俄罗斯印度军事贸易及技术合作浅析

俄罗斯和印度之间的军事技术合作对俄印长期稳定的战略伙伴关系来讲是至关重要的，双方高层均认为俄印两国在军事技术领域仍然有着非常广阔的合作前景，双方期望到2010年将武器贸易额提高到100亿美元。     

透视前进中的印俄军事合作

近年来,出于各自战略和现实利益的考虑,印俄两国关系得到加强,两国在军事领域的合作由温变热,开始向纵深推进。从印度方面来看,印度加强与俄军事合作的真正意图是购买或联合研制开发生产先进的武器装备,以加速军队装备信息化建设,实现称霸世界的军事野心。从俄罗斯的角度来看,俄不断加强与印度的军事合作,主要是看重印度军火的需求量,通过向其军火出口,换取国家建设急需资金,复兴军工企业,强化其在南亚次大陆的影响力。国际分析人士指出,印俄不仅是重要的军事技术和工业伙伴,也是军事政治伙伴,两国在军事领域的合作已经跃上一个新的台阶。军…     

俄印军事技术合作再度热络

2009年12月7日印度总理辛格访恫莫斯科。期间，俄罗斯总统梅德韦杰夫、总理普京分别与辛格举行会谈，双方就能源、航空、反恐、医药及应对气候变化等问题进行了讨论。辛格访问莫斯科期间，两国领导人还就双方军事技术、能源、科技等领域的合作与交流交换了意见。值得注意的是，重视传统军事技术合作的俄印两国这次又签订了一揽子军售大单。一时间，一度磕磕绊绊的俄印军贸和军事技术合作重又再次升温，再次引起了国际社会的广泛关注。     

印度海军中的“俄裔”装备

印度一直以来都在谋求在南亚乃至整个亚太地区的军事大国地位。其军事装备中的大中型军舰、高性能战机等仍然依赖外购,而在印度的武器外购过程中,俄罗斯一直都是高志榜首,2004年印度国防预算为133亿美元,其中2004年初就与俄罗斯确定了一笔高额的军购合同,用以购买经过大幅改造的“戈尔什科夫海军上将”号航空母舰和载型     

俄欲死守“势力孤岛”

维护巨大的军售利益。中东地区是俄制武器的主要销售地,叙利亚更是俄制武器的重要客户。尽管叙利业至今已欠俄130亿美元的武器款,但俄近年来仍与叙签订了约40亿美元的军售合同,仪2010年叙就购买了7亿美元俄制武器,这对于近年来迫于两方压力接连失去伊拉克、利比亚,伊朗市场,年均对外军售仅约百亿荚元的俄罗斯来讲,是一笔不菲的收入。     

俄印军事技术合作分析

俄罗斯国防部一位官员2月1日宣布．为进一步加强俄印在军事领域的合作．两国计划将目前两国仅限于军事装备采购销售的合作方式提升为联合研制开发多种新式军用装备的更高级别。本文试图分析一下俄印军事技术合作的质量．并预测双方合作的发展前景。     

印度为强军“脚踩两只船”

2月18日,美国参谋长联席会议主席迈尔斯在访问印度期间宣布,美将与印度谈判向印出售先进的武器定位雷达系统问题。这将是美印两国40多年来达成的第一项军售协议,意味着印度为增强自身军力,在对外军事合作和交流,特别是在对外采购先进武器装备方面打开了新的渠道。     

印度加速发展核潜艇的战略思考

2002年12月4日,俄罗斯总统普京访问了印度,时间虽短,但俄印之间迅疾签署了《德里宣言》。俄罗斯称,俄愿意向印度出售包括攻击型核潜艇和航空母舰在内的价值数十亿美元的先进武器。英国颇具权威的《独立报》披露,在俄印双方高达数十亿美元的武器交易中,最引人注     

向中国出售武器危险吗？

对中国的军售问题在俄罗斯一直存有争议,国防部已将俄对外军售置于自己的控制之下,并对一些敏感的军售进行严格审查。向中国出售武器真的危险吗？不久前,俄罗斯战略和技术分析中心副主任康·马基延科就此问题进行了深入分析,结论截然相反。     

