历史与现实的纠葛

3月17日,克里米亚通过全民公投宣告从乌克兰独立,并加入俄联邦。3月18日,俄罗斯总统普京在克林姆林宫同克里米亚及塞瓦斯托波尔代表签署条约,允许克里米亚和塞瓦斯托波尔以联邦主体身份加入俄罗斯联邦。那么,在历史与现实中,克里米亚、乌克兰和俄罗斯,到底有着怎样纠葛？动荡中的各方又有着怎样的利弊权衡？     

克里米亚独立“建军”

俄罗斯总统普京8月14日批准俄罗斯国防部提出的将在克里米亚建立军队集群的计划,并把该计划纳入俄罗斯武装力量发展计划中,到2020年前,俄罗斯将投入7000多亿卢布（约合1200亿元人民币）用于克里米亚各方面的发展。俄罗斯方面称,成立军队集群意在保卫克里米亚半岛的安全。这支独立的军队集群宛若伸向黑海以至地中海的“铁拳”,将在事实上确立俄罗斯对克里米亚这个新加盟共和国的主权保护。     

克里米亚兵事录

进入2014年2月之后,乌克兰局势急转直下。2月24日乌克兰最高拉达（议会）下令废除了给予俄语地方官方语言地位的法案,随即引发俄罗斯族聚居区的激烈反弹,其中尤以最南部的克里米亚为最,居民游行要求脱离乌克兰,升起俄罗斯国旗。3月16日,克里米亚举行全民公投,结果96．77％的民众赞成加入俄罗斯。这一切,不禁让人想起克里米亚这块土地上久经兵燹之灾的往事……     

乌克兰在角力中走向何方

<正>乌克兰形势的突变,使俄罗斯总统普京去年11月阻止乌克兰加入欧盟联系国的成功基本被颠覆。3月1日,俄上议院批准普京对乌动武申请。目前俄军已经基本控制了克里米亚。乌克兰严重对立的东西部透出了浓浓的火药味。乌克兰形势发展涉及俄罗斯核心利益俄罗斯无法承担失去乌克兰的战略损失。乌克兰领土横跨东西欧,     

博弈克里米亚

3月21日,俄罗斯总统普京签署了克里米亚共和国及塞瓦斯托波尔市加入俄罗斯联邦的总统法令,宣布两地完成了所有入俄法律程序,成立克里米亚联邦区,包含整个克里米亚半岛。24日,乌克兰临时总理亚采纽克要求乌克兰军队撤出克里米亚。     

独联体狼烟四起 俄罗斯深受困扰

一、独联体局势不稳,俄罗斯疲于应付 俄罗斯是前苏联遗产的主要继承者,近年来它在处理与独联体其余国家“特殊”关系的同时,也受到独联体地区的冲突和热点问题带来的许多困扰。 克里米亚归属一直是困挠着俄乌关系发展的一大症结。进入1994年后,俄在涉及俄乌关系的克里米亚问题上采取了一种较为理智的作法,在克里米亚80％     

俄乌军力全面对比

3月16日,克里米亚公投宣布脱乌入俄。因此导致的俄乌紧张局势再度升级,乌克兰宣布全军战备,驻塞瓦斯托波尔（克里米亚地区）俄黑海舰队亦加强戒备。同时,美西方国家在乌克兰周边增派军事力量,俄罗斯空降兵亦临近俄乌边境地区举行大规模演习。乌克兰地区战云密布,克里米亚周边剑拔弩张。那么,作为军事对抗的双方,俄乌军力对比如何呢？     

反无人机急先锋——俄罗斯“汽车场”电子战系统

恰逢美俄在克里米亚问题上的博弈进入白热化之时,俄罗斯媒体于近日爆出一架美军MQ-5B“猎人”多用途无人机在克里米亚上空被截获的消息。截获美军无人机的是一款名为“汽车场”的电子战系统。美国方面随即对此予以了坚决否认。不过,不论此次美军无人机被截是真是假,     

事件

北海舰队举行甲午战争爆发120周年纪念活动 7月25日,北海舰队在威海甲午战争故地刘公岛,开展以“铭记甲午耻、践行强军梦”为主题的水兵集体签名宣誓、舰艇鸣笛、瞻仰凭吊等活动,纪念甲午战争爆发120周年。在甲午战争博物馆里,1000多幅甲午战争历史照片和300多件舰船文物,再次把官兵带到了那个惨痛的历史记忆中。俄罗斯宣布开始扩建驻扎在克里米亚地区塞瓦斯托波尔港的黑海舰队,增加新的水面舰艇和潜艇,并加强舰队现代化建设。在克里米亚于今年3N并入俄罗斯后,俄罗斯废除了与乌克兰的租借协议。     

