Doing Away with “Legitimate Authority”

ABSTRACT

I argue in this article that traditional just war theory did allow private, indeed even individual war, and that arguments in support of a legitimate authority criterion, let alone in support of the “priority” of this criterion, fail. I further argue that what motivates the insistence on “legitimate authority” is the assumption that doing away with this criterion will lead to chaos and anarchy. I demonstrate that the reasoning, if any, underlying this assumption is philosophically confused. The fact of the matter is that wars need not necessarily be authorized by some higher authority (such as a king, president, or parliament) in order to be justified, and this moral fact does not need to lead to chaos and anarchy. Accordingly, the criterion of legitimate authority cannot be relied on to delegitimate individual war, private war, guerrilla war, or even terrorism. Finally, I consider some other defenses of authorization and demonstrate that the “authorization” these accounts defend is either not needed for justification or already provided by other just war criteria or, indeed, entirely fictitious.     

How do sources of traditional legitimacy constrain popular uprisings? The case of the Kingdom of Swaziland

ABSTRACT

Research concerning authoritarian stability and peace usually investigates co-optation and repression. Recently, several studies argue that traditional legitimacy is also important for stability in monarchies. However, existing research rarely considers how legitimacy constrains rebellions and help the royal family to stay in power. Hence, this article explores the causal links between sources of traditional legitimacy and absence of uprisings. The study investigates the relationship with a case study of the Kingdom of Swaziland. In line with my expectations, I find a causal relationship between sources of traditional legitimacy and absence of popular uprisings. First, the royal family actively uses traditional legitimacy to justify their rule. Second, the Afrobarometer indicates that the Swazi people trust the King more than citizens in other African countries trust their head of state. Third, opposition actors have limited opportunities to mobilize the broader population against the monarchy. Fourth, traditional legitimacy dampens ongoing protests and thereby hinders their escalation into popular uprisings or political violence. Repression is clearly an important explanation for limited rebellion in Swaziland, but this article shows that also traditional legitimacy sources play a role.     

In Defense of Mercy

ABSTRACT

Though it is legally permissible to kill combatants in war, unless they are rendered hors de combat, the existence of “Naked Soldiers” raises an important moral question: should combatants kill vulnerable enemy combatants or show mercy towards them? Most philosophers who address this question argue that it is morally permissible to kill the Naked Soldier given the extended notion of self-defense during war. They ground their arguments in a form of collectivism. In this article, I use Larry May’s argument. He offers an approach that extends the principle of discrimination that would apply also to combatants. Instead of assuming all combatants are de facto dangerous, this approach would allow for nuance in targeting the enemy and showing mercy when enemy combatants clearly pose no danger, in other words, when they are Naked Soldiers. I defend this view against two criticisms: Noam Zohar’s view of armies as complex collectives and Stephen Deakin’s view that a policy that spares Naked Soldiers would be open to abuse. I argue that it is not only morally suspect to kill Naked Soldiers, but also it is within the spirit of both international laws governing war and the just war tradition to offer mercy whenever possible.     

The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad factor in the Mali crisis

Mali has been a battleground for more than a year now. While the armed conflict came in the aftermath of the Libyan crisis that left the regional security environment depleted, it also served as a catalyst for the collapse of state authority in Mali. This created conditions conducive for the proliferation of, and attacks by, radical religious armed groups in the northern regions of the country, including the Tuareg armed movement: the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA). But, far from being a new phenomenon, the Tuareg-led armed insurrection in the northern regions is as old as the post-colonial Malian state, and continues to pose tremendous challenges in West Africa and the Sahel region for both regional and extra-regional actors. The recent crisis in the Sahel region is seen as one of the most serious since the end of the Cold War, with anticipated dire long-term impacts on the security of the region and beyond. While attention is predominantly focused on defeating the jihadist groups that have threatened the survival of the Malian state, one must not lose sight of the fact that the ‘Tuareg Factor’, as represented by the rebellion launched by MNLA, remains critical both in terms of appreciating the deterioration of the situation and attempting to frame long-lasting solutions. The paper argues that the Tuareg's persistent recourse to rebellion against Bamako needs to be understood within a historical trajectory that takes into consideration three key parameters: firstly, the post-colonial state in Mali and its African leadership's relations with the descendants of the Tuareg communities; secondly, the amalgamation created by the so-called war on terror; and, finally, the contradictions of the democratisation process of the 1990s.¹1 This article is based on field research carried out between 2008 and 2013 on the ‘Resurgence of Tuareg-led Rebellions’.     

