GNSS接收机离散化处理对解扩性能影响的研究

建立了扩频信号防混叠滤波、采样和量化与解扩输出关系的数学解析模型,推导得到解扩输出信噪比的解析表达式。分析与仿真表明,当量化位数大于等于4比特,解扩得到总的信噪比损失可以分解为由量化引起的损失和滤波加采样引起损失的乘积,且量化器最优限幅系数只与量化位数相关;当量化位数小于4比特时,信噪比损失在一定条件下可近似为量化损失和滤波加采样损失的乘积。当量化位数大于4比特、滤波器带宽大于5倍码率、采样频率大于4倍码率时,再增大上述参数引起的信噪比损失波动小于0.05dB,对解扩性能提升不明显。本文结论可为实用型GNSS接收机前端离散化处理优化设计提供理论指导。     

两级滤波结构的导航卫星天线阵抗干扰算法

干扰和多径是影响接收机导航定位性能的两个主要因素。针对卫星导航接收机的抗干扰问题,提出了一种基于两级滤波结构的卫星导航天线阵抗干扰算法。第一级滤波采用功率倒置算法抑制干扰,通过相关解扩提高卫星信号的信噪比,并估计出其空间特征矢量。第二级滤波用估计得到的卫星信号空间特征矢量对第一级滤波输出信号进行加权处理,从而形成指向卫星信号方向的主波束来进一步提高信噪比。仿真结果表明,该算法的性能明显优于功率倒置算法,且非常接近传统的波束形成算法,不需要阵列校正以及姿态测量单元辅助,其实现代价远小于传统的波束形成算法。     

卫星导航接收机延迟锁定环鉴相器有限字长分析

码相位鉴别器作为延迟锁定环的主要组成部分,其性能直接影响了接收机伪码的跟踪精度。针对输入信号有限字长效应对鉴相器性能的影响,提出一种新的基于信号统计特性的分析方法,分析了归一化早迟幅度鉴相器输入信号有限字长对输出性能的影响。理论分析和仿真结果表明,字长效应在输入信号高信噪比下比低信噪比时明显,随着信噪比的增加,由有限字长导致的伪码跟踪精度损失将增加,而当输入信号采用4bit以上的量化时,字长效应对伪码跟踪性能的影响将可忽略。该结论可用于指导接收机低功耗小型化设计。     

非晶丝GMI磁传感器信号的小波分析

当非晶丝巨磁阻抗效应( Giant Magneto-Impedance,GMI)磁探头输出数据的信噪比小于0时,常规的峰值检波方法难以检出真实信号.为此,提出了一种新的微弱信号检测方法,将非晶丝GMI磁探头的输出信号经放大、滤波和采样之后直接送入数字信号处理系统,利用小波变换方法提取微弱信号的特征,并利用相关分析法确定...     

卫星导航接收机中积分清零器的性能分析

为了使跟踪环路得到最高的输入信噪比,卫星导航接收机在时延估计时应使用匹配滤波器。但出于节省硬件资源的考虑,卫星导航接收机通常采用积分清零器完成相关运算。然而积分清零器相对于匹配滤波器存在性能损耗,对此目前尚无量化的结论。本文推导出积分清零器性能损耗的解析表达式,并使用Monte Carlo仿真的方法验证结论的正确性。理论和仿真结果表明当采样率为2倍的前端带宽时,积分清零器相比匹配滤波存在约0.44dB的损耗,当采样率提高到4倍信号带宽时,积分清零器的性能损耗几乎可以忽略。该结论对卫星导航接收机的设计具有重要的意义。     

数字化扩频接收机的自适应抗干扰滤波方案研究

讨论了自适应抗干扰滤波在最小频移键控的直接序列扩频(DS-MSK)数字化接收机中的应用问题,对非线性滤波加以改进,提出了部分解扩非线性滤波(PDNF)结构,将快速更新子带自适应滤波(FRSAF)算法用于PDNF结构以提高收敛速度。结合FRSAF算法的PDNF自适应抗干扰滤波方案在收敛速度、稳健性和输出信噪比等方面明显优于结合LMS算法的传统非线性抗干扰滤波方案,仿真结果验证了上述结论。     

直序扩频系统中频信号的同时解扩解调方法

常规直序扩频接收机将中频信号的解扩、解调分立进行,获得的处理增益为扩频码的周期。对于输入信噪比极低的系统,该处理增益难以满足系统低误码率的要求。在基于软件无线电的直序扩频系统中,接收机可以对中频采样信号同时进行解扩解调,分析表明,当采样率满足一定条件时,能够获得比常规方法更高的处理增益,适宜在低信噪比系统中应用。     

