Was World War Two a Completely Just War?

ABSTRACT

According to Brian Orend’s binary political model, minimally just states possess a robust set of moral rights, while other states essentially exist in a moral vacuum in which they possess no moral rights. I argue that a more plausible comparative model would allow for a state to acquire (or lose) discrete moral rights as it improves (or damages) its moral record. This would generate a more accurate portrayal of both domestic policy within states and military conflict between states; including, in particular, the role of the Allied forces during World War Two.     

How do wars end? A multidisciplinary enquiry

ABSTRACT

The cessation of military confrontations rarely coincides with the end of war. Legal and political matters continue after the last shot has been fired, civilians driven from their homes try to rebuild their houses and their lives, veterans need to adapt to their new role in civil society, and the struggle to define the history and the significance of past events only begins. In recent years, in particular, the changes in the character of contemporary warfare have created uncertainties across different disciplines about how to identify and conceptualise the end of war. It is therefore an opportune moment to examine how wars end from a multidisciplinary perspective that combines enquiries into the politics of war, the laws of war and the military and intellectual history of war. This approach enables both an understanding of how ‘the end’ as a concept informs the understanding of war in international relations, in international law and in history and a reconsideration of the nature of scientific method in the field of war studies as such.     

The road not taken: Conflict termination and guerrillaism in the American Civil War

Irrespective our views on the rationality of our opponent's continuing to conduct operations against us, unless utterly extirpated, he retains a vote on when and how conflict will end. This is because war is about power — compelling another actor to do something he would not otherwise do, or to cease doing something he would otherwise prefer to do. In planning for conflict termination we should account for the peculiarities of opponents who may decide not to quit when we have beat them fair and square. We do not desire that they cease conventional fighting, but that they cease fighting altogether.     

Conflict and fiscal capacity

We examine the role of war in retarding state fiscal capacity in developing countries, measured by tax revenue ratios to GDP. We build a simple theoretical model of a factionalized state, where patronage substitutes for common interest public goods, along with violent contestation over a rent or prize. Our dynamic panel empirical analysis applied to 79 developing countries, during 1980–2010, indicates that war, especially civil war, retards fiscal capacity, along with imperfect democracy, political repression, poor governance, and dependence on oil and macroeconomic mismanagement. High intensity conflict is particularly destructive of state capacity. In countries experiencing low intensity wars, other institutional factors may matter more than war. The diminution of fiscal capacity due to war appears less pronounced after the end of the cold war.     

British Policy on Total Maritime Warfare and the Anti-Shipping Campaign in the Mediterranean, 1940–1944

During World War II, the British ran a sustained anti-shipping campaign against Axis merchant and supply traffic in the Mediterranean. Although the effects of this on the land war in North Africa have been the subject of much debate, little attention has been paid to the nature and prosecution of the campaign itself. This article analyses the changes in British attitudes and policy towards attacking merchant shipping prior to and throughout the campaign. It then goes on to examine the conduct of the campaign itself and compare it with other British efforts elsewhere during the war. It concludes that the anti-shipping campaign in the Mediterranean was a unique combined arms offensive for the British, and a major evolution in their attitudes and policy towards maritime total war.     

A Matter of Choice: Strategy and Discretion in the Shadow of World War II

American policy-makers are predisposed towards the idea of a necessary war of survival, fought with little room for choice. This reflects a dominant memory of World War II that teaches Americans that they live in a dangerously small world that imposes conflict. Critics argue that the ‘choice versus necessity’ schema is ahistorical and mischievous. This article offers supporting fire to those critiques. America's war against the Axis (1941–45) is a crucial case through which to test the ‘small world’ view. Arguments for war in 1941 pose overblown scenarios of the rise of a Eurasian super-threat. In 1941 conflict was discretionary and not strictly necessary in the interests of national security. The argument for intervention is a closer call that often assumed. This has implications for America's choices today.     

The strategy of the organisation of Ukrainian nationalists in its quest for a sovereign state, 1939–1950

ABSTRACT

The armed resistance offered by the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) to the Soviet state was the toughest internal political challenge that the Soviet regime faced from World War II to the 1980s. However, OUN’s grand strategy was based on self-delusion and was, therefore, always irrational. It resulted in misinterpretation of the sentiments of Ukrainians and the international situation, collaboration with Nazi Germany despite incompatible goals, counterproductive ethnic violence and sweeping terror against alleged Soviet collaborators. Local civilians rather than the representatives of the Soviet regime were OUN’s primary target; this alienated most residents of Western Ukraine.     

