The sixteenth-century antecedents of special operations ‘small war’

The first conceptual, theoretical treatises about small war (la petite guerre) as special operations appeared only from the middle of the seventeenth century. The term is not used in the eighteenth-century sense of ‘special operations’ in older sources. The supposed absence of any treatment of the subject is surprising considering the obsession with the ‘art of war’ in the Renaissance, but other authors attribute it to a supposed antinomy between chivalric ideals and irregular warfare. But the absence of explicit manuals on the subject is not evidence of absence of advanced reflection on this kind of operations in the Middle Ages and in Early Modern times. We should thus look elsewhere, in other genres, for writings that contain and pass on military knowledge. Epics, romances, educational and military treatises, and memoirs in fact contain elements of a theory of special operations, even though these genres differ from our conception of rationality inherited from the Enlightenment.     

The essence of war: French armies and small war in the Low Countries (1672–1697)

In the late seventeenth century during the Dutch War (1672–1678) and the Nine Years War (1688–1697), French armies relied on small war for the accomplishment of essential tasks and as part of an overall strategy of exhausting their opponents in the Low Countries. The purposes of small war included the imposition of contributions on enemy populations, the destruction of the enemy base of operations, blockades of fortresses, and the general support of campaign armies. The expression ‘small war’ in the French language appeared with growing frequency in the 1690s. Small war can be viewed as both a cause and consequence of the characteristics of these wars. The limited policy goals of Louis XIV the king of France required a strategy that minimised risk and accomplished the goal of reducing if not eliminating the Spanish presence in the Low Countries that bordered the north of France. As French armies increased in size during this period, the demand for specialists at small increased in order to provide security and ensure supply. Small war in the late seventeenth century was thus not ideologically motivated insurgency, but in the minds of French commanders an essential component of strategy and the nature of war.     

The partisan war in north-west Russia 1941–44: a re-examination

This article examines the extent to which the limited achievements of the Soviet partisan movement in north-west Russia during the first months of the Great Patriotic War can be attributed largely to inadequacies in the organisation, leadership, equipment and training of the movement as emphasised in Soviet and post-Soviet Russian published works. On the basis of Soviet archival sources the author concludes that while these factors were important, German occupation policies were far more effective in inhibiting partisan activity in the area concerned than existing published material would have us believe. However, these policies seem only to have been effective in the context of the German military successes or perceived successes at the front. The author goes on to examine factors contributing to the dramatic increase in Soviet partisan activity towards the end of the period of German occupation.     

French war plans, 1914: The ‘Balance of Power Paradox’

Historians have noted that both German and French war preparation in 1914 fell victim to the inadequacies of traditional threat-based planning: vulnerability to ‘threat deception’ which caused each to underestimate or mischaracterize the threat; a tendency to ‘mirror-image’ by fitting intelligence into preconceived notions of how the enemy was expected to behave; and ‘group think’ that discouraged a serious consideration of alternative scenarios. This article applies the ‘Balance of Power Paradox’ to explain why, at the dawn of the twentieth century, war planning in both Germany and France was driven by an acute sense of weakness which encouraged each side to fashion highly ‘risk acceptant’ strategies. In particular, he examines why and how French commander-in-chief General Joseph Joffre evolved and rationalized his audacious, and disastrous, Plan XVII to leverage French weaknesses and prevent the stronger German Army from bringing the full weight of its military strength to bear against France. The potential implication of this historical vignette is that leaders, and by extension military planners, of both strong and weak states focus on the constraints faced by their opponents, and assume that they can avoid the limitations of their position, while their opponent cannot.     

The Millenials’ war: dilemmas of network dependency in today’s military

This work is about how the United States military has become dependent on networked technology. As arguably the largest contributor to national security, it has become so dependent that its chief doctrine integrates networked technology into nearly every specialty, with particularly intense focus on Network Centric Warfare. As the military’s old guard is replaced by the highly technical Millenial Generation, there is cause to pause when assuming this techno-acuity brings nothing but advantage and success. Vulnerabilities stemming from such extensive dependence offer opportunities for exploitation that have not gone unnoticed. The first step to moving forward from this point is to fully understand the extent to which the military has become dependent on computer networks. It might be the Millenials’ war today, but it would be quite unwise for the United States military to think about it and fight it in a purely Millenial way.     

