Wellington's use of deception tactics in the Peninsular War

Wellington's use of intelligence developed throughout his military career. Arguably, his experiences in India taught him the importance of intelligence, but it was during the Peninsular War that he honed his analytical techniques. As the war progressed, he developed sophisticated methods for the integration of strategic intelligence – largely gathered by civilian agents – with operational intelligence – collected by military personnel. This allowed him to develop operational conceptualisation, which in turn contributed to the successes he achieved over the French forces in Iberia. However, more than anything, it was his considered use of intelligence, combined with intricate deception operations in the latter stages of the conflict, which deprived the French of reliable intelligence on his own movements, and demonstrated his understanding of the importance of intelligence. This article investigates Wellington's increasing awareness of the importance of intelligence and deception during the Peninsular War.     

Self-Interest versus the Common Cause: Austria,Prussia and Russia against Napoleon

This essay re-examines coalition warfare during the Napoleonic era by looking at the three eastern European powers – Austria, Prussia and Russia – how they interacted over time with France as well as each other, and how they managed French preponderance on the Continent. Before 1812, coalition warfare was dominated by eighteenth-century military and diplomatic attitudes: overall foreign political goals were ill-defined and were characterised by deep mistrust. The result was that the eastern powers pursued their own interests with little regard to coalition cohesion. If the coalition held together in 1813 and 1814, on the other hand, it was largely because individual powers' self-interest coincided with the overall objectives of the coalition – an increased determination to defeat Napoleon – along with a never before seen numerical superiority in allied troops. In this, Austria and especially Chancellor Metternich's role in juggling conflicting interests between the allies so that they could present, for the first time, a united front against France was fundamental.     

Antelope,Poseidon or a Hybrid: The Upgrading of the British Strategic Nuclear Deterrent, 1970–1974

It is the purpose of this article to illustrate how the British government reached its decision to upgrade the Polaris strategic nuclear deterrent in 1973. Using British and American documentation it is demonstrated that the strategic imperatives for upgrading Polaris were fundamental to the project. Existing accounts of the Polaris Improvement Project, however, have not given the appropriate attention to the wider US–UK political differences in this period. By doing so it is shown how in addition to the wider economic, strategic and political factors, this was of paramount significance in the Heath government opting for the ‘Super Antelope’ method in upgrading Polaris.1 ¹‘Super Antelope’ was the codename for the upgrade of Polaris. This was eventually changed to ‘Chevaline’. Peter Hennessy, Cabinets and the Bomb (Oxford: OUP 2007), 28–9. View all notes     

How Probable is Cyber War? Bringing IR Theory Back In to the Cyber Conflict Debate

Many well-established explanations for war suggest that cyber weapons have a greater chance of being used offensively than other kinds of military technologies. This response article introduces a research agenda for the study of cyber war, and offers an example – principal-agent problems in cyber operations – to demonstrate how rigorous theoretical and empirical work may proceed.     

British Strategy and the Struggle with France 1793–1815

This article examines the various constraints under which the conduct of British strategy operated during the French Wars – examples include its political and geographical situation, its far-flung colonial interests and its limited military resources and its need to maintain a strong alliance system in continental Europe – and shows how the direction that it took closely mirrored a variety of campaigns in the eighteenth century. That said, the position in which Britain found herself in the struggle against the French Revolution and Napoleon was frequently contradictory, and it is no coincidence that it was some time before the ideal combination of strategies was found that marked the period 1808–14. The fact that the difficulties involved were overcome said a great deal for the underlying strength of the British state.     

‘Innovate or die’: Organizational culture and the origins of maneuver warfare in the United States Marine Corps

The purpose of this article is twofold. First, this article contributes to the understanding of the origins of maneuver warfare as the capstone doctrine of the Marine Corps. It does so by identifying a second source that fostered change in the Marine Corps – one in addition to disquiet about the conduct of the war in Vietnam – which stemmed from the challenges posed by the United States' post-Vietnam strategic and military reorientation. And second, this article examines the influence of organizational culture, or identity, on innovation in the Marine Corps. A critical strand in the growing literature on military innovation focuses on organizational culture and how it influences the behavior and responses of particular military organizations. This article contributes to this literature by analyzing the influence of the organizational culture of the Marine Corps in shaping what was deemed an appropriate response to the challenges it confronted in the 1970s.     

