俄罗斯的太空安全观

太空被视为俄罗斯的国家总体实力与军事实力的象征。维护太空安全与太空力量的平衡，成为俄罗斯国家战略考虑的问题。面对美国太空武器化的政策，为保证其进出太空的自由和其太空战略利益，俄罗斯对此做出回应。一方面，联手中国等国家呼吁国际社会限制太空武器化；另一方面谋求“非对称反击”手段，发展相关反制武器，不让美国在太空武器领域一枝独秀。     

俄罗斯太空安全政策探析

后苏联时代的俄罗斯未能维持其在太空安全领域的优势,已不再是太空军事强国。本文首先梳理了俄罗斯太空安全政策的发展历程,其次,讨论了俄罗斯在太空安全治理和防止太空武器化方面的外交倡议,最后总结了俄罗斯太空安全政策的特征。本研究认为,自21世纪初起,俄罗斯逐渐开始复兴其太空军事力量,力图使其太空安全政策适应新的地缘政治格局,不仅积极调整其航天计划,对其航天工业体系、航天机构和航天资产进行简化、整合和现代化建设,还谋求“非对称”反制策略,并在联合国框架内积极开展“太空外交倡议”,以应对美国太空武器化所带来的威胁和挑战,同时推动禁止太空武器化进程。     

太空安全问题论略

冷战结束后，越来越多国家进入太空，太空轨道拥挤和太空碎片增多，太空安全出现新情况：航天器相互碰撞和碎片撞击航天器的几率增加。美国为谋求制天权，力图使太空武器化，拒绝有关禁止太空部署武器条约的谈判。为了对抗美国的霸权，一些国家也在开始研发、试验新太空武器，导致太空安全困境的再次出现和进一步恶化。未来太空安全取决于美国的态度和国际社会的努力。     

特朗普政府太空防卫战略调整的动因、 特点与影响

面对太空领域变化的安全环境和自身实力的相对衰弱,特朗普政府对美国的太空防卫战略进行了重大调整。相比奥巴马政府的太空防卫战略,特朗普政府明确将太空作为新型作战域,加快天军建设,并以中俄为主要对手,联合盟友构建军民一体、内外联动的太空防卫体系。本文认为,特朗普政府对于太空防卫战略的调整凸显了美国欲加快太空武器化、谋求外空绝对军事力量优势的霸权企图。但这无疑会加剧目前愈演愈烈的太空"安全困境",将更多国家拉入"太空军备竞赛"的恶性循环中,对国际太空安全和全球战略稳定带来消极影响。展望拜登政府的太空防卫政策,其军事色彩会略微下降,但也将更重视技术积累和太空的开发利用。     

【邀请论文】特朗普政府太空防卫战略调整的动因、特点与影响

面对太空领域变化的安全环境和自身实力的相对衰弱,特朗普政府对美国的太空防卫战略进行了重大调整。相比奥巴马政府的太空防卫战略,特朗普政府明确将太空作为新型作战域,加快天军建设,并以中俄为主要对手,联合盟友构建军民一体、内外联动的太空防卫体系。本文认为,特朗普政府对于太空防卫战略的调整凸显了美国欲加快太空武器化、谋求外空绝对军事力量优势的霸权企图。但这无疑会加剧目前愈演愈烈的太空“安全困境”,将更多国家拉入“太空军备竞赛”的恶性循环中,对国际太空安全和全球战略稳定带来消极影响。展望拜登政府的太空防卫政策,其军事色彩会略微下降,但也将更重视技术积累和太空的开发利用。     

加强我国太空威慑能力建设的战略思考(上)

<正>随着航空航天技术的突飞猛进,太空已经成为世界军事大国争夺战略控制权的新战场,"有关国家发展太空力量和手段,太空武器化初显端倪",加强太空威慑能力建设已成为当前各国高度关注的战略问题。一、太空威慑能力的战略地位与作用太空威慑,亦称空间威慑,是以强大的太空实力为后盾,通过威胁使用或实际使用太空力量,以慑止对手发起进攻。加强太空威慑能     

美国“猎星”行动的台前幕后

美国使用“标准-3”导弹成功击落失控卫星的行动是人类首次成功运用地空武器系统对卫星完成的攻击．也使得美国成为世界上第一个具备实战反卫星能力的国家。此次击落卫星的行动是美国太空对抗战略的直接体现．表明美国要继续推进太空武器化，显示美国在太空领域的优势地位不可动摇．这也将刺激新一轮太空军备竞赛升温．破坏世界的和平与稳定。     

第二次太空竞赛背景下美国太空威慑战略与启示

随着21世纪进入第3个十年,第二次太空竞赛日益激烈。针对美国这一太空强国,通过分析其太空战略,研究其太空部队、太空军事基础设施的特点以及新太空军事联盟的发展历程,得出由美国主导的太空军事化、战场化、武器化格局已经成型的结论。这种形势对和平利用太空国家的发展战略构成了严重威胁。结合上述分析,为更好地解决第二次太空竞赛带来的风险和冲突,使人类能够共享共有太空、和平利用太空,提出加强和平发展宣传、普及强化太空安全意识、完善太空人才梯队建设、加强全球太空深度合作等措施。     