印度海上大扩军

2002年12月4日，在俄罗斯总统普京访问印度期间，俄印双方签署《德里宣言》，俄印两国军火交易取得重大突破，俄罗斯称愿意向印度出售包括航母和攻击型核潜艇在内的价值数十亿美元的先进武器。国际战略分析家纷纷表示，这项具有极为重要战略意义的军火交易一旦成为现实，将会打破南亚次大陆脆弱的战略平衡，对南亚乃至亚太地区的稳定产生重大深远的影响。     

Russia’s strategy for influence through public diplomacy and active measures: the Swedish case

Russia, as many contemporary states, takes public diplomacy seriously. Since the inception of its English language TV network Russia Today in 2005 (now ‘RT’), the Russian government has broadened its operations to include Sputnik news websites in several languages and social media activities. Moscow, however, has also been accused of engaging in covert influence activities – behaviour historically referred to as ‘active measures’ in the Soviet KGB lexicon on political warfare. In this paper, we provide empirical evidence on how Russia since 2014 has moved towards a preference for active measures towards Sweden, a small country in a geopolitically important European region. We analyse the blurring of boundaries between public diplomacy and active measures; document phenomena such as forgeries, disinformation, military threats and agents of influence and define Russian foreign policy strategy. In summary, we conclude that the overarching goal of Russian policy towards Sweden and the wider Baltic Sea is to preserve the geostrategic status quo, which is identified with a security order minimising NATO presence in the region.     

CONTRIBUTORS

Russia holds the largest stocks of civilian highly enriched uranium (HEU) of any country, operating more than fifty research reactors, pulsed reactors, and critical assemblies using HEU, as well as nine HEU-fueled icebreakers. Russia's participation in international efforts to phase out civilian HEU is crucial if international HEU minimization efforts are to succeed. Individual Russian institutes and organizations participate in international programs to replace HEU with low-enriched uranium in Soviet-supplied research reactors, develop alternative fuels, and repatriate fresh and spent HEU fuel from third countries. However, an overarching national policy on HEU phase-out has yet to be adopted. There are many obstacles to obtaining such a commitment from Moscow. At the same time, the ongoing reform of the Russian nuclear industry and plans for expansion of domestic nuclear power generation and for increased nuclear exports create opportunities for securing such a commitment.     

Coercive diplomacy and the Donbas: Explaining Russian strategy in Eastern Ukraine

What were Russia’s objectives in Eastern Ukraine, and why was it seemingly unable to achieve a successful or decisive outcome? In contrast to Russia’s seizure of Crimea, the uprising in Eastern Ukraine was marked by disorganization and chaos. Using proxy and surrogate actors, along with military exercises and the injection of Russian troops, Russia sought to institutionalize a political entity inside Ukraine to influence its domestic politics. In this article, I analyze the mechanisms by which Russia attempted to implement, and later salvage, its strategy. The article contributes to clearer theoretical and practical understanding of limited force in coercive diplomacy, signaling, and a more rigorous treatment of the role and uses of proxy actors.     

Russia and Strategic Conventional Weapons:

ABSTRACT

Russian political leaders and military strategists are growing increasingly concerned about “strategic conventional weapons”—a broad category that appears to include all non-nuclear, high-precision, standoff weapons—and about long-range, hypersonic weapons, in particular. These concerns are complex and multifaceted (and, in some cases, contradictory), but chief among them are the beliefs that strategic conventional weapons could prove decisive in a major conflict and that Russia is lagging behind in their development. US programs to develop and acquire such weapons—namely, the Conventional Prompt Global Strike program—are of great concern to Russian strategists, who argue both that the United States seeks such weapons for potential use against Russia—its nuclear forces, in particular—and because strategic conventional weapons are more “usable” than nuclear weapons. Asymmetric responses by Russia include increased reliance on tactical nuclear weapons, efforts to enhance the survivability of its nuclear forces, and investments in air and missile defenses. There is also strong—but not completely conclusive evidence—that Russia is responding symmetrically by attempting to develop a long-range, conventionally armed boost-glide weapon.     

