小二乘算法(RLS)进行定位.首先讨论了无线射频注入的定位精度需求,建立了机载无源单站定位模型,得出了最小二乘(LS)解.然后依据无线射频注入的实时性要求将其转化为递推形式.仿真结果表明,RLS算法与LS算法的定位精度和收敛速度接近,但前者实时性好,运算复杂度低,所需存储空间小,能够满足无线射频注入的定位需求.最后依据仿真结果给出了提高定位精度和收敛速度的措施.     

The UK,interrogation and Iraq, 2003–2008

The UK’s interrogation operations during the conflict in Iraq (2003–2008) are often portrayed by the media as involving significant amounts of mistreatment. This article demonstrates that these practices are not necessarily representative of the UK’s interrogation operations across this conflict. In doing so it contributes to the limited literature on the practice of interrogation and on the UK’s combat operations in Iraq. The UK’s interrogation capability, and therefore its intelligence-gathering capability, is shown to have rested primarily with the military’s Joint Forward Interrogation Team (JFIT). The JFIT suffered from limitations to the number, training and experience of its interrogators and interpreters. It is argued that maintaining a permanent, higher level of preparedness for interrogation by the British armed forces is desirable.     

Remembering and forgetting Mirambo: Histories of war in modern Africa

ABSTRACT

While the study of organised violence is considered essential to understanding the history of the West, and accordingly imbued with various layers of meaning and remembrance, war is widely regarded as inimical to the modern nation in Africa and stable development more broadly. Using examples drawn from primarily from East Africa, this paper considers the ways in which warfare in the deeper (‘precolonial’) past has been framed and envisioned in recent decades, in particular by governments whose own roots lie in revolutionary armed struggle and who began life as guerrilla movements. While in some cases particular elements of the deeper past were indeed mobilised in pursuit of contemporary political goals, in many other scenarios histories of precolonial violence were beheld as problematic and unworthy of remembrance. This paper highlights the paradox and ambiguity which has attended the memory of key aspects of Africa’s deeper past.     

SIM—LISP:一个通信网络管理专家系统外壳的设计与实现

本文介绍了笔者为开发名为OONMES的网络管理专家系统所实现的一个简单专家系统工具SIM-LISP。SIM-LISP是一个用C/C++语言来实现的模拟LISP语言的可调用函数集,它短小精巧,速度快,可以完成针对网管专家系统的事实或规则知识的表示、匹配、合一和推理等基本操作,并有与知识对象的连接功能,是网管专家系统内核实现的支撑环境。     

Al Qaida on the US invasion of Afghanistan in their own words

This article consists of selected translations from captured interviews and dairies of Al Qaida members. The time period covered is from mid-2001 to early 2002 and concerns their operations in Afghanistan. The material clearly conveys a range of emotion, from confident to despondent, as well as efforts to contest the US actions. The first several pages give the reader context and some possible “lessons learned,” but the story(ies) are best told by the Al Qaida members themselves. All names are pseudonyms.     

Does Intent equal Capability? Al-Qaeda and Weapons of Mass Destruction

The prospect of terrorists deploying weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is often referred to as the foremost danger to American national security. This danger has become more realistic because of al-Qaeda's expanding global network and the expressed willingness to kill thousands of civilians. In the past four years, numerous media reports have documented the group's ongoing quest for WMD capabilities; many reports have detailed al-Qaeda members’ attempts to manufacture or obtain certain chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) agents to use in WMD against targets in the West and the Middle East. Yet the question remains: Does al-Qaeda's current WMD capability match its actual intent? While most studies of the group have focused on its explicit desire for WMD, allegations of CBRN acquisition, and the killing potential of specific CBRN agents, few open-source studies have closely examined the evolution of al-Qaeda's consideration of WMD and, most notably, the merit of actual CBRN production instructions as depicted and disseminated in the group's own literature and manuals. The following report will examine the history of al-Qaeda's interest in CBRN agents, the evolution of the network's attitude toward these weapons, and the internal debate within the organization concerning acquisition and use of WMD. More so, the following research will assess the validity of actual CBRN production instructions and capabilities as displayed and disseminated in al-Qaeda's own literature and websites.     

