Country survey X: Defence spending in Turkey

This paper provides a country survey of the Turkish defence economy. Turkey is a member of NATO alliance and is strategically located between Europe and Middle East. Moreover, Turkey has a high defence burden and high economic growth. The first part of the survey presents a brief economic background of Turkey, its armed forces, the defence industry, its modernisation and trends in Turkish defence expenditure. The rest of the paper focuses on the relationships between defence spending and economic growth. The effect of defence spending on economic growth is econometrically estimated using a supply side model. Both externality effects and the size effect of defence spending are estimated for Turkey. The study concludes that defence expenditure stimulates economic growth while externalities from the defence sector to the rest of economy are negative for Turkey.     

The Effects of Defence Spending Reductions: A CGE Estimation of the Foregone Peace Dividend in the Case of Greece

With the collapse of bipolarity and the end of the East-West armaments race, defence budgets have shrunk and military expenditures across many countries have fallen, opening-up the prospect of potential beneficial economic spin-offs. In the case of Greece, a country with a higher than average defence burden, military spending has not exhibited similar downward trends as it has done in other members of NATO and the European Union. The paper, using a Computable General Equilibrium model, estimates through simulations the effects on the Greek economy had reductions in current defence spending been equal to the NATO average. The results from the CGE estimations suggest that a shift of expenditure from defence into non-defence public spending would have an appreciable beneficial impact.     

Country survey IX: Spain

From the early 1980s Spain embarked on a wide‐ranging process of military reform, from organisational changes to defence industrial policies. Investment in military equipment was set to grow, policies were drawn up to foster the domestic defence industrial base, defence R&D rocketed, and Spain joined a myriad of international arms development programmes. Yet, by 1991 the process of reform had run out of steam. Expenditure planning proved unreliable, and firms suffered from sharp cutbacks in procurement expenditure. The model of defence industrial growth sketched in the mid‐1980s had floundered. The Spanish case provides an example of how the quest to maximise defence procurement from domestic sources can fall victim to industrial and budgetary constraints. Spanish defence producers are now becoming increasingly intertwined with foreign defence companies.     

Country survey XI: Defence and the Israeli economy

The literature on economic aspects of defence in Israel is critically reviewed by subject: measuring the defence burden, the determinants of defence spending, the effects of defence spending on the economy, and the military‐industrial complex. An overview of the Israeli economy is provided, and some new econometric findings on the determinants of defence spending are presented. The paper concludes by addressing policy issues in the context of Israel's jubilee.     

DETERMINING THE DEFENCE INDUSTRIAL BASE

This paper models the determination of the defence industrial base – the number of different military systems a country decides to maintain. High R&D costs means that few countries can afford to produce major weapons systems and the producers also import systems. Non‐producers rely on imports and we assume their demand is driven by regional arms races. Military capability is determined by the number of systems and the quantity and quality of each. We examine how the defence industrial base is influenced by military expenditures, R&D costs, export controls, the nature of regional arms races and a variety of other factors.     

Using the Feder-Ram and Military Keynesian Models to Examine the Link Between Defence Spending and Economic Growth in Sri Lanka

This study uses the Feder-Ram model in conjunction with the military Keynesian model to examine the nexus between defence spending and economic growth in Sri Lanka. We find that the Keynesian aggregate demand model is better suited to analyse the link than the Feder-Ram model for the case of Sri Lanka. Based upon our results we expect a higher economic growth rate in Sri Lanka if more public resources are diverted from the defence to civilian sectors of the economy, now that the war between the government and separatist guerrillas has come to an end. However, recent post war events cast doubt upon whether a diversion of sources from military to non-military spending will actually occur. We conclude that the sanguine predictions of our economic analysis are entirely dependent upon the political decisions of the Sri Lankan government for their realization.     

Is there a Greek‐Turkish arms race?: Evidence from cointegration and causality tests†

Greece and Turkey are both members of NATO and are two of the principal players in the Balkan region. Their respective defence burdens (i.e. the share of military expenditure to GDP) are the highest in NATO. Their bilateral relations are marred by serious friction and conflict of interest and have on a number of occasions come close to an armed confrontation. Their strategic interaction and mutual weapons build‐up has recently attracted the attention of researchers in the field testing the hypothesis of a Greek‐Turkish arms race with conflicting results. This paper, using cointegration and causality tests, finds evidence of a systematic armaments competition between the two countries provided that a defence policy regime shift estimated to occur in 1985 is explicitly taken into consideration. This policy regime change is associated with the stagnation of defence spending in Greece owing to the gradual deterioration of Greek public finances over the last decade.     

