THE HUMAN CAPITAL PEACE: DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT

This paper explores the relationship between human capital and international conflict. In theory, human capital may increase the opportunity cost of military service and the economic cost of injury and loss of life in combat; it may decrease the benefits of conflict as human capital cannot be easily appropriated or transferred; it may affect societal norms toward peace and war; and it may alter military productivity through new technology and complementarities between military technology and personnel. Using a panel of politically relevant dyads, I find robust empirical evidence that human capital may significantly decrease the likelihood of militarized conflict between nations. In short, the findings suggest that promoting human capital‐oriented development may help to increase peace in the world.     

ADVANCED US CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS AND NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

The Obama administration has made a great effort to increase the role of advanced conventional weaponry in US national security thinking and practice, in part to help reinvigorate the global nuclear disarmament agenda by reducing the role played by nuclear weapons in the US defense posture. However, such a strategy is fundamentally flawed because increases in US conventional superiority will exacerbate US relative strength vis-à-vis other powers, and therefore make the prospect of a nuclear weapon-free world seem less attractive to Washington's current and potential nuclear rivals. Consequently, it is highly likely that the impact of efforts to increase US advanced conventional superiority through ballistic missile defense and a conventional “prompt global strike” program will ensure that the Obama administration is adopting a pathway to nuclear abolition on which it is the sole traveler for the foreseeable future.     

Operation Motorman (1972) and the search for a coherent British counterinsurgency strategy in Northern Ireland

The role of the British Army in Northern Ireland during Operation Banner (1969–2007) is an instructive case study of counterinsurgency operations as well as an important chapter in recent British military history. Given troops deployed to the province as aid to the civil power, it is particularly useful in discussions about the principle of minimum force. This article seeks to explore the issue of minimum force through the example of Operation Motorman, the Army's successful attempt to remove the barricades, which had established so-go areas for the security forces in Northern Ireland.     

Civil Wars,International Conflicts and Other Determinants of Paramilitary Strength in Sub-Saharan Africa

Previous research on African military spending suggests the existence of civil strife as the best predictor of high levels of military spending. However, little is known about why some African nations maintain strong ‘auxiliary’ or paramilitary organizations while others do not. This study finds that the presence of civil or interstate war does not strengthen reserve or irregular forces. Civilian governments promote strong paramilitary organizations to counter any threat the regular military might pose to regime survivability as a form of clientelist politics.     

Manpower allocation with time windows and job‐teaming constraints

In this work, we study manpower allocation with time windows and job‐teaming constraints. A set of jobs at dispersed locations requires teams of different types of workers where each job must be carried out in a preestablished time window and requires a specific length of time for completion. A job is satisfied if the required composite team can be brought together at the job's location for the required duration within the job's time window. The objective is to minimize a weighted sum of the total number of workers and the total traveling time. We show that construction heuristics used with simulated annealing is a good approach to solving this NP‐hard problem. In experiments, this approach is compared with solutions found using CPLEX and with lower bounds obtained from a network flow model. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2005.     

Incorporating learning curve costs in acquisition strategy optimization

Each year, the U.S. Army procures billions of dollars worth of weapons and equipment. The process of deciding what to buy, when to buy, and in what quantities is extremely complex, requiring extensive analysis. Two techniques used in this analysis are mathematical programming and cost estimation. Although they are related through constraints on available procurement funds, the use of nonlinear cost learning curves, which better represent system costs as a function of quantity produced, have not been incorporated into the mathematical programming formulations that compute the quantities of items to be procured. As a result, the solutions obtained could be either suboptimal, or even infeasible with respect to budgetary limitations. In this paper we present a piecewise linear approximation of the learning curve costs for a more accurate portrayal of budgetary constraints used in a mixed integer linear programming for acquisition strategy optimization. In addition, implementation issues are discussed, and performance results are given. © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 46: 255–271, 1999