“相向而行，才能越走越近”

近日，朝核问题终于走出山重水复的境地，让世人看到了柳暗花明。6月26日，朝鲜驻华大使崔镇洙在北京向朝核问题六方会谈中方代表团团长、中国外交部副部长武大伟提交了朝鲜核申报清单；美国方面同日表示，将履行其将朝鲜从“支持恐怖主义国家”名单中删除和终止对朝适用《敌国贸易法》的承诺；27日，朝鲜炸毁了其宁边地区核设施的冷却塔。双方此举不由让人想起一句域外箴言：相向而行，才能越走越近。     

朝鲜第三次核试验全透视

朝鲜核试验背后隐藏的,是一段错综纠结的历史,隐藏着朝核问题的历史根源,朝鲜的违抗深深植根于它在与韩国、日本和美国对抗多年后产生的强烈的不安全感。这种不安全感问题不解决,局势就不会得到改善     

时事月报(7月1日至30日)

国际 1日,朝鲜人民军板门店代表部代表发表谈话,视美国增强韩美战斗力、对朝封锁或制裁为"破坏停战协定的行为",人民军将动用一切力量"予以无情的报复"。10日,在朝韩第11次部长级会谈中,韩国警告朝鲜不要加剧半岛核危机,朝回应"已作好两手准备"。12日凌晨,朝韩发表联合声明,提出要和平解决朝核问题。21日,朝鲜发表声明,重申希望与美国签订互不侵犯条约,以此来解决朝鲜半岛危机。     

举动

朝鲜重申不参加朝核问题六方会谈；俄罗斯将增加在吉尔吉斯斯坦驻军数量；印度军方将加强无人侦察机的部署；新任北约秘书长把阿富汗及北约与俄关系列为工作重点；乌兹别克斯坦反对俄在吉尔吉斯斯坦南部驻军；     

中国周边军事强国“群起”

从历史角度考察，一个国家的发展历程无不与其周边安全环境有着密切联系。周边安全环境的发展变化塑造着、甚至决定着一个国家的战略选择。从目前情势看，中国周边安全环境尽管总体上保持稳定，但依然频繁受到朝核问题、领海主权、边界纠纷等地区热点和焦点问题的冲击。同时，心怀大国梦想的部分亚洲国家，如日本、韩国、印度等，更是利用各种矛盾和冲突借机大力提升军事资源投入，由此引发中国周边出现了军事强国“林立”的状况。     

时事月报

国际·国内·兵团(2007年1月1日至1月31日)●2日,伊朗总统艾哈迈迪·内贾德称,西方国家如因核问题而对伊朗发动军事攻击,将遭到伊朗的严厉还击。●5日,美国国务卿赖斯表示,参加朝核问题六方会谈的有关各方正在为复会进行密切磋商。如果朝鲜为实现无核化采取更加建设性的态度,六方会谈可望很快复会。     

2003年全球海军装备发展回顾与展望

2003年对于全世界来说都留下了震憾的记忆:伊拉克战争短暂的像一部“大片”;阿以和平路线图计划走走停停; “非典型肺炎”肆虐全球;中国“神五”载人成功;朝核问题六国会谈无获而终;印巴双方互摇“橄榄枝”;一代“枭雄”萨达     

朝鲜半岛：怎一个“核”字了得

年初以来,朝鲜半岛局势出现缓和,朝韩恢复高层接触并达成共识,双方如期举行离散家属团聚活动,这些都为打破半岛僵局创造了有利条件。但是,朝鲜国内的不稳定因素逐渐显现,朝核问题和美朝之间的矛盾难解,美韩对朝武力威慑动作频频,以及朝鲜可能采取的反制措施等等,都可能会给脆弱的半岛缓和局势带来破坏性灾难。     

配电系统谐波电流火灾隐患研究

随着人民生活水平的提高，非线性用电设备大量使用，这方便和提高了人们的生活质量，但非线性负载会给三相供电线路注入谐波电流，引发中性线过载。从配电系统谐波电流的产生、危害入手，应用Fourier级数分解方法对非正弦周期电流进行理论分析，得出三次谐波及其奇数倍谐波会在中性线产生叠加效应，再加上三相负载不平衡，造成中性线过载，进而引发火灾事故的结论。     

金门登陆作战项目管理败因分析

金门登陆作战作为我军战争史上一次导致参战部队全军覆灭的重大失败作战，在我军乃至世界战争史上都产生了重大影响。本文利用项目管理这一现代管理理论，以定性和定量相结合的分析方法，对金门登陆作战全过程进行分析研究，充分挖掘了其深层次的规律性因素，对其失败的原因教训进行了深入的探究和剖析。     

A nuclear-armed North Korea without ICBMs: the best achievable objective

This article analyzes the North Korean nuclear crisis from a balance-of-power perspective. It is in the long-term interests of international peace for a secure and independent North Korea to serve as a buffer between US and Chinese ground forces. However, the conventional military advantage of the South Korean-American alliance over North Korea has grown drastically since the end of the Cold War, threatening North Korea’s survival. Since North Korea lacks any reliable ally, nuclear weapons represent its most cost-effective way to restore a balance of power and thus secure itself. Accepting security guarantees in exchange for its nuclear arsenal is rhetorically appealing but not a viable approach. North Korea’s development of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), however, has overcompensated for the post-Cold War imbalance, inviting talk in Washington of waging a preventive war. Persuading North Korea to give up its ICBM capability, not its nuclear arsenal, should therefore be the primary objective of US diplomacy.     