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EXTERNAL DEBT,DEFENCE EXPENDITURES AND GNP REVISITED: THE CASE OF TURKEY

This paper contributes to the continuing debate on the economic effects of military expenditure by undertaking a case study of Greece. Within Europe Greece provides a particularly interesting object of study. It has the highest military burden in Europe and NATO, is the only European Union country situated in the unstable environment of the Balkans, faces a military threat from Turkey, and has a very weak economy. After some background analysis of the economy and military expenditure, the paper investigates the determinants of Greek military expenditure as well as whether the high military burden has played an important role in Greece's poor economic performance over the period 1960–1996. It estimates a Keynesian simultaneous equation model with a supply side, which allows the indirect effects of military expenditure to be captured explicitly. It concludes that the major determinants of Greek defence spending are not economic but strategic (the threat of war) and that the direct effect of defence spending on economic growth as well as the indirect effects through savings and trade balance are all significantly negative. On the basis of such strong results, the paper concludes that defence spending is harmful for the Greek economy.     

France and its allies: A comparative study of defence spending trends since 1985*

Within the EU France devotes to defence the largest financial and human resources although it is not the richest country, nor has it the largest population or labour force. The cost of nuclear weapons accounts for only a small fraction of this abnormally high French defence effort. If France had restructured its military capabilities at the same rate as its principal Allies during the 1985–1994 period, then French defence outlays would be about 20% less than at present. The fundamental reasons for France's excess defence outlay comprise virtual total dependence on French sources for equipment, produced in very small numbers; a military presence outside of Europe; and too many personnel. These deficiencies, and the consequent absence hitherto of a “peace dividend”, indicate a failure to identify the country's real strategic requirements, and a lack of will to reorganise efficiently French defence. The recently announced reform towards an all‐professional force is unlikely to achieve the potential and desirable improvement in cost‐effectiveness.     

Country Survey I–Military Spending in India 1

After a brief survey of the Indian economy, we survey the supply and demand of military expenditures in India over the last four decades. The causes of military expenditures appear to include regional rivalries and protracted conflicts, but it has proven difficult to delineate these with empirical models. The effects of military spending in India on economic growth appear to be benign, despite much speculation to the contrary. However, the opportunity costs of defence spending are shown to be considerable. We conclude with speculation about the role of debt and debt servicing in retarding future economic growth in India. We also speculate about the potential for the creation of a war economy in India.     

The Demand for Military Expenditure in Europe: The Role of Fiscal Space in the Context of a Resurgent Russia

A variant of established work on the demand for military expenditure is developed based on a practical concept of fiscal space from the perspective of short-term government choices concerning public expenditures. A new indicator, referred to as fiscal capacity, is defined and used as a candidate explanatory variable in an empirical model of European defence spending over the 2007–2016 period. Fiscal capacity is found to outperform simpler measurements of economic conditions, notably GDP growth forecasts, in explaining changes in defence spending efforts as a share of GDP. Regarding security environment variables, the results suggest that Russia has recently come to be seen as a potential military threat by European nations, leading to defence spending increases, the more so the shorter the distance to stationed or deployed Russian forces, and particularly so by those European nations that have a land border with Russia. A prospective exercise is then carried out in order to assess the capacity of EU member states that are also members of NATO to reach NATO’s 2% goal for defence spending over a mid-term horizon.     

Guns for Butter? Empirical Evidence from China

Abstract

This study examines the causal nexus between defence spending and education expenditure in China using the bootstrap Granger full-sample causality test and sub-sample rolling window estimation. The full-sample result indicates that there is no causality between defence spending and education expenditure. By adopting a time-varying rolling window approach to revisit the dynamic causal relationships, this article identifies a negative unidirectional causality running from education expenditure to defence spending. The finding suggests that it is the education expenditure crowds out defence spending in China rather than reverse. No causality is demonstrated from defence spending to education expenditure, indicating that an increase in military spending will not crowd out expenditure on education. The results could be partly explained by that the education expenditure in China is below the requirement of corresponding economic growth, urging for more financial budget. Whereas the findings support a negative trade-off between defence and education expenditures, they refute the theory of ‘guns for butter’.     

Russia and Strategic Conventional Weapons:

ABSTRACT

Russian political leaders and military strategists are growing increasingly concerned about “strategic conventional weapons”—a broad category that appears to include all non-nuclear, high-precision, standoff weapons—and about long-range, hypersonic weapons, in particular. These concerns are complex and multifaceted (and, in some cases, contradictory), but chief among them are the beliefs that strategic conventional weapons could prove decisive in a major conflict and that Russia is lagging behind in their development. US programs to develop and acquire such weapons—namely, the Conventional Prompt Global Strike program—are of great concern to Russian strategists, who argue both that the United States seeks such weapons for potential use against Russia—its nuclear forces, in particular—and because strategic conventional weapons are more “usable” than nuclear weapons. Asymmetric responses by Russia include increased reliance on tactical nuclear weapons, efforts to enhance the survivability of its nuclear forces, and investments in air and missile defenses. There is also strong—but not completely conclusive evidence—that Russia is responding symmetrically by attempting to develop a long-range, conventionally armed boost-glide weapon.     

