Original Sword Designs,Now in the Metropolitan Museum of Art,New York,Entered in Competition to Make Admiral Seymour’s City of London Sword of Honour in 1882

This paper examines two rare original Sword Designs, which have recently come to light, patterns said to be the two sides of the Sword of Honour awarded with the Freedom of the City of London to Admiral Seymour, Baron Alcester, Commander-in-Chief HM Ships and Vessels Mediterranean, for the Egyptian Campaign in 1882. The paper places the designs in their historical and iconographical context and assesses, by examining various evidence, if the patterns are, in fact, the original designs of the sword actually presented to Seymour at the Guildhall in 1883.     

Using Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency Operations: The French in Algeria, 1954–1962

While the importance of indigenous forces for successful counterinsurgency operations has long been recognized by great powers fighting local insurgencies, the factors that determine the performance of such forces have attracted relatively little scholarly attention. This paper aims to contribute to our understanding of those determinants through an examination of the role and performance of auxiliary indigenous units in French counterinsurgency operations during the Algerian War (1954–62). The findings presented here suggest some important lessons for those seeking to recruit and deploy effective indigenous forces in counterinsurgency operations.     

Brinkmanship,not COIN,in Pakistan’s post-9/11 Internal War

Politics is critical to making sense of Pakistani successes and failures in dealing with non-state armed groups. This includes domestic political currents; regional political currents; and the global impetus of the post-9/11 era. How these currents overlap renders to any reading of insurgency in Pakistan real complexity. This article engages with this complexity rather than shirking from it. Its hypothesis is that while the insurgency bordering Afghanistan has been an epicentre of Pakistani military efforts to fight the Taliban, this theatre is in of itself insufficiently inclusive to grasp the nature of Pakistan’s security challenges and its consequent responses.     

New Light on the Swordmakers,Goldsmiths and Jewellers,John Ray and James Montague,Active in Partnership in London 1800–1821, With a New and Extended List of Their Known Work

Abstract

Some new information is presented on the prominent London goldsmiths and jewellers, John Ray and James Montague, of 22 Denmark Street, Soho, active in partnership from 1800 to 1821. A revised and extended list has been compiled of recorded works, including presentation swords, freedom boxes, ‘Toys’, tokens and other items, made by this highly reputable Soho workshop, during a decisive period of British history.     

Naval policy and national strategy in France, 1933–1937

This article argues that French naval policy‐makers were slow to adjust to the changed strategic landscape of the 1930s. During the 1920s France did not face a serious land or air threat. Defence policy‐makers were therefore able to devote a large portion of the defence budget to rebuilding French maritime power. But when the Depression and the rise of Nazi Germany overturned the strategic situation in Europe, policy‐makers adjusted by giving priority to land and air rearmament and by placing ever greater emphasis on securing an alliance with Great Britain. The French naval establishment resisted this trend unsuccessfully. The frustration of naval planning increased the resentment and mistrust of both the Third Republic and Great Britain that characterised naval attitudes before and particularly during the Second World War.     

Terrorism as Method in Nepali Maoist Insurgency, 1996–2016

During the period 1996–2006, the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) waged overt people’s war to seize state power and institute a new order that realized the party’s understanding of ‘New Democracy’ as posited by Mao Tse-tung. Contextual shifts led to a crucial strategic turning point in September 2005, when the Maoists agreed to a united front with estranged legal parties to oust the monarchy and establish a republic. Though touted as acceptance of political reintegration, the move was tactical rather than strategic. The party had no intention of supporting a parliamentary version of democracy and thus, 2006–2016, engaged in a covert effort to seize power. Central to this effort was the paramilitary Young Communist League (YCL), the members of which responded to inflammatory party verbiage and exhortations with attacks upon rival political actors. These attacks, academically and legally, were terrorism and offered a salient illustration of intra-state unrestricted warfare. Ultimately, organizational, national, and regional circumstances caused the main Maoist movement to move decisively away from its covert approach. By that time, however, radical splinters had embraced the use of terrorism against rival political actors, creating a situation whereby local politics is yet a dangerous endeavor in certain areas and at certain times.     

The Wretched of the Empire: Politics,Ideology and Counterinsurgency in Rhodesia, 1965–80

This article examines the vital importance of political ideology in formulating effective counterinsurgency, by examining the case of Rhodesia between 1965 and 1980. During this period, the Rhodesian Front (RF) Government of Ian Smith adopted a radical right-wing ‘world-struggle ideology’ to justify settler resistance to African decolonisation. The RF's ideology, based on settler-status anxiety, upheld a conspiratorial interpretation of modern politics that emphasised virulent forms of Anglophobia, anti-communism, anti-internationalism and anti-liberalism. The Smith Government portrayed African nationalism not as an indigenous political phenomenon, but as an external instrument of world communism and Western appeasement. After 1972, when Rhodesia faced a protracted insurgency, many of the principles of RF ideology were applied to counterinsurgency warfare with disastrous results. Because the Rhodesian Government viewed African guerrilla warfare as unrelated to domestic politics, Rhodesian counterinsurgency lacked a realistic political dimension. The dictates of settler ideology blinded the Rhodesian Government to the vital need to win ‘hearts and minds’ by applying timely principles of political pacification and reform to its counterinsurgency effort. Instead a Rhodesian counterinsurgency campaign of maximum force was pursued. Such a campaign proved counter-productive accelerating strategic deterioration and leading ultimately to the political victory of the African guerrilla cause in 1980.     

