Is there a Greek‐Turkish arms race?: Evidence from cointegration and causality tests†

Greece and Turkey are both members of NATO and are two of the principal players in the Balkan region. Their respective defence burdens (i.e. the share of military expenditure to GDP) are the highest in NATO. Their bilateral relations are marred by serious friction and conflict of interest and have on a number of occasions come close to an armed confrontation. Their strategic interaction and mutual weapons build‐up has recently attracted the attention of researchers in the field testing the hypothesis of a Greek‐Turkish arms race with conflicting results. This paper, using cointegration and causality tests, finds evidence of a systematic armaments competition between the two countries provided that a defence policy regime shift estimated to occur in 1985 is explicitly taken into consideration. This policy regime change is associated with the stagnation of defence spending in Greece owing to the gradual deterioration of Greek public finances over the last decade.     

An Empirical Analysis of the Arms Race Between South and North Korea

This study analyses an arms race between South and North Korea over the period 1963–2000. Despite the strategic importance of the Korean Peninsula, the arms race between South and North Korea has rarely been studied. In this study, the South–North arms race is empirically estimated using Richardson’s action–reaction model. The pattern of South–North arms race between the Cold War (1963–1989) and the post‐Cold War eras (1990–2000) as well as the existence of an arms race is examined comparing both countries’ defence spending, number of military personnel and tactical aircraft.     

A RANDOM RATIONING MECHANISM WHICH REDUCES THE RISKS OF NO SON LEFT AT HOME

This paper empirically re‐examines the long‐run co‐movements and the causal relationships between GDP and defence expenditures in a multivariate model with real defence expenditure per capita (ME), real GDP per capita (GDP), and real capital stock per capita (K). We apply the view of the aggregate production function to construct the empirical model. Using up‐to‐date data for 27 OECD countries and 62 non‐OECD countries for the 1988–2003 period, we combine cross‐sectional and time series data to re‐investigate the relationship between GDP and ME. Previous studies using time series data may have yielded misleading results on account of the short time span of typical datasets. By contrast, we use recently developed panel unit root tests and heterogeneous panel cointegration tests, and conclude that there is fairly strong evidence in favour of the hypothesis of a long‐run equilibrium relationship between GDP and ME. The long‐run panel regression parameter results, such as the fully modified OLS, indicate that a positive relationship between GDP and ME only holds for OECD countries, whereas a negative relationship from ME to GDP only exists in non‐OECD countries under examination and in the panel as a whole. Furthermore, by implementing the dynamic panel‐based error correction model, we determine that GDP and ME lack short‐run causalities, but do show long‐run bidirectional causalities in both OECD and non‐OECD countries.     

Defense spending and economic growth across the Taiwan straits: a threshold regression model

This paper employs both linear and non‐linear models to investigate the relationship between national defense spending and economic growth for Taiwan and China. Using data from 1953–2000 on defense spending, GDP, import, export and capital, we find that China's defense spending leads that of Taiwan. There exists the phenomenon of an arms race between both countries when official Chinese data are used. On the one hand, feedback relations prevail between economic growth and defense spending growth in Taiwan. On the other hand, China's national defense is found to lead economic growth.     

Budget allocation,national security,military intelligence,and human capital: a dynamic model

This study develops a dynamic model that integrates military intelligence into the defense capability of the country and the optimal allocation of its government budget. We assert that the effectiveness of the country’s military intelligence is contingent on the quality of its human capital, which, in turn, implies a long-term positive relationship between the government’s various civilian expenditures and its capacity to achieve a cost-effective intelligence and, hence, military capability. This relationship is developed within a multiple-period arms race model between two rivals. Using this model and stylized data for the Israeli–Syrian arms race, we show that an appropriate budget shift from defense to civilian expenditures during the initial periods of the planning horizon will gradually (over a decade, say) increase the quality of human capital in the country and, thus, the effectiveness of its intelligence, which, in turn, will increase the country’s future security and welfare.     

DETERMINING THE DEFENCE INDUSTRIAL BASE

This paper models the determination of the defence industrial base – the number of different military systems a country decides to maintain. High R&D costs means that few countries can afford to produce major weapons systems and the producers also import systems. Non‐producers rely on imports and we assume their demand is driven by regional arms races. Military capability is determined by the number of systems and the quantity and quality of each. We examine how the defence industrial base is influenced by military expenditures, R&D costs, export controls, the nature of regional arms races and a variety of other factors.     

