A transformed insurgency: The strategy of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) in the light of communist insurgency theories and a modified Beaufrean exterior/interior framework

This paper examines the insurgency in Nepal (1996–2008) from a military theoretical point of view. It looks at the insurgency from André Beaufre's exterior/interior framework, which is modified to match postmodern conflicts. Simultaneously the importance of the political is underlined. The author critically examines the relevance of the Maoist label the movement and insurgency have received. He claims that the insurgency became a hybrid consisting of Chinese, Latin American, and Leninist thoughts wrapped in pragmatic/revisionists and nationalist ideas. The author also suggests that the ability of insurgents – or counter-insurgents – to combine the effects of the exterior and interior is more likely to constitute the key centre of gravity of a conflict than any single political, economic, or military factor.     

A Rejoinder to Peter M. Sales

This analytical article asks the question: to what degree did the media contribute to the Rwandan genocide and what might have been done about it? In examining the historical development of mass media in Rwanda, this paper argues that while hate media clearly contributed to the dynamics that led to genocide, its role should not be overstated. While it is commonly believed that hate media was a major cause of the genocide, instead it was a part of a larger social process. The use of violent discourse was at least as important as, for example, the availability of weapons in carrying out the genocide. Put another way, violent discourse was necessary but not sufficient by itself to cause the genocide of 1994. In arguing this thesis, Rwandan history is examined to demonstrate the processes of communication in the formation of destructive attitudes and behaviour. Next, analysis of the methods and content of propaganda campaigns is discussed. Finally, an overview of the requirements and organizations for third parties to conduct international communication interventions is presented in the last section.     

Factors leading to insurgency in Balochistan

Balochistan has been in the midst of a full fledged insurgency for over five years now. Pakistani establishment has tried to project the current insurgency as a tribal mischief being perpetrated by a few feudal lords but the widespread support that the insurgents have been enjoying and the impunity with which they have been targeting symbols of government authority not only across the entire length and breadth of Balochistan but even outside, indicate that there are deep rooted, well defined causes that have led to this insurgency. The paper attempts to analyse the factors that have led to current round of insurgency in Balochistan.     

Setting a place at the table: ending insurgencies through the political process

This article argues that, under certain conditions, allowing insurgents into the political process – through elections or government posts – can be a useful tool in the peace process and can help end insurgencies. However, bringing insurgents into the political process is unlikely to end insurgencies on its own, particularly if insurgents, the government, or the population believes that force is still a viable means of defeating the opponent and changing the status quo. The article begins with a brief overview of the causes of insurgency and on conflict resolution for internal wars. The article then considers two examples of insurgents that have entered the political process – the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Northern Ireland and Hezbollah in Lebanon – and the differing degrees of success in transforming these insurgents to non-violent participants in the political process. It concludes by suggesting how insurgents can be brought into the political process as part of conflict resolution and the implications for Afghanistan.     

Hard Line: The Republican Party and US Foreign Policy since World War II Shaping Strategy: The Civil-Military Politics of Strategic Assessment

This article examines the Dhofar campaign in Oman (1965–75), and the role Britain played in assisting the Omani royal government against left-wing insurgents. Using existing secondary sources and declassified British government papers, it reassesses the contribution of British military advisers and special forces to the counter-insurgency (COIN) campaign, the balance between military action and civil affairs, the external dimension of the conflict, and intelligence and covert operations. It concludes by assessing whether the Dhofar War offers any guidance to Western armed forces involved in contemporary COIN campaigns such as those in Afghanistan and Iraq.     

Urban Insurgency

Urban insurgency has generally been presented by analysts and security force personnel as a distinct variant. In contrast, insurgents themselves have often recognized the particular requirements of two dissimilar but related approaches of operation, the urban and rural. Hence they have sought to field approaches and doctrine that exploited the specifics of each. In some cases, simply debating such has led to internal fractures that could not be overcome. More often there has been a deadly rural-urban synthesis that has increasingly challenged security forces.     

Boko Haram insurgency and gendered victimhood: women as corporal victims and objects of war

ABSTRACT

Boko Haram insurgency in North East Nigeria has exposed women (girls, ladies, and mothers) to a complex jeopardy. While some women have suffered untimely widowhood or child-lack as a result of the Boko Haram onslaught, others have suffered death, forced abduction, and allied assaults on the main and side lines of the insurgency. Oftentimes, women have faced direct violence that essentially degrade their humanity. This is evident in the deployment of women as war-front sex slaves, human shields, and suicide bombers by the insurgents. The virtual expendability of women in the context of Boko Haram insurgency has been vividly demonstrated by the gale of female suicide bombings in Nigeria over the recent years. By means of a textual and contextual analysis of library sources and/or documentary data, as well as an adroit application of the theory of objectification, this study posits that, in addition to suffering collateral vulnerabilities, women have equally been instrumentalized as objects of terror in the context of Boko Haram insurgency. The paper further argues that the ‘weaponization’ of women’s bodies as bomb vessels and human shields by the insurgents highlights the height of women’s corporal victimization and objectification in contemporary asymmetric warfare.     

