RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT: TRENDS IN COST AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR UK AEROSPACE

This paper, intended to stimulate debate, suggests that we are at a turning point in the history of the UK military aerospace industry. It argues that there is urgent need for a fresh vision as to how the UK military aerospace industry can both prosper and make its maximum contribution to the defence of Britain. Further, the resulting plans and policies must emphasise the robustness of defence capabilities in a future in which the only thing we can be certain is that it will be very different from the present – especially whenever defence most matters.     

‘I have seen the future and it works’: The US defence industry transformation – lessons for the UK defence industrial base

The US has embarked upon a major transformation of its approach to defence industrial base planning. Although bureaucratic and industrial inertia, as well as budgetary constraints, may delay transformation, its effects will lead to radical changes in the US defence industrial base with new entrants and new combinations of players. The UK, with more modest defence ambitions, capabilities and budget, will seek to keep in touch with the US. However, a commercially‐led drive to embed UK industry even more deeply in the US defence market could be the last step in creating a largely US–UK North Atlantic relationship, with much of Europe very much a subsidiary business concern. This contains a risk that the UK will become increasingly dependent on the US for design and integration of major systems and national defence industrial capability focused on a limited number of niche technologies.     

The future of the defence firm: the case of the UK aerospace industry

The focus of this paper is the future of the defence firm within the context of the UK aerospace industry and its supply chain. The analysis considers aerospace markets and the aerospace industry in the UK before assessing the future of the defence/aerospace firm as a case study. The paper concludes that its future in terms of the strategic and important aerospace industry is uncertain. The corporate governance of the defence firm will have to change to reflect the hollowing‐out of the firm as the industry experiences significantly less vertical integration. The emphasis of the future defence/aerospace firm will be on ‘buy’ and not necessarily ‘make’. There will also be fewer independent defence aerospace firms as horizontal integration will occur across air, land and sea platforms as well as civil and defence aerospace firms. Indeed, conglomerate integration may even occur with cost pressures and market forces ensuring that merger activity goes beyond defence and aerospace into wider manufacturing industries and, in some cases, service industries in global markets.     

The defence firm of the future

This paper offers the personal view of a senior executive in the Defence Procurement Agency about the future requirements of the defence industry’s principal UK customer. The focus here is on trying to identify the type of corporate behaviour and range of skill sets that the UK Government will need from defence suppliers, both primes and supply chain companies in the future. The concluding message from this ‘Customer View’ is that there is likely to be a continuing market for the company that specializes in delivering defence capability. It will be a company that will be looking for a long‐term relationship, with a specialist knowledge of its various national customers and a willingness to work openly and closely with them. It will be agile in its ability to bring together diverse technologies, to package them as a system and to deliver them either as hardware or as a service. Such suppliers will also need to innovate and to adapt at least as rapidly as the threats that they seek to counter.     

‘A fly in outer space’: Soviet ballistic missile defence during the Khrushchev period

Although the Soviet missile defence effort was begun to protect the USSR from attack by nuclear missiles, Khrushchev was quick to see its political value, and used the prospect of an anti‐ballistic missile system to emphasize Soviet technological superiority. Within the Soviet armed forces there was widespread consensus about the importance of ABM's damage‐limiting role. The debates about strategy for future war in Soviet military publications demonstrate that support in the armed forces for an ABM capability transcended service loyalties and remained remarkably strong even after 1962, when technical problems and an effort to improve relations with the US following the Cuban Missile Crisis meant that the missile defence project no longer enjoyed the public backing of senior Party and military figures.     

THEORY AND APPLICATION TO THE US MILITARY

An ever‐growing share of defence R&D expenditures is being dedicated to the development and fielding of integrative technologies that enable separate individual systems to work in a coordinated and synergistic fashion as a single system. This study explores the optimal defence budget allocation to the development and acquisition of weapon systems and to the development of integrative technologies. We develop a suitable optimization framework, and then use it to derive the optimal budget allocation and analyse its properties. Finally, we use US defence budget data to calibrate the parameters of the model and provide a quantitative measure for the apparent US military supremacy.     

United States defence contractors and the future of military operations

ABSTRACT

The United States’ global strategic outlook has shifted markedly since the end of major combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. As the United States’ strategic posture shifts, the nature of military operations is simultaneously changing rapidly. Many analysts predict that cyber-operations, autonomous weapons systems, artificial intelligence, and clandestine special forces operations will be central features in future conflicts. Although often overlooked by scholars and policy analysts, defence contractors are integral to the development and implementation of these emerging categories of warfare. This inquiry examines the evolving nature of the American defence industry and the roles corporations play in current theatres of conflict. Surprisingly, rather than becoming less reliant on defence contractors after their much-maligned performance in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, American military and intelligence agencies have become more dependent on the private sector as technology becomes increasingly central to warfare.     