Defence spending and economic growth: A causal analysis for Greece and Turkey*

There are a number of studies which consider the relation between military spending and economic growth using Granger causality techniques rather than a well‐defined economic model. Some have used samples of groups of countries, finding no consistent results. Others have focused on case studies of individual countries, which has the advantage of the researchers bringing to bear much more data than the cross country samples and a greater knowledge of the structure of the economy and the budget. This paper adds to the literature by providing an analysis of two countries, Greece and Turkey, which are particularly interesting case studies given their high military burdens, the poor relations between the two and the resulting arms race in the area. In addition to analysing the data using standard “pre‐cointegration” Granger causality techniques, this paper employs modern vector autoregressive (VAR) methodology that utilises cointegration via Granger's representation theorem. The standard Granger causality tests suggest a positive effect of changing military burden on growth for Greece, but this is not sustained when the cointegration between output and military burden is taken into account. The only evidence of significant Granger causality is a negative impact of military burden on growth in Turkey.     

War and punishment the implication of arms purchases in maritime Southeast Asia

While there is no arms race currently underway in Southeast Asia, there should still be concern for the effects of a regional arms buildup. No state currently possesses, or is seeking to possess, the capabilities necessary to dominate the core territory of its potential adversaries. However, the types of weapons being procured favour punishment based strategies that are highly unstable and war‐prone. Geographic vulnerability to blockade and interdiction make Southeast Asia's security dilemma particularly acute.     

Financial versus human resources in the Greek‐Turkish arms race: A forecasting investigation using artificial neural networks

This paper aims at forecasting the burden on the Greek economy resulting from the arms race against Turkey and at concentrating on the leading determinants of this burden. The military debt and the defence share of GDP are employed alternatively in order to approximate the measurement of the arms race pressure on Greece, and the method used is that of artificial neural networks. The use of a wide variety of explanatory variables in combination with the promising results derived, suggest that the impact on the Greek economy resulting from this arms race is determined, to a large, extent, by demographic factors which strongly favour the Turkish side. Prediction on both miltary debt and defence expenditure exhibited highly satisfactory accuracy, while the estimation of input significance, indicates that variables describing the Turkish side are often dominant over the corresponding Greek ones.     

The structure of the defense industry and the security needs of the country: a differentiated products model

This paper models the interactions between the defense needs of the USA and Western Europe, which produce several heterogeneous defense goods, and the defense industry market structure. The results show that net defense costs of the USA and Europe are lower when the number of defense firms in each arms‐producing country is small and when the world prices of the defense goods are high. The model predicts that the increase in world prices will crowd‐out countries in the developing world from the market for modern weapon systems and may force them to develop and use ‘cheap and dirty’ weapon systems.     

The inherent propensity toward peace or war embodied in weaponry

Thomas Schelling argues that armed adversaries face an inherent propensity toward peace or war embodied in their weaponry, geography and military organizations. Inherent propensity is the idea that there are characteristics embodied in the weapons that push adversaries toward peace or war, independent of the goals of the decision‐makers, the political disagreement between adversaries, and misperceptions about mutual resolve and hostility. We theoretically illustrate inherent propensity in conventional and nuclear arms settings using Lanchester and Intriligator war models. Our work extends the Intriligator‐Brito model, identifies when the competing Richardson and Intriligator‐Brito views of the relationship between arms races and war are correct, illustrates the stabilizing/destabilizing effects of alliances, and highlights the importance of arms quality control in the US‐USSR relationship.     

Asymmetric effects of military expenditure between Turkey and Greece

One of the major topics of the defense economics literature regarding Turkey and Greece has been the empirical modeling of various aspects of arms racing. However, despite a considerable amount of research, little evidence has been found in favor of an arms race between the two countries. In the literature, this failure of applied studies has been attributed, among other reasons, to the sensitivity of the results to the underlying model specification, to small sample size, and to measurement issues. This study uses novel, nonlinear, models to investigate the possible relationship between the military expenditures of the two countries. It is assumed that if there are two regimes characterizing the low (or negative) and high-growth military expenditure periods, the growth rates of one country's military expenditure may have distinct effects on the military expenditure regimes of the other country or may contribute to the change from one regime to another. The nonlinear models examined are Smooth Transition Regression models (STRs). Strong evidence of nonlinearity for Greece is found, with asymmetry relating to two distinct regimes through lagged Turkish military expenditure changes.     

The Determinants of Arms Production

This study analyzes the determinants of arms production in 15 countries using annual panel data from 1997 to 2002. The results suggest that real GDP per capita, military expenditures, arms exports, and arms imports are positively related to arms production.     

