THE FRAGILE TRADITION OF NUCLEAR RESTRAINT

The Tradition of Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons by T.V. Paul. Stanford University Press, 2009. 319 pages, $29.95.     

DIVERGING NUCLEAR PATHWAYS IN SOUTH ASIA

Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb, by Feroz Hassan Khan. Stanford University Press, 2012. 544 pages, $29.95.

Managing India's Nuclear Forces, by Verghese Koithara. Brookings Institution Press, 2012. 304 pages, $59.95.     

POLITICAL SCIENCE,COMING IN FROM THE COLD

Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21st Century: The Role of Theory (vol. 1, 312 pages, $24.95) and A Comparative Perspective (vol. 2, 488 pages, $24.95), edited by William C. Potter with Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova. Stanford University Press, 2010.     

NUCLEAR BOMB SQUAD

Defusing Armageddon: Inside NEST, America's Secret Nuclear Bomb Squad, by Jeffrey T. Richelson. W.W. Norton & Company, 2009. 318 pages, $27.95.     

ATOMS FOR PEACE

Atomic Assistance: How “Atoms for Peace” Programs Cause Nuclear Insecurity, by Matthew Fuhrmann, Cornell University Press, 2012, 344 pages, $29.95.     

NUCLEAR MYTHOLOGY AND NUCLEAR USELESSNESS

Five Myths about Nuclear Weapons, by Ward Wilson. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2013. 188 pages, $22.     

POLITICAL SURVIVAL AND NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East, by Etel Solingen. Princeton University Press, 2007. 404 pages, $26.95.     

SPARRING ON THE SUBCONTINENT

South Asian Security and International Nuclear Order: Creating a Robust Indo-Pakistani Nuclear Arms Control Regime, by Mario Esteban Carranza. Ashgate, 2009. 208 pages, $99.95.     

HOW WAS THE COLD WAR WON?

Reagan's Secret War: The Untold Story of His Fight to Save the World from Nuclear Disaster, by Martin Anderson and Annelise Anderson. Crown Publishers, 2009. 464 pages, $32.50.

The Rebellion of Ronald Reagan: A History of the End of the Cold War, by James Mann. Viking, 2009. 410 pages, $27.95.     

STRENGTHENING THE SECOND LINE OF DEFENSE

On Nuclear Terrorism, by Michael Levi. Harvard University Press, 2007. 210 pages, $24.95.     

INDISPENSABLE INTELLIGENCE AND INEVITABLE FAILURES

Preventing Catastrophe: The Use and Misuse of Intelligence in Efforts to Halt the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, by Thomas Graham Jr. and Keith A. Hansen. Stanford University Press, 2009. 300 pages, $35.     

SYMBIOTIC SPIES

Spying on the Nuclear Bear: Anglo-American Intelligence and the Soviet Bomb, by Michael S. Goodman. Stanford University Press, 2007. 295 pages, $50.     

A Doctrine without Dogma

ABSTRACT

In No Use: Nuclear Weapons and U.S. National Security Policy, Thomas M. Nichols calls for a constructive rethinking about the history of nuclear weapons and the attitudes that have grown up around them. Despite dramatic reductions since the end of the Cold War, the United States still maintains a robust nuclear triad that far exceeds the needs of realistic deterrence in the twenty-first century. Nichols advocates a new strategy of minimum deterrence that includes deep unilateral reductions to the US nuclear arsenal, a no-first-use pledge, withdrawing US tactical nuclear weapons from Europe, and ending extended nuclear deterrence for allies. The weakest part of his argument eschews nuclear retaliation against small nuclear states that attack the United States, opting instead to use only conventional weapons to guarantee regime change. He admits this will entail enormous cost and sacrifice, but cites the “immorality” of retaliating against a smaller power with few targets worthy of nuclear weaponry, which totally ignores the massive underground facilities constructed to shield military facilities in many of these states. Despite this, Nichols's thoughtful approach to post-Cold War deterrence deserves thoughtful consideration.     

How durable is the nuclear weapons taboo?

The nuclear weapons taboo is considered one of the strongest norms in international politics. A prohibition against using nuclear weapons has seemingly shaped state behavior for nearly seven decades and, according to some observers, made nuclear use ‘unthinkable’ today or in the future. Although scholars have shown that nuclear aversion has affected decision-making behavior, important questions about the nuclear taboo remain unanswered. This article seeks to answer a basic question: How durable is the taboo? We develop different predictions about norm durability depending on whether the taboo is based primarily on moral logic or strategic logic. We use the comparable case of the norm against strategic bombing in the 20th century to evaluate these hypotheses. The logic and evidence presented in this paper suggest that the norm of nuclear non-use is much more fragile than most analysts understand.     

Bomboozled: How the U.S. Government Misled Itself and Its People into Believing They Could Survive a Nuclear Attack

Bomboozled: How the U.S. Government Misled Itself and Its People into Believing They Could Survive a Nuclear Attack, by Susan Roy. Pointed Leaf Press, 2011. 176 pages, $45.     