经略周边 助梦中国与世界——学习习近平主席在周边外交工作座谈会上的重要讲话

周边外交是我国总体外交的重要组成部分。在新时期,我们应当把中国梦同周边各国人民过上美好生活的愿望、同地区发展前景对接起来,让命运共同体意识在周边国家落地生根,并致力践行“亲、诚、惠、容”的周边外交理念。“亲”就是要传承山水相连、血脉相通的传统友谊;“诚”就是要坚持重义守信、言出必行;“惠”就是要让中国的发展惠及周边,实现互利共赢;“容”就是要实现和而不同、多元共生的包容开放发展。做好周边外交工作,为实现中国梦保驾护航并搭建更加广阔的舞台,带动亚太梦和世界梦。     

Quantitative monitoring of military transformation in the period 1992–2010: Do the protagonists of transformation really change more than other countries?

Military transformation is a complex, slow, asymmetric, changeable, political, and not necessarily completely rational process that clearly needs an effective monitoring mechanism. This paper fills a gap in current literature by creating and testing a model for multi-dimensional and multi-level quantitative monitoring of military transformation applicable in any country. The model is based on 10 transformation indicators that reflect changes in organizational structure, personnel structure, weapon systems, and defense spending. Its application on a sample of seven countries (USA, United Kingdom, France, Netherlands, Poland, Russia, and China) in the period from 1992 to 2010 unexpectedly shows that the USA – a protagonist in the transformation process among allies as well as globally – has carried out the smallest relative change. The non-directed transformation index indicates that Russia carried out 51.8% more change (or 34.1 index units), and the directed index indicates that Poland carried out 157.2% (or 40.8 index units) more change than the USA.     

致命性自主武器系统军备控制态势分析

致命性自主武器系统是指不需要人类操作员干涉,能够自主选择目标并进行攻击的一类武器系统,"平台无人、自主运行、致命攻击"是其主要特征。随着人工智能技术的快速发展,完全自主的致命性武器系统日益受到国际社会的关注,并开始成为国际军备控制问题的焦点。本文主要从技术的视角探讨致命性自主武器系统的军备控制问题。首先,介绍致命性自主武器系统的定义、发展动因以及军控问题的由来;其次,针对国际人道法提出的区分原则、比例原则、预防原则,分析当前自主武器系统在自主目标识别、确认和攻击环节存在的技术问题;最后,分析美国、俄罗斯、欧盟等世界主要国家和地区的军控态度,并探讨我国自主武器系统发展的策略建议。     

Iron Cannot Fight 1 – The Role of Technology in Current Russian Military Theory

Contemporary Russian military theory is dominated by three schools of thought: the ‘traditionalists’, the ‘modernists’ and the ‘revolutionaries’. On the role of technology in future warfare, the traditionalists argue for both high tech and massive forces at the same time. The modernists are ready to trade manpower for technology, whereas the revolutionaries give technology full priority. Both the traditionalists and the modernists believe Russia, because of the country's technological lag and limited resources, should respond asymmetrically to the Western technology challenge. The revolutionaries, on the other hand, maintain that Russia must respond in kind. If not, the country will no longer be able to defend its sovereignty. The currently ongoing radical reform of the Russian military is a partial victory for the modernists, but which model or mix of models that will dominate in the future is first of all dependent on the Russian military's purchasing power and the state of the domestic defence industry.     

Gorshkov's Gambit

This article is a portrait of Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, commander of the Soviet Navy for almost three decades, from 1956–85. The author, a retired US Navy admiral with a Harvard PhD in Russian studies who served as both defense and naval attaché in Moscow, draws on numerous face-to-face interactions with Gorshkov. He also explores Gorshkov's memoirs that were published recently in Russia but have not appeared in an English translation. The paper is not only a first-hand account of an important historical figure, but also a window into the world of military-to-military diplomacy and intelligence during the Cold War.     

ASSESSING RUSSIAN ATTITUDES TOWARD PHASED,DEEP NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS

As the United States and Russia contemplate the next stage of nuclear arms reductions beyond the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, another issue enters the agenda—that of the impact of possible deep reductions on the shape of the global nuclear balance. As the gap between the US/Russian arsenals and the arsenals of “second-tier” nuclear weapon states narrows, the familiar shape of the global balance, which remains, to a large extent, bipolar, is likely to change. The article explores the Russian approach to the relationship between further US-Russian reductions and the prospect of “nuclear multipolarity,” and assesses the relative weight of this issue in Russian arms control policy as well as the views on the two specific regional balances—the one in Europe (including UK and French nuclear weapons) and in Asia (the possible dynamic of the Russian-Chinese nuclear balance).