俄罗斯媒体盘点2014年俄国防领域10大事件

延续以往惯例,俄新社评选出了2014年度俄罗斯国防和安全领域10大事件,包括,克里米亚半岛和平回归俄罗斯,俄罗斯最新型"安加拉"运载火箭首次试射,俄军组建国家防御指挥中心等,下面介绍如下:克里米亚回归2014年2月,在基辅市中心流血冲突事件背景下,乌克兰发生了国家政变,政权面临分崩离析,在克里米亚半岛开始出现"不明身份军人",封锁交通枢纽以免基辅非法武装分子渗入。在互联网内,这些身穿无部队标志的迷彩服的军人因其在履行职责时举止得体而开始被称为"彬彬有礼的人",他们为克里米亚在3月16日和平进行全民公投提供了保障。这些"彬彬有     

The Strategic Use of Soft Balancing: The Normative Dimensions of the Chinese–Russian ‘Strategic Partnership’

This article examines Chinese and Russian foreign policy and military strategy from the theoretical standpoint of soft balancing. Analysis of their thinking indicates that both seek to offset US military superiority without engaging American power directly. To that end, Chinese and Russian strategists have adopted ‘soft’ or ‘normative’ power assets as strategic capabilities in their military and foreign policy. Alternative norms, such as the concept of ‘sovereign democracy’, allow China and Russia to deliberately ignore human rights issues in order to achieve diplomatic advantage with respect to the United States. The two powers have institutionalized these norms within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which they use to counterbalance US interests in Central Asia.     

对我国维和警察在任务区进行文化传播的思考

文化影响力是一个国家软实力的重要组成部分,对外进行文化传播是塑造一个国家积极正面形象、提高软实力的有效手段。通过探讨维和警察进行文化传播的重要性、任务、方式以及应注意的问题,旨在对中国维和警察及维和警察培训有所裨益。中国维和警察应发挥自身优势积极进行中华文化传播,塑造中国警察的良好形象,打造中国维护世界和平、构建和谐世界、负责任的大国形象。     

试论道德教育对提升文化软实力的价值

科学价值观的缺位,对文化软实力造成了现实冲击。道德教育可以从以下三个方面发展和提升文化软实力：端正文化软实力的价值取向,使它坚持为人民服务、为中国特色社会主义服务、为人类可持续发展服务;传播意识形态、繁荣科学技术、落实典章制度、纯净民情风俗及对各部分间关系的调节,优化文化软实力的价值结构;增强道德责任感、培养社会公德意识和扩大道德行为,促进文化软实力的价值实现。     

Hard Balancing in the Age of American Unipolarity: The Russian Response to US Ballistic Missile Defense during the Bush Administration (2001–2008)

One of the central debates in contemporary international relations scholarship concerns the issue of whether balancing has occurred in response to US-based unipolarity, and if it has, how this should be characterised. Existing research has seen analysts argue that major power responses to unipolarity can be placed in one of either three categories: an absence of balancing, soft balancing, and hard balancing. This article contributes to the scholarly literature by providing a case study of hard internal Russian balancing against the US’s development and deployment of Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) systems during the Bush Administration (2001–08). Russian hard balancing against the US has involved: (1) fielding new strategic nuclear and conventional weapons equipped with BMD countermeasures, and, relatedly, (2) making changes in military doctrine. As a result, security dilemma dynamics are increasingly in evidence in US relations with Russia.     

Is Russia a revisionist military power in the Arctic?

In contrast with a widespread perception of Russia as an expansionist power in the Arctic, this article argues that Moscow does not seek military superiority in the region. Rather, Moscow's military strategies in the Arctic pursue three major goals: first, to demonstrate and ascertain Russia's sovereignty over its exclusive economic zone and continental shelf in the region; second, to protect its economic interests in the High North; and third, to demonstrate that Russia retains its great power status and still has world-class military capabilities. The Russian military modernization programs are quite modest and aim at upgrading the Russian armed forces in the High North rather than providing them with additional offensive capabilities or provoking a regional arms race. The Russian ambitions in the Arctic may be high, but they are not necessarily implying the intentions and proper capabilities to confront other regional players by military means. On the contrary, Moscow opts for soft rather than hard power strategy in the Arctic.     