中国的太空力量

中国发展外空技术完全是为了和平利用外空,中国一向主张太空的非武器化,认为防止在太空进行军备竞赛符合世界各国利益。本文是美国专家的观点,仅供参考。     

岛屿维权行动法律保障研究

正党的十八大明确指出,要"高度关注海洋、太空、网络空间安全","坚决维护国家海洋权益,建设海洋强国"。这些重要论述突出强调了海洋安全对国家安全和发展战略的重大意义,充分体现了时代发展的新形势新要求。岛屿及其附带海域具有重大战略利益,岛屿维权关系国家主权和领土完整,是维护国家海洋权益的重中之重。以"法治思维"和"法治方式"理性应对当前岛屿争端愈演愈烈的现实,依法组织开展岛屿维权行动,已成为维护国家主权、安全和发展利益的一项重要任务。     

美国应对外空国际条约的做法简析

针对现行国际空间法存在的诸多漏洞和缺陷，国际空间大国积极利用这些漏洞寻求开展外空试验的依据，并规避法律的约束以发展外空武器装备，使得外空存在被武器化的风险，外空军备竞赛日益激烈。因此，研究并利用外空条约、关注空间大国开展外空试验的现实做法，可以为开展外空活动提供借鉴和依据。本文重点研究了美国海基反卫试验和轨道快车试验，从试验背景、目的、对外口径以及对外反应几个方面，综合对比分析了试验的现实做法，剖析了美国应对外空条约的做法，从技术上、政策上和法律上得出了如何应对的方法和途径。研究成果可为我国合理合法地开展外空行动提供借鉴，从而赢得国际社会的认可。     

POTENTIAL PROLIFERATION POINTERS FROM THE PAST: Lessons from the British Nuclear Weapons Program, 1952–69

Becoming a nuclear weapon state and sustaining a militarily credible nuclear weapons capability is far from trivial, especially for medium powers. Such a capability is demonstrated by much more than firing a first test or acquiring significant quantities of fissile material; capability is indicated by factors including weaponization, delivery of weapons, reliability and effectiveness of weapons and their delivery systems, fissile material availability, and nuclear and non-nuclear testing. Files in the British National Archives shed considerable light on the problems faced by the nuclear weapon program of the United Kingdom from 1952 through the late 1960s. The question is whether this experience is unique or if it instead offers insights into the potential problems faced by, or facing, other medium or aspiring nuclear weapon states. The proliferation-related topics highlighted include: fissile material production, nuclear testing, the first weapon, weapon delivery rates, non-nuclear testing, delivery platform problems, and long-term maintenance and capability sustainability. Further research could provide clearer insights.     

KICKING THE HORNETS’ NEST

This article applies the concept of nuclear ambivalence to the case of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Nuclear ambivalence differs from other approaches to understanding nuclear proliferation in that it focuses on the deeply misunderstood relationship between the two potential uses of nuclear power: energy and weapons. According to this theory, the civilian applications of nuclear technology cannot be separated from the potential military applications and vice versa. Ambivalence, therefore, extends into the realm of states’ nuclear intentions, making it impossible to know with certainty what a potential proliferator's “true” intentions are. This article will demonstrate that the concept of nuclear ambivalence applies in the case of Iran, suggesting that current international nonproliferation efforts run the risk of encouraging rather than discouraging Iranian weaponization. The final section outlines recommendations for policy makers to reverse this counterproductive nonproliferation approach.     

India nuclear weapons: No first use or no full disclosure?

This article argues India is laying the foundation to move away from “no-first-use” (NFU) as its nuclear weapons employment policy. Since the inception of its nuclear weapons program, India has claimed NFU as the centerpiece of its nuclear strategy. But India has a history of developing foundational changes to its nuclear weapons program before such changes actually occur. For example, the infrastructure of India’s nuclear weapons program was already being created in the 1950s under the guise of civilian nuclear power. Similarly, the weaponization of India’s program, which did not officially occur until after the 1998 tests, had its genesis in far earlier decisions. A close examination of trends in India’s nuclear weapons production complex, its delivery systems, and its command and control complex all lead to the conclusion that India is laying the groundwork for more flexible employment options, up to and including first use. This article does not argue such a decision has been taken. Rather, it argues the underpinning is in place to allow for a move to more flexible options, perhaps very quickly, at some point in the future. This could occur during crisis or it could occur incrementally over time.     