Multilateral Counter-Insurgency Networks

Postmodern terrorism presents a significant challenge to global security and law enforcement institutions. Non-state actors operating across international borders, engaged in an apparent global insurgency of extremism that transects the traditional boundaries of crime and war, pose significant challenges to both intelligence and law enforcement agencies. These networked global insurgents blend political and religious fanaticism with criminal enterprises to challenge the rule of law and pose an epochal shift in the structures and relations among states. Negotiating this epochal shift requires traditional organs of national security (the diplomatic, military and intelligence services) to forge new partnerships with police and public safety organizations at the state and local (sub-national), as well as transnational levels. Significant operational, policy and cultural challenges must be overcome to forge an effective multi-lateral global network to counter global terrorism and insurgency.     

Why Pakistan failed: tribal focoism in Kashmir

The classical repertoire of insurgency types is under-specified, and does not apply well to the case of Pakistan's conduct of insurgency in Kashmir. Pakistan's approach to insurgency has been a consistent tribal variant of focoism, in which there is a reliance on imported itinerant insurgents to conduct raids to stimulate an uprising. This has its basis in the traditional warfare of the region, learned US insurgency doctrine in the 1960s, and an historical disregard for subject populations, which has led to an aversion to fostering grass-roots political movements.     

Schlock and Blah: Counter-insurgency Realities in a Rapid Dominance Era

This article examines the concept of ‘shock and awe’ in US military thought. It argues that the term derives from two main sources in defense thinking: rapidity in operations and overwhelming military superiority and is reflected in the concept of ‘full spectrum dominance’. However, the concept is not well attuned to fighting net-based counter insurgency war in a terrain such as Iraq which depends upon both intelligence gathering and adaptive military organizations. The article concludes that US military thinking should be more attuned to the effects of military force especially on political processes and the capacity of insurgents to mobilize popular support.     

Rwanda's Hutu Extremist genocidal Insurgency: An Eyewitness Perspective

The current war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) can trace its root cause to the 1994 Rwanda Genocide and the subsequent Hutu extremist genocidal insurgency. Rwanda, since independence has endured several different insurgencies, some failed and one where guerilla forces seized control of the government. Rwanda's second enduring insurgency, concluded by Hutu genocidal extremists, is the focus of discussion. Insurgency is the rise of armed force taken by one section of a country to overthrow those governing the country at the time, or to force them to do things they do not want to do. This article assesses the effectiveness of both sides, and so far the government has the initiative and has had success.     

CHOOSING GENOCIDE: ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES ON THE DISTURBING RATIONALITY OF RACE MURDER

An economic theory of genocide is presented with application to Rwanda‐1994. The theory considers ‘macro’ conditions under which an authority group chooses genocide and ‘micro’ conditions that facilitate the spread of genocide. From the macro perspective, a bargaining model highlights four rational explanations for an authority’s choice of genocide: prevention of loss of power, indivisibility, elimination of a persistent rival, and political bias. From the micro perspective, an evolutionary game model shows how supporters of genocide gain the upper hand in group dynamics over resisters and bystanders. The theory and application suggest that the conditions for genocide are not exceptional.     

Nigerian women and the trends of kidnapping in the era of Boko Haram insurgency: patterns and evolution

ABSTRACT

The rising trend of kidnapping targeting women has shown that counterinsurgency does not begin and end with the strategic advantage of state security providers in the security market and the field. Kidnapping of females by Boko Haram insurgents threatens human security and hinders sustainable development goals in Northeastern Nigeria. With primary and secondary sources, this qualitative study examines how Boko Haram insurgents target women in Northeastern Nigeria. The paper argues that community driven security strategy achievable through the collaboration between state and traditional security providers, can prevent the entry and easy escape of the insurgents. It concludes that the forces of order should sustain a policy of stop and searches until insurgents are defeated along with a programme of community-based human rights education and insurgency emergency response system for quick response to security threats.     

Boko Haram’s increasingly sophisticated military threat

ABSTRACT

This paper evaluates Boko Haram’s military capabilities and details the process of how its standing army, driven by these capabilities, came to pose a phased threat between 2013 and 2015 in particular. This was a period when military fighting dominated the insurgency in north-east Nigeria. Whereas there is an abundance of literature on Boko Haram’s histories and the impact of its insurgency on north-east Nigeria, analysis of Boko Haram’s military campaigning is still deficient. Attempting to fill this gap, this paper uses field findings and battlefield case studies from north-east Nigeria to highlight how Boko Haram’s overt front – its standing army – came to supplant its guerrilla operations as the main security threat to the frontier area.