自适应LMS和相关算法在GMI磁传感器信号检测中的应用

在GMI磁传感器的研制中,微弱磁场信号经常淹没于电路固有噪声中。当非晶丝GMI(GiantMagneto-Impedance)磁传感器的输出信噪比小于0dB时,常规的峰值检波方法无法检出传感器信号。针对此问题,提出了一种新的微弱信号(信噪比小于0dB)检测方法,利用LMS自适应滤波算法提取非晶丝GMI磁传感器输出信号的特征参数,将该特征参数与理想参数进行相关运算,并根据相关值的大小来确定信号大小,从而实现对微弱磁信号的测量。仿真结果表明,采用LMS自适应滤波算法和相关分析相结合的方法,对于传感器输出信噪比等于-10dB的微弱信号,根据相关值与外磁场大小的对应关系,仍然可以确定外磁场大小。     

一种重叠加窗频域抑制窄带干扰算法及研究

提出了一种重叠加窗的直接序列扩频(DSSS)通信系统抑制窄带干扰算法.该算法利用重叠加窗降低了因数据截断引起的频谱泄漏,同时也减少了因加窗而引入的信噪比损耗.将该重叠加窗算法与另2种门限检测算法联合运用抑制窄带干扰.理论分析和计算机仿真结果均表明,该算法能有效消除加窗引起的频谱失真和信噪比损失,并且可以有效抑制直扩通信系统中的窄带干扰.     

基于改进近邻传播算法的Walsh软扩频盲解扩方法

针对现代二次雷达系统通信中存在的Walsh软扩频难以盲解扩问题,借鉴常规扩频解扩方法及聚类分析,提出了一种基于近邻传播算法的Walsh软扩频盲解扩方法。该方法首先对接收信号进行采样得到目标结构数据集合,并根据统计量估计得出信号时延。然后采用改进近邻传播算法进行伪码集合估计,并得到聚类中心从而得到伪码集合。最后利用已知的Walsh码和信息码的映射关系得到信息序列,完成盲解扩问题。仿真结果表明,在白噪声条件下,可有效解决Walsh软扩频盲解扩问题,性能较同类算法均有提升并降低算法复杂度。     

The UK,interrogation and Iraq, 2003–2008

The UK’s interrogation operations during the conflict in Iraq (2003–2008) are often portrayed by the media as involving significant amounts of mistreatment. This article demonstrates that these practices are not necessarily representative of the UK’s interrogation operations across this conflict. In doing so it contributes to the limited literature on the practice of interrogation and on the UK’s combat operations in Iraq. The UK’s interrogation capability, and therefore its intelligence-gathering capability, is shown to have rested primarily with the military’s Joint Forward Interrogation Team (JFIT). The JFIT suffered from limitations to the number, training and experience of its interrogators and interpreters. It is argued that maintaining a permanent, higher level of preparedness for interrogation by the British armed forces is desirable.     

Remembering and forgetting Mirambo: Histories of war in modern Africa

ABSTRACT

While the study of organised violence is considered essential to understanding the history of the West, and accordingly imbued with various layers of meaning and remembrance, war is widely regarded as inimical to the modern nation in Africa and stable development more broadly. Using examples drawn from primarily from East Africa, this paper considers the ways in which warfare in the deeper (‘precolonial’) past has been framed and envisioned in recent decades, in particular by governments whose own roots lie in revolutionary armed struggle and who began life as guerrilla movements. While in some cases particular elements of the deeper past were indeed mobilised in pursuit of contemporary political goals, in many other scenarios histories of precolonial violence were beheld as problematic and unworthy of remembrance. This paper highlights the paradox and ambiguity which has attended the memory of key aspects of Africa’s deeper past.     

SIM—LISP:一个通信网络管理专家系统外壳的设计与实现

本文介绍了笔者为开发名为OONMES的网络管理专家系统所实现的一个简单专家系统工具SIM-LISP。SIM-LISP是一个用C/C++语言来实现的模拟LISP语言的可调用函数集,它短小精巧,速度快,可以完成针对网管专家系统的事实或规则知识的表示、匹配、合一和推理等基本操作,并有与知识对象的连接功能,是网管专家系统内核实现的支撑环境。     

Al Qaida on the US invasion of Afghanistan in their own words

This article consists of selected translations from captured interviews and dairies of Al Qaida members. The time period covered is from mid-2001 to early 2002 and concerns their operations in Afghanistan. The material clearly conveys a range of emotion, from confident to despondent, as well as efforts to contest the US actions. The first several pages give the reader context and some possible “lessons learned,” but the story(ies) are best told by the Al Qaida members themselves. All names are pseudonyms.     

