共查询到20条相似文献，搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
Ryusuke Hohzaki 《海军后勤学研究》2007,54(1):46-58
This paper deals with a two‐person zero‐sum game called a search allocation game, where a searcher and a target participate, taking account of false contacts. The searcher distributes his search effort in a search space in order to detect the target. On the other hand, the target moves to avoid the searcher. As a payoff of the game, we take the cumulative amount of search effort weighted by the target distribution, which can be derived as an approximation of the detection probability of the target. The searcher's strategy is a plan of distributing search effort and the target's is a movement represented by a path or transition probability across the search space. In the search, there are false contacts caused by environmental noises, signal processing noises, or real objects resembling true targets. If they happen, the searcher must take some time for their investigation, which interrupts the search for a while. There have been few researches dealing with search games with false contacts. In this paper, we formulate the game into a mathematical programming problem to obtain its equilibrium point. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007 相似文献
2.
A. Garnaev 《海军后勤学研究》2007,54(1):109-114
This paper deals with a two searchers game and it investigates the problem of how the possibility of finding a hidden object simultaneously by players influences their behavior. Namely, we consider the following two‐sided allocation non‐zero‐sum game on an integer interval [1,n]. Two teams (Player 1 and 2) want to find an immobile object (say, a treasure) hidden at one of n points. Each point i ∈ [1,n] is characterized by a detection parameter λi (μi) for Player 1 (Player 2) such that pi(1 ? exp(?λixi)) (pi(1 ? exp(?μiyi))) is the probability that Player 1 (Player 2) discovers the hidden object with amount of search effort xi (yi) applied at point i where pi ∈ (0,1) is the probability that the object is hidden at point i. Player 1 (Player 2) undertakes the search by allocating the total amount of effort X(Y). The payoff for Player 1 (Player 2) is 1 if he detects the object but his opponent does not. If both players detect the object they can share it proportionally and even can pay some share to an umpire who takes care that the players do not cheat each other, namely Player 1 gets q1 and Player 2 gets q2 where q1 + q2 ≤ 1. The Nash equilibrium of this game is found and numerical examples are given. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007 相似文献
3.
Ryusuke Hohzaki 《海军后勤学研究》2009,56(3):264-278
Search theory originates from the military research efforts of WWII. Most researchers of that period modeled their search games in noncooperative games, where players are enemies or compete against each other. In this article, we deal with a cooperative search game, where multiple searchers behave cooperatively. First we describe several search problems and discuss the possibility of a coalition or cooperation among searchers. For the cooperative search game, we define a function named quasi‐characteristic function, which gives us a criterion similar to the so‐called characteristic function in the general coalition game with transferable utility. The search operation includes a kind of randomness with respect to whether the searchers can detect a target and get the value of the target. We also propose a methodology to divide the obtained target value among members of the coalition taking account of the randomness. As a concrete problem of the cooperative search game, we take the so‐called search allocation game, where searchers distribute their searching resources to detect a target in a cooperative way and the target moves in a search space to evade the searchers. Lastly, we discuss the core of the cooperative search allocation game. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2009 相似文献
4.
This article deals with a two‐person zero‐sum game in which player I chooses in integer interval [1, N] two integer intervals consisting of p and q points where p + q < N, and player II chooses an integer point in [1, N]. The payoff to player I equals 1 if the point chosen by player II is at least in one of the intervals chosen by player II and 0 otherwise. This paper complements the results obtained by Ruckle, Baston and Bostock, Lee, Garnaev, and Zoroa, Zoroa and Fernández‐Sáez. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 48: 98–106, 2001 相似文献
5.
Ryusuke Hohzaki 《海军后勤学研究》2008,55(1):76-90
This article deals with a two‐person zero‐sum game called a search allocation game (SAG), in which a searcher and a target participate as players. The searcher distributes his searching resources in a search space to detect the target. The effect of resources lasts a certain period of time and extends to some areas at a distance from the resources' dropped points. On the other hand, the target moves around in the search space to evade the searcher. In the history of search games, there has been little research covering the durability and reachability of searching resources. This article proposes two linear programming formulations to solve the SAG with durable and reachable resources, and at the same time provide an optimal strategy of distributing searching resources for the searcher and an optimal moving strategy for the target. Using examples, we will analyze the influences of two attributes of resources on optimal strategies. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 2008 相似文献
6.