Daily life and motivation in war: The wehrmacht in the Soviet Union∗

Lucio Ceva, Le Forze armate. Turin: UTET, 1981, Pp. 641; L.48,000.

Bernd Wegner, Hitlers Politische Soldaten: Die Waffen‐SS 1933–1945. Paderborn: Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh, 1982. Pp. 363; DM48.

Jean Vanwelkenhuyzen, Les avertissements qui venaient de Berlin, 9 octobre 1939–10 mai 1940. Paris‐Gembloux: Editions Duculot, 1982. Pp. 398; Fr.90.

Andrew Hodges, Alan Turing: The Enigma. New York: Simon &; Schuster. Pp. 587; $22.50.

Nigel Hamilton, Monty: Master of the Battlefield, 1942–1944. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1983. Pp.xxxi + 863; £12.95.

Bernard Burrows and Geoffrey Edwards, The Defence of Western Europe. London: Butterworth Scientific, 1982. Pp.155; £16.

Elmar Dinter and Paddy Griffith, Not Over by Christinas: NATO's Central Front in World War III. Chichester, Sussex: Antony Bird Publications, 1983. Pp.xiv + 178; £8.95.

David Capitanchik and Richard C. Eichenberg, Defence and Public Opinion. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs and Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983. Pp.ix + 98; £4.95.

Ian Clark, Limited Nuclear War. Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1982. Pp.266; £16.50.

Bhupendra Jasani (ed.), Outer Space ‐ A New Dimension of the Arms Race. London: Taylor and Francis, 1982. Pp. xviii + 423; £18.50.

William J. Taylor, Jr. and Steven A. Maaranen (eds.), The Future of Conflict in the 1980s. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1982. Pp. xiii + 505.

Joseph S. Himes, Conflict and Conflict Management. Athens, GA; University of Georgia Press. 1980. Pp.333.

Richard Burt (ed.), Arms Control and Defense Postures in the 1980s. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press and London: Croom Helm, 1982. Pp.x + 230; £15.95.     

Has war a future?

On Future War, Martin van Creveld. London: Brassey's (UK), 1991. Pp.254, £24.50. ISBN 0–08–041796–5.     

Does civil war hamper financial development?

We examine how armed conflict effects financial development in a cross-country setting using dynamic panel data analysis in a panel of 66 developing countries for the period 1985–2010. Financial development is measured by M2 as a share of GDP, and credit allocated to private sector by banks as a share of GDP. Our findings suggest that armed conflict has a significant adverse effect on financial development. Simultaneously, the quality of governance is always highly significant and conducive to the financial development. The quality of governance is more salient in determining financial development compared to low- and medium-intensity armed conflict; however, the quality of governance cannot entirely offset the adverse impact of high-intensity armed conflict on financial development.     

Pricing war within a real option framework∗

The aim of this paper is to provide insights on war spending using simple tools of financial calculus rather than developing a general theory. Combining Grossman and Han's theory of war finance with the empirical literature that displays a straightforward relationship between the real value of money and wartime military events, we advocate the use of the real option approach of war spending. Some calculations and an empirical example illustrate this approach.     

Female participation in war: Bio‐cultural interactions

Throughout history fighting has been associated with men. Cross‐cultural studies of male/female differences have found serious violence as the most distinctive sex difference there is. Is that a matter of education and social conventions, or are men naturally far more adapted to fighting than women are? This question is at the centre of public debate nowadays regarding the right and ability of women to enlist in combat roles in the armed services. The article attempts to elucidate the nature of the bio‐cultural interactions involved, whose complexity, and even existence, are all too often ignored in the debate.