UNITED STATES—SOUTH AFRICA RELATION

Abstract

The article evaluates the security challenges that are likely to occur along international borders in East Africa with the advent of the East African Community Common Market in July 2010. In an attempt to illustrate the porosity of borders and the likelihood that criminals could take advantage of the situation, the author describes the ease with which transnational crime could thrive (in the absence of efficient border security measures) under the guise of informal cross-border trade that derives its basis largely from the customs and historical linkages in the region. Border towns in the region are considered zones of risk but also opportunities for quick money-making ventures and deals that tend to attract a variety of criminals. While the danger is not alarmingly high, there is a likelihood that with the opening up of the East African Community to the free movement of goods and people, criminals will exploit this freedom to commit crimes such as human trafficking, drug smuggling and moving terrorists and contraband goods unless mechanisms are put in place to curtail these activities. Should this not happen, the mission of the East African Community could be jeopardised.     

中朝边境地区跨境毒品犯罪问题研究

受国际毒潮的影响，中朝边境地区不仅面临着来自朝鲜毒品的直接渗透，而且还是“金三角”、“金新月”毒品的终端和中转站，呈现出贩运路线相对固定，入境地点相对集中，人员结构复杂，毒品贩运方式、手段诡秘等特点。由于跨境毒品走私案件不断增多，中朝边境地区禁毒形势日益严峻，并由此引发了一系列的社会问题，影响了中朝边境地区的安全与稳定，给边境地区缉毒工作带来了新的困难和挑战。     

The Trust Paradox in Nuclear Smuggling

ABSTRACT

This article explores the paradox of trust in the largest nuclear smuggling operation involving highly enriched uranium (HEU) discussed in open source literature. In the first effort to understand the type, extent, and role of trust in nuclear smuggling enterprises, it draws from literature on trust development in legitimate businesses as well as criminal enterprises. Observed behavioral patterns in this case challenge traditional notions of the internal dynamics of temporary groups engaged in nuclear smuggling and operational realities of such activities. The article seeks to explain why individuals agree (and continue) to operate in this high-risk environment, unbound by close personal ties, without any effort to verify the background, motives, or qualifications of the fellow conspirators. It offers ways to advance current nonproliferation efforts in non-state actor interdiction by exploiting the environment of shallow trust in temporary groups.     

Combating nuclear smuggling? Exploring drivers and challenges to detecting nuclear and radiological materials at maritime facilities

International concern over nuclear terrorism has grown during the past few decades. This has driven a broad spectrum of efforts to strengthen nuclear security globally, including the widespread adoption of radiation-detection technology for border monitoring. Detection systems are now deployed at strategic locations for the purported purpose of detecting and deterring the smuggling of nuclear and radioactive materials. However, despite considerable investment in this area, few studies have examined how these programs are implemented or the operational challenges they face on a day-to-day basis. This article seeks to address this with a focus on radiation-detection efforts at maritime facilities. Utilizing practitioner interviews and a survey, this article identifies the factors that influence the planning and use of these systems in this fast-moving environment. The results clearly demonstrate that the implementation of these systems varies significantly across different national and organizational contexts, resulting in a fragmented global nuclear-detection architecture, which arguably undermines efforts to detect trafficked nuclear-threat materials. Greater consideration should therefore be given to developing international standards and guidance, designing and adopting tools to support key parts of the alarm assessment process, and broader sharing of good practice.     

Using container inspection history to improve interdiction logistics for illicit nuclear materials

Strengthening the United States' ability to prevent adversaries from smuggling nuclear materials into the country is a vital and ongoing issue. The prospect of additional countries, such as Iran, obtaining the know‐how and equipment to produce these special nuclear materials in the near future underscores the need for efficient and effective inspection policies at ports and border crossings. In addition, the reduction of defense and homeland security budgets in recent years has made it increasingly important to accomplish the interdiction mission with fewer funds. Addressing these complications, in this article, we present a novel two‐port interdiction model. We propose using prior inspection data as a low‐cost way of increasing overall interdiction performance. We provide insights into two primary questions: first, how should a decision maker at a domestic port use detection data from the foreign port to improve the overall detection capability? Second, what are potential limitations to the usefulness of prior inspection data—is it possible that using prior data actually harms decision making at the domestic port? We find that a boundary curve policy (BCP) that takes into account both foreign and domestic inspection data can provide a significant improvement in detection probability. This BCP also proves to be surprisingly robust, even if adversaries are able to infiltrate shipments during transit. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 60: 433‐448, 2013     