EXTRAORDINARY VISITS

North Korea has the bomb but not much of a nuclear arsenal. For fifty years, it pursued the plutonium path to the bomb in parallel with its pursuit of nuclear electricity. My visits to North Korea's Yongbyon nuclear complex provided a window to its plutonium capabilities. After having made six visits to North Korea, Pyongyang surprised me during my seventh visit last November by showing me a small, modern uranium enrichment plant, which I was told was needed for its new indigenous light water reactor program. However, the same capabilities can be used to produce highly enriched uranium bomb fuel. Following a pattern of having made poor risk-management decisions during much of the past twenty years of diplomacy dealing with the North Korean nuclear threat, Washington remains in a standoff with Pyongyang.     

Why provoke? the Sino-US competition in East Asia and North Korea’s strategic choice

This article seeks to make sense of North Korean provocations in light of the Sino-US strategic competition in post-Cold War East Asia, where such variables as China’s rise, US’s pivot to Asia, and growing Sino-ROK economic ties are driving the strategic choices of major states in the region. The article examines the main motivations behind Pyongyang’s provocations since the end of the Cold War, discusses their implications for the Sino-US strategic competition in East Asia, and offers predictions about the future of North Korean provocations. The central thesis of the article is that Pyongyang has exploited the Sino-US strategic competition in East Asia for its regime survival. By raising North Korea’s strategic value to China, the intensifying Sino-US competition allows Pyongyang to continue provocations, regardless of Beijing’s explicit opposition.     

North Korea,deterrence, and engagement

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) justifies its nuclear weapon arsenal with the concept of deterrence. It means that it will try to miniaturize and modernize its warheads and missiles. This leads to a first-use doctrine of nuclear weapons. Obama's policy of engagement does not offer a solution to the North Korean nuclear issue as yet. In the context of its policy of critical engagement with the DPRK, the European Union has three key interests: regional peace and stability, denuclearization, and human rights. The Conference on Security and Cooperation (CSCE) could be a precedent. The CSCE process was based on three “baskets”: security, economics, and humanitarian. The multilateral Trans-Pacific Partnership is a step in this regard. This article looks at three theoretical approaches: realism, liberal institutionalism, and liberal internationalism. It concludes that a political strategy to create a stable North Korean peninsula has to go beyond nuclear deterrence that is based on the realist notion of balance of power.     

An Empirical Analysis of the Arms Race Between South and North Korea

This study analyses an arms race between South and North Korea over the period 1963–2000. Despite the strategic importance of the Korean Peninsula, the arms race between South and North Korea has rarely been studied. In this study, the South–North arms race is empirically estimated using Richardson’s action–reaction model. The pattern of South–North arms race between the Cold War (1963–1989) and the post‐Cold War eras (1990–2000) as well as the existence of an arms race is examined comparing both countries’ defence spending, number of military personnel and tactical aircraft.     

The Evolution of US Extended Deterrence and South Korea’s Nuclear Ambitions

ABSTRACT

Extended deterrence has been a main pillar of the security alliance between the United States and South Korea (Republic of Korea [ROK]) since the end of the Korean War. The changing dynamics of US extended deterrence in Korea, however, affected Seoul’s strategic choices within its bilateral alliance relationship with Washington. Examining the evolution of US extended deterrence in the Korean Peninsula until the Nixon administration, this article explains why South Korea began its nuclear weapons programme in a historical context of the US–ROK alliance relationship. This article argues that President Park Chung-hee’s increasing uncertainty about the US security commitment to South Korea in the 1960s led to his decision to develop nuclear weapons in the early 1970s despite the fact that US tactical nuclear weapons were still stationed in South Korea.     

CHINA AND THE U.S. BEYOND THE KOREAN PENINSULA

China-U.S. cooperation over the most difficult security problem in Northeast Asia—the North Korean nuclear issue—in essence projects its bigger power game amid the tectonic shifts of Asian geopolitics. The nuclear issue affords a test case to gauge the future posture of China and the United States in East Asia and their partnership in that conflict-prone region. Approaches to resolving this issue must take into account the geopolitical realignment of Asia, Washington's reorientation of relations with its Asian allies, and China's rise as an influential regional player and the subsequent regional response. However, the long-standing mistrust between China and the United States is contributing to a lack of substantial progress in Korean nonproliferation efforts. The declared nuclear test by Pyongyang further put the denuclearization cooperation between China and the Unites States on the line. China-U.S. cooperation in denuclearizing Pyongyang may either produce lasting stability for the region or create ‘‘collateral damage,’’ with the North Korean issue paling in comparison.     

North Korea's ‘first’ nuclear diplomacy, 1993–94

North Korea's nuclear diplomacy in 1993–94 was its first long, complex, and sophisticated military–diplomatic compaign, in which it sought to obtain both displomatic and economic benefits. Although North Korea could not achieve all of its goals, its endeavour was quite successful overall. North Korea's nuclear development, deterrent capabilities, the limits of the international nuclear regime, and the lack of transparency in the North Korean system played important roles in this.     

ENERGY FOR SECURITY:

Though North Korea agreed to partial denuclearization in February 2007, achieving that goal is at best a long way off. A natural gas pipeline linking all of Northeast Asia and promising energy and economic help could help convince the isolated nation to step away from its nuclear programs entirely; it could also provide the nonproliferation and energy security benefits that have eluded the region for so long. These economic benefits could motivate the other nations involved in the six-party talks to deal with North Korea more than if only nuclear reactors were offered.