Does Health Spending Crowd out Defense in the United States? Evidence from Wavelet Multiresolution Analysis

Abstract

This study investigates the association between defense and health spending using multi-resolution analysis incorporating the structural change model. Our empirical results suggested that a negative correlation between defense and health spending persists over the entire period of 1941–2013 in the very long-run (over 16 years cycle), but there is a change in correlation between defense and health spending in the short-run (2–4 years cycle), medium-run (4–8 years cycle), and long-run (8–16 years cycle) during the same period. In particular, there appears to have been a trade-off relationship between defense and health spending during the ex-Korean War period, but there was a complementary relationship between defense and health spending during the post-Korean War period. The crowding-out effect of health spending on defense spending during the period when the Affordable Care Act was put into effect relies on the strength of the positive correlation in the long-run (8–16 years cycle) and negative correlation in the short-run (2–4 years cycle) and very long-run (over 16 years cycle).     

The loss‐averse newsvendor problem with supply options

In this article, we consider a loss‐averse newsvendor with stochastic demand. The newsvendor might procure options when demand is unknown, and decide how many options to execute only after demand is revealed. If the newsvendor reserves too many options, he would incur high reservation costs. Yet reserving too few could result in lost sales. So the newsvendor faces a trade‐off between reservation costs and losing sales. When there are multiple options available, the newsvendor has to consider how many units of each to reserve by studying the trade‐off between flexibility and costs. We show how the newsvendor's loss aversion behavior affects his ordering decision, and propose an efficient algorithm to compute his optimal solution in the general case with n options. We also present examples showing how the newsvendor's ordering strategy changes as loss aversion rises. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. 62:46–59, 2015     

Waging the inchoate war: Defining,fighting, and second-guessing the ‘Long War’

Abstract

This article answers three questions: What is the nature of the Long War? How is progress (or lack thereof) to be assessed? Where is it likely to go next? An appreciation of Clausewitz shows that practical centers of gravity exist for the Long War, and that the conflict pivots upon the ability to persuasively link ideology to events via a strategic narrative. A close examination of an illustrative case study, the interaction between the US and the late Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq 2004 – 2006, shows that Al Qaeda has suffered a severe setback, but also that the nature of the war is set to shift yet again. Further tangible progress for the US requires waging the Long War as a global counterinsurgency based on a strategy of ‘selective identification’ (versus pure ‘disaggregation’) as well as an understanding of how to more effectively craft a strategic narrative.     

Theory,Method, and the Mechanism of Framing: Reflections on the Syrian Civil War and Palestinian Intifada

This article bridges two literatures: research on social movements, in which framing is widely recognized as an important causal mechanism; and research in civil wars and insurgencies, which tends to deemphasize cultural-interpretative factors such as framing. We argue that it is important that insights of framing be applied to insurgencies because there is a fundamental framing action that often occurs. We have in mind civil wars in which oppositional activists, who previously had pursued nonviolent tactics, apply a prognostic frame of ‘what to do’ that specifies armed conflict. Drawing on methodologies of subject–verb–object grammars used to analyze political texts, this article elaborates a comprehensive approach to framing that involves not only shifts in the < verb>, or specifications of ‘what to do’, but also shifts in a < subject>, or definitions of ‘who we are’, and in an < object>, or the targets of ‘who the enemy is’. We use organizational texts from the first Palestinian Intifada to demonstrate the approach. We also consider frame shifts in the Syrian civil war, inferring the grammatical structures of the frame transformations for secularists and radical Islamists from events leading up to the outbreak of sustained violence. This article proposes that a three-part grammatical approach captures the interrelated elements of a full and robust framing mechanism that is generalizable. It represents an advance over framing perspectives that typically isolate identity and target components from action prognoses, therefore missing the synchronization among the three, and how limits and/or opportunities for one shape the definition of the others.     