POLITICAL CHANGE AND BORDER SECURITY REFORM IN EURASIA: The cCase of Georgia

This article presents four challenges to promoting border security in post-Soviet Eurasia, even in those states that have experienced regime change and profess new interest in constructing sound state institutions. The analysis is drawn from the specific example of Georgia—a major recipient of U.S. border security assistance and the site of several intercepted efforts of radioactive materials trafficking—but it is relevant to other states in the region, as well. The challenges assessed are: (1) the gradual nature of border regime reform, (2) trade-offs that subordinate border reform to other developmental priorities, (3) bureaucratic inertia and politics, and (4) the continued existence of unrecognized territories that lie beyond the reach of the state and of international law.     

PREVENTING DIRTY BOMBS

Radioactive sealed sources have a long history and a much wider worldwide distribution than do weapons-usable fissile materials. This article compares the mechanisms for controlling radioactive sources with those of weapons-usable materials and makes the case for improved policy making on the safe and secure management of radioactive sources (often referred to simply as “sources”). Such sources have been widely distributed with commercial and government support to nearly every country, yet there are no legally binding, international agreements or regulations to control any aspect of their life cycle. This is problematic because some sources that are disused, abandoned, or otherwise fall out of regulatory control could be used in the form of a radiological dispersal device (RDD, or dirty bomb). An RDD could pose significant economic and psychological impacts with the potential for detrimental effects on public health. The lack of international measures to control sources is troubling for several reasons: creating an RDD is much easier than fashioning a nuclear weapon from scratch or from stolen fissile materials; given the many incidents involving diversion from regulatory control and the misuse of sources, an RDD attack would be one of the more likely scenarios; materials security for sources is generally weak and inconsistent; it is nearly impossible to determine the total amount of sources manufactured and distributed; used sources are frequently found uncontrolled and transiting borders, and penalties are light at best; the market-based supply and demand of sources facilitates their rapid and loosely regulated distribution; and the “peaceful uses” aspect of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons along with norms that began developing around the time of Atoms for Peace have promoted the nearly unchecked global distribution of sources. Several immediate and long-term actions are suggested to reduce the threat posed by radiological sources.     

海港口岸犯罪分子利用集装箱偷渡的预防与控制

随着我国集装箱进出口贸易的迅猛增长和各地对偷渡活动严厉打击，不法分子开始尝试利用集装箱组织大规模偷渡，并渐呈上升和蔓延趋势，严重干扰了口岸正常的出入境秩序。从集装箱运输流程主要环节（装货、施封、存放、运输、装船）入手，通过分析当前海港口岸集装箱偷渡活动的特点及在集装箱管理过程中存在的问题，提出预防与控制集装箱偷渡的对策。     

The Bush War to Save the Rhino: Improving Counter-poaching Through Intelligence

The rhino is going extinct due to poaching at a rate which far outstrips current law enforcement or conservation efforts to halt their decline. A critical aspect of counter-poaching failures to date is an inaccurate view of the nature of poaching as a crime. Rather than demand-side efforts, attacking elusive smuggling networks or expensive technical solutions like drones, this article notes how a quasi-military tactical approach of ‘combat tracking’ offers the best way to protect the species. Based on wide ranging interviews and fieldwork across dozens of parks in southern Africa, it demonstrates how the current restricted range of the rhino, and the rarity of skilled poachers, makes a tactical solution the most effective to date.     