Population transfers in counter-insurgency: a recipe for success?

Since control over the population constitutes the most crucial determinant for victory in irregular warfare, how should a state authority isolate the insurgents (the “fish” in Maoist terms) from the population (the “sea” in which the “fish” thrive)? Should a state authority simply drain the “sea” by diverting its “water” elsewhere? Does the forcible transfer of the local people who support an insurgency truly work? This article studies how the royalist regime of Greece forcibly transferred thousands of villagers (over 10% of the total population) to counter the communist insurgency during the Greek Civil War (1946–1949) and shows whether and how these deportations could be crowned with success.     

Reading the Riot Act: Toward a More Comprehensive Ban on Chemical Weapons

ABSTRACT

The recent use of chemicals in warfare in Syria and Iraq illustrates that, despite the important work of the 1997 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the world has not yet been totally successful in stopping the use of indiscriminate toxic agents in conflicts, either by states or non-state actors. Michael Crowley's excellent and timely new book, Chemical Control, analyzes the use of “riot control agents” (RCAs) and “incapacitating chemical agents” (ICAs), including launch and dispersal systems, by police, paramilitary, and military forces over the last decades and raises the challenging question about where the red line might be drawn between banned and permitted uses of chemicals. He discusses this problem not only in the context of the CWC, which allows use of RCAs for civilian riot control, but also in the context of international law, human rights, and criminal justice, including the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and other disarmament and abolition regimes. He proposes a “holistic, three-stage approach” to addressing this issue “for effective regulation or prohibition of the weapon or weapon-related technology of concern.” As we approach the global abolition of a whole class of weapons of mass destruction in the next decade or even sooner, Chemical Control is helpful in better understanding and solving the dilemma of what's actually banned or permitted under international law, and precluding states undermining the chemical weapons ban.     

Introduction: Exploring the jungle of terminology

When twentieth-century authors wrote about ‘partisan warfare’, they usually meant an insurgency or asymmetric military operations conducted against a superior force by small bands of ideologically driven irregular fighters. By contrast, originally (i.e. before the French Revolution) ‘partisan’ in French, English, and German referred only to the leader of a detachment of special forces (party, partie, Parthey, détachement) which the major European powers used to conduct special operations alongside their regular forces. Such special operations were the classic definition of ‘small war’ (petite guerre) in the late seventeenth and in the eighteenth centuries. The Spanish word ‘la guerrilla’, meaning nothing other than ‘small war’, only acquired an association with rebellion with the Spanish War of Independence against Napoleon. Even after this, however, armies throughout the world have continued to employ special forces. In the late nineteenth century, their operations have still been referred to as prosecuting ‘la guerrilla’ or ‘small war’, which existed side by side with, and was often mixed with, ‘people's war’ or popular uprisings against hated regimes.     

The Changing Nature of Legitimate Authority in the Just War Tradition

ABSTRACT

The legitimate authority principle has become reduced to the issue of state authority. In its current formulation, the state has the sole authority to wage war, and because non-state actors, by their very definition, cannot satisfy this principle, their use of force is inherently unethical. This does not reflect the reality that non-state actors are increasingly engaging in the use of force, sometimes legitimately. As a result, the legitimate authority principle can and should look beyond the state. This article navigates a terrain in which non-state actors engage in the use of force, and in which revisionist just war thinking proposes that the concept of legitimate authority is irrelevant to thinking about the ethics of war. It proposes a principled approach to the inclusion of some non-state actors under the rubric of legitimate authority. This approach draws upon the historical development of the legitimate authority principle and incorporates the factors important to early writers on the subject.     

