综合电子信息系统生存能力评估方法

为了评估现有C4 ISR系统的适应能力和生存能力,分析了影响系统生存能力的四个属性,给出了评估系统生存能力的方法、过程和模型,并结合示例给出了系统生存能力计算方法,以此评估方法为指导,提出了提高系统生存能力的建议。     

基于生存能力的作战方案评估仿真模型

导弹武器系统的生存能力是反映作战方案好坏的定量依据之一。给出了基于生存能力的导弹作战方案评估系统的模型体系和构成,通过对该系统评估模型中的指标分析,建立了伪装生存能力、防护生存能力、机动生存能力等多个模型,并将其综合为对作战方案的生存能力评估模型。经过一定的仿真试验证明,模型正确,运行结果符合实际。     

机动导弹武器系统生存能力评估分析

分析了机动导弹武器系统生存能力的影响因素,建立了机动导弹武器系统的生存能力指标体系,针对其中的指标分别提出相应的定量分析模型:建立多种侦察设备的发现概率模型,进行空面导弹引战配合分析及引信系统压制性干扰分析,在对机动导弹武器系统进行目标特性分析的基础上,建立了空面导弹对机动导弹武器系统的毁伤概率模型,最终探讨出一种在遭受空面导弹攻击条件下机动导弹武器系统生存能力的评估方法。仿真结果表明该方法将对机动导弹武器系统生存能力的提高和生存能力设计产生积极的影响。     

陆基导弹武器系统生存能力研究

导弹武器系统的生存能力是一个关键的战技指标.国内外对导弹武器系统生存能力的分析评估十分重视,已开展了许多研究工作.介绍了研究陆基导弹武器系统生存能力的重要性,对其概念、定性评估模型、解析评估模型、仿真评估模型和提高生存能力的途径等几方面的研究进行了综述和分析,并就相关问题提出了一些看法.     

常规袭击下指挥所生存能力分析

在现代战争中,指挥所是作战部队的核心设施,其生存能力对战争进程和战争胜负有着根本性的制约作用,也成为敌方的首要攻击对象。当前,指挥所的生存能力已经成为各级指挥员极其关注的问题。针对指挥所面临的威胁,分析制约其生存能力的因素,找出有效的应对之策,对作好军事斗争准备将有着重要意义。从指挥所可能面临的常规袭击环境出发,探讨了影响指挥所生存能力的因素,建立了各种袭击模式下的生存能力模型,并应用模拟的方法对指挥所生存能力进行了定量分析,并结合定性分析得出了有益的结果。     

炮兵机动过程中生存能力评估研究

针对当前侦察器材和空中来袭目标的主要特点,运用数学建模和仿真模拟的方法对炮兵在机动过程中的生存能力进行了分析.建立了炮兵机动过程中的生存能力数学模型,该数学模型包含整体机动和分散机动过程中的生存能力数学模型,利用该数学模型对一个实例进行计算和仿真,验证了模型的有效性,并且为提高炮兵机动过程中的生存能力提供了理论依据.     

雷达装备战场生存能力的综合评估方法

装备战场生存能力评估是武器系统战场损伤研究的一项基本工作.如何有效地进行雷达装备战场生存能力评估,对雷达的研制及作战运用具有深远的影响.基于层次分析法建立了作战状态雷达装备战场损伤生存能力综合评估模型,研究了运用专家经验评判的权重确定标准和雷达战、技性能指标的评估指数量化模式,以及雷达装备生存能力定量加权综合评定的方法.最后对某型雷达系列装备的生存能力进行了评估分析,验证了该方法的可行性.     

防空武器系统生存能力评价

分析了现代战场环境条件下影响防空武器系统生存能力的主要因素,建立了一个防空武器系统生存能力评价的指标体系,给出了各级分指标的量化评价思路和方法,采用加权算术平均法和加权几何平均法进行指标综合.提供了一个生存能力快速量化评价的实用模型.     