What Happened to Israeli Military Thought?

Abstract

This article addresses the following question: how can one explain the neglect of the intellectual aspects of the profession on the part of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF)? The explanations offered for that neglect are a mixture of cultural and societal factors. The cultural explanation focuses on Israeli strategic culture; the traditional Israeli perception of the combination of rich experience and experience-based intuition as a winning ticket; the tendency to extol improvisation; a cult of material strength; and a strong belief in technology. The social explanation stresses the declining attractiveness of a military career for qualitative young Israelis. The article contends that change can take place only if the IDF undergoes a process of institutional intellectualism – if not willingly then one imposed by the political echelon.     

Metastases: Exploring the impact of foreign fighters in conflicts abroad

This article examines the historical impact of foreign fighters and how the international community has sought to counter this threat. It argues that foreign fighters have contributed significantly to the metastasis of Salafi-jihadism over the past 30 years. They have globalized local conflicts. They have brought advanced skills to battlefields. Further, the logistics infrastructure built by foreign fighters has allowed Salafi-jihadism to expand rapidly. The challenge for security officials today is how to prevent the foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq from expanding the threat of Salafi-jihadism further. To inform this effort, this article derives lessons learned from past efforts against Arab Afghans in Bosnia (1992–1995) and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s foreign volunteers in Iraq (2003–2008).     

The 1983 Nuclear Crisis – Lessons for Deterrence Theory and Practice

This article distills insights for the scholarship of deterrence by examining the 1983 nuclear crisis – the moment of maximum danger of the late Cold War. Important contributions notwithstanding, our understanding of this episode still has caveats, and a significant pool of theoretical lessons for strategic studies remain to be learned. Utilizing newly available sources, this article suggests an alternative interpretation of Soviet and US conduct. It argues that the then US deterrence strategy almost produced Soviet nuclear overreaction by nearly turning a NATO exercise into a prelude to a preventive Soviet attack. Building on historical findings, this article offers insights about a mechanism for deterrence effectiveness evaluation, recommends establishing a structure responsible for this endeavor, and introduces a new theoretical term to the strategic studies lexicon – a ‘culminating point of deterrence’.     

How the High North became Central in NATO Strategy: Revelations from the NATO Archives

From the late 1970s and until the end of the Cold War, the ‘High North’ constituted a central theatre for military forces. Extensive NATO preparations were made, a solid infrastructure developed in northern Norway, and frequent and large-scale exercises were carried out. These developments, from the late 1970s, were much discussed by scholars and strategists. However, the change of perception, laying the foundation for the military build-up, had actually occurred a decade earlier, in the late 1960s. This change has not yet been given its rightful attention, partly because the relevant documents have only recently become available. This essay takes the chronology of events back into the 1960s and to NATO's secret discussions between the national Ministers of Defence and Chiefs of Staff. The most significant turning-points were the Flexible Response strategy of 1967; SACLANT's concern over increased Soviet naval activity and his ‘Maritime Strategy’ studies of 1965 and 1967; NATO's awakening to the Soviet SSBN threat in 1967; and the concept of ‘External Reinforcement of the Flanks’ of 1968 – finally followed by the ‘Brosio Study’ (named after the then NATO Secretary-General) of 1969. As a consequence of these developments NATO's ‘tactical northern flank’ was set to become an independent strategic theatre.     