Country survey IV: Pakistan

This paper examines the role of the military in Pakistan, particularly in regard to civil‐military relations and defence industrialisation. Pakistan's military expenditure is relatively high, but apart from investment multipliers, little of this spending filters through to the civil sector. Pakistan's defence‐industrial strategy centres on rebuild and Chinese technological collaboration. However, while this ‘capital‐saving’ approach has merit, the strategy has thus far failed to stimulate broader civil development linkages. A conclusion of this paper is that Pakistan is failing to maximise the strategic dual‐use benefits of integrating civil‐military activity.     

An analysis of the Washington naval agreements and the economic provisions of arms control theory

During the Cold War, two contending hypotheses dominated theories concerning the economic impact of anus control. The first suggested that when certain prerequisites were fulfilled, arms control agreements served to promote lasting reduction in military spending. The second asserted that instead of promoting savings, arms control encouraged diversion of resources to more advanced and expensive weapons, thus driving defense spending higher. Through the examination of the impact of the Washington Naval Agreements on naval expenditure during the 1920s, this paper provides empirical evidence to support the latter of these competing hypotheses. The United States, Great Britain, and Japan all realized economic savings after signing the Washington Naval Agreements. However, these savings soon eroded as the powers developed more advanced weapons‐systems.     

MILITARY EXPENDITURE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN MIDDLE EASTERN COUNTRIES: A DYNAMIC PANEL DATA ANALYSIS

Defence expenditures have both costs and benefits to the economy. The costs of defence expenditures are mainly emphasized as opportunity costs. On the other hand, defence spending may have growth‐promoting potential benefits: a rise in defence spending may result in a higher aggregate demand, production and employment. This paper examines empirically the effects of military expenditures on economic growth for Middle Eastern countries and Turkey, for the time‐period 1989–1999. The relationship between military expenditure and economic growth is investigated by using cross‐section and dynamic panel estimation techniques. Empirical analysis indicates that military expenditure enhances economic growth in the Middle Eastern countries and Turkey as a whole.     

United States defence contractors and the future of military operations

ABSTRACT

The United States’ global strategic outlook has shifted markedly since the end of major combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. As the United States’ strategic posture shifts, the nature of military operations is simultaneously changing rapidly. Many analysts predict that cyber-operations, autonomous weapons systems, artificial intelligence, and clandestine special forces operations will be central features in future conflicts. Although often overlooked by scholars and policy analysts, defence contractors are integral to the development and implementation of these emerging categories of warfare. This inquiry examines the evolving nature of the American defence industry and the roles corporations play in current theatres of conflict. Surprisingly, rather than becoming less reliant on defence contractors after their much-maligned performance in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, American military and intelligence agencies have become more dependent on the private sector as technology becomes increasingly central to warfare.     

Optimal versus required defence expenditure: The case of the Greek-Turkish arms race

The aim of this paper is to indicate the extent to which the arms race against Turkey, in which Greece and Cyprus have been entangled, imposes a defence expenditure burden that is tough for the two allies to bear. To do so we have resorted to evaluating the optimal military expenditure for the two countries, allied in the context of the Integrated Defence Doctrine, which is compatible with the constraints imposed by the resources of their economies. All experiments and scenarios examined lead to the conclusion that the current defence burden of the two allies seems to be driving their economies beyond capacity limits. The fact remains, however, that under the circumstances, a one-sided disarmament policy like the one currently followed by Greece, is a risky choice given that the long-term armament programmes pursued by Turkey, whose role in this arms race has been proven as leading, leave very small room to the Greek and Cypriot sides to reduce their own defence expenditure.     

Iron Cannot Fight 1 – The Role of Technology in Current Russian Military Theory

Contemporary Russian military theory is dominated by three schools of thought: the ‘traditionalists’, the ‘modernists’ and the ‘revolutionaries’. On the role of technology in future warfare, the traditionalists argue for both high tech and massive forces at the same time. The modernists are ready to trade manpower for technology, whereas the revolutionaries give technology full priority. Both the traditionalists and the modernists believe Russia, because of the country's technological lag and limited resources, should respond asymmetrically to the Western technology challenge. The revolutionaries, on the other hand, maintain that Russia must respond in kind. If not, the country will no longer be able to defend its sovereignty. The currently ongoing radical reform of the Russian military is a partial victory for the modernists, but which model or mix of models that will dominate in the future is first of all dependent on the Russian military's purchasing power and the state of the domestic defence industry.