Country failure and social grievances in the Greek Civil War 1946–1949: An economic approach

The Civil War that took place in Greece between the Communist Party and the Centre-Right Government during 1946–1949 is examined from a political economy perspective. The cost of the conflict is measured as output forgone relative to what it would have prevailed had Greece followed a post-war recovery similar to that of other nations in Western Europe. A two-stage approach compares Nazi-occupied countries with neutral ones to assess the cost inflicted by Second World War, and then compares Greece with the former to estimate the impact of the civil conflict. A regional analysis finds that the political discontent was mainly shaped by pre-war socio-economic grievances, rather than being affected by contemporaneous deprivation or driven by class structure as hardliners of both sides preferred to present in pushing for an all-out confrontation. The failure to settle political rivalries and thus prevent the conflict is also discussed.     

IS STUXNET PHYSICAL? DOES IT MATTER?

Cyber-weapons are software and software, at least intuitively, is non-physical. Several authors have noted that this potentially renders problematic the application of normative frameworks like UN Charter Article 2(4) to cyber-weapons. If Article 2(4) only proscribes the use of physical force, and if cyber-weapons are non-physical, then cyber-weapons fall outside the purview of Article 2(4). This article explores the physicality of software, examining Stuxnet in particular. First, I show that with a few relatively uncontroversial metaphysical claims we can secure the conclusion that Stuxnet is physical. In particular, there exist instances of Stuxnet that are both located in space and causally efficacious, and this is very strong evidence for their being physical. Second, I argue that the question of physicality is actually irrelevant for the moral evaluation of an attack like Stuxnet because of its undeniably physical effects. Finally, I argue that some features of Stuxnet should make us optimistic about the prospects for discrimination and proportionality in cyberwarfare.     

The financial performance of aircraft manufacturers during world war II: the vicissitudes of war

Controversy has long surrounded the role and profitability of US defense contractors. From a financial perspective the question becomes whether defense contractors earn greater profits and investor returns than other companies during military conflicts. We explore this question by examining the accounting profitability and investor returns of US aircraft manufacturers before, during, and after World War II and compare them to a sample of non-defense firms. We also examine the reactions of aircraft stock prices to important political and military events of the time. We find that (1) aircraft stocks exhibited positive abnormal returns around events associated with defense buildups and outbreaks of hostile action and negative returns around events signaling an end to hostilities, (2) the company’s accounting returns improved during the war but these higher accounting returns did not translate into higher stock returns for the shareholders, and (3) investors could have earned higher stock returns had they switched out of aircraft stocks after Pearl Harbor and reinvested the proceeds in the overall market.     

Germany’s Answer to Standard Oil: The Continental Oil Company and Nazi Grand Strategy, 1940–1942

German grand strategy during World War II included making Europe independent of oil imported from sources controlled by the United Kingdom, the United States, and the USSR. The first step was to wrest control of oilfields. Producing and distributing the oil, however, required the creation of a company capable of replacing the evicted British, American, and Soviet suppliers. Therefore, in 1941, the Third Reich established the Continental Oil Company. Analysis of the company’s foundation and operations sheds light on the objectives of the Third Reich, including the postwar economic development of Axis Europe and the extension of German hegemony beyond the USSR into the Middle East.     

The Normative Implications of “Knowing the Future” for Preventive War

What if claims about the future informed us about the intentions and the capabilities of our opponents to wage war against ourselves? Would and should the existing norms that restrict the preventive use of force change in the wake of such transformation? This article highlights the potential normative consequences of this change and discriminates between several possible normative evolutions. Would and should the “knowability of the future” alter radically the traditional rule of self-defense? This rule could indeed be jeopardized but, as I argue in this paper, it should not (and might not necessarily). However, the distinction between preemption and prevention could become obsolete. Future claims about security will also induce new security doctrines as knowledge about the future would be used to signal one’s intentions and deter one’s opponent. This change would also have a significant impact on accountability, as citizens would have a more active role in discussions over foreign policy. Moreover, new modes of predictions and forecasting will challenge the traditional role of experts whose biases have hampered their analyses and anticipations. Thus, trustworthy future claims could bring significant progress in both ethical and political terms as they would trigger a debate on the role of knowledge in democratic societies.     

French war plans, 1914: The ‘Balance of Power Paradox’

Historians have noted that both German and French war preparation in 1914 fell victim to the inadequacies of traditional threat-based planning: vulnerability to ‘threat deception’ which caused each to underestimate or mischaracterize the threat; a tendency to ‘mirror-image’ by fitting intelligence into preconceived notions of how the enemy was expected to behave; and ‘group think’ that discouraged a serious consideration of alternative scenarios. This article applies the ‘Balance of Power Paradox’ to explain why, at the dawn of the twentieth century, war planning in both Germany and France was driven by an acute sense of weakness which encouraged each side to fashion highly ‘risk acceptant’ strategies. In particular, he examines why and how French commander-in-chief General Joseph Joffre evolved and rationalized his audacious, and disastrous, Plan XVII to leverage French weaknesses and prevent the stronger German Army from bringing the full weight of its military strength to bear against France. The potential implication of this historical vignette is that leaders, and by extension military planners, of both strong and weak states focus on the constraints faced by their opponents, and assume that they can avoid the limitations of their position, while their opponent cannot.