CALLING FOR ACTION

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards are under more stress today than at any time in their history. Compliance concerns, a shortage of resources and technology, and growing responsibilities threaten to undermine the effectiveness and credibility of this vital and fundamental pillar of the nonproliferation regime. To address this challenge, the United States recently launched the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative. The goal of this initiative is to ensure the IAEA makes the fullest possible use of its existing authority to prevent the diversion of safeguarded material and to investigate suspicious activities. The initiative will advance state-of-the-art technology, foster the development of a new generation of safeguards experts, and promote technology collaborations and safeguards-conscious infrastructure in states using or pursuing nuclear power. Although it has a domestic focus, the initiative's intent is to catalyze a much broader commitment to international safeguards in partnership with other governments and the IAEA.     

INVESTIGATING THE RUBBLE OF SYRIA'S SECRET REACTOR

Damascus has severely impeded an investigation by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) into Syria's construction of a covert nuclear reactor, which was destroyed in a 2007 Israeli air strike. Pressing Damascus to cooperate with the inquiry is necessary to ascertain that there are no other undeclared activities in Syria, to determine the role of North Korea in the construction of the reactor, and to help prevent future clandestine efforts. With Damascus doing its best to avoid the investigation, securing Syrian cooperation will require adept diplomacy backed by the prospect of special inspections and, if necessary, a referral to the UN Security Council. The case of Syria's secret reactor highlights areas in which the IAEA needs buttressing, from the enhanced sharing of information, to reporting that is less political and more forthright. The case also illustrates the downside of politicizing IAEA investigations and supports the new director's apparent intent to return the agency to its core technical tasks.     

EXPORT CONTROLS AND INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS

Export controls and international safeguards are central to ensuring international confidence in the peaceful uses of nuclear materials and technologies and to achieving adequate oversight on the transfer and use of nuclear materials, technology, and equipment required for the development of proliferation-sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle. Although the independent strengths of export controls and international safeguards rely largely on universal adherence, there may be opportunities to exploit the shared strengths of these systems. This article provides background information on the separate evolution of export controls and international safeguards, considers how these two elements of the nonproliferation regime interact, and identifies some possible avenues that could, over time, lead to wholly integrated activities.     

THE NPT

This article assesses the successes and failures of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) since its creation in 1968 by developing and applying a set of “metrics” to each of the NPT's substantive articles as well as to its withdrawal provisions. In light of this analysis, the article also puts forward some specific proposals for strengthening the NPT and its implementation, with a view to the debate and decisions at the upcoming 2010 NPT Review Conference. A concluding section turns explicitly to the 2010 NPT Review Conference and proposes pursuit of agreement on three NPT Action Plans: one for nonproliferation, one for peaceful uses, and one for nuclear disarmament. Combining vision and practicable steps, these Action Plans would set out a roadmap for action between the 2010 and the 2015 NPT Review Conferences. They could provide a foundation for substantive exchanges—in this case, on progress toward their implementation—during the preparations for the 2015 conference.     

“The major prize”: apartheid South Africa’s accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1988–91

ABSTRACT

This article focuses on the final years of South Africa’s nuclear-weapon program, particularly on the decision-making process leading up to the signature of the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) by the South African government in 1991. In August 1988, after two decades of defiance, negotiations between the apartheid government and the NPT depository powers (the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union) ensued at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna. Despite South Africa being the only state to give up its indigenously developed nuclear weapons and subsequently join the nonproliferation regime, little is known about how the national position on NPT accession and IAEA safeguards evolved. Research carried out in multiple archives using hitherto untapped primary sources and interviews with key actors from several countries show how domestic and regional political dynamics influenced Pretoria’s position on entering the nonproliferation regime. In the process, the F.W. de Klerk government managed to skillfully exploit international proliferation fears to advance its own agenda, thereby connecting South African NPT accession with that of the neighboring Frontline States coalition of Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.     

Serious Rules for Nuclear Power Without Proliferation

The authors propose five principles for addressing the major deficiencies of the current treaty-based approach to nonproliferation. These involve: effectively closing the door to withdrawals from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT); defining which nuclear technologies fall within the NPT's “inalienable right” provision, so as to maintain a reasonable safety margin against possible military application; expansion of International Atomic Energy Agency inspections to include greater readiness to use its “special” inspection authority; creation of an NPT enforcement regime, to include a secretariat; and universalizing the NPT so as to apply to all states, while creating a path for current non-parties to come into compliance. There is no illusion here about the prospects for the adoption of this approach. At a minimum, the world needs to be frank about the gap between nuclear programs and current nonproliferation protection. Encouragement of greater use of nuclear power should be predicated on closing that gap.     

THE HEALTH OF THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION REGIME

How do we assess the health of international regimes? Many analysts have insisted recently that the nuclear nonproliferation regime is in urgent need of repair or that it should even be discarded because of its supposed ineffectiveness. However, it is essential that statements about the regime being in crisis be scrutinized for veracity and utility. While the spread of nuclear weapons poses an undeniable and serious threat to international security, a mistaken crisis mentality with respect to the regime could lead to rash attempts to alter it in unnecessary or ineffective ways or, at worst, to discard it completely. This paper returns to a theoretical framework that differentiates regimes, across both issue areas and time, to provide a more specified evaluation of regime health. By disaggregating the nuclear nonproliferation regime and assessing the individual and interactive health of multiple dimensions, a number of dimension-specific, regime-strengthening policy recommendations emerge.     