The Gravity of Arms

The aim of this paper is to investigate the determinants of international arms transfers in a gravity model framework. By distinguishing between the decision to export arms (extensive margin) and the value of the arms exported (intensive margin), while also considering its interdependence, is what differentiates this paper from previous research. A theoretically justified gravity model of trade augmented with political and security motives is estimated using a two-stage panel data approach for 104 exporting countries over the period from 1950 to 2007. In addition to the usual gravity variables related to the economic mass of the trading countries and the trade cost factors, the model is extended with political and security factors. The level of democracy in both trading partners, political differences between trading partners and voting similarity with the United States in the UN General Assembly of the countries engaged in trade are the main political factors, whereas the existence of conflicts, military pacts, and embargoes are taken as security motives. The key result indicates that both political and security motives are an important determinant of an arms trade, but their effects on the extensive margin of exports (the decision to order a transfer) differs from their effect on the intensive margin (average value of exports). Moreover, the relative importance of the factors under study has changed since 1989. In the post-cold war period, countries that are less democratic are more likely to export arms, military pacts are less relevant and embargoes play a role.     

The financing factor in military trade

Available sources value transfers of weapons irrespective of whether they are paid for and how. Data from the U.S. indicates that the shares of arms given for free or on credit are high. If other arms exporters, all military aid and all credits used for military purposes are considered, which is done here on the basis of rough estimates and an opportunity cost model, the true cash costs of weapons in the year of the actual transfer are small. On the other hand, the financial burden of earlier arms imports via debt service has grown over time. It most probably exceeded the true cash cost of imports of arms in the late 1980s. Large differences between arms transfer data and the actual true costs of arms transfers means that analysis of the economic effects of arms imports without considering these financial aspects makes little sense.     

ARMS CONTROL CONTINUUMS

In July 2001, member states will gather in New York for the UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Arms in All its Aspects. It represents part of the effort to establish controls on small arms and light weapons. This article argues that it is possible that nuclear and conventional arms control represent two ends of a continuum, with common goals and a common set of mechanisms and processes at work. A decade after the end of the Cold War, it is not surprising that the international community is working on mechanisms to deal with conventional arms. The existence of a continuum and connections between conventional and nuclear arms control is less evident. The two arms control communities appear to function in isolation of each other. The return to the debate on small arms and light weapons echoes post-World War I and II periods. The fact that small arms control is back on the agenda within the context of the UN may signify recognition that any kind of arms control serves the same purpose—preventing and mitigating the effects and duration of, and bringing an end to conflict.     

REGULATING SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS

One of the biggest challenges currently facing the developing world is the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. Arms control and disarmament have been part of the diplomatic agenda since the middle of the 19th century and were two of the most important issues facing the world's major powers during the 1960s and 1970s. When the Cold War ended, different instruments had been developed to negotiate the control over nuclear, chemical, biological and conventional weapons. However, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons poses new challenges to the international system. While control over legitimate use is laudable, the major problem relates to the illicit proliferation external to the state system. To address this challenge, international and national law faces the challenge of regime creation, and of the implementation and enforcement of international and national standards. Possible approaches to regime creation are discussed in this essay and recent examples are provided of how these were applied in practice to the issue of small arms and light weapons by the OAS, ECOWAS, SADC, the OAU and in East Africa.     

An analysis of the Washington naval agreements and the economic provisions of arms control theory

During the Cold War, two contending hypotheses dominated theories concerning the economic impact of anus control. The first suggested that when certain prerequisites were fulfilled, arms control agreements served to promote lasting reduction in military spending. The second asserted that instead of promoting savings, arms control encouraged diversion of resources to more advanced and expensive weapons, thus driving defense spending higher. Through the examination of the impact of the Washington Naval Agreements on naval expenditure during the 1920s, this paper provides empirical evidence to support the latter of these competing hypotheses. The United States, Great Britain, and Japan all realized economic savings after signing the Washington Naval Agreements. However, these savings soon eroded as the powers developed more advanced weapons‐systems.     

Arms Racing and the Costs of Arms Imports: A Stochastic Model

The paper draws on the demand for arms imports model of Levine and Smith (1995, 1997) using stochastic processes of the birth-death type in steady state. It assumes two antagonistic regional players engaged in an armaments race satisfying their demand for military hardware through imports from the international market. The paper examines the effects that arms imports have on the military balance between the two recipient countries. It constructs a state space of possible outcomes in terms of the military balance/imbalance between the two countries involved. A new variable is introduced which tries to encapsulate the absolute difference in their respective security functions at any moment in time. This variable affects the transition from one state of affairs to the other.