网络攻击螺旋模型构建及运用研究

网络攻击模型是实施网络攻击的基本遵循依据,本文分析了经典网络攻击链模型存在的适用性不足、全面性欠缺、整体性不够三个主要问题,构建了更适合描述APT攻击的网络攻击螺旋模型。该模型将网络攻击活动描述为侦察、武器化、渗透与破坏、横向移动、撤出以及评估与改进6个阶段,并设置为螺旋循环式结构,通过对攻击链模型的优化与重构,使模型层次更加分明,任务更加明确,功能更加完备。在此基础上,对模型中各阶段行动应当完成的攻击任务和采取的攻击方式进行了梳理,运用统一建模语言从静态和动态两个方面对网络攻击螺旋模型在APT攻击中的运用方式进行了形式化描述,梳理了该模型的运用原则和特性,对分析识别APT攻击行为并采取针对性防御措施阻断攻击链具有一定借鉴意义。     

FROM PROLIFERATION TO PEACE

Despite both regional and international efforts to establish a weapons of mass destruction–free zone (WMDFZ) in the Middle East, regional support beyond mere rhetoric seems unattainable. The lack of commitment to WMD disarmament results from the complexity of regional security dynamics, which are characterized by a high level of weaponization and crosscutting conflicts. This article examines a strategy for WMD disarmament in the Middle East. First, such a strategy must reflect the motives underlying a state's WMD aspirations. Security and prestige may be identified as two motives that affect the acquisition, and thus also the abandonment, of WMD. Second, Egypt, Iran, Israel, and Syria are important actors because their reasons for desiring WMD cannot be considered apart from each other, and progress will consequently depend on the inclusion of all these actors. In this regard, we recommend the establishment of a parallel process between efforts to establish a WMDFZ and peaceful relations in the Middle East. Solving central problems, like the lack of political determination and security cooperation, is vital to create consensus on the final framework of a zone. This study suggests a way forward by analyzing the central causes of conflict in the region and recommending ways to resolve them in order to establish a WMDFZ.     

Boko Haram insurgency and gendered victimhood: women as corporal victims and objects of war

ABSTRACT

Boko Haram insurgency in North East Nigeria has exposed women (girls, ladies, and mothers) to a complex jeopardy. While some women have suffered untimely widowhood or child-lack as a result of the Boko Haram onslaught, others have suffered death, forced abduction, and allied assaults on the main and side lines of the insurgency. Oftentimes, women have faced direct violence that essentially degrade their humanity. This is evident in the deployment of women as war-front sex slaves, human shields, and suicide bombers by the insurgents. The virtual expendability of women in the context of Boko Haram insurgency has been vividly demonstrated by the gale of female suicide bombings in Nigeria over the recent years. By means of a textual and contextual analysis of library sources and/or documentary data, as well as an adroit application of the theory of objectification, this study posits that, in addition to suffering collateral vulnerabilities, women have equally been instrumentalized as objects of terror in the context of Boko Haram insurgency. The paper further argues that the ‘weaponization’ of women’s bodies as bomb vessels and human shields by the insurgents highlights the height of women’s corporal victimization and objectification in contemporary asymmetric warfare.     

THE FUTURE OF BIOLOGICAL DISARMAMENT

The Sixth Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) gave the future of biological disarmament new hope. It brought the BWC back closer to the core of multilateral efforts to combat the weaponization of disease, agreed to an intersessional work program for 2007–2010, created an implementation support unit, and revived the interrupted process of BWC evolution through extended understandings agreed at review conferences. However, its aims were deliberately modest. Having set their sights realistically low, delegations did not have to lower them much further. What was most important was to prevent U.S.-Iranian acrimony from paralyzing the conference. With deadlock once again narrowly averted, the conference had to clear away the debris left from past dissensions in order to open the way to constructive evolution for the treaty. In particular the conference avoided contentious subjects such as permanent organization and verification measures for the BWC; its institutional deficit and compliance problems remain. Successes and limitations of the conference are analyzed, as is its equivocal outcome on confidence-building measures. Developing on the endogenous principle, the BWC will continue to need constant attention. At the center of a complex edifice, the BWC must be kept sound, strong, and solid.     

Proliferation and critical risk

Does proliferation increase the risk of war between new nuclear powers? Two schools of thought ‐ proliferation pessimists and optimists ‐ offer very different answers. The former stress the first‐strike danger of nuclear‐armed ballistic missiles and the resulting crisis instability as a cause of preemptive war. The latter stress the caution‐inducing effects of nuclear warheads and fear of retaliation as a check on would‐be attackers.

To bridge the gap between these two schools, Daniel Ellsberg's concept of critical risk is used to show how the likelihood of war changes as new nuclear powers enlarge and improve their missile forces. Ellsberg's framework suggests that the danger of war is low between recent proliferators but rises as nuclear stockpiles grow, thereby changing the payoffs associated with striking first or striking second and increasing the danger of war due to accidents, miscalculations, and uncontrollable interactions between rival nuclear forces.

Ellsberg's framework also suggests that the transition from weaponization to secure second strike force is likely to be long and difficult, in part because short‐range missiles like India's Prithvi are better suited to strike first than to strike second, and in part because negative control procedures reduce the value of striking second, thereby increasing the attraction of a preemptive strike.