无人系统路线图自主性分析

在第三次抵消战略的驱动下,受军费预算不断削减、内部成本日益增长的影响,为遏制中俄等国日益崛起的军事力量,谋求和维持未来军事优势,美军只能将目光聚焦于创新作战概念,发展以无人系统为代表的更具成本效益和作战威力的武器装备。随着人工智能和机器学习技术的进步,无人系统的自主能力得到了大幅提高,未来将可能根据任务需要,实现从远程控制、自动化系统到近乎完全自主。本文认为,美国国防部除将加快发展人工智能和机器学习技术,聚焦于自主系统带来的作战效率和效能的提高,持续评估自主系统以提升作战人员的信任水平之外,也正加紧制定相关的政策法规,以确保自主系统的研发更加规范有序。     

Chains,networks and shifting paradigms: the UK defence industry supply system

Industrial supply chains have emerged as the focus of much economic and business research over the previous decade and defence is no exception. This paper reviews contributions made to the body of knowledge in this field with particular attention given to primary research undertaken on the UK defence industrial supply system. In doing so, the author assesses the quantity and quality of knowledge available to researchers, analysts and policy makers. There have been a number of valuable contributions to the literature and this paper reveals a subject that is extremely complicated, dynamic and yet under‐researched. It is suggested that it may well be this complexity and dynamism, coupled with difficulty in accessing data, that has inhibited research development in this field. Defence industry supply systems are repeatedly referred to as ‘chains’; however, primary research consistently suggests this is a misnomer – the author concludes that future analysis of the UK defence sector must embrace directly the economics of networks if understanding of the same is to progress and industrial ‘invisibility’ is to be avoided.     

Patents and Dual-use Technology: An Empirical Study of the World's Largest Defence Companies

Abstract

This paper examines the generation of technological knowledge by leading companies in the defence industry. In particular, we test whether the characteristics of large defence companies are related to both the production of different types of patents (civilian, military and mixed), and the generation of dual-use technologies. To explore these links, we rely on economic data for the top 100 defence companies from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute database, and patent information from the Worldwide Patent Statistical Database. Our results show that the relationship between the production of civilian patents and the size of the company is positive and significant. However, this relationship does not hold for the production of military patents. Furthermore, the military commercial profile is unrelated to the generation of military patents. Regarding the involvement in dual-use technologies, firms engaged in dual-use are those with higher military sales, a greater number of employees and a larger number of patents (civilian, military and mixed) than those not engaged in dual-use. Furthermore, we found a skill effect (more involvement in dual-use per employee) in European firms compared to US firms. These findings help to identify which firms should be targeted by government policies if increasing dual-use technologies becomes a political objective.     

A Revolution Too Far? US Defence Innovation,Europe and NATO’s Military-Technological Gap

The United States is launching another defence innovation initiative to offset the growing military-technological might of countries such as China, Russia and Iran. However, by utilising emerging technologies from the commercial sector to achieve greater military power the US may further open up the technology gap within NATO. This raises serious questions for NATO’s European allies. This article probes the nature of the US’s latest innovation strategy and sets it within the strategic context facing Europe today. Whether European governments, firms and militaries will join the US in its new defence innovation drive will hinge on politico-military and industrial considerations.     

Estimating defence budget saving from disarmament: the United States’ case

Probing the technology in the production of US national defence by using a dynamic cost‐function model with adjustment costs, this paper evaluates the effect of reducing the level of national defence on the defence budget saving. Our inquiry involves estimating the defence production structure without output data for non‐market goods that are normally unavailable. Our findings include: (i) the United States behaves rationally to minimize cost in the production of national defence; (ii) the adjustment costs are larger in disarmament than in military build‐up; (iii) due to the adjustment costs peculiar to disarmament, the defence budget saving from disarmament appears small, but cutbacks allow great savings on the defence budget.     

Iron Cannot Fight 1 – The Role of Technology in Current Russian Military Theory

Contemporary Russian military theory is dominated by three schools of thought: the ‘traditionalists’, the ‘modernists’ and the ‘revolutionaries’. On the role of technology in future warfare, the traditionalists argue for both high tech and massive forces at the same time. The modernists are ready to trade manpower for technology, whereas the revolutionaries give technology full priority. Both the traditionalists and the modernists believe Russia, because of the country's technological lag and limited resources, should respond asymmetrically to the Western technology challenge. The revolutionaries, on the other hand, maintain that Russia must respond in kind. If not, the country will no longer be able to defend its sovereignty. The currently ongoing radical reform of the Russian military is a partial victory for the modernists, but which model or mix of models that will dominate in the future is first of all dependent on the Russian military's purchasing power and the state of the domestic defence industry.     

