TERRORISM AND AFRICA

Since the events of 11 September, regional organisations around the globe have realigned themselves to confront the new security threats posed by terrorism. While these threats can, and do, affect southern Africa in many ways, there has yet to be strong action taken at a regional level, and commitments to dealing with the issue have been varied. This essay attempts to explore why terrorism should demand more attention from southern African states, and reasons why those states should confront the issue through regional apparatuses.

It also examines areas that the SADC region will have to fine-tune in order to successfully implement security measures against terrorism. The essay seeks to take stock of the present capacity within the region as well as learn from what other regions around the world are doing. It highlights how other regions have already taken steps to mitigate their collective vulnerabilities by emphasising coordination, cooperation and harmonization among members. The essay highlights how, by integrating international models with existing regional capacity, southern African states can—and should—begin to confront the threats that terrorism poses to the region.     

INITIATIVES AGAINST TERRORISM IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

The events that occurred on 11 September 2001 in two of the largest urban centres in the US, and subsequent developments, have brought to the fore the lingering friction between tolerable action against terrorism and the sustainability of human rights observance. It remains somewhat unfortunate that old debates around enduring concepts and controversial issues persist. The most recent African multilateral initiative is the 1999 Algiers Convention which attempts to reconcile these often conflicting policy objectives.     

SUICIDE TERRORISM AND THE BACKLASH EFFECT

This paper presents a game‐theoretic model of suicide terrorism containing three agents: the terrorist leader; a targeted government; and potential terrorist supporters. Supporters join the terrorist group if they gain more from their participation than from their economic opportunities. Preemptive measures by the government can result in a backlash that encourages recruitment through new grievances. Suicide attacks can also lead to recruitment. Increases in preemption costs and/or economic opportunities can reduce the overall level of terrorism, while increasing the proportion of suicide to normal attacks. An increase in the effect of preemption on recruitment, or the propaganda effect of suicide bombings has the opposite effect of increasing normal and suicide attacks, but decreasing the proportion of suicide to normal attacks in the terrorist organization’s strategy profile.     

THE SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT OF RADIOLOGICAL TERRORISM

The July 2005 terrorist attacks in London demonstrated the resilience of Western society in the face of low-level conventional terrorism. But the psychological damage from the London bombings would likely pale next to the severe, unpredictable, long-lasting effects of a radiological attack. One unique hazard of radiation exposure beyond the obvious physiological effects is that it is colorless, odorless, and tasteless, making it difficult for ordinary citizens to evaluate, quantify, and rationally understand the dangers confronting them. Radiological weapons stand out among the tools available to terrorists for their capacity to inflict far-reaching psychological damage to civilian populaces well beyond the immediate victims. A possible solution to mitigate the psychological consequences is to build a “resilience culture,” an interlocking set of beliefs, attitudes, approaches, and behaviors that help people fare better in any disaster or extraordinary circumstance. The “all-hazards approach,” which emphasizes the identifiable similarities among the “disaster triad”—that is, natural, accidentally man-made, and intentionally man-made disasters—extends to acts of terrorism and could help demystify the fears associated with radiological terrorist weapons.     

NUCLEAR TERRORISM AND THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF CIVILIAN HEU ELIMINATION

An increasing number of countries recognize the special risks of nuclear terrorism associated with the civilian use and storage of and commerce in highly enriched uranium (HEU). They are especially concerned that non-state actors might gain access to HEU and use it to build and detonate improvised nuclear devices. The risk is aggravated by the very large global stocks of HEU, some of which are inadequately protected. Although HEU has few commercial uses, and most experts believe it is technically feasible to substitute low-enriched uranium for HEU in nearly all civilian applications, efforts to reduce HEU stocks have been impeded by a variety of economic, political, and strategic considerations. This article analyzes the nature of these impediments and discusses what is required to overcome them.     

THE AU PLAN ON TERRORISM

At a senior officials' meeting held in Algiers from 11–14 September 2002, the African Union proved ready and able to provide the political cohesion and sense of purpose needed for Africa to combat terrorism. While member states inevitably played to a global gallery in demonstrating their commitment to the ‘war on terrorism’, the practical counter-terrorist proposals adopted at the meeting substantially address Africa's security challenges. The resulting Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism focuses on state building and inter-governmental co-operation, to literally and figuratively close Africa's borders to terrorist activities. Implementing the plan will be a tough challenge for many African governments, especially to ensure that their counter-terrorist measures adhere to international and regional human rights accords.     