Terrorism in West Africa: Real,emerging or imagined threats?

This essay locates the West African region in the context of the post-9/11 discourses on terrorism and counter-terrorism, particularly as it relates to the global war on terror. It identifies and analyses the issues and challenges that flow from the integration of West Africa into hegemonic transnational/globalised security arrangements, and the ways in which the emerging state (militaristic) and globalised security framework could reinforce or, paradoxically, undermine regional, intranational human and environmental security in one of Africa's most troubled regions. It critically examines the possibility of a terrorist threat in the region and analyses the global stakes involved in integrating West Africa into the global war on terror. On this basis, it concludes that zero-sum, militarist, globally driven solutions may fail to address the historical, political, and socio-economic roots of a possible terrorist threat in West Africa.     

People's War? Self-Interest,Coercion and Ideology in Nepal's Maoist Insurgency

This paper analyses the micro-level processes by which ordinary rural Nepalis came to support the Maoist insurgency. Working through the implications of orthodox collective action theory, it finds that Maoist cadres are unlikely to have been strongly motivated by considerations of acquisitive self-interest. However, the participation of many may have been partly secured through various forms of coercion. Non-instrumental motivations for participation that are not accounted for by the rational choice premises that underpin conventional collective action theory are also identified. These are found to have been of particular significance in the violent and uncertain context of contemporary Nepal.     

Squad leaders today,village leaders tomorrow: Muslim auxiliaries and tactical politics in Algeria, 1956–1962

From 1956 to 1960, the French Army developed a force of Muslim auxiliaries (supplétifs) as a major component of its strategy to combat the National Liberation Front (FLN) insurgency in Algeria. Aside from their military utility in hunting down the guerrillas in the mountains and forests, the supplétifs were instrumental in undermining FLN legitimacy in the countryside. The rapid growth and employment of the supplétif force dismantled FLN political control in the villages, undermined the enemy's unity, and critically weakened the revolutionaries' claim to represent all of Algeria's Muslims. The military and political activities of France's Muslim soldiers also projected an image of Muslim–European unity behind the French cause, and portrayed the French Army as the only legitimate political force in numerous villages. These political successes, however, were limited to the local, tactical level of revolutionary warfare, and the Army was never able to convert the supplétifs into a force of decisive, strategic political significance. They thus had little ultimate impact on the outcome of the conflict.     

The rationalisation of warship building in the United Kingdom, 1945–2000

After the Second World War the Admiralty and shipbuilding industry agreed that the largest possible capacity for warship building should be maintained. This proved impossible as the Royal Navy struggled to evoke a strategy in the nuclear era and the price of increasingly complex vessels rose remorselessly. As the shipbuilding industry wilted in the 1960s in the face of international competition a process of natural selection was followed by increasing political intervention in the industry. Nationalisation in the 1970s aimed to preserve capacity and employment, policy aims which were reversed by privatisation in the 1980s and which, ultimately resulted in an oligopoly in the warship building sector.     

The Dutch COIN approach: three years in Uruzgan, 2006–2009

Rarely has a military commitment led to such intense discussion in the Netherlands as the Task Force Uruzgan (TFU) mission in Afghanistan. In February 2010, the Netherlands' coalition government even collapsed after the two largest parties failed to agree on the withdrawal of Dutch troops from Afghanistan later this year. This article deals first of all with the difficult discussion over the Afghanistan mission of the TFU. The authors then subject three ISAF operations to close scrutiny. The authors provide some suggestions to help understand better this pivotal point in the execution of the whole operation and thus give a fuller picture of the Dutch counterinsurgency approach in Uruzgan.     

The structure of defense production in the United States, 1929‐∗

This article contains a critical review of the literature on the economics of military affairs in Greece and Turkey as of December 1999. In particular, I review (a) arms race models; (b) models of the demand for military expenditure; (c) models measuring the economic impact of military expenditure; and (d) literature and issues related to indigenous arms production. I conclude with a number of summary lessons and observations of how future research might improve upon the existing body of work.     

The sources of the Australian tradition in irregular warfare, 1942–1974

This article had its genesis in a background study for the development of a new Australian Army counter-insurgency doctrine. Archival research showed that the Australian counter-insurgency doctrine employed in such post-1945 conflicts as Burma, Malaya, Borneo and Vietnam originated in the jungle campaigns of the South West Pacific Area during World War II. The historical record also showed that the Army's counter-insurgency doctrine, as with its World War II-jungle warfare doctrine, was a pragmatic amalgam of Australian experience and British doctrine. The article traces this process through the development of a series of doctrine manuals. It also considers the contribution of key individuals to both counter-insurgency theory and practice. This distinctively Australian approach to the development of doctrine was responsible for producing a highly successful manual, The Division in Battle: Pamphlet No. 11, Counter-Revolutionary Warfare (DIB 11), which the Army used during its involvement in Vietnam.     

Polaris,East of Suez: British Plans for a Nuclear Force in the Indo-Pacific, 1964–1968

This article investigates the little-known plans formulated by Harold Wilson's Labour government to deploy Polaris submarines in the Indo-Pacific region. The scheme was first proposed in 1965 as a response to several problems faced by British policy-makers, including China's acquisition of a nuclear capability, Britain's wish to maintain a meaningful position ‘East of Suez’ at reduced cost, and German pressure for equal treatment within NATO on nuclear matters. Despite extensive high-level discussion, the plans were finally abandoned in mid-1968, as Labour moved more decisively to forsake the world role.