Military expenditure and unemployment in the OECD

The effect of military expenditure on employment is a matter of considerable importance. However, few of the standard economic analyses of unemployment take any explicit account of variations in military expenditure in their models. The purpose of this paper is to assess whether the prevalent neglect of this variable in labour economics is justified.

The paper briefly surveys previous estimates made of the employment effects of military expenditure. It then considers evidence from the simple dynamic reduced form regressions estimated on long historical series for the US and the UK and pooled post‐war data for 11 OECD countries. It does not suggest that the share of military expenditure is a significant influence on the unemployment rate. This implies that in analysing unemployment no special account need be taken of military expenditure and that the fear that reductions in the share of military expenditure will be associated with higher average unemployment levels is misplaced.     

How to Last Alone at the Top: US Strategic Planning for the Unipolar Era

This article investigates how key actors within the US defence policy community realigned their interests to forge a new consensus on the redirection of US defence strategy following the ‘peace shock’ they faced with the collapse of bipolarity. This consensus centred on the idea that achieving US security in the ‘age of uncertainty’ demanded overwhelming US military power, which was widely interpreted as necessitating military capabilities to fight multiple major theatre wars simultaneously against regional ‘Third World’ adversaries. This helped to preserve many of the principal pillars of US Cold War defence policy through deflecting calls for more radical organisational changes and deeper cuts to defence budgets.     

Estimated UK employment dependent on ministry of defence expenditure and defence exports

The Ministry of Defence (MOD) has published estimates of the number of average full‐time UK industry employees dependent on MOD expenditure and defence exports for a number of years. This paper provides the outcome of a recent review of the process used. The method of deriving MOD and defence export final demand vectors, and calculating from these estimates of direct employment (i.e. that in supplying companies) and indirect employment (i.e. that incurred through the supply chain) are described. Difficulties with the data are explored. Alternative approaches, methods used in other countries and challenges posed by changing MOD administrative systems are briefly discussed.     

Country survey VI: Australia

Australia is a geographically large country, with the world's longest national coastline to defend, but a relatively small economy of some 17.5 million people. Since World War II, Australia has faced the dilemma of how to structure defence policy in the absence of an identifiable threat. Its policy of self‐reliance aims to permit Australia to conduct defensive operations in the event of low/medium level threats without depending immediately on its allies. This is to be achieved through the technological sophistication of defence equipment, a highly professional but small defence force and local industry support.

The burden of defence, measured as the share of defence outlay in GDP declined from about 3% in 1971–72 to about 2.3% in 1993–94. It has been the Government's policy to encourage the development of local defence‐related industry, in particular in areas such as: electronics/optics; communications and information technology; aerospace; shipbuilding and repair, munitions; and land vehicles. However, defence procurement has a small impact on the Australian economy as a whole.     

Bridging the Gap: Mobilisation Constraints and Contractor Support to US and UK Military Operations

The increasing use of private military and security companies (PMSCs) has attracted considerable scholarly attention due to its corrosive effects on US democracy. Drawing on neoclassical realism, this article provides a comparative dimension to the study of the political drivers of military privatisation by analysing contractor support to US and UK operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Domestic political constraints have shaped both US and UK response to the need for more boots on the ground, increasing the propensity to use contractors as a force multiplier in spite of their problematic impact on military effectiveness.     

DETERMINING THE DEFENCE INDUSTRIAL BASE

This paper models the determination of the defence industrial base – the number of different military systems a country decides to maintain. High R&D costs means that few countries can afford to produce major weapons systems and the producers also import systems. Non‐producers rely on imports and we assume their demand is driven by regional arms races. Military capability is determined by the number of systems and the quantity and quality of each. We examine how the defence industrial base is influenced by military expenditures, R&D costs, export controls, the nature of regional arms races and a variety of other factors.     

Estimating non‐transparent military expenditures: The case of china (PRC)∗

Data limitations arising from non‐transparency in military expenditure reporting impose significant constraints on economists studying country and comparative developments in this field. This article focuses on the case of China. It reviews the recent literature on China's military expenditure, examines the variance in published estimates, and identifies three factors which help explain the variance: budgetary falsification; non‐budgeted PLA revenue; and the US dollar purchasing‐power parity of the yuan. Conclusions emphasize important policy implications of such variance and suggest a more active role for defence economists in a field of research generating considerable attention from international relations scholars.