This pivot towards military fighting, for a group initially composed of a few ragtag combatants, on the surface might seem surprising. Yet, whereas Boko Haram may lack the popular support required for ‘people’s war’, classic insurgency theories nevertheless hold some explanatory power for this deliberate shift: away from guerrilla warfare as the expedient of the weaker side, and towards the use of a large standing army of locals to swarm, and sometimes successfully overrun, state forces.     

Thailand and the Insurgency in the South

The insurgency in southern Thailand has proven to be intractable over the last few years. The insurgents, who comprise several different groups, have largely retained the initiative in a series of relatively unsophisticated operations. Although involving ethnic Malay Muslims – and marked by an increasingly strong Islamist ideology – the insurgency has been predominantly ethnic rather than religious. External jihadist involvement has been minimal at best. The recent coup in Thailand may improve the odds of reaching some form of accommodation with the southern insurgents; but it is likely that the south will remain a continuing security problem for Bangkok.     

British counter‐insurgency in Kenya, 1952–56: Extension of internal security policy or prelude to decolonisation?

Despite considerable post‐war planning, the British counter‐insurgency campaign in Kenya did not constitute a Colonial Office strategy for decolonisation. COIN in Kenya had one purpose: to re‐impose law and order, or British control. If for no other reason, this is demonstrated by the initial reluctance of the Colonial Office to intervene. Frequent re‐assessments and postponement of the ending of the State of Emergency, and the subordination of socio‐economic and political reforms to military objectives, show clearly that decolonisation was not high on the British list of priorities in Kenya. This article questions the relationship between COIN and decolonisation, and the validity of models of British counter‐insurgency.     

Maritime interdiction in Sri Lanka's counterinsurgency

A comprehensive maritime interdiction strategy to attack the insurgent's logistic system was a key element in the defeat of the Tamil Tigers. The campaign of maritime interdiction required the Sri Lankan Navy (SLN) to attack LTTE arms smuggling, sea piracy, and maritime terrorism. The SLN degraded the insurgency's robust maritime logistical network while also devising tactics to engage the maritime insurgents who reacted with swarm and suicide boat tactics. The efforts of the SLN forced the Tamil Tigers to confront the government's final land offensives with diminished resources, thus collapsing a three decades’ old insurgency in a matter of months.     

Low-intensity conflict in Eastern Sudan: A comparative approach to the development of rebel groups

This article discusses the development of a low-intensity conflict in Sudan's eastern region between 1994 and 2006. Drawing on data collected in the region in 2009, recruitment processes within three different insurgent groups are analysed and compared, paying attention to the impact of these processes on insurgents' organisational development and military capacity. The peace process in Eastern Sudan is further discussed, focusing specifically on the disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) programmes for former insurgents. The article finally discusses current developments and draws conclusions regarding the risk of renewed rebellion in Eastern Sudan.     

The campaign of the lost footsteps: the pacification of Burma, 1885-95

ABSTRACT

What Rudyard Kipling called the ‘campaign of lost footsteps’ was the longest campaign fought by the Victorian army. The conquest of Upper Burma, an area of 140,000 sq. miles with a population of four million, took only three weeks in November 1885 and was accomplished with minimum cost. However, the removal and deportation of the Burmese King and dismantling of all traditional authority dismantled led to growing resistance to British rule leading to an increasingly difficult guerrilla war. Though the Burmese guerrillas were characterised by the British as mere bandits or dacoits, many were former soldiers along with Buddhist monks. The extremely difficult nature of campaigning in the terrain and climate of Burma was not sufficiently appreciated by the War Office, who viewed the conflict as a ‘subaltern’s war’ and ‘police’ work. Intended regime change was also not accompanied by any consideration of the likely implications. Prolonged insurgency necessitated deploying a force far larger than originally intended; though order was finally secured by 1895, the campaign proved destructive of Burmese society while British recruitment of hill tribes into the police and armed forces sowed the seeds for future divisions.     

Building Legitimacy: Interactional Dynamics and the Popular Evaluation of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Turkey

Abstract

Previous research has identified a variety of general mechanisms to explain how insurgents build legitimacy. Yet, there is often a gap between these mechanisms and the interactional dynamics of insurgencies. This article attempts to bridge this gap through a theoretically informed analysis of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party’s (PKK) insurgency in Turkey. I show how the PKK’s efforts to cultivate legitimacy, Turkey’s counterinsurgency strategies, and civilian perceptions of the PKK, all mutually influenced one another. Based on this analysis, I argue that the mechanisms that produce popular legitimacy coevolve with insurgents’ behaviors, states’ interventions, and civilians’ perceptions.