Security,autonomy and defense burdens: The effects of alliance membership in the 19th and 20th centuries

This paper investigates the effect of alliance membership on the defense burdens of major powers in the 19th and 20th centuries. We hypothesize that the reactions of states to alliance membership will be different in the pre‐nuclear and nuclear eras. Possession of nuclear weapons by allies makes the security provided by the alliance more akin to a collective good than is the case in the pre‐nuclear era. States join alliances for two reasons: security and autonomy. The effects of each of these concerns are identified. We include in our model such alliance‐level factors as the power equivalence of the allies and the number of states in the alliance. We also look at state‐level variables such as power position within the alliance. We conclude that the nuclear period generally operates as the free‐rider principle would posit, while models based on “complementarity of effort” are more applicable in the earlier period.     

One more push: Forcing the Dardanelles in March 1915

The historiography of the Gallipoli campaign suggests that the Turks were critically short of ammunition for the Dardanelles coastal defences in March 1915. This theme, established by Winston Churchill, became the basis for a widespread belief that the Royal Navy, after its failure to carry the Dardanelles on 18 March 1915, simply needed one more determined naval push to breakthrough the narrows. The presumed consequence was that the Ottoman Empire, with Constantinople under the guns of the Royal Navy, would have withdrawn from the war. Using modern Turkish sources, the author examines the available quantities, placement, and expenditure of ammunition, and challenges the premise that the Turks were desperately short of heavy shells. The author concludes that the Turks had sufficient remaining ammunition to fiercely contest control of the straits.     

Arms Control,Proliferation and Terrorism: The Bush Administration's Post-September 11 Security Strategy

The current Bush Administration considers ‘outlaw regimes’ and their terrorist clients acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMD) the gravest danger to international security. Thus, arms control, proliferation and terrorism are inextricably linked. The administration also believes that arms control and non-proliferation, as traditionally practiced, do not provide effective tools for preventing WMD spread. As evidenced in Iraq, Washington subscribes to an interventionist policy of rolling back WMD programs it considers threatening. This article examines the logic that underpins US arms control and proliferation thinking and considers the implications of US policy for relations with other states deemed to be proliferation risks.     

Bayonets on Musa Dagh: Ottoman Counterinsurgency Operations – 1915

This article examines the Ottoman military's escalatory response to violence and frames the Armenian insurrection of 1915 in the historical context of contemporary early twentieth-century counterinsurgency campaigns. A case study is presented, from a military historian's perspective, of counterinsurgency operations conducted by the Ottoman Army's 41st Infantry Division against Armenian insurgents on Musa Da? (Musa Dagh) in an operational area south of Iskenderun (Alexandretta). In this particular operational area, it appears that the modern label which most closely approximates what happened there is ethnic cleansing. Finally, the article concludes with an objective assessment of the effectiveness of the Ottoman Army's counterinsurgency operations.     

Chinese Theater and Strategic Missile Force Modernization and its Implications for the United States

The People's Republic of China (PRC), no longer content with its longstanding ‘minimalist’ nuclear posture and strategy, is enhancing the striking power and survivability of its theater and strategic missile forces and rethinking its nuclear doctrine in ways that may pose serious challenges for the United States. Although the modernization of Chinese nuclear and missile forces may ultimately result in greater strategic deterrence stability, this change will not come about immediately or automatically. Indeed, it is entirely possible that China's growing missile capabilities could decrease crisis stability under certain circumstances, especially in the event of a US–China conflict over Taiwan.     

Branch‐and‐price‐and‐cut for the manpower routing problem with synchronization constraints

In this article, we propose a branch‐and‐price‐and‐cut (BPC) algorithm to exactly solve the manpower routing problem with synchronization constraints (MRPSC). Compared with the classical vehicle routing problems (VRPs), the defining characteristic of the MRPSC is that multiple workers are required to work together and start at the same time to carry out a job, that is, the routes of the scheduling subjects are dependent. The incorporation of the synchronization constraints increases the difficulty of the MRPSC significantly and makes the existing VRP exact algorithm inapplicable. Although there are many types of valid inequalities for the VRP or its variants, so far we can only adapt the infeasible path elimination inequality and the weak clique inequality to handle the synchronization constraints in our BPC algorithm. The experimental results at the root node of the branch‐and‐bound tree show that the employed inequalities can effectively improve the lower bound of the problem. Compared with ILOG CPLEX, our BPC algorithm managed to find optimal solutions for more test instances within 1 hour. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 138–171, 2016