Effects of Nuclear Technology Export Competition on Nuclear Nonproliferation

ABSTRACT

While nuclear suppliers compete in markets, they simultaneously partner in other fields. This produces a delicate relationship between civilian nuclear programs and nuclear weapon proliferation. This study explores how export competition affects suppliers’ conditions of supply related to nuclear nonproliferation. We investigated three export cases (India, North Korea, and South Korea) and identified four effects that competition has on the conditions of supply related to nonproliferation. First, under highly competitive conditions, suppliers might hesitate to enforce the conditions of supply to avoid negotiation conflicts with recipients. Second, suppliers focus on politically and economically attractive recipients while mostly ignoring unattractive ones, perhaps allowing proliferation problems to fester out of view in marginal states. Third, suppliers can build consensus on the conditions of supply to avoid being the only party experiencing negotiation conflicts. Fourth, suppliers can constrain others from relaxing the conditions of supply to maintain economic benefits and nonproliferation norms. The first two effects accelerate proliferation while the last two promote nonproliferation. Although the extent of these effects can vary with changes in nonproliferation norms, they can contribute to our understanding of the relationship between nonproliferation and civilian nuclear programs.     

Nuclear Subsidies and Proliferation: Clarifying the Link

ABSTRACT

In March 2015, the South Australian state government established a royal commission to investigate the financial, social, technical, diplomatic, and nonproliferation benefits and risks of expanding its nuclear industry, including activities related to uranium mining; enriching, reprocessing, and fabricating nuclear fuels for both domestic use and export; producing nuclear power; and storing radiological waste, including foreign spent reactor fuel. Given its enormous uranium reserves and current mining activities, some Australians have argued that Australia could benefit financially by expanding the mining sector and by adding value to its uranium exports by enriching the material and fabricating it into reactor fuel assemblies. Others have maintained that Australia can realize significant economic benefits by recycling and storing foreign spent fuel and producing carbon-free nuclear power. In the end, the commission recommended that Australia consider opening up a high-level waste repository to take in foreign spent fuel. It did not recommend any other nuclear activities at this time. The following viewpoint is based on testimony I delivered to the commission on the nuclear weapon proliferation implications of the proposed activities. If Australia wants to avoid the temptation of selling nuclear goods to states that might use these goods to make bombs, it should only consider new nuclear activities that can be entirely financed by the private sector and turn a profit without having to resort to foreign sales. This policy would also enable Australia to set an important, new international nonproliferation standard.     

“Flectas non frangas”: revisiting early twenty-first century UK–US defense relations (2000–2005) after five years

Adopting the analytical framework of the established interpretive “schools” of Anglo-American relations, this article offers several reflections on UK–US defense relations as they occurred over the significant years of 2000–2005. During those years, trajectories were established on which UK–US defense relations continue to travel today and outcomes emerged which are still being navigated. This article concludes that the Latin phrase, “Flectas Non Frangas” (essentially translated as: “Bend not Break”), is the most appropriate to adopt to characterize the developments undergone in recent UK–US defense relations. Many historical and strategic lessons with contemporary relevance are drawn.     

CONTRIBUTORS

ABSTRACT

Narratives about Brazil's nuclear program are distorted by supporters and critics alike. In Brazil, the national nuclear infrastructure is undergoing a period of expansion, with plans to build new nuclear power plants and industrial-scale fuel production facilities. While Brazil's leaders herald the nuclear sector as a triumph for indigenous science and technology, foreigners view the nuclear program as a dangerous legacy of the military regime. This discrepancy becomes even more apparent in discussions about the ongoing construction of Brazil's first nuclear powered submarine. Brazil's military touts the submarine as a symbol of political status, economic growth, and military might. But from abroad, the military's involvement in nuclear development is considered unnecessary, worrisome, and even irresponsible. These narratives—often incomplete or selective—have polarized discussions about Brazil's nuclear submarine program and caused considerable political antagonism during safeguards negotiations. This article works to dispel myths, highlight legitimate concerns, and explain historical perspectives that shed light on some difficulties that can be anticipated in future negotiations.     

Outflanking missile defences: the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty,nuclear weapons and terrorism

Ian Bellany, an Emeritus Professor of Politics at Lancaster University, died in July 2011 at the age of 70, after a long and painful struggle with myelofibrosis, a rare and invariably terminal blood cancer. Between early 2009 and August 2010, under contract to Hurst & Co., he worked intermittently on a book about nuclear terrorism, which he provisionally entitled Before the Storm. The editor and I are grateful to Michael Dwyer at Hurst & Co. for releasing the draft. What is published here is an edited version of that draft. It may seem presumptuous to speak for Ian, but I am sure he would also have liked to thank the doctors and nurses of the NHS Morecambe Bay Universities Hospital Trust, whose skill, knowledge, and flair for improvisation kept him alive and writing for much longer than anyone expected. Alastair Bellany, Rutgers University, New Jersey, USA.

In the past, terrorists have tended to eschew acts of extreme violence for fear of alienating those whom they wish to persuade and attract to their cause. The first to discard this philosophy was the Aum group in Japan, which sought to use anthrax and acquire a nuclear weapon. Since then, attitudes have changed, spurred on by the impact on public perception of the successful Al Qaeda 9/11 attack on New York and Washington. By crossing the line between moderation and extreme violence, terrorist groups retain one valuable capability: they are much less easily deterred and have few inhibitions. This article considers the three nuclear options open to terrorists – produce a radiological contaminant bomb; build a nuclear bomb; or steal or get given a nuclear device. It examines the possibilities and probabilities of each option and considers how the implementation of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) provisions might impose some constraints on terrorists’ nuclear ambitions. By examining the doubtful nuclear security practices of different states and providing statistical evidence of an increase in levels of international terrorist violence, this article points to determined terrorists in time acquiring the means to acquire one or other variants of a nuclear weapon. It concludes that it is not a matter of “if” but “when.”