Proliferation Optimism and Pessimism Revisited

Policies to counter the threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have, for the most part, been modeled on strategies originally devised to counter the danger of nuclear proliferation. While useful in countering a traditional CBN (chemical/biological/nuclear)/WMD threat, current counter-proliferation and non-proliferation regimes are insufficient to meet the challenge of maritime terrorism. Maritime terrorism represents a new category of threat; one that partially overlaps with conventional WMD, but for which – due to the scope and nature of the maritime industry – traditional counter-proliferation policies may be inadequate and even inappropriate. This article outlines the means by which maritime shipping can be used as WMD and discusses the policies implemented to deal with these threats, in light of the challenges presented to traditional conceptualizations of WMD and counter-proliferation strategies.     

General Zuo’s counter-insurgency doctrine

ABSTRACT

This paper examines the career of one of the most notable of Chinese state officials in the mid-nineteenth century, General Zuo Zongtang (1812–1885) at a time when the Qing Empire was beset by enemies on all sides along with the massive Taiping Rebellion (1851–65). The paper explores how Zuo created a coherent and flexible counter-insurgency doctrine that underpinned his suppression of the Taipings, the Nian, Muslim rebels of the northwest and the defeat of a massive Sufi revolt in Central Asia. The paper also shows how Zuo helped convince the Russians to return territory they occupied in Central Asia, thereby preserving the territorial integrity of the Qing Empire in the region.     

With an eye to history: The origins and development of ‘Stay-Behind’ in Norway

Based on full access to Norwegian archives up to 1970, the article describes the origins and development of ‘stay-behind’– an organized preparedness, under the aegis of the Norwegian Intelligence Service, for intelligence and sabotage behind enemy lines in case of a Soviet occupation. Initiated by Defence Minister Jens Christian Hauge, wartime leader of the Norwegian military resistance, the set-up built on lessons learnt during the German occupation, when effective resistance was hampered by inexperience and improvisation. Secrecy and security, and national Norwegian control albeit with cooperative links with British and American secret services, were distinctive features of the networks that came into being from 1948 onwards. NATO began to take an interest from 1952, but SACEUR's main concern was for ‘retardation’– guerrilla and sabotage activities to delay Soviet forces even before entering NATO territory.     

Cyberpower in Strategic Affairs: Neither Unthinkable nor Blessed

Abstract

This article explores the effect of connectivity on strategic affairs. It argues that the effect on war's character is potentially, although not yet shown in practice, considerably large. Its effect upon the distribution of power among states in the international system is small, contrary to the claims of ‘cyberwar’ alarmists. All told, however, its effect upon strategic affairs is complex. On the one hand, it represents a significant advance in the ‘complexification’ of state strategies, understood in the sense of the production of intended effects. On the other hand, strategists today – still predominantly concerned with the conflicts and confrontations of states and organised military power – are generally missing the power which non-traditional strategic actors, better adapted to the network flows of the information age, are beginning to deploy. These new forms of organization and coercion will challenge the status quo.     

EU armed forces and social media: convergence or divergence?

This article explores how armed forces in EU member states work with and view social media in national and international settings, and what the patterns of convergence/divergence are on these issues. To that end, a questionnaire targeted at EU armed forces was constructed. An index of qualitative variation was calculated to explore the relative convergence among respondents (n = 25) on issues of risks and opportunities with using social media nationally and internationally. Consistent with previous research on European armed forces, we found higher levels of divergence than convergence. Contrary to our expectations that similar challenges, joint international standards, and membership in international organizations would foster convergence with regard to social media use in areas of deployment, we found that convergence appeared foremost pertaining to the domestic level. Policy divergence was strongest in areas of deployment.     

Forecasting a Hurricane: Israeli and American Estimations of the Khomeini Revolution

The surprising ‘Arab Spring’ raises the question as to what would enable national intelligence to provide high quality warnings prior to the eruption of popular revolutions. This article uses new sources of evidence to trace and explain Israel's success in comparison to US failure at correctly estimating the course of the Iranian Revolution in 1977–79. In explaining this variance, the article shows that it was mainly the result of the intimate acquaintance of Israel's representatives in Iran with the local language, history and culture, as well as the ability to communicate with locals – tools which the Americans completely lacked.