Book reviews

Encyclopaedia of Modern Air Force Squadrons. By Chris Ashworth. Patrick Stephens, London (1989), ISBN 1-8526-013-6, £19.95

The Future of Sea Power. By Eric Grove. Routledge, London (1990), ISBN 0-415-00482-9, £35.00

Soviet Strategic Interests in the North. By Kirsten Amundsen. Pinter, London (1990), ISBN 0-86187-018-2, £30.00

Soviet Seapower in Northern Waters. Edited by John Skogan and Arne Brundtland. Pinter, London (1990), ISBN 0-86187-038-7, £35.00

Glasnost, Perestroika, and U.S. Defense Spending. By William W. Kaufmann, Brookings Institution, Washington, DC (1990), ISBN 0-8157-4881-7, $8.95

The Educating of Armies. Edited by Michael D. Stephens. Macmillan, London (1989), ISBN 0-333-43447-1, £35.00     

Determining confidence bounds for highly reliable coherent systems based on a paucity of component failures

A computationally simple method for obtaining confidence bounds for highly reliable coherent systems, based on component tests which experience few or no failures, is given. Binomial and Type I censored exponential failure data are considered. Here unknown component unreliabilities are ordered by weighting factors, which are firstly presumed known then sensitivity of the confidence bounds to these assumed weights is examined and shown to be low.     

All Counterinsurgency is Local: Counterinsurgency and Rebel Legitimacy

Abstract

Although the concept of legitimacy is central to Western counterinsurgency theory, most discourse in this area black-boxes the concept. It hence remains under-specified in many discussions of counterinsurgency. Fortunately, recent research on rebel governance and legitimacy contributes to our understanding of the problems faced by counterinsurgents who want to boost state legitimacy while undermining that of the rebels. Taken together, this research illustrates that a rational choice approach to legitimacy is simplistic; that micro-level factors ultimately drive legitimacy dynamics; and that both cooption of existing legitimate local elites and their replacement from the top–down is unlikely to succeed. Western counterinsurgency doctrine has failed to grasp the difficulties this poses for it.     

Crane scheduling with spatial constraints

In this work, we examine port crane scheduling with spatial and separation constraints. Although common to most port operations, these constraints have not been previously studied. We assume that cranes cannot cross, there is a minimum distance between cranes and jobs cannot be done simultaneously. The objective is to find a crane‐to‐job matching which maximizes throughput under these constraints. We provide dynamic programming algorithms, a probabilistic tabu search, and a squeaky wheel optimization heuristic for solution. Experiments show the heuristics perform well compared with optimal solutions obtained by CPLEX for small scale instances where a squeaky wheel optimization with local search approach gives good results within short times. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2004.     

Value added analysis for army equipment modernization

This paper describes the Value Added Analysis methodology which is used as part of the U.S. Army's Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System to assist the Army leadership in evaluating and prioritizing competing weapon system alternatives during the process of building the Army budget. The Value Added Analysis concept uses a family of models to estimate an alternative system's contribution to the Army's effectiveness using a multiattribute value hierarchy. A mathematical optimization model is then used to simultaneously determine an alternative's cost‐benefit and to identify an optimal mix of weapon systems for inclusion in the Army budget. © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 46: 233–253, 1999     

Learning to Fight and Fighting to Learn: Practitioners and the Role of Unit Publications in VIII Fighter Command 1943–1944

A military cannot hope to improve in wartime if it cannot learn. Ideally, in wartime, formal learning ceases and the application of knowledge begins. But this is optimistic. In 1942, USAAF Eighth Air Force assumed it had the means necessary for victory. In reality, its technique and technology were only potentially – rather than actually – effective. What remained was to create the practice of daylight bombing – to learn. This article (1) recovers a wartime learning process that created new knowledge, (2) tests existing tacit hypotheses in military adaptation research, and (3) offers additional theoretical foundation to explain how knowledge is created in wartime