The Success of the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit and its Contribution to the Nonproliferation Regime

The 2014 Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) in The Hague was a resounding success, both in organizational terms and in terms of substance. The new substance can be found in the Communiqué, as well as in innovative joint statements by participants, all of which may be considered as implementation of actions decided upon in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The next two years in the NSS process cannot be business as usual. This viewpoint makes some suggestions for NSS states to undertake between now and the final summit in 2016, including preparations for winding down the NSS process as we know it.     

PREVENTING DIRTY BOMBS

Radioactive sealed sources have a long history and a much wider worldwide distribution than do weapons-usable fissile materials. This article compares the mechanisms for controlling radioactive sources with those of weapons-usable materials and makes the case for improved policy making on the safe and secure management of radioactive sources (often referred to simply as “sources”). Such sources have been widely distributed with commercial and government support to nearly every country, yet there are no legally binding, international agreements or regulations to control any aspect of their life cycle. This is problematic because some sources that are disused, abandoned, or otherwise fall out of regulatory control could be used in the form of a radiological dispersal device (RDD, or dirty bomb). An RDD could pose significant economic and psychological impacts with the potential for detrimental effects on public health. The lack of international measures to control sources is troubling for several reasons: creating an RDD is much easier than fashioning a nuclear weapon from scratch or from stolen fissile materials; given the many incidents involving diversion from regulatory control and the misuse of sources, an RDD attack would be one of the more likely scenarios; materials security for sources is generally weak and inconsistent; it is nearly impossible to determine the total amount of sources manufactured and distributed; used sources are frequently found uncontrolled and transiting borders, and penalties are light at best; the market-based supply and demand of sources facilitates their rapid and loosely regulated distribution; and the “peaceful uses” aspect of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons along with norms that began developing around the time of Atoms for Peace have promoted the nearly unchecked global distribution of sources. Several immediate and long-term actions are suggested to reduce the threat posed by radiological sources.     

党的十七大“建设和谐世界”思想的价值分析

“外交是内政的延续”,通过对“建设和谐世界”思想及其指导下的中国外交实践的深入分析,我们不难看出,“建设和谐世界”思想,可以树立中国的良好国际形象,可以消除国际上对中国和平发展的疑虑和不信任,对提高中国的综合国力、加快中国的和平发展意义深远。     

石河子移民文化对当地少数民族文化的影响

文化通性使不同民族文化之间的学习和交融成为可能,新疆石河子是以汉族移民为主体的移民地区,不同地域移民带来的文化互相碰撞交融,与兵团文化结合形成了独具特色的石河子多元一体地域文化。本文从经济生活、宗教信仰和民俗习惯、教育观和生育观几个方面来分析石河子特殊的移民文化对当地少数民族文化产生的影响。     

The Hydrogen Bomb,Lewis L. Strauss and the Writing of Nuclear History

In January 1950 President Harry S. Truman announced that the United States would proceed with further work to determine the feasibility of a ‘Super’, or hydrogen, bomb. The events leading up to that decision – counter-pressures and advocacy from a number of quarters, including the divided Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), the nuclear scientists, Congress and the Pentagon – is well known. Less attention has been given to how the story of the Super came to be told in official and popular publications. Admiral Lewis L. Strauss, rogue member of the AEC, later presidential adviser on atomic affairs and AEC chairman, was one of the most vigorous advocates of developing thermonuclear weapons. He was also a highly skilled player of bureaucratic politics. This article draws upon the Strauss archives to examine how he used his position and his contacts to shape the history of the H-bomb to his own political advantage.     

中国传统文化世界化的翻译策略

我国传统文化走向世界需要通过翻译克服“语言的障碍”,翻译时却面临文化差异带来的理解上的困难。为解决这一问题,本文提出翻译的三大策略:求同策略,即使用详细的注释沟通文化差异;存异策略,即使用外语词汇组合或派生出合适的新词区别类似的概念;融合策略,即在外语中增加汉语的拼音词并加以注释,使汉语渗透到外语中去。     

部队思想政治工作应高度重视传统文化的现代转化

传统文化的现代转化,是新的历史条件下对传统文化的继承和发展。新时期部队思想政治工作必须重视传统文化的现代转化,这关系官兵民族精神和道德品质的培养,它丰富的精神内涵至今仍然具有旺盛的生命力。     

中华传统行刑文化论纲

中华传统行刑文化是中华传统法律文化的重要组成部分,许多方面表现了中华民族的先进性,蕴含了许多合理因素。包括德主刑辅,宽猛相济的行刑理念;恤刑悯囚的人本传统;法、理、情相统一的行刑策略;引礼入法等。社会主义法治建设应继承和发扬传统行刑文化中的合理成分,树立科学行刑理念,实现和谐行刑。     

美国西点军校橄榄球运动传统文化透析

著名的美国西点军校百余年来有着橄榄球运动的传统。从表面上来看,人们可能会以为这是西点为培养军事人才的素质而采取的常规训练手段,而实际上更为重要的是它深受美国社会的政治和文化影响。这是因为：一方面体现了西点军校平民化治军的政治文化,另一方面橄榄球运动表征着美国主流文化和美国精神,这二者的结合是这一传统经久不衰的深层原因。