两栖装甲车辆机动生存能力评估指标体系分析

两栖装甲车辆机动生存能力的高低将直接影响其登陆作战任务的完成,如何对其进行正确评估是提高两栖装甲车辆生存能力的关键所在。构建两栖装甲车辆生存能力评估指标体系是其生存能力评估的一项重要内容。阐述两栖装甲车辆的特征以及在战场面临的主要威胁,采用专家调查法和层次分析法构建两栖装甲车辆的机动生存能力评估指标体系,并对该评估指标体系进行分析。装甲装备的生存能力主要取决于装甲装备的敏感性及易损性,具体表现为车辆自身效能、战场环境因素、战场保障能力等,可用生存概率进行分析。     

基于HLA的机动导弹武器系统生存能力仿真评估

通过计算机仿真对生存能力进行评估是一种有效的分析评估手段.利用HLA架构下的仿真理论设计了基于未来战场环境的机动导弹武器系统生存能力仿真评估软件系统,并根据总体设计框架给出了机动导弹武器系统在两次连续打击模式下的生存能力评估作战联邦实例,联邦设计具备扩展到评估敌我双方实施多武器攻防的能力,便于全面考察机动导弹武器系统在复杂真实战场环境下所具备的生存能力.     

Putin – the masked nemesis of the strategy of ambiguity

Recent events demonstrate the complex and adaptive approach employed by Russia to reassert influence in Europe. The changing face of Russia’s strategy commenced in 2007 when it launched a crippling cyber-attack against Estonia. This was followed by a large Russian conventional attack against Georgia in 2008, occupying two large areas of the nation. 2014 witnessed the Russian annexation of Crimea where in just a week, Russia seized control of Crimea “without firing a shot.” The annexation of Crimea was rapidly followed by a Russian inspired and led subversive war in eastern Ukraine. The common thread among these diverse Russian operations is its use of ambiguity to confound and confuse decision makers in the West.     

India's counter-insurgency experience: the ‘trust and nurture’ strategy

The Indian Army, a force trained primarily for conventional warfare, has been engaged in internal counter-insurgency operations since the 1950s. Despite such a long innings on a counter-insurgency mode, little attention has been accorded within military circles to doctrinal innovation for waging sub-conventional warfare in India's democratic political context. At best, the Army continues to view counter-insurgency duty as secondary to its primary duty of defending India from external conventional threats. By conceptualizing a counter-insurgency strategy of ‘trust and nurture’, this article aims to fill this critical doctrinal gap in India's military policy. The author argues that a counter-insurgency strategy of ‘trust and nurture’ based on democratic political culture, measured military methods, special counter-insurgency forces, local social and cultural awareness and an integrative nation-building approach will result in positive handling of India's internal security problems. The author utilizes India's counter-insurgency experiences in Assam, Mizoram, Nagaland, Punjab, and Operation ‘Sadhbhavana’ in Jammu and Kashmir as illustrative empirical indicants in order to validate the ‘trust and nurture’ strategy.     

Remembering and forgetting Mirambo: Histories of war in modern Africa

ABSTRACT

While the study of organised violence is considered essential to understanding the history of the West, and accordingly imbued with various layers of meaning and remembrance, war is widely regarded as inimical to the modern nation in Africa and stable development more broadly. Using examples drawn from primarily from East Africa, this paper considers the ways in which warfare in the deeper (‘precolonial’) past has been framed and envisioned in recent decades, in particular by governments whose own roots lie in revolutionary armed struggle and who began life as guerrilla movements. While in some cases particular elements of the deeper past were indeed mobilised in pursuit of contemporary political goals, in many other scenarios histories of precolonial violence were beheld as problematic and unworthy of remembrance. This paper highlights the paradox and ambiguity which has attended the memory of key aspects of Africa’s deeper past.     

The UK,interrogation and Iraq, 2003–2008

The UK’s interrogation operations during the conflict in Iraq (2003–2008) are often portrayed by the media as involving significant amounts of mistreatment. This article demonstrates that these practices are not necessarily representative of the UK’s interrogation operations across this conflict. In doing so it contributes to the limited literature on the practice of interrogation and on the UK’s combat operations in Iraq. The UK’s interrogation capability, and therefore its intelligence-gathering capability, is shown to have rested primarily with the military’s Joint Forward Interrogation Team (JFIT). The JFIT suffered from limitations to the number, training and experience of its interrogators and interpreters. It is argued that maintaining a permanent, higher level of preparedness for interrogation by the British armed forces is desirable.     

