Stalking the Secure Second Strike: Intelligence,Counterforce, and Nuclear Strategy

Secure second strike nuclear forces are frequently held to be easy to procure. Analysts have long argued that targeting intelligence against relocatable targets like submarine launched and land mobile ballistic missiles is difficult to obtain. However, the scholarly consensus on intelligence for counterforce operations is seriously overdrawn. Both during and after the Cold War, the United States developed substantial intelligence capabilities to track and target submarines and mobile missiles. These efforts achieved important and under-appreciated success. Second strike forces have been far more vulnerable than most analysts are willing to credit.     

Regaining Strategy: Small Powers,Strategic Culture,and Escalation in Afghanistan

Abstract

In Western operations in Afghanistan, small European powers escalate in different ways. While Denmark and the Netherlands have contributed to Western escalation through integration with British and US forces, Norway and Sweden have done so by creating a division of labour allowing US and British combat forces to concentrate their efforts in the south. These variations in strategic behaviour suggest that the strategic choice of small powers is more diversified than usually assumed. We argue that strategic culture can explain the variation in strategic behaviour of the small allies in Afghanistan. In particular, Dutch and Danish internationalism have reconciled the use of force in the national and international domains, while in Sweden and Norway there is still a sharp distinction between national interest and humanitarianism.     

Drone Strikes and Grand Strategy: Toward a Political Understanding of the Uses of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Attacks in US Security Policy

This article analyzes the political utility of US drone strikes theoretically and deductively. Placing strikes within the context of the theorized political functions of force and considering how they fit into two grand strategies, restraint and selective engagement, I argue that these strikes buy the United States relatively little in the way of political effects assuring its own security because the terrorism threat they are intended to combat is a limited one within the skein of US global interests. Furthermore, their contribution to counter-terrorism efforts is likely to diminish with the adoption of armed drones by non-state actors. Drone strikes can, however, provide leverage over recalcitrant US client states while reassuring liberal partners and giving them some leverage over US choices. In addition, within the counter-terrorism sphere, drone strikes are less likely to inflame popular opinion than are alternative uses of force. This analysis contributes to an increasingly rigorous examination of the strikes’ role in US foreign and security policy.     

Certainty of Uncertainty: Nuclear Strategy with Chinese Characteristics

China's nuclear deterrent relies on so-called ‘first strike uncertainty’, which means not letting the other side be confident of a completely successful disarming strike. But in order to deter, the uncertainty must be high enough. After reviewing the developmental history of China's nuclear capability and the evolution of Chinese and foreign leaders’ perceptions of China's nuclear retaliatory capability, this article identifies the criteria of nuclear deterrence for China and other countries. This research can contribute to Sino-US strategic dialogue and deepening understanding of the security consequences of nuclear proliferation.     

A Matter of Choice: Strategy and Discretion in the Shadow of World War II

American policy-makers are predisposed towards the idea of a necessary war of survival, fought with little room for choice. This reflects a dominant memory of World War II that teaches Americans that they live in a dangerously small world that imposes conflict. Critics argue that the ‘choice versus necessity’ schema is ahistorical and mischievous. This article offers supporting fire to those critiques. America's war against the Axis (1941–45) is a crucial case through which to test the ‘small world’ view. Arguments for war in 1941 pose overblown scenarios of the rise of a Eurasian super-threat. In 1941 conflict was discretionary and not strictly necessary in the interests of national security. The argument for intervention is a closer call that often assumed. This has implications for America's choices today.     

大战略与近代英国的崛起

大国的崛起从来就是一个艰难而漫长的过程。在此过程中,大战略正确与否,是头等重要的事情。古往今来,有多少国家在崛起途中因为战略错误或策略不当,或胎死腹中,或半途而废。在不少人的印象中,近代英国主要依靠大炮巨舰迅速崛起并得以称霸。事实上,从16世纪中后期开始,英国的政治家们就超越了当时各国均主要关注武力的视野,从政治、经济、军事、外交、文化多方面入手,以大战略的思维来筹划自身的崛起。正是他们的远见卓识、忍辱负重和长期坚持,经过长达两个多世纪的努力,最终成就了与其领土和人口极不相称的长期霸业。今天中华民族复兴过程中遇到的一些问题,与当年英国遇到的问题十分相似,因此,借鉴英国崛起的宝贵经验很有必要。     

Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: US Performance and the Institutional Dimension of Strategy in Afghanistan

It is not too soon to draw cautionary lessons from the inconclusive results of US performance during more than 11 years of Operation ‘Enduring Freedom’ in Afghanistan. As in Vietnam, fundamental difficulties persist in adapting enduring institutions to the requirements of strategy. At the heart of the matter is tension between the assumptions that underlie counterinsurgency as practiced in Afghanistan and organization of the US Armed Forces, State Department, and Agency for International Development. Knowledge of basic principles and necessary changes is available to answer the question, could the US have done better?     

