Airpower in India's 1999 Kargil War

For 74 days in mid-1999, India waged an intense war against intruding Pakistani forces on the Indian side of the Line of Control dividing Kashmir in the Himalayas. The Indian Air Force (IAF) was a key contributor to India's eventual victory in that war. Among other things, the IAF's combat performance showed how the skillful application of air-delivered firepower, especially if unmatched by the other side, can shorten and facilitate the outcome of an engagement that might otherwise have persisted indefinitely. It also showed that a favorable position in the conventional balance remains strategically useful even in conditions of mutual nuclear deterrence.     

Forecasting Civil Conflict with Zero-Inflated Count Models

Advances in the study of civil war have led to the proliferation of event count data, and to a corresponding increase in the use of (zero-inflated) count models for the quantitative analysis of civil conflict events. Our ability to effectively use these techniques is met with two current limitations. First, researchers do not yet have a definitive answer as to whether zero-inflated count models are a verifiably better approach to civil conflict modeling than are ‘less assuming’ approaches such as negative binomial count models. Second, the accurate analysis of conflict-event counts with count models – zero-inflated or otherwise – is severely limited by the absence of an effective framework for the evaluation of predictive accuracy, which is an empirical approach that is of increasing importance to conflict modelers. This article rectifies both of these deficiencies. Specifically, this study presents count forecasting techniques for the evaluation and comparison of count models' predictive accuracies. Using these techniques alongside out-of-sample forecasts, it then definitively verifies – for the first time – that zero-inflated count models are superior to comparable non-inflated models for the study of intrastate conflict events.     

The sixteenth-century antecedents of special operations ‘small war’

The first conceptual, theoretical treatises about small war (la petite guerre) as special operations appeared only from the middle of the seventeenth century. The term is not used in the eighteenth-century sense of ‘special operations’ in older sources. The supposed absence of any treatment of the subject is surprising considering the obsession with the ‘art of war’ in the Renaissance, but other authors attribute it to a supposed antinomy between chivalric ideals and irregular warfare. But the absence of explicit manuals on the subject is not evidence of absence of advanced reflection on this kind of operations in the Middle Ages and in Early Modern times. We should thus look elsewhere, in other genres, for writings that contain and pass on military knowledge. Epics, romances, educational and military treatises, and memoirs in fact contain elements of a theory of special operations, even though these genres differ from our conception of rationality inherited from the Enlightenment.