Arrival and departure state distributions in the general bulk‐service queue

In this paper, we give an explicit relation between steady‐state probability distributions of the buffer occupancy at customer entrance and departure epochs, for the classical single‐server system G/G^[N]/1 with batch services and for the finite capacity case. The method relies on level‐crossing arguments. For the particular case of Poisson input, we also express the loss probability in terms of state probabilities at departure epochs, yielding probabilities observed by arriving customers. This work provides the “bulk queue” version of a result established by Burke, who stated the equality between probabilities at arrival and departure epochs for systems with “unit jumps.” © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 46: 107–118, 1999     

AMENDMENT TO THE AFRICAN UNION'S RIGHT TO INTERVENE

Heads of State and Government passed the first amendments to the Constitutive Act of the African Union within seven months of the launch of the organization. This article provides a legal analysis of the broadening of Article 4(h) of the Act, the right of intervention, to prevent a “serious threat to legitimate order”. It argues that this clause is inconsistent with the other grounds for intervention, which aim to protect African peoples from grave violations of human rights when their governments are unable or unwilling to do so. The amendment, by contrast, aims to uphold state security, rather than human security. The context in which this and other amendments were adapted from proposals by Libya in Durban 2002 is considered in terms of political implications for the African Union.     

On queues with dependent interarrival and service times

AnM/G/1 queueing system is studied in which the service time required by a customer is dependent on the interarrival time between his arrival and that of his predecessor Assuming the two variables are “associated,” we prove that the expected delay in this system is less than or equal to than of a conventional M/G/1 queue This conclusion has been verified via simulation by Mitchell and Paulson [9] for a special class of dependent M/M/1 queue. Their model is a special case of the one we consider here. We also study another modified GI/G/1 queue. where the arrival process and/or the service process are individually “associated”.     

The Taliban’s Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (1996–2001): ‘War-Making and State-Making’ as an Insurgency Strategy

This paper examines the institutional and functional aspects of the Taliban’s Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA). The Taliban’s coercive approach and its entire reliance on “war-making” to “state-making” shows the difficulty of the transformation of an insurgent group into a state structure. The Taliban was primarily capable of establishing a two-track system of governance. However, the assessment of the IEA’s institutional and functional capabilities shows that the military–political organization formed by the Taliban lacked statehood in all three areas of legitimacy, authority and capacity.     

THE AU MISSION IN BURUNDI

Abstract

Even though the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, MPLA) managed to take firm control of the state as the war ended in 2002, this article contends that its hegemony is not absolute. At the fringes of the state administration, emerging regional elites have established associations that seek to provide a remedy against the centralised system, which essentially deprives regions of political influence and sufficient economic resources. As in many other countries on the African continent, political identities that were legally enforced and institutionally reproduced in colonial times have hardly been transcended in the post-colonial period. Even if the associations' influence today does not yet reach further than bringing some insecurity to an otherwise secure polity dominated by the MPLA, the associations could play a role in reinforcing strong regional solidarity and give political expression to feelings of exclusion. Such sentiments could in turn lead to an increase of exclusivity ideas about citizenship, or even xenophobic violence. Much will depend on the strategies of the MPLA, and to what extent it will accommodate these emergent forces in the post-war era, not the least through the current sub-national state reforms.     

Transformation of Military Ethics During the Zhou Dynasty in Ancient China

ABSTRACT

The transformation of the governance model from a rule of virtue to political realism in China has been a topic of great interest to scholars. In this study, I examine military culture during the Zhou Dynasty and investigate the changes in ethics based on factors such as cultural values, social customs, and political structure to understand the process by which moral values have changed as the governance model transformed from rule of virtue to political realism. I found that military ethics have changed from governance through the use of rituals during the Western Zhou Dynasty to what was called “deception makes an army” during the Eastern Zhou Dynasty.     