How the High North became Central in NATO Strategy: Revelations from the NATO Archives

From the late 1970s and until the end of the Cold War, the ‘High North’ constituted a central theatre for military forces. Extensive NATO preparations were made, a solid infrastructure developed in northern Norway, and frequent and large-scale exercises were carried out. These developments, from the late 1970s, were much discussed by scholars and strategists. However, the change of perception, laying the foundation for the military build-up, had actually occurred a decade earlier, in the late 1960s. This change has not yet been given its rightful attention, partly because the relevant documents have only recently become available. This essay takes the chronology of events back into the 1960s and to NATO's secret discussions between the national Ministers of Defence and Chiefs of Staff. The most significant turning-points were the Flexible Response strategy of 1967; SACLANT's concern over increased Soviet naval activity and his ‘Maritime Strategy’ studies of 1965 and 1967; NATO's awakening to the Soviet SSBN threat in 1967; and the concept of ‘External Reinforcement of the Flanks’ of 1968 – finally followed by the ‘Brosio Study’ (named after the then NATO Secretary-General) of 1969. As a consequence of these developments NATO's ‘tactical northern flank’ was set to become an independent strategic theatre.     

美国海上力量的变化与发展

本文结合美海军1991～1997财政年度造舰计划叙述和分析了美海军海上力量今后的变化和发展,着重分析了航空母舰、驱逐舰、潜艇等几种主要战斗舰艇在2000年左右可能达到的数量。     

第三次台海危机:台湾的"军事反攻"与美国政府的政策

新中国成立后,退踞台湾的蒋介石当局坚持其“反共复国”的基本政策,“反攻大陆”成为其念兹的行动口号和目标。维持一个反共的台湾政权,是美国敌视和遏制新中国政策之重点,符合美国的战略利益。蒋介石当局在美国的军经援助下,从20世纪50年代开始力图在各方面准备条件,图谋在对其有利时机发动对大陆的军事反攻;同时对大陆东南沿海地区不断进行骚扰性进攻和突袭性进攻。这就是在“反共复国”政策下的“待机反攻”和“有限反攻”,而受到美国的支持。到了60年代之初,中国大陆内部、中苏关系和远东国际关系、美国肯尼迪政府对华政策等等都出现了新的情况,蒋介石以为反攻时机来临,遂谋划在1962年夏秋之际对大陆东南沿海地区发动大规模的军事反攻,为此在军事、政治、财经等各方面进行动员和准备,并强烈要求美国给予支持和援助。美国政府盱衡战略全局,“保护台湾不受中共攻击”,但也不支持台湾当局反攻大陆。美蒋双方为此在近两年时间里进行了反复的谈判与交涉,反攻大陆的计划始终遭到美国的拒绝。中国政府适时公开揭露蒋军窜犯大陆的阴谋,动员军民,调集重兵,严阵以待;同时在外交战线实行“以美制台”策略。在内外诸方面因素的制约下,蒋介石策划的一场“军事反攻”终于在中途归于流产。     

北约军事战略的演变与奥地利防务政策之争

华约和苏联解体以后 ,北约不断调整其军事战略。北约对南联盟的军事行动表明北约新战略对欧洲的军事安全形势产生了重大影响 ,其中尤以对地处东欧和南欧战略边缘地带的奥地利最为明显。加之奥地利政局的风云突变 ,其中立政策亦受到严峻的挑战。     

移动电源起火原因分析及使用中应注意的几个问题

近年来,移动电源起火爆炸事故频发。在介绍移动电源结构和工作原理的基础上,总结了移动电源起火爆炸的主要原因,提出了移动电源在使用过程中应注意的几个问题,为移动电源的安全使用提供了建议。     

Rising Tide,Dispersing Waves: Opportunities and Challenges for Chinese Seapower Development

Abstract

This article surveys China’s current naval forces and considers key dynamics and possible Chinese naval futures to 2020, the projected end of Beijing’s ‘strategic window of opportunity’, the idea that a peaceful external environment for economic development, globalization, and integration of China into the global economy allows China to benefit from diversion of US attention to countering terrorism. It considers broad possibilities through 2030, the general limit of public US government projections, and by which time multiple factors will likely slow China’s growth and compete for leadership focus and resources.