An inspection game: Taking account of fulfillment probabilities of players' aims

This paper deals with an inspection game of customs and a smuggler. The customs can take two options of assigning a patrol or not. The smuggler has two strategies of shipping its cargo of contraband or not. Two players have several opportunities to take actions during a limited number of days. When both players do, there are some possibilities that the customs captures the smuggler and, simultaneously, the smuggler possibly makes a success of the smuggling. If the smuggler is captured or there remain no days for playing the game, the game ends. In this paper, we formulate the problem into a multi‐stage two‐person zero‐sum stochastic game and investigate some characteristics of the equilibrium solution, some of which are given in a closed form in a special case. There have been some studies so far on the inspection game. However, some consider the case that the smuggler has only one opportunity of smuggling or the perfect‐capture case that the customs can certainly arrest the smuggler on patrol, and others think of a recursive game without the probabilities of fulfilling the players' purposes. In this paper, we consider the inspection game taking account of the fulfillment probabilities of the players' aims. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2006     

To catch an intruder: Part A—uncluttered scenario

We analyze an interdiction scenario where an interceptor attempts to catch an intruder as the intruder moves through the area of interest. A motivating example is the detection and interdiction of drug smuggling vessels in the Eastern Pacific and Caribbean. We study two models in this article. The first considers a nonstrategic target that moves through the area without taking evasive action to avoid the interdictor. We determine the optimal location the interceptor should position itself to best respond when a target arrives. The second model analyzes the strategic interaction between the interceptor and intruder using a Blotto approach. The intruder chooses a route to travel on and the interceptor chooses a route to patrol. We model the interaction as a two‐player game with a bilinear payoff function. We compute the optimal strategy for both players and examine several extensions. © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 64: 29–40, 2017     

“金新月”毒品向新疆走私渗透的现状与对策

当前“金新月”毒品向新疆走私渗透已呈“不可逆转”、“突飞猛进”、“毒恐联合”之势。采取强力措施，严厉打击日益突出的“金新月”毒品走私渗透问题，对于新疆的社会稳定和经济发展具有十分重要的现实意义。     

Homeland Security and Intelligence: Can Oil Mix with Water in an Open Society?

The newest US Cabinet department is Homeland Security (DHS). One of the most controversial aspects in the process of developing this entity is the role of intelligence in providing information on the increasing terrorist threat. This article examines the intelligence challenges for homeland security. In doing so, it explores the problems of merging disparate cultures - law enforcement vs intelligence, civil entities vs military, federal vs state and local jurisdictions, and domestic focus vs international perspective. Given the nature of the globalized, asymmetric threat, the need for more and better intelligence sharing is obvious. Terrorists and other criminals do not respect international boundaries; in fact, they exploit them in an effort to prevent effective and timely countermeasures. This demands that robust multinational collaboration and interagency coordination be practiced.     

Political opposition,external threats,and elite responses: analyzing domestic security policy in post-Rose Revolution Georgia

In the years since the 2003 Rose Revolution, the popularly elected leadership of the Republic of Georgia has responded to organized protests with a variety of repressive tactics. These reactions suggest that former challengers to authoritarian elites may utilize similar methods of retaining power during crisis periods. Yet, the alleged involvement of agencies of the Russian Federation in fomenting domestic instability has also occupied a central position in the national security policies of the outgoing Saakashvili government. These conditions both preceded and were reinforced by the South Ossetia War of August 2008. This article proposes a theoretical model that represents the intervening effect of interstate conflicts on state–society relations in Georgia from 2003 to present. It presents several hypotheses and possible indicators, data sources, and techniques for analyzing the interaction between characteristics of opposition groups, external threats, and the domestic security practices of contemporary Georgian political elites.     