Rising bipolarity in the South China Sea: the American rebalance to Asia and China's expansion

This article synthesizes three elements of power and balancing in the South China Sea (SCS): analytical perspectives on China's behaviour and intentions, the American rebalance to Asia and the dispositions of American allies and partners. Based on extensive interviews and theoretical analysis, it concludes that ‘soft balancing’ backed by American military power provides the optimum chance for resolving the growing dispute. Short to medium-term weakness of Malaysia, Philippines and Vietnam, as well as Japan, means the United States must provide much of the military power while working to build their forces. The most promising alternative is multilateral diplomacy through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ Regional Forum, a vehicle for negotiating a Code of Conduct and implementation of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. If China remains motivated mainly by defense of realist interests, the costs imposed against expansion will eventually cause recalculation of Beijing's strategy, and soft balancing by the United States and its partners has a chance of working. The constructivist perspective, stressing self-conceptualization of Chinese strategic culture, supports Chinese confidence that patience will eventually bring dominance. If China tries offensively to change the status quo, soft balancing is less likely to influence Beijing. President Xi Jin Ping appears to be offensively asserting power, seeking regional dominance before he is due to step down in 2023. This supports the finding of enhanced risks of unintended escalation in the SCS and the East China Sea.     

Hoping for the Best,preparing for the worst: China's response to US hegemony

In the post-Cold War strategic environment, Beijing could plausibly have opted for Soviet-style geostrategic competition with Washington, but it has not. Chinese leaders have not thus far, and almost certainly will never, amass thousands of nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert or deploy significant forces to a network of bases spanning the globe. Nevertheless, the below assessment of China's increasing hard and soft power yields the conclusion that a Chinese challenge to US hegemony cannot be ruled out. The United States must prudently maintain military forces appropriate to facing a potential peer competitor. At the same time, however, Washington must engage in a process of creative diplomacy that simultaneously matches China's soft power and engages seriously with Beijing to create areas of consensus and cooperation.     

A Revolution Too Far? US Defence Innovation,Europe and NATO’s Military-Technological Gap

The United States is launching another defence innovation initiative to offset the growing military-technological might of countries such as China, Russia and Iran. However, by utilising emerging technologies from the commercial sector to achieve greater military power the US may further open up the technology gap within NATO. This raises serious questions for NATO’s European allies. This article probes the nature of the US’s latest innovation strategy and sets it within the strategic context facing Europe today. Whether European governments, firms and militaries will join the US in its new defence innovation drive will hinge on politico-military and industrial considerations.     

Unblocking inertia: US-Russian nuclear arms control and missile defenses

The United States and Russia, in the aftermath of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and destabilization of Ukraine, seem to have ditched entirely the “reset” in their political relations. Despite this odor of Cold War redux, there remain the opportunities and necessities for renewed attention to strategic nuclear arms control as between the two governments. US and NATO missile defenses as planned for European deployment figure into this equation, although in somewhat unpredictable ways, given technological uncertainties in existing and foreseeable defenses, as well as the possibility of improved delivery systems for offensive conventional or nuclear weapons.     

Russia and Strategic Conventional Weapons:

ABSTRACT

Russian political leaders and military strategists are growing increasingly concerned about “strategic conventional weapons”—a broad category that appears to include all non-nuclear, high-precision, standoff weapons—and about long-range, hypersonic weapons, in particular. These concerns are complex and multifaceted (and, in some cases, contradictory), but chief among them are the beliefs that strategic conventional weapons could prove decisive in a major conflict and that Russia is lagging behind in their development. US programs to develop and acquire such weapons—namely, the Conventional Prompt Global Strike program—are of great concern to Russian strategists, who argue both that the United States seeks such weapons for potential use against Russia—its nuclear forces, in particular—and because strategic conventional weapons are more “usable” than nuclear weapons. Asymmetric responses by Russia include increased reliance on tactical nuclear weapons, efforts to enhance the survivability of its nuclear forces, and investments in air and missile defenses. There is also strong—but not completely conclusive evidence—that Russia is responding symmetrically by attempting to develop a long-range, conventionally armed boost-glide weapon.