This paper deals with search for a target following a Markovian movement or a conditionally deterministic motion. The problem is to allocate the search efforts, when search resources renew with generalized linear constraints. The model obtained is extended to resource mixing management. New optimality equations of de Guenin's style are obtained. Practically, the problem is solved by using an algorithm derived from the FAB method. © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 49: 117–142, 2002; DOI 10.1002/nav.10009 相似文献
7.
针对资源受限情形下的两阶段攻防资源分配问题,提出一种基于多属性决策的资源分配对策模型。防守者首先将有限的防护资源分配到不同的目标上,继而进攻者选择一种威胁组合方式对目标实施打击。基于博弈论相关知识,模型的求解结果可以使防守者最小化自身损失,使进攻者最大化进攻收益。同时,针对模型的特点,给出了一些推论和证明。通过一个示例验证了模型的合理性以及相关推论的准确性,能够为攻、防双方规划决策提供辅助支持。 相似文献
8.
使用对策论的观点和方法 ,结合搜索论的知识 ,建立了一类搜索 -规避对抗对策模型 .对模型的结论做了系统分析 ,考虑了对策双方的最优策略及使用 . 相似文献
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对运动目标搜索是军事系统工程的一个重要内容,其在很多领域具有广泛应用,如对潜艇搜索、对失事舰船飞机搜救、制导武器搜索捕捉目标等。用运动学和数学的有关知识分析了目标定速直航机动时的分布函数以及搜索者与其可相遇的条件,提出了对运动目标按螺旋线搜索的另一种证明方法,建立了直线搜索时目标可能位置点的数学模型,并以此为依据分析了对运动目标螺旋搜索模式的一个误区。 相似文献
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传感器在进行目标跟踪时,常规算法主要通过线性规划建立传感器与目标之间的分配方法。但是在对多目标和多传感器的战场环境中,这些方法有一定局限性。研究了基于遗传算法的传感器分配方法,通过构造符合传感器分配这一特殊问题的染色体,从而形成初始种群,然后利用遗传算法模拟生物遗传迭代和自然选择的遗传机理,通过多次选择最终收敛于问题的一个满意解。仿真显示,在大数据运算的环境中,该算法有更高的可行性和有效性。 相似文献
12.
针对多平台协同搜索的最优搜索问题,以多无人机区域搜索任务为背景,将搜索论和随机规划引入到编队协同搜索中,建立了环境模型、无人机模型、传感器模型;为了解决目标丢失后的“应召”搜索问题,建立了目标的随机漫游模型;通过对搜索力最优分配问题的分析,认为其实质为一类线性规划问题,提出了一种基于递归原理的解算方法;最后,通过仿真计算,证明了该随机漫游模型的合理性,并验证了所提算法的有效性。 相似文献
13.
In this paper we study a capacity allocation problem for two firms, each of which has a local store and an online store. Customers may shift among the stores upon encountering a stockout. One question facing each firm is how to allocate its finite capacity (i.e., inventory) between its local and online stores. One firm's allocation affects the decision of the rival, thereby creating a strategic interaction. We consider two scenarios of a single‐product single‐period model and derive corresponding existence and stability conditions for a Nash equilibrium. We then conduct sensitivity analysis of the equilibrium solution with respect to price and cost parameters. We also prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium for a generalized model in which each firm has multiple local stores and a single online store. Finally, we extend the results to a multi‐period model in which each firm decides its total capacity and allocates this capacity between its local and online stores. A myopic solution is derived and shown to be a Nash equilibrium solution of a corresponding “sequential game.” © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2006 相似文献
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We analyze an interdiction scenario where an interceptor attempts to catch an intruder as the intruder moves through the area of interest. A motivating example is the detection and interdiction of drug smuggling vessels in the Eastern Pacific and Caribbean. We study two models in this article. The first considers a nonstrategic target that moves through the area without taking evasive action to avoid the interdictor. We determine the optimal location the interceptor should position itself to best respond when a target arrives. The second model analyzes the strategic interaction between the interceptor and intruder using a Blotto approach. The intruder chooses a route to travel on and the interceptor chooses a route to patrol. We model the interaction as a two‐player game with a bilinear payoff function. We compute the optimal strategy for both players and examine several extensions. © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 64: 29–40, 2017 相似文献
16.