Legitimate Authority as a Jus Ad Bellum Condition: Defense of a Procedural Requirement in Just War Theory

ABSTRACT

Today, it is widely held that while authorization may be helpful in assuring that the other jus ad bellum criteria are met, legitimate authority is not itself a condition for just recourse to war. Or, if it is necessary, it is said to be a trivial requirement, as mobilization for war requires some political authorization. Those who would retain the legitimacy requirement have differing views about who the proper authority is. I argue that, reasonably understood, legitimate authorization is necessary for jus ad bellum. Considerations of agency and consent in force combine with the social contract to commit us to deferring to recognized authorities. These obligations are strengthened by the epistemic reliability and pragmatic value conferred by governing institutions and procedures limiting recourse to war. These same rationales imply that the U.N. Security Council should regulate the international use of force. I qualify that if higher authorities fail to act, other subsidiary authorities may then authorize force. However, the move to each subsequent level of authorization must be justified. Understood in this way, the requirement that wars not be fought without legitimate authorization is a non-trivial, necessary procedural jus ad bellum condition.     

The Problem of Weak Nuclear States

Governments are increasingly recognizing the problem posed by internally weak nuclear-capable states. The problem, however, is under-theorized. This article brings together literature on sovereignty and international order, the nonproliferation regime, and weak states, and introduces new concepts to provide a more structured understanding of this problem. Insight comes from focusing attention on the function and governance of two nuclear estates (termed the production and operational estates), and on their resilience to decay and disorder occurring within the state and society. Drawing on empirical observation, the authors suggest a typology of weakness in nuclear states, involving state fragmentation typified by the former Soviet Union, the “hard weak state” typified by North Korea, and the internally conflicted state typified by Pakistan. Although these types give rise to distinctive difficulties, their alleviation depends heavily on the maintenance of internal authority within the state and estates, the presence or absence of cooperative relations, and the international regulatory framework's vitality.     

“Made in China”: an emerging brand in the global arms market

Possession of a brand is a sine qua non for economic success, not least because it connotes trust in delivering the value promised. Although Western arms exporters offer branded systems whose sales are influenced by price, there is a plethora of other economic variables, such as offset requirements and life-cycle support. Entrants to the international arms market will struggle without such arms “packages.” China’s entry, however, goes beyond the traditional economic paradigm. A four-stage historical model offers the backdrop for identifying the drivers that have forged its market entry into 55 countries worldwide. The strategy initially focused on sales of rudimentary military equipment for political purposes, but recently it has begun to commercialize exports, repositioning them from a low- to a high-tech sales trajectory. A Sino “brand” is thus emerging, reflecting both competitiveness and diplomatic considerations, especially non-interference in client state domestic affairs.     

Flowshop/no-idle or no-wait scheduling to minimize the sum of completion times

This paper deals with flowshop/sum of completion times scheduling problems, working under a “no-idle” or a “no-wait” constraint, the former prescribes for the machines to work continuously without idle intervals and the latter for the jobs to be processed continuously without waiting times between consecutive machines. Under either of the constraints the problem is unary NP-Complete for two machines. We prove some properties of the optimal schedule for n/2/F, no-idle/σC_i. For n/m/P, no-idle/σC_i, and n/m/P, no-wait/σC_i, with an increasing or decreasing series of dominating machines, we prove theorems that are the basis for polynomial bounded algorithms. All theorems are demonstrated numerically.     

Bolstering components for maximizing system lifetime

This article considers the problem of which component should be “bolstered” or “improved” in order to stochastically maximize the lifetime of a parallel system, series system, or in general, k-out-of-n system. Various ways of bolstering including active redundance, standby redundancy, and burn-in are studied. Also the method of reducing working temperature or stress level according to Arrhenius models is investigated. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 45: 497–509, 1998