Does Intent equal Capability? Al-Qaeda and Weapons of Mass Destruction

The prospect of terrorists deploying weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is often referred to as the foremost danger to American national security. This danger has become more realistic because of al-Qaeda's expanding global network and the expressed willingness to kill thousands of civilians. In the past four years, numerous media reports have documented the group's ongoing quest for WMD capabilities; many reports have detailed al-Qaeda members’ attempts to manufacture or obtain certain chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) agents to use in WMD against targets in the West and the Middle East. Yet the question remains: Does al-Qaeda's current WMD capability match its actual intent? While most studies of the group have focused on its explicit desire for WMD, allegations of CBRN acquisition, and the killing potential of specific CBRN agents, few open-source studies have closely examined the evolution of al-Qaeda's consideration of WMD and, most notably, the merit of actual CBRN production instructions as depicted and disseminated in the group's own literature and manuals. The following report will examine the history of al-Qaeda's interest in CBRN agents, the evolution of the network's attitude toward these weapons, and the internal debate within the organization concerning acquisition and use of WMD. More so, the following research will assess the validity of actual CBRN production instructions and capabilities as displayed and disseminated in al-Qaeda's own literature and websites.     

Late Medieval Lance Use: Mounted Combat and Martial Arts in Western Europe from the 14th to the 16th Century

Despite the lance’s status and the amount of attention the couched lance has received in historiography, study of its martial art has been neglected. The various lance types and techniques used by western European cavalry have only recently begun to receive scholarly attention. Additionally, Medieval European lance use has too often been studied in isolation, without an adequate understanding of the idiosyncratic and asymmetrical dynamics of mounted combat. Although the charge with the couched lance was a valid tactic, it was only one of many. Light and heavy lances were used in one hand or two to trip, block, unhorse, and wrestle. These techniques were governed by the harsh laws of distance, speed, impact, iron, and asymmetry. By utilizing the surviving Fechtbücher and several Peninsular and Near Eastern sources, a brief foray into the diverse techniques of lance use and their purposes has been attempted here.     

A model for geographically distributed combat interactions of swarming naval and air forces

This article describes the Distributed Interaction Campaign Model (DICM), an exploratory campaign analysis tool and asset allocation decision‐aid for managing geographically distributed and swarming naval and air forces. The model is capable of fast operation, while accounting for uncertainty in an opponent's plan. It is intended for use by commanders and analysts who have limited time for model runs, or a finite budget. The model is purpose‐built for the Pentagon's Office of Net Assessment, and supports analysis of the following questions: What happens when swarms of geographically distributed naval and air forces engage each other and what are the key elements of the opponents’ force to attack? Are there changes to force structure that make a force more effective, and what impacts will disruptions in enemy command and control and wide‐area surveillance have? Which insights are to be gained by fast exploratory mathematical/computational campaign analysis to augment and replace expensive and time‐consuming simulations? An illustrative example of model use is described in a simple test scenario. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 562–576, 2016     

Thomas Firth and Sons – Steelmakers to the Arms Industries. Part 2: Heavy Armaments

Firth’s were the first of the Sheffield steel makers to enter the field armaments. Their involvement with Colt has been outlined in an article in the journal of the Colt Collectors Association in America and their activities as steelmakers to the small-arms industries has been covered in a previous issue of this Journal. This article gives a brief overview of their involvement as manufacturers in the field of heavy armaments, being the first to make all-steel guns and their evolving role in the use of steel for ordnance, culminating in the displacement of wrought iron by the adoption of steel for ordnance manufacture by the Royal Gun Factory in the 1880s. It also highlights their development of stainless steel in this context.     

Putin – the masked nemesis of the strategy of ambiguity

Recent events demonstrate the complex and adaptive approach employed by Russia to reassert influence in Europe. The changing face of Russia’s strategy commenced in 2007 when it launched a crippling cyber-attack against Estonia. This was followed by a large Russian conventional attack against Georgia in 2008, occupying two large areas of the nation. 2014 witnessed the Russian annexation of Crimea where in just a week, Russia seized control of Crimea “without firing a shot.” The annexation of Crimea was rapidly followed by a Russian inspired and led subversive war in eastern Ukraine. The common thread among these diverse Russian operations is its use of ambiguity to confound and confuse decision makers in the West.     

Information Is Not a Weapons System

ABSTRACT

While many militaries have tried to capitalize on the potential of information operations in internal war, few have succeeded. I argue that military information campaigns fall short of expectations for two reasons. First, the theory of influence militaries generally embrace – communications as a non-lethal weapons system – is largely invalid. While treating information as a weapons system makes it easier to integrate it into the existing military planning system, this overstates the independent effects of communications on behavior and understates the importance of interactive effects of what commercial marketing theory refers to as the “marketing mix” – product, price, promotion, and placement. It would be more appropriate to treat military information operations as a form of marketing: a composite effort to induce a specific behavior in a target audience by applying a combination of material and ideational instruments. The marketing model suggests that the efficacy of information operations will depend not simply on the message and its delivery (promotion) but on the behavior the sender seeks to induce (the product), the costs of that behavior (the price), and the opportunities available for such behavior (the placement).