走私 运输毒品案件的特点及侦查对策

受国际毒潮的影响，我国的毒品犯罪形势日趋严峻和复杂，而在毒品犯罪中，走私、运输毒品犯罪占有相当大的比例。由于毒品的走私和运输，带来了毒品的消费，引发了吸毒的蔓延，我国的毒品问题呈现出“多头入境、多线渗透、多点中转、多地集散、多地消费”的状况。研究走私、运输毒品案件的特点，有助于了解走私、运输毒品案件的规律，指导禁毒部门采取有针对性的侦查对策，有力地打击走私、运输毒品犯罪。     

NATO options and dilemmas for deterring Russia in the Baltic States

According to the NATO’s collective defence strategy and the principle of deterrence, “no one should doubt NATO’s resolve if the security of any of its members were to be threatened”. In this sense, credible deterrence acts as a guarantee for peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region. However, recent events in Ukraine and Georgia have revealed the potential weaknesses of the current deterrence models. Without any overt fear of retaliation, we have seen Russia’s aggressive steps towards its neighbours, which were planned and executed with great sophistication, initiative, agility and decisiveness. Although contrary to Ukraine and Georgia which are not the members of the Alliance, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are granted security guarantees in the NATO framework, the Baltic countries clearly constitute Russia’s point of contact with NATO and are, therefore, also subject to the interests of Russia to test mutual capabilities and commitment, and to send strategic messages to the Alliance. In this context, the article aims to assess how credible is the deterrence posture provided by NATO in avoiding potential aggression on the part of Russia against the Baltic countries.     

Fencing the bear? Explaining US foreign policy towards Russian interventions

Despite the burgeoning literature on Russia’s renewed power politics, little attention has been paid to the fact that US reactions towards Russia’s military interventions were all but coherent. The USA has chosen weak measures in Georgia in 2008 (shaming) compared to its assertive response in Ukraine in 2014 (sanctions, hard deterrence). This article assesses the explanatory power of neorealist, liberal and constructivist theories for the variation in US reactions towards Russian interventions in Georgia and Ukraine. Our argument is that the constructivist perspective explains the cases best as it highlights the power and communality of normative assessments. The Ukraine crisis was perceived by the USA as a violation of core international norms, especially the non-use of force and the principle of territorial integrity. Relevant international norm carriers shared this assessment of the conflict. In contrast, the perception of the Georgian war centred on the issue of democracy promotion. While democracy is an important aim of US foreign policy, it does not summon the same normative importance as general principles of international law. Furthermore, the perception of the Georgian war remained contested among Western allies, which decreased the communality of the normative assessment.     

金新月毒情对我国禁毒工作的影响及对策

当前,“金新月”地区毒品生产、加工、贩运泛滥。我国西北地区与“金新月”相邻,近年来从该地区流入我国的毒品呈现迅猛上升的趋势,对我国禁毒工作构成了严重的威胁。     

Policeman versus Soldiers,the debate leading to MAAG Objections and Washington rejections of the Core of the British Counter Insurgency Advice

The British recognized that insurgencies were based upon a struggle for political legitimacy and subordinated to this was the military conflict. Their plan countered insurgents by denying them political legitimacy. They cast the insurgent in the role of the criminal while they enhanced the government's legitimacy. Policemen were considered vital to this process because they arrest and charge criminals. If policemen impute criminality upon insurgents then the use of army troops had the opposite effect. Armies are used in combat and this bestows a well-recognized legitimacy on the foes they combat. The American military advisory group in Vietnam found this difficult to accept.     

NATO’s push into the Caucasus: geopolitical flashpoints and limits for expansion

The Caucasus has been a major flashpoint of contention between NATO and a resurgent Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The rivalry saw the escalation of hostility in the region during the brief 2008 Russo-Georgian War where a NATO-backed Georgia challenged South Ossetia supported by the Russian military. In 2011, NATO officially recognised Georgia as a potential member, challenging Russia’s traditional sphere of influence in the Caucasus. Moscow says the Eastward expansion of NATO into the Baltics and to include Georgia as a member state is a method of containing a resurgent Russia. However, the former Soviet Republics of Ukraine, the Baltics and Georgia, maintain that Russia represents a threat to their sovereignty, as seen by the Russian support of the breakaway unrecognised Republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. A hostile rivalry between the Russian-backed Armenia and Azerbaijan, which is reliant upon NATO-member Turkey, intensifies the polarisation in the Caucasus.