Noam Goldberg 《海军后勤学研究》2017,64(2):139-153
A simultaneous non‐zero‐sum game is modeled to extend the classical network interdiction problem. In this model, an interdictor (e.g., an enforcement agent) decides how much of an inspection resource to spend along each arc in the network to capture a smuggler. The smuggler (randomly) selects a commodity to smuggle—a source and destination pair of nodes, and also a corresponding path for traveling between the given pair of nodes. This model is motivated by a terrorist organization that can mobilize its human, financial, or weapon resources to carry out an attack at one of several potential target destinations. The probability of evading each of the network arcs nonlinearly decreases in the amount of resource that the interdictor spends on its inspection. We show that under reasonable assumptions with respect to the evasion probability functions, (approximate) Nash equilibria of this game can be determined in polynomial time; depending on whether the evasion functions are exponential or general logarithmically‐convex functions, exact Nash equilibria or approximate Nash equilibria, respectively, are computed. © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 64: 139–153, 2017 相似文献
17.
We consider the effects of cueing in a cooperative search mission that involves several autonomous agents. Two scenarios are discussed: one in which the search is conducted by a number of identical search‐and‐engage vehicles and one where these vehicles are assisted by a search‐only (reconnaissance) asset. The cooperation between the autonomous agents is facilitated via cueing, i.e., the information transmitted to the agents by a searcher that has just detected a target. The effect of cueing on the target detection probability is derived from first principles using a Markov chain analysis. In particular, it is demonstrated that the benefit of cueing on the system's effectiveness is bounded. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2006 相似文献
18.
在协同空战中,快速正确的空战决策是己方战机少受敌方伤害并取得战争胜利的前提。目标与火力资源分配是决策过程的重要部分。多机空战与单机空战相比有明显的不同,不同之处是面临多个敌方目标,根据我方资源最优分配作战对象和火力,基于遗传算法实现了两种算法的有人无人目标与火力资源分配。仿真结果表明,带有毁伤概率门限的算法既节省火力资源又快速有效。 相似文献
19.
When facing uncertain demand, several firms may consider pooling their inventories leading to the emergence of two key contractual issues. How much should each produce or purchase for inventory purposes? How should inventory be allocated when shortages occur to some of the firms? Previously, if the allocations issue was considered, it was undertaken through evaluation of the consequences of an arbitrary priority scheme. We consider both these issues within a Nash bargaining solution (NBS) cooperative framework. The firms may not be risk neutral, hence a nontransferable utility bargaining game is defined. Thus the physical pooling mechanism itself must benefit the firms, even without any monetary transfers. The firms may be asymmetric in the sense of having different unit production costs and unit revenues. Our assumption with respect to shortage allocation is that a firm not suffering from a shortfall, will not be affected by any of the other firms' shortages. For two risk neutral firms, the NBS is shown to award priority on all inventory produced to the firm with higher ratio of unit revenue to unit production cost. Nevertheless, the arrangement is also beneficial for the other firm contributing to the total production. We provide examples of Uniform and Bernoulli demand distributions, for which the problem can be solved analytically. For firms with constant absolute risk aversion, the agreement may not award priority to any firm. Analytically solvable examples allow additional insights, e.g. that higher risk aversion can, for some problem parameters, cause an increase in the sum of quantities produced, which is not the case in a single newsvendor setting. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008 相似文献
20.
利用集群搜索对策的理论与方法 ,建立了集群对固定目标的一类搜索对策模型 ,给出了集群的ε -最优搜寻策略 ,并考虑了其在搜索过程中的应用 相似文献