COUPS AND COUP ATTEMPTS IN AFRICA

Coups and coup attempts are a phenomenon that has ravaged the African continent from the time of independence to the present. Despite the common belief that increased democratic practices should lead to fewer incidents of coups or coup attempts, this appears not to be the case. Despite the political determination not to reward military governments or those that have arisen from extra-constitutional arrangements, through welcoming them into the community of states, the scourge continues. This article seeks to identify other possible explanations for the prevalence of this phenomenon. The suggested models include greed and a crisis of expectations; naivety, ignorance and gullibility; and foreign intervention. The paper also provides a review of the prevalence of coups on the continent and a brief coverage of conceptual factors, which provides some understanding of civil-military relations as well as an indication of what the future holds.     

PROTECTING CULTURAL MONUMENTS AGAINST TERRORISM

Famous cultural monuments are often regarded as unique icons, making them an attractive target for terrorists. Despite huge military and police outlays, terrorist attacks on important monuments can hardly be avoided. We argue that an effective strategy to discourage terrorist attacks on iconic monuments is for a government to show a firm commitment to swift reconstruction. Using a simple game‐theoretic model, we demonstrate how a credible claim to rebuild any destroyed cultural monument discourages terrorist attacks by altering the terrorists' expectations and by increasing the government's reputation costs if they fail to rebuild.     

NEPAD AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN SOUTH AFRICA

The latest general elections in Mozambique, in December 2004, saw the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) emerging as a clear victor—its third national election victory since the start of the multiparty system. FRELIMO has now governed Mozambique continuously since independence in 1975. Its candidate, Armando Guebuza, has become Mozambique's third president, following Samora Machel (who died in 1986 while in office) and the current president, Joaquim Chissano, who stood down in February 2005.

For Mozambique's political elite, whose image was greatly damaged by corruption scandals and the related murder of well-known journalist Carlos Cardoso in 2000, challenging tasks lie ahead. Part of the challenge entails bringing people back into formal politics, as the December 2004 elections showed a poor turnout. Even more worrying, when one considers the historical distrust between the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) and FRELIMO, was the almost complete lack of political voices other than these two main contenders. RENAMO emerged with 27 fewer parliamentary seats than it had held before the election, and no other party made it into parliament. FRELIMO will therefore meet little opposition in the next five years. But will the change of presidency in Mozambique offer opportunities for a fresh approach to the country's problems?     

HUMAN STABILITY AND CONFLICT IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

States in the Horn of Africa have limited control of their economic situation and very little autonomy in security matters. Globalisation, the growing militarisation of conflicts and an ideological vacuum are some of the reasons for this. The idea that a central power (the state) can, or should, bring order to the periphery, should be questioned. When the rule of law is maintained at the expense of diversity, catastrophic conflict may arise. Regional organisations have too few resources to implement conflict prevention, management or resolution strategies. Refugees and displaced populations are the result. Authoritarian statism, fostered by international capitalist interests, has not prevented the tragic conflicts in the Horn. This Western model has not brought democratic rule, equality or human rights and it should be resisted in future peace efforts. A regional, co-operative union with a strong civil society drawing on pre-colonial wisdom offers the Horn a better path to prosperity and stability.     

PEACE PROCESSES AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

Conflict resolution processes must meet certain prerequisites and conditions. Unless the warring parties or the mediators meet, it will be difficult to find lasting and just solutions to the conflicts in the Horn (Djibouti, Eritrea and Ethiopia, and Somalia). Most of these conflicts have ethnic or religious components and also have a lot do with the nature of the government institutions and the power distribution among the communities within these states. Identifying the main causes of the conflict and the issues involved in each country is a very necessary first step toward peace. Secondly, conditions have to be identified that would make the current peace agreements work. This includes identifying the specific problems faced by the parties involved; ascertaining the validity of the mechanisms through which the problems will be overcome; and planning how the agreements will be maintained. The knowledge that mediators have about the conflict is often as important as the actual meeting of parties at the negotiation table. This article also evaluates the peace initiatives underway in the Horn and attempts to identify the apparent reasons that prevented their implementation.