TERRORISM: FACTS FROM FIGURES 1

If international terrorism is on a rising trend, an important source of confirmation or refutation of this is time‐series data on terrorist activity. Using chiefly data collected by the RAND/MIPT consortium we show using basic statistical analysis that in the period 1968–2005 the yearly number of all international terrorist incidents shows no trend over time, but fluctuates year on year in a random manner. On the other hand some indicators do show a definite trend over time, principally the steady rise in the number of incidents that are death‐dealing in nature. A further conclusion is drawn, showing that the proportion of these incidents leading to deaths above a given level is virtually fixed.     

THE FATE OF DISPUTED TERRITORIES: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

This paper presents a simple model to characterize the outcome of a land dispute between two rival parties using a Stackelberg game. Unlike Gershenson and Grossman (2000 Gershenson, D. and Grossman, H.I. 2000. Civil conflict: ended or never ending?. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 44(6): 807–821.  [Google Scholar]), we assume that the opposing parties have access to different technologies for challenging and defending in conflict. We derive the conditions under which territorial conflict between the two parties is less likely to persist indefinitely. Allowing for an exogenous destruction term as in Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2000 Garfinkel, M. and Skaperdas, S. 2000. Conflict without misperceptions or incomplete information: how the future matters. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 44(6): 793–807. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]), we show that, when the nature of conflict becomes more destructive, the likelihood of a peaceful outcome, in which the territory’s initial possessor deters the challenging party, increases if the initial possessor holds more intrinsic value for the disputed land. Following Siqueira (2003 Siqueira, K. 2003. Conflict and third‐party intervention. Defence and Peace Economics, 14(6): 389–400. [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]), our model has policy implications for peace through third‐party intervention.     

BANKING ON NONPROLIFERATION

In the past decade, governments have increasingly relied on financial sanctions to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. By targeting not only individuals and entities involved in illicit activities, but also banks that allow transactions to occur, financial sanctions were expected to stanch the flow of funds that support proliferation and compel compliance with international law—notably by Iran. Ten years later, Iran's nuclear program has advanced, calling into question the effectiveness of financial sanctions. Previous research evaluating the effectiveness of financial sanctions has focused on the impact of sanctions on the targeted country or on the enforcement of sanctions by the international community. Little attention has been devoted to their implementation by banks and government agencies. Based on interviews with US and European bank and government representatives, this article argues that the inefficiency of financial sanctions is due to shortcomings in training and information support from governments to financial institutions; governments on both sides of the Atlantic have provided little or no assistance to enable banks to identify patterns of proliferation financing and implement the sanctions regime. To transform financial sanctions into effective nonproliferation tools, governments need to play a greater role in their implementation.     

Book reviews

Frank Zimmer, Bismarcks Kampf gegen Kaiser Franz Joseph Konigsgratz und seine Folgen. Graz, Vienna, Cologne: Styria Verlag 1996. Pp.203,49 illus., 1 map. OS 350/DM 49. ISBN 3–222–12377–2.

Saul Zadka, Blood in Zion: How the Jewish Guerrillas drove the British out of Palestine. London and Washington: Brassey's, 1995. Pp.227, chron., illus., index. £19.95. ISBN 1–85753–136–1.

Theodore L. Gatchel, At the Water's Edge: Defending against the Modern Amphibious Assault. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1996. Pp.xvi+217, notes, biblio, index. $36.95. ISBN 1–55750–308–7.

Max G. Manwaring and William J. Olson (eds.) Managing Contemporary Conflict: Pillars of Success. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996. Pp.269, no index. $65 (cloth); $25 (paper). ISBN 0–8133–8969 and 9978–5

Chris Seiple, The US Military/NGO Relationship in Humanitarian Interventions, Carlisle Barracks, PA: The

Richard L. Millett and Michael Gold‐Biss (eds.) Beyond Praetorianism: The Latin American Military in Transition. University of Miami: North/South Center Press; Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996. Pp.xv +317, index. $24.95. ISBN 1–5745–000–9.

Rudolph C. Barnes Jr, Military Legitimacy: Might and Right in the New Millennium. London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1996. Pp.199, select biblio., index. £27.50/$39.50, ISBN 0–714–4624–5.     

Joint inventory and pricing decisions for perishable products with two‐period lifetime

We consider a periodic review model over a finite horizon for a perishable product with fixed lifetime equal to two review periods. The excess demand in a period is backlogged. The optimal replenishment and demand management (using price) decisions for such a product depend on the relative order of consumption of fresh and old units. We obtain insights on the structure of these decisions when the order of consumption is first‐in, first‐out and last‐in, first‐out. For the FIFO system, we also obtain bounds on both the optimal replenishment quantity as well as expected demand. We compare the FIFO system to two widely analyzed inventory systems that correspond to nonperishable and one‐period lifetime products to understand if demand management would modify our understanding of the relationship among the three systems. In a counterintuitive result, we find that it is more likely that bigger orders are placed in the FIFO system than for a nonperishable product when demand is managed. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2013