Late Medieval Lance Use: Mounted Combat and Martial Arts in Western Europe from the 14th to the 16th Century

Despite the lance’s status and the amount of attention the couched lance has received in historiography, study of its martial art has been neglected. The various lance types and techniques used by western European cavalry have only recently begun to receive scholarly attention. Additionally, Medieval European lance use has too often been studied in isolation, without an adequate understanding of the idiosyncratic and asymmetrical dynamics of mounted combat. Although the charge with the couched lance was a valid tactic, it was only one of many. Light and heavy lances were used in one hand or two to trip, block, unhorse, and wrestle. These techniques were governed by the harsh laws of distance, speed, impact, iron, and asymmetry. By utilizing the surviving Fechtbücher and several Peninsular and Near Eastern sources, a brief foray into the diverse techniques of lance use and their purposes has been attempted here.     

A model for geographically distributed combat interactions of swarming naval and air forces

This article describes the Distributed Interaction Campaign Model (DICM), an exploratory campaign analysis tool and asset allocation decision‐aid for managing geographically distributed and swarming naval and air forces. The model is capable of fast operation, while accounting for uncertainty in an opponent's plan. It is intended for use by commanders and analysts who have limited time for model runs, or a finite budget. The model is purpose‐built for the Pentagon's Office of Net Assessment, and supports analysis of the following questions: What happens when swarms of geographically distributed naval and air forces engage each other and what are the key elements of the opponents’ force to attack? Are there changes to force structure that make a force more effective, and what impacts will disruptions in enemy command and control and wide‐area surveillance have? Which insights are to be gained by fast exploratory mathematical/computational campaign analysis to augment and replace expensive and time‐consuming simulations? An illustrative example of model use is described in a simple test scenario. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 562–576, 2016     

Thomas Firth and Sons – Steelmakers to the Arms Industries. Part 2: Heavy Armaments

Firth’s were the first of the Sheffield steel makers to enter the field armaments. Their involvement with Colt has been outlined in an article in the journal of the Colt Collectors Association in America and their activities as steelmakers to the small-arms industries has been covered in a previous issue of this Journal. This article gives a brief overview of their involvement as manufacturers in the field of heavy armaments, being the first to make all-steel guns and their evolving role in the use of steel for ordnance, culminating in the displacement of wrought iron by the adoption of steel for ordnance manufacture by the Royal Gun Factory in the 1880s. It also highlights their development of stainless steel in this context.     

Putin – the masked nemesis of the strategy of ambiguity

Recent events demonstrate the complex and adaptive approach employed by Russia to reassert influence in Europe. The changing face of Russia’s strategy commenced in 2007 when it launched a crippling cyber-attack against Estonia. This was followed by a large Russian conventional attack against Georgia in 2008, occupying two large areas of the nation. 2014 witnessed the Russian annexation of Crimea where in just a week, Russia seized control of Crimea “without firing a shot.” The annexation of Crimea was rapidly followed by a Russian inspired and led subversive war in eastern Ukraine. The common thread among these diverse Russian operations is its use of ambiguity to confound and confuse decision makers in the West.     

Information Is Not a Weapons System

ABSTRACT

While many militaries have tried to capitalize on the potential of information operations in internal war, few have succeeded. I argue that military information campaigns fall short of expectations for two reasons. First, the theory of influence militaries generally embrace – communications as a non-lethal weapons system – is largely invalid. While treating information as a weapons system makes it easier to integrate it into the existing military planning system, this overstates the independent effects of communications on behavior and understates the importance of interactive effects of what commercial marketing theory refers to as the “marketing mix” – product, price, promotion, and placement. It would be more appropriate to treat military information operations as a form of marketing: a composite effort to induce a specific behavior in a target audience by applying a combination of material and ideational instruments. The marketing model suggests that the efficacy of information operations will depend not simply on the message and its delivery (promotion) but on the behavior the sender seeks to induce (the product), the costs of that behavior (the price), and the opportunities available for such behavior (the placement).