SIM—LISP:一个通信网络管理专家系统外壳的设计与实现

本文介绍了笔者为开发名为OONMES的网络管理专家系统所实现的一个简单专家系统工具SIM-LISP。SIM-LISP是一个用C/C++语言来实现的模拟LISP语言的可调用函数集,它短小精巧,速度快,可以完成针对网管专家系统的事实或规则知识的表示、匹配、合一和推理等基本操作,并有与知识对象的连接功能,是网管专家系统内核实现的支撑环境。     

Al Qaida on the US invasion of Afghanistan in their own words

This article consists of selected translations from captured interviews and dairies of Al Qaida members. The time period covered is from mid-2001 to early 2002 and concerns their operations in Afghanistan. The material clearly conveys a range of emotion, from confident to despondent, as well as efforts to contest the US actions. The first several pages give the reader context and some possible “lessons learned,” but the story(ies) are best told by the Al Qaida members themselves. All names are pseudonyms.     

Does Intent equal Capability? Al-Qaeda and Weapons of Mass Destruction

The prospect of terrorists deploying weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is often referred to as the foremost danger to American national security. This danger has become more realistic because of al-Qaeda's expanding global network and the expressed willingness to kill thousands of civilians. In the past four years, numerous media reports have documented the group's ongoing quest for WMD capabilities; many reports have detailed al-Qaeda members’ attempts to manufacture or obtain certain chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) agents to use in WMD against targets in the West and the Middle East. Yet the question remains: Does al-Qaeda's current WMD capability match its actual intent? While most studies of the group have focused on its explicit desire for WMD, allegations of CBRN acquisition, and the killing potential of specific CBRN agents, few open-source studies have closely examined the evolution of al-Qaeda's consideration of WMD and, most notably, the merit of actual CBRN production instructions as depicted and disseminated in the group's own literature and manuals. The following report will examine the history of al-Qaeda's interest in CBRN agents, the evolution of the network's attitude toward these weapons, and the internal debate within the organization concerning acquisition and use of WMD. More so, the following research will assess the validity of actual CBRN production instructions and capabilities as displayed and disseminated in al-Qaeda's own literature and websites.     

Late Medieval Lance Use: Mounted Combat and Martial Arts in Western Europe from the 14th to the 16th Century

Despite the lance’s status and the amount of attention the couched lance has received in historiography, study of its martial art has been neglected. The various lance types and techniques used by western European cavalry have only recently begun to receive scholarly attention. Additionally, Medieval European lance use has too often been studied in isolation, without an adequate understanding of the idiosyncratic and asymmetrical dynamics of mounted combat. Although the charge with the couched lance was a valid tactic, it was only one of many. Light and heavy lances were used in one hand or two to trip, block, unhorse, and wrestle. These techniques were governed by the harsh laws of distance, speed, impact, iron, and asymmetry. By utilizing the surviving Fechtbücher and several Peninsular and Near Eastern sources, a brief foray into the diverse techniques of lance use and their purposes has been attempted here.     

物理学中的辩证自然观——控制、信息、系统与辩证自然观

和谐律、守恒律、方向律是自然辩证法中自然观的三大规律,它们贯穿、融合并体现于各具体学科的研究领域中。本文主要以自然辨证规律在控制与系统科学中的体现为依托,系统阐述物理学中控制系统理论与信息理论及其应用中自然观三大规律的具体表现。     

The practice and theory of British counterinsurgency: the histories of the atrocities at the Palestinian villages of al-Bassa and Halhul, 1938–1939

This article details two largely unreported atrocities by British forces operating against Arab rebels during the Arab revolt, 1936–9, at the Palestinian villages of al-Bassa and Halhul. It then examines the military-legal system that underpinned and authorised British military forces operating in aid of the civil power, suggesting that the law in place at the time allowed for a level of reprisals and punitive actions, such as happened at al-Bassa and Halhul. The article does not conclude that the law allowed for atrocities but it does argue that it gave a basic form and understanding to an operational method that was brutal and could lead to atrocities. It thus tests the idea in much of the literature on counterinsurgency that the British were restrained and used minimum force when compared to other colonial and neo-colonial powers fighting insurgents.