浅析武警部队“能打胜仗”核心军事能力建设

习主席关于“能打仗、打胜仗”是强军之要的重要思想,是对党的建军治军思想的继承和发展,有着很强的指向性,为在新的历史起点上加快推进国防和军队现代化建设指明了方向。贯彻落实好“能打仗、打胜仗”重要思想,必须按照打仗的标准搞建设抓准备,确保武警部队始终能够召之即来、来之能战、战之必胜。     

ECONOMIC GROWTH AND VIOLENT INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT: 1875–1999

This paper extends the joint product model of military alliances to apply to the new strategic doctrine adopted by NATO in the 1990s. In particular, a choice must be made between protecting one's own territory and pooling forces for an alliancewide rapid reaction force. This new model accounts for a host of externalities and their implications for burden sharing, full financing, and allocative efficiency. The Pigouvian taxes that adjust for force thinning and attack deflection are shown to finance optimal border‐protecting forces under a variety of circumstances. Second‐best considerations arise owing to the pure publicness of rapid reaction forces. The ideal toll arrangement does not currently characterize NATO financing, nor is it likely to do so.     

GPS定位误差分析及建模

采用时间序列分析方法,根据大量的实测数据分析了ＧＰＳ定位误差的统计特征,建立了ＧＰＳ定位误差模型。     

利用灰色理论与时间序列探讨我国物价指数的发展变化

本文根据装备建设的需要,对物价指数的变化进行了研究,首先依据原始数据利用灰色理论建立预测模型,在分析模型精度基础上,提出了灰色时间序列模型,使模型精度得到提高。并根据我国物价指数变化的特点,进一步建立了上包络线模型．使本文更具实际意义。     

Civil wars and economic growth: A regional comparison

The paper examines the impact of civil wars on income per-capita growth at home and in neighbors for four regional groupings of countries: Africa, Asia, Latin America, and a pooled Asian and Latin American sample. Both macroeconomic and civil-war influences on growth differ by region. With the use of a distance measure, we demonstrate that the spatial reach from the negative consequences of a civil war are region and time period specific. Generally, there was less dispersion in Africa than in Asia and Latin America. Moreover, Africa demonstrates a greater ability to recover from the adverse effects of civil wars than the other regions tested.     

加拿大山猫数据的几种时序模型分析

本文利用四种时间序列模型,即自回归模型、组合模型、疏系数自回归模型、门限自回归模型,分别对时间序列分析中一组有名数据,即加拿大山猫数据,进行模型拟合,并对得到的四个模型及预报结果进行了分析和比较。     

The Myth of British Minimum Force in Counterinsurgency Campaigns during Decolonisation (1945–1970)

This article argues that the dominant paradigm in studies of British small wars positing a central role of minimum force in doctrinal guidelines for counterinsurgency needs to be even more fundamentally revised than has been argued in recent debates. More specifically, it argues that minimum force is nowhere to be found in British doctrine during the small wars of decolonisation. The need for revision also applies to the way British counterinsurgency is usually sharply contrasted with French counterinsurgency. British doctrine during this period is better understood when placed in its proper historical context. This means comparing it with the other two most significant examples of doctrinal development for small wars of decolonisation – those of France and Portugal. This comparison shows that British counterinsurgency was not uniquely population-centric, and this characteristic cannot, therefore, be the reason for its arguably superior if far from infallible performance. Evidence for these arguments comes primarily from doctrinal sources developed specifically to deal with counterinsurgency, complemented with insights from key military thinkers and archival sources of relevance practices. Some wider implications of this analysis for the relationship between combat experience and doctrinal development as well as for counterinsurgency are identified.     

ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MILITARY EXPENDITURE,THREAT, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: A NONLINEAR APPROACH

The main objective of the paper is to decipher the military expenditure–economic growth relationship, taking the level of economic development (income) into consideration. Our findings suggest the following: (i) military expenditure has a significantly negative relationship to economic growth for the 23 countries with initial incomes (threshold variable) less than or equal to $475.93; (ii) when the threat level is heightened, economic growth (23 countries) is expected to decrease. However, military expenditure in the presence of sufficiently large threats increases growth; (iii) for the remaining 69 countries whose initial incomes (real GDP per capita in 1992 price) exceed $475.93, no significant relationship exists whether the threat variable is taken into consideration or not.     

时间序列分析中的模型定阶策略

模型的定阶问题是时间序列分析(包括参数谱估计、系统辨识,回归分析)研究领域中的一个重要问题。本文对现有的数种模型定阶方法,进行了分析、讨论和归纳,指出了它们所适用的场合及优劣。     

MILITARY EXPENDITURE AND GRANGER CAUSALITY: A CRITICAL REVIEW

A large literature has used tests for Granger (1969) non‐causality, GNC, to examine the interaction of military spending with the economy. Such tests answer a specific although quite limited question: can one reject the null hypothesis that one variable does not help predict another? If one can reject, there is said to be Granger causality, GC. Although the limitations of GNC tests are well known, they are often not emphasised in the applied literature and so may be forgotten. This paper considers the econometric and methodological issues involved and illustrates them with data for the US and other countries. There are three main issues. First, the tests may not be informative about the substantive issue, the interaction of military expenditure and the economy, since Granger causality does not correspond to the usual notion of economic causality. To determine the relationship of the two notions of causality requires an identified structural model. Second, the tests are very sensitive to specification. GNC testing is usually done in the context of a vector autoregression, VAR, and the test results are sensitive to the variables and deterministic terms included in the VAR, lag length, sample or observation window used, treatment of integration and cointegration and level of significance. Statistical criteria may not be very informative about these choices. Third, since the parameters are not structural, the test results may not be stable over different time periods or different countries.     

Defense spending and economic growth: evidence from China, 1952–2012

This paper examines whether defense expenditures contributed to economic growth in China for the 1952–2012 period. We examine the contribution of defense to economic growth using recently published official data on economic activity, defense, and government expenditures. We employ the Feder-Ram and augmented Solow models of economic growth to explore the defense-growth relationship. The Feder-Ram model appears to poorly explain economic growth in China. The augmented Solow model suggests, however, that a 1% increase in defense expenditures raises the